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Abstract 
 
 
 
 
The thesis title Can Photography Describe Its Own Event? is purposefully 
designed to ask very complex questions of the medium of photography in its 
present moment. It is a question, which employed under differing conditions of 
thought throughout the thesis tests photography against the fields of difference 
and creativity. Gilles Deleuze threw down a challenge to the medium by 
neglecting to include consideration of the photographic in his process led 
philosophy of difference. He purposefully ignores photography and seemingly 
locates it firmly within a system of representation and identity that his work was 
designed to systematically dismantle.  
 
Whilst presenting photography as a form of spatialised stasis, often consisting of 
pictorial clichés reproducing fixed bytes of information, his vitalist thought 
alternately seeks to interpret temporal continuity and constant variation in service 
of the power of creativity. The thesis asks, how can a concept invented in the 
service of facts and positivism contribute to a new world of speculative 
uncertainty. To describe its own event, photography must partake of difference 
and temporal paradigms such as a performative process-seriality. It must perceive 
itself as being an immanent practice consisting of all the uncertainties and 
intensities of variation of any other event in the world. A temporal cryptography. 
 
The dénouement of the thesis seeks to tentatively locate photography as working 
in an emergent fashion in the service of a process-reality rather than 
representational model and copy. This new zerography strips away the well-worn 
conventions of photographic syntax and imagines resetting itself to zero. Moving 
past the informational and the symbolic and beyond the binary subject/object 
position it emerges into a world of quantum indeterminacy where it is no longer 
interested in defining other events but of contributing to a new speculative 
creativity and invention. The world as if rather than as is. 
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Introduction: 
Can Photography Describe Its Own Event? 
 
 
 
It is fair to say that we are now at a moment that sees 
itself as being after postmodernism but that has yet 
to attract the burden of a proper name or the 
motivation of an enabling politics. The invention of 
such a politics and with it a mode of critical writing 
that is appropriate for the times we live therefore 
remains the most pressing task to face the present 
generation of photography’s interlocutors.  
  (Batchen 2009: 21) 
 
 
 If photography can remain open, and encourage us 
to remain open, to the spontaneous dynamism of 
life, its unplanned energies, and the anticipation of 
the virtual, it has the potential to use and relinquish 
such documentary power–to image both the 
photographic actual and imagine photographic 
becoming. 
(Kramp 2012: u.p. n.19) [emphasis in original] 
 
 
Becoming is a Deleuzean [sic] concept: not just 
another word but a problem, and for this reason 
Deleuze will try to give as many nuances and sense 
to becoming as possible.  
(Colebrook 2002: 4) [emphasis in original]  
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And so what of a becoming photography? Amongst the questions that we shall be 
asking in the thesis is can photography become Photography in an expanded 
sense? Can the practice with its existing theoretical positions become something 
more, can we begin to ask if it can attain more of the status of concept, in that it 
can finally be seen as a way of thinking the world and not just seeing? And if so 
can it begin to describe its own event? In the transcendent world of model and 
copy that transcribes both identity and representation, photography exists as 
external to the events of the world, working as an archive or a library for human 
experience. ‘Becoming’ suggests an alternate paradigm; one of immanence and 
process, where all is motivated and in flux and everything emerges within a 
dynamic field of variation, in that the conditions of events and entities constantly 
differ in themselves. If like Henri Bergson we can perceive of photography as 
equal to perception, then in a ‘process reality’ it can surely think its own event, 
and it is the work of the thesis to extend this to the questions of both performing 
and describing its own event. Thinking, performing and describing the event of 
photography become to be seen as intensive modalities from within the expanded 
concept of photography. But now what of the event; “[a]s an event, a beginning 
must be understood as a novel selection in ongoing and continually altering 
series” (Williams 2008: 2) [emphasis in original]. Concerning the prospect of an 
event and a beginning then, it will be pertinent at this early stage to state that each 
Section including this Introduction will be instigated by three quotations. These 
quotations offer the reader both a glimpse into future musings whilst resisting a 
definitive set starting point as far as possible, thus moving the ‘beginning’ of each 
Section away from a singular, fixed point. This offers a metaphorical entrance 
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into the work of the thesis as the quotations simultaneously suggest several 
representative snapshots of the workings of each Section, as well as introducing 
the alternative paradigm of difference, in the sense that they present images of the 
intensive processes of the subsequent ideas and arguments. 
 
 
The themes of becoming and difference will occur 
over and over again, and should become more 
precise as this book [thesis] progresses. This ties in 
with Deleuze’s concept of repetition. We need to 
repeat difference and thinking; the minute we feel 
we have grasped what thinking and difference are 
then we have lost the very power of difference.  
(Colebrook 2002: 7-8) [emphasis in original, 
my brackets] 
 
 
Therefore we shall look at the concept of photography from many different 
perspectives in order to fracture the notion of its coherent and historically bound 
classical perspective. We need to address the enigma of our title over and over in 
order to unleash the power of difference from within its possibilities. By 
subjecting it to multiple interpretations we will begin to repeat difference until it 
no longer has the power to promote a fixed and coherent meaning. Through this 
method we hope to form a productive process whereby we can perceive of the 
concept of photography in more fluid terms and as a set of concepts encompassing 
heterogeneous becomings rather than an entity with a more or less bounded 
outline.  
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The six words that transmit the productive question out into the writings are 
carefully arranged so as to produce creative interpretations that will lead us away 
from the concept of representation in all of its fixity and towards new creative 
models. “Indeed, the aim of writing should not be representation but invention.” 
(Colebrook 2002: 4). A particularly assiduous reader might well be wondering 
why the thesis does not ask the more logical question can photography perform its 
own event? But crucially, in this form we lose both the paradox and the enigma as 
afforded by the word describe, which sets photography’s own constative function 
against itself – can photography describe its own event? The first question has 
been addressed recently and as one of the precursors of the thesis, is included as a 
case study in the first Section. This is the concept of ‘Performed Photography’ 
conceived of by Paul Jeff1 and published as a PhD by the University of Wales in 
2008. In the thesis, our title and question reoccurs throughout as the central tenet 
of the work and which all other questions revolve around. Through the act of 
repetition through variation the question increasingly portrays its own instability, 
hence its ability to creatively generate multiple interpretations. As such, it will 
appear in the text variously written in full in italics, or in acronym form 
integrating the question mark as a symbol within a perceived code, rather than the 
mere denotation of a question (as the question mark is absorbed into the code, the 
phrase when appearing at the end of a sentence will incorporate a full stop). We 
shall address CPDIOE? in this way as a multiplicity; at once a question, a code, a 
crypt and a plane of potentiality, these dealt with in three consecutive Sections to 
be folded into an expanded coexistent form of photography, able to interrogate the 
world from many perspectives and not just from the hegemony of vision. One 
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way to summarise the general trajectory of the research would be through the 
particularly elegant quotation below by Eduardo Cadava in Words of Light: 
Theses on the Photography of History (1997): 
 
 
Like the gaze of the camera that momentarily fixes 
history in an image, the thesis condenses a network 
of relations into a frame whose borders remain 
permeable. A photograph in prose, the thesis names 
a force of arrest. It signals in writing the interruption 
of writing. 
(Cadava 1997: xx) 
 
 
-o- 
 
 
The central hypothesis will then be continually interrupted as each new Section 
introduces another perspective on the question and this brings us in turn to the 
question of the Sections. There are three Sections to the thesis, each headed by 
semantic constructions, in turn; Section I: Photo[graphy], Section II: 
Crypto[graphy] and Section III: Zero[graphy]. The suffix ‘[graphy]’ presented 
here in bracketed parenthesis is used to denote the relation of each conceptual 
perspective to writing, writing here being emphasised to dissolve the reliance on 
vision in photography and to broaden the conception into a mode of thought as 
well as a practice. The prefix to each bracket marks the distinction between 
Sections and their corresponding emphases. Section I utilises ‘photo’ to refer to 
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light or the period of Enlightenment from which photography was born. Section II 
introduces the ‘crypt’ or dark, unseen elements of the concept of photography and 
this also encapsulates the position of the author here in the thesis as a whole, as a 
cryptographer as Gilles Deleuze calls for in his book The Fold: Leibniz and the 
Baroque ([1993] 2003): 
 
 
A ‘cryptographer’ is needed, someone who can at once 
account for nature and decipher the soul, who can peer 
into the crannies of matter and read into the folds of the 
soul.  
(Deleuze [1993] 2003: 3) 
 
 
Section III introduces a perspective more of my own invention perhaps, to 
describe the perceived current moment of photography post-digitisation; 
zero[graphy] in which we will explore a more emergent concept of photography, 
one we may term a photography of immanence. These three perspectives 
(Sections) are meant to be perceived in their coexistence as intensities of the same 
concept, and not as distinct theories. In this way it is hoped that we can reconcile 
photography as a concept in both its mainstream conception as representation as 
well as its potentialities within the field of difference.  
 
 
Instead of providing yet one more system of terms 
and ideas Deleuze wanted to express the dynamism 
and instability of thought. He reinvented his style 
and vocabulary with each project. No term in his 
work is capable of being defined in itself; any single 
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term makes sense only in relation to the whole 
which it helps to create.  
(Colebrook 2002: 4) 
 
 
The quotation above elucidates the complex intermingling of concepts at play 
here, which helps to add different dimensions to these ideas, whilst also revealing 
how, over time, the concepts themselves differ in kind and appear as new 
foldings, new interpretations. If we refer to photography’s etymological roots it 
reveals its connection with light, writing and representation, quite literally 
translated from Greek as photos (light) graphos (writing/drawing). Conversely, 
the etymology of cryptography resides in the dark and the buried  – from the 
Greek root kryptos meaning hidden, remaining in the dark and not brought to the 
light of representation. To move to our third and final Section zero[graphy], zero 
has its etymological roots in the Sanskrit śūnya/śhūnya for zero or nothing, and 
also the Arabic word çifr, which is the common root for cipher, thus making a 
connection to Section II. The conceptual arrangement of the three Sections 
provides us with three differing fields on which to test our question and 
hypothesis. Firstly the question as it exists to the rational light of day, secondly 
the question as it resides within the hidden and the unseen irrationality of night, 
and lastly, the question as it emerges from the breaking light of dawn and 
disappears into the twilight before night, that indeterminable state on the cusp of 
consciousness. 
 
 
-o- 
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We will now return to our three opening quotations to the Introduction and say a 
few words that might reveal our endeavour. As Geoffrey Batchen has recognised, 
“…it is fair to say that we are now at a moment that sees itself as being after 
postmodernism but that has yet to attract the burden of a proper name or the 
motivation of an enabling politics”. (Batchen 2009: 21). For many including 
Simon O’Sullivan this new era may be considered as anti-representational, or 
beyond the limits of representation. “How in fact to think beyond representation?” 
(O’Sullivan 2006: 29). If this is the case then the thesis will ask what is the role of 
the photographic in this new moment? Batchen goes on to say that the invention 
of new modes of political and critical practice “…remains the most pressing task 
to face the present generation of photography’s interlocutors” (Batchen 2009: 21). 
It is this pressing task that the thesis sets out to address and, by asking a series of 
questions in the Bergsonian sense, attempts to contribute toward a solution. Henri 
Bergson, in The Creative Mind: An Introduction to Metaphysics (1946) states: 
 
 
The truth is that in philosophy and even elsewhere it 
is a question of finding the problem and 
consequently of positing it, even more than of 
solving it. For a speculative problem is solved as 
soon as it is properly stated. By that I mean that its 
solution exists then, although it may remain hidden 
and, so to speak, covered up: The only thing left to 
do is uncover it. But stating the problem is not 
simply uncovering, it is inventing. 
(Bergson 1946: 58-59) [my emphasis] 
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In order to address the problem Batchen identifies, we must take up the method 
that Bergson advocates. The thesis is engaged in a speculative problem to the 
extent that it is involved in an attempt to dissolve the classical perspective, that is, 
representation in photographic discourse and to invent new creative possibilities 
and potentialities for the future of the medium. The speculation is that it may be 
possible to re-orient the concept of photography away from what Deleuze regards 
“…as an instrument for reproducing representations of reality–a device that 
iterates images until they are ossified as established stories, icons, or event 
stagnant perceptions.” (Kramp 2012: u.p. n.3). And invest in it the: 
 
 
…creative power to legislate and dance, to produce 
knowledges and experience that remain diverse and 
allusive, and to imagine new kinds of relationships 
and sensations that at once have efficacy and 
explosive untapped energies.  
(Kramp 2012: u.p. n.7) [emphasis in 
original] 
 
 
In the quotation at the top of the Section Michael Kramp is looking for a new 
photography, one that is not so closed and enclosing and one that offers more than 
“…dated empirical encounters that have been transformed and organised into 
archived authorities.” (Kramp 2012: u.p. n.2).  
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 Figure 1: ‘Interior of a Library’ [drawing] (c. 1798) Etienne-Louis  
 Boulée. Thaw Collection, The Pierpont Morgan Library, New York. 
 
 
Kramp begins his introductory essay to a special edition of the journal Rhizomes: 
Cultural Studies in Emerging Knowledge, entitled ‘Unburdening Life, or the 
Deleuzian Potential of Photography’ (2012) by analysing a futuristic library that 
might one day make a material reality out of Enlightenment dreams. This is a 
dream of catagorisation, information and facts, all catalogued, collected together 
and legitimated. He ends the opening paragraph by making an allusion to the 
invention of photography and its part in compiling such a positivist Enlightenment 
vision. We can see even in Boulée’s drawing an aspiration towards a photographic 
realism, a mere forty years before its invention, with its optical depth of field, 
perspective and great rendering of detail. 
 
A central concern of Kramp here is to invent a practice that utilises both 
representation and difference in which it can employ its documentary attributes 
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and renounce them in the same movement. The quotation by Claire Colebrook 
from her book Gilles Deleuze (2002) addresses the concept of ‘becoming’ as 
problem, and observes that it is precisely because of this that Deleuze sets about 
revealing the variation and subtle tonalities of meaning and sense of his concept. 
We will also share this strategy in our elucidation of CPDIOE? in its various 
semblances via the multiplicity of interpretations and nuances of our central 
question that will be uncovered throughout the thesis. To clarify the use of the 
three quotations at the top of each Section and indeed of this Introduction and the 
Conclusion, we can already state at least three objectives. The first is to interpret 
our contemporary moment in the context of the photographic and to begin the task 
of constructing future modalities, as well as breaking from the habitual and 
perhaps ossified conventions of the past. To find new creative ways forward for a 
new context. It is important to note the link Batchen makes to politics and a new 
critical writing as these non-photographic perspectives can be appended to the 
medium in order for it to be able to expand beyond its own boundaries. The 
second objective is introduced by Kramp via the very specific philosophy of 
Deleuze and concerns the quest for new photographic creativities and 
potentialities. Since embarking on this research scholars such as Kramp have also 
begun to apply the philosophers ideas to lens-based theories and practices. This 
emerging perspective largely concerns the un-harnessing of photography from its 
Enlightenment project of cataloguing/archiving the world and representing a 
particular type of empirical truth. The project is to turn the medium around one 
hundred and eighty degrees and enable photography to partake in potential futures 
and creatively decipher the virtual (possible) as well as represent the actual (real), 
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these Deleuzian concepts will be expanded upon in Section III. The final objective 
to be drawn from this Introduction and initiated by Colebrook is that of applying 
the Deleuzian concept of becoming (or continuous variation) to the inherent stasis 
of photography, which renders the world into an idealistic stillness. The problem 
being how to represent a world of dynamic flux and change utilising a medium 
specifically invented to arrest and fix such instability. If we perceive the world 
from a vitalist viewpoint then the task for photography must be how to approach a 
world of forces and becomings in a creative, inventive and productive manner that 
also allows for understandings of such a world. In order to begin such a task it 
will prove fruitful to more fully appreciate the parameters and potentialities of 
photography. This involves understandings of both the history and present 
moment of photography, and then exploring fresh perspectives that can reinvent 
how photography partakes in the world, and how we can find new and innovative 
ways to use it. For this purpose the thesis will be leaning more on the concepts of 
Deleuze than any other thinker, although we shall encompass many other ideas 
and perspectives. At this stage we must also acknowledge that the thesis is more 
concerned with writing a practice of photography than developing a new practical 
model. This writing photography might be better explained in Batchen’s terms as 
a ‘photogrammatology’ (Batchen 1994), where he leans on the deconstructive 
perspective of Derrida’s Of Grammatology ([1967] 1976). Reflecting on 
photography as a form of language, Batchen references John Tagg who states; 
“…history has no unity. It is a flickering across a field of institutional spaces. It is 
this field we must study, not photography as such.” (Tagg 1988: 63). This is 
another central strategy of the thesis and language and writing will loom large 
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within that approach. We shall take a moment to read Batchen’s own words in this 
respect from his essay ‘Photogrammatology: Writing/Photography’ (1994): 
 
 
According to this view, photography itself has no 
unified history or singular identity, because the 
meanings and effects of any individual photograph 
are always contingent, i.e., are entirely determined 
by the various institutions or discourses in which 
that photograph is caught at any given moment. 
Likewise, photography has no power of its own. 
Rather, it is temporarily vested with the power of the 
apparatuses that deploy it in particular 
circumstances. As a system of representation, 
photography has no meaning outside of these real-
politic deployments. Thus, there can be no such 
thing as a singular photography at all, only a myriad 
of discontinuous photographies.  
(Batchen 1994: 3) [emphasis in original] 
 
 
It is these photographies as a multiplicity that we are concerned with here in the 
thesis and Batchen offers another contribution in the same essay, and one that we 
can utilise here in the Introduction in order to take the first step in deciphering our 
code/question CPDIOE?. Returning to the question of the suffix ‘graphy’, 
Batchen explains that it is an “…abstract noun of action or function.” (Batchen 
1994: 5) which as such, has both active and passive connotations. He goes on to 
say; “[o]perating simultaneously as verb and noun, this is a writing that produces 
while being produced, inscribing even as it is inscribed.” (Batchen 1994: 5). This 
is the first clue that our title/question can hold many interpretations as within the 
construct ‘photography’, the suffix, that is, graphy denotes the ability to inscribe 
whilst at the same moment being inscribed. Perhaps here we can draw an analogy 
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to photography describing whilst at the same moment being described – can 
photography describe its own event?. 
 
 
-o- 
 
 
Now we shall address the sub-title of the thesis; ‘The dissolving of the classical 
perspective in the concept of photography’. This phrase deals with the mainstream 
practice of photography, and the history of the medium and its practitioners. In 
Deleuze and Guattari’s conception, it is the major or dominant position of the 
medium of photography and that which we shall endeavour to cause a rupture 
within, and so enabling new creative possibilities (see Section I for an exposition 
on the major/minor concept). The phrase ‘classical perspective’ will for the 
purposes of the thesis be synonymous with this hegemonic major outlook. The 
notion of dissolving refers to Bergson’s famous maxim concerning duration and 
difference in kind (how an entity or concept can differ in itself, or change over 
time), regarding a lump of sugar dissolving in a glass of warm water. The sugar is 
granted duration in so far as it takes part in natural processes and therefore is seen 
to differ in kind from its initial spatial configuration (this is dealt with more 
comprehensively in Section I). Therefore, we are attempting to dissolve the 
aforementioned classical perspective of photography by immersing it within a 
new element, in this case, the field of difference or to refer back to an originary 
idea, Alfred North-Whitehead’s process philosophy that Deleuze is particularly 
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indebted to. In Process and Reality ([1929] 1978) Whitehead was trying to 
express a new vision that challenged many ‘common-sense’ ideas in that he 
prioritised events and processes over objects and spatial realities. Such ideas 
could not simply be expressed in the common language (Mesle 2008: 17). Here 
again is another justification for the use of language in our pursuit of new 
photographies: 
 
 
Words and phrases must be stretched towards a 
generality foreign to their ordinary usage; and 
however such elements of language be stabilized as 
technicalities, they remain metaphors mutely 
appealing for an imaginative leap…  
(Whitehead [1929] 1978: 4) 
 
 
This then presents us with the challenge of the fluidity and mutability of language, 
in that all meanings hold the potential to be expressed in new ways; where the 
notion of a fixed certainty is disrupted by a wavering indeterminacy. In some 
ways this evokes the dance between the Bergsonian conception of difference by 
degree and difference in kind (in itself)2, if we acknowledge a move from stasis 
and a world of distinct entities to a world of mobility expressed in its fluid state. 
As we will see in the thesis, the recurrence of certain ideas and concepts will 
reveal this process; that is, how we understand and appreciate such ideas shall 
change and transform over the duration of the work. Moreover, by interrogating 
and continually questioning these concepts and terms, we instigate a certain 
fluidity in our interpretive faculties and learn that concepts and objects always 
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have more than one aspect, and so a multi-perspectival approach should always be 
more fruitful. Through the process of stretching words and phrases as Whitehead 
advocates above, it is our task to consider, what we understand the concept of 
photography to be; what photography is, but also to imagine what photography 
could be. A shift in emphasis from the as is of the world to the as if (see Section 
III). We will return often to the question of the instability of meaning and its 
productive use and generative function in enabling differing positions that we will 
apply throughout the thesis.  
 
 
-o- 
 
 
This will be a suitable point to state the hypothesis of the thesis and also indicate 
some hopefully original contributions that arise from it. If a hypothesis “…states a 
relationship between two, or more, concepts and suggests that one has an impact 
on the other.” (Grix 2004: 42), then our hypothesis is concerned with the 
relationship of two philosophical systems, representation and difference, as they 
pertain to the medium of photography. In this case, the direction of travel will be 
toward a realignment of the medium away from its representational history and 
toward the potentialities of difference, or variation through duration. Our first 
proposition is that future creative photographies (potential practices or modes of 
thought) will be premised on dynamic theories of event rather than pictorial or 
representational theories. The next proposition is that the axes around which 
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photographies are constructed will shift from a spatialised bias to a more 
temporally inflected paradigm. A related proposition tests photography against 
theories of difference (continuous temporal moulding as Deleuze refers to it 
([1993] 2003)) so as to produce the possibility of a temporally motivated 
becoming-photography; here we shall be reliant principally on the philosophical 
thought of Gilles Deleuze. Another proposition concerns the encompassing of the 
event of photography into a dynamic event-field so that its relation to that field is 
no longer external but interpreted as immanent and inherent; enveloped in an 
expansive field of vision. Finally, we propose a new interpretive possibility for 
photography which we shall name ‘zero[graphy]’. This term shall encompass new 
photographic forms of expression, a neutral process-led iteration that allows the 
medium freedom from old certainties (as well as hackneyed and clichéd 
metaphorical adjuncts) and the creativity to explore the indeterminate, the 
fictional and the virtual.  
 
 By utilising a carefully constructed question, can photography describe its own 
event? (CPDIOE?), we hope that we can test the allegiances of photography to its 
mainstream history and look for fractures and spaces where old boundaries 
dissolve, allowing for entries into the realm of difference. By testing our question 
against multiple perspectives; photographic, philosophical and literary, we will 
demonstrate photography’s capacity to act creatively as a multiplicity. As we 
create new interpretations of our question/problem via the process of complex 
repetition that returns difference with each elucidation, we will also be inventing 
new perspectives and potential manifestations for the concept of photography. In 
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this respect, one more proposition will be that photography will increasingly 
become to be perceived as a mode of thought rather than merely a technological 
practice.  
 
 
-o- 
 
 
The protocols of close reading and deciphering, 
analyzing and translating, questioning and obsessive 
revisiting that deconstruction follows hardly can be 
thought in separation from the kind of prayerlike 
attentiveness and careful, restless study that a 
serious engagement with photography requires.  
(Richter 2010: xxii)  
 
 
Philosophically the paradigm of thought the thesis adopts will be that of a radical 
empiricism/phenomenology. It traces a line of thought from Heraclitus and 
Leibniz, through Bergson and Whitehead in the early twentieth century and 
culminating in Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari at the end of the century; all are 
concerned with mobility, flux, flow and becoming. These thinkers provide in 
Damian Sutton’s terms a ‘field of narrativity’, a kind of background matrix on 
which I shall inscribe my ideas. “Narrativity is the immanence of story, and to 
exist in any part of the text it must be indivisible over the whole.” (Sutton 2009: 
144) [emphasis in original]. The thesis adopts a qualitative approach to research, 
which places an emphasis on the qualities of entities and on processes and 
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meanings that are not quantifiably measured (Denzin and Lincoln 2005: 10). 
Yvonna S. Lincoln and Egon Guba offer an understanding of qualitative research 
by utilising Cary Nelson et al.’s definition of cultural studies: 
 
 
Qualitative research is an interdisciplinary, 
transdisciplinary, and sometimes counterdisciplinary 
field. It crosscuts the humanities and the social and 
physical sciences. Qualitative research is many 
things at the same time. It is multiparadigmatic in 
focus.  
  (Nelson et al. in Lincoln and Guba 2005: 4) 
 
 
Whilst we might situate the research within a combination of the Constructivist, 
Post-Structuralist and Participatory research paradigms (Lincoln and Guba 1985), 
the above quotation offers a sage reminder that ideas and methods in a number of 
areas are moving away from fixed definitions and instead becoming increasingly 
interconnected. To briefly address the paradigms for a moment though, 
Constructivism “…connects action to praxis and builds on antifoundational 
arguments while encouraging experimental and multi-voiced texts” (Denzin and 
Lincoln 2005: 189). Whilst Post-Structuralism “…permits – even invites or incites 
– us to reflect on our method and explore new ways of knowing” (Richardson and 
St. Pierre 2005: 962). The Participatory paradigm is largely implied in the main 
text of the thesis, however there is evidence provided in the ‘Photographic 
Experiements carried out as IPCRES’ (between Section III and the Conclusion) to 
show some practical experimentation toward the findings. As Denzin and Lincoln 
note, within the last decade “…the borders and boundary lines between these 
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paradigms and perspectives have begun to blur” (Denzin and Lincoln 2005: 183-
4). Susan Finley maintains this point and recognises that the old paradigms have 
been ruptured by shifts and a “…border crossing dynamic” (Finley 2005: 684), 
which has allowed for previously distinct or incompatible paradigms of inquiry to 
be understood together. Concerning our area of research, Finley in her essay 
‘Arts-Based Inquiry: Performing Revolutionary Pedagogy’ (2005) avers:  
 
 
Arts-based researchers are increasingly using art 
forms that include visual and performing arts as well 
as forms borrowed from literature. This presents a 
boundary crossing amongst arts-based researchers, it 
critiques the privilege of language-based ways of 
knowing and it further challenges status quo 
responses to the question ‘what is research?’  
  (Finley 2005: 685) 
 
 
Of particular interest to the thesis is a further point Finley makes in that; “…the 
hyphen that connects ‘arts’ and ‘based’ is a textual reference to the arts as a basis 
for something else, something that is ‘not art’.” (Finley 2005: 686). This is 
precisely where we shall locate our research, in that whilst being arts-based, it by 
no means sits comfortably in a narrow categorisation of one specific field. Finley 
goes on, “[a]mong the particular skills of the arts-based researcher is the ability to 
play or, perhaps more accurately, to construct a field for play” (Finley 2005: 686). 
Perhaps it is our philosophical paradigm of thought as detailed above that 
demarcates our constructed ‘field for play’, and what we are playing with on this 
ground is the concept of photography. As the Introduction has shown thus far, it 
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would make little sense to pin down a set of conventions by which to carry out 
this research as this would absolutely contradict modes of thought as an unstable 
process. “I make, remake and unmake my concepts along a moving horizon, from 
an always decentered centre, from an always displaced periphery which repeats 
and differeciates them.” (Deleuze [1968] 2004a: xix). Indeed, with the dissolving 
of the once fixed boundaries between paradigms and practices, there lies an 
opportunity for new connections and relations to be instigated that draw on 
interdisciplinarity in the ever-expanding field of the visual arts. Concerning this 
endeavour, Denzin and Lincoln identify the role of the researcher ‘-as-
interpretive-bricoleur’ (Denzin and Lincoln 2005) as a key component of 
qualitative research. This notion of bricolage is one we will become familiar with 
in the thesis as we can recognise this improvisation as a favoured strategy by 
Deleuze in his oeuvre. With Guattari in Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and 
Schizophrenia ([1972] 2004), Deleuze cites bricolage (a term used by Claude 
Lévi-Strauss) as the characteristic mode of production of the schizophrenic 
producer. (Deleuze and Guattari [1972] 2004: 7-8). As a research methodology, 
we could refer to this as a rhizomatic approach (Deleuze and Guattari [1987] 
2004a), which promotes connections and communications between heterogeneous 
locations and events. As O’Sullivan observes, “[b]y blurring discrete categories, 
producing new encounters and fostering monstrous couplings, new kinds of 
writing and new kinds of thought become possible.” (O’Sullivan 2006: 18). 
 
Although the thesis is not a practice-based work, yet again the boundaries 
between paradigms and practices are such that relevance can be found in many 
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perspectives. We might note here a practice-based research methodology that has 
emerged from the growing interest and the increasing fluidity between practices 
as highlighted above; ‘a/r/tography’, which has been developed by Rita L. Irwin 
et al. (2004, 2005, 2006). This methodology adopts a non-hierarchical, rhizomatic 
approach to what Irwin et al. refer to as a ‘living inquiry’ (2005) or a 
‘methodology of situations’ (2006) and addresses the multifarious splintered 
practices of academics, researchers and writers (artists, writers, teachers 
representing the a/r/t of a/r/tography) 3 in the contemporary age. Irwin also 
introduces the concept of méttisage, a kind of mixed knowledge economy, which 
is adopted in a contemporary career in the cultural/academic sphere; “…an 
existence that desires an aesthetic experience found in an elegance of flow 
between intellect, feeling, and practice.” (Irwin 2004: 29). This mirrors to a small 
extent the relationships of interest that merge together in the thesis, those of a 
photographer/practitioner that finds constructive elements within for instance, 
fields of study such as philosophy and literature to enable a greater understanding 
of the primary area of inquiry.  
 
 
Méttisage is an act of interdisciplinarity. It 
hyphenates, bridges, slashes, and creates other forms 
of thirdness that provide the space for exploration, 
translation, and understanding in deeper and more 
enhanced ways of meaning-making.  
  (Irwin 2004: 30) 
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Finally, whilst not wholly relevant here, it is worth noting that there is an element 
of performativity within the wider field of the research, not just in the practical 
experiments that are related to the research, but in the context below it is worth 
including: 
 
 
Performativity is the writing and rewriting of 
meanings that continually disrupts the authority of 
texts. Resistance is a kind of performance that holds 
up for critique hegemonic texts have become 
privileged stories told and retold.  
  (Finley 2005: 687)  
 
 
-o- 
 
 
Before detailing the trajectory of the research through the structure of the thesis, it 
will be pertinent to address the difficulties of working around binary oppositions. 
This thorny question occurs several times throughout the thesis and can often 
offer paradoxical perspectives. Although our text utilises the concept on occasion 
as a productive method for introducing new concepts, it is important to recognise 
here that binary thought is related to representation, in that it produces two 
opposing fixed positions from which to operate. There are a number of strategies 
employed in the thesis by which to disrupt this fixity to differing degrees. The 
first is the most obvious and that is to form a productive synthesis from the two 
terms. The most disruptive starting point being from within the binary 
 33 
construction. The use of the term antinomies also provides a complexity of 
reading as it provides a tension between two reasonable statements (or positions) 
that promotes a sense of the illogical, paradoxical and indeterminate. A more 
appropriate method for the aims of the thesis is that of proving coexistence in all 
positions, including binaries, thereby producing an equivalence of terms and an 
acceptance that the world is a fluid multiplicity, rather than a matrix of fixed 
points. We should recognise that the very notion of binary oppositions are 
potentially problematic from a Deleuzian perspective, a perspective that promotes 
rhizomatic thinking, fluidity and connectivity. As O’Sullivan highlights:  
 
 
Poststructuralism, at least from a certain perspective, is 
a critique of these binaries. However, this critique often 
merely entails the reversing of the binary, or the putting 
under erasure (the deferral) of the privileged term. 
(O’Sullivan 2006: 15) 
 
 
Therefore, as O’Sullivan attests, to carry out a critique of binary oppositions is to 
carry out a critique of representation.  
 
 
-o- 
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As this introduction draws to a close we shall briefly detail the trajectory of the 
research question and disclose the structure of the three Sections.  
 
Section I: Photo[graphy] is concerned with the classical perspective of 
photography, not so much the delineations of the medium but more through 
posing it as a problem in need of a creative resolution. After some rumination on 
the notion of a Bergsonian problem, that is, how to state a problem so that its 
solution is implicit in the stating, we shall move on to examining the concrete 
conditions of photography in its mainstream manifestations. Following a short 
discussion on the possibilities of a paradigm shift for the medium we will look for 
indications of the commencement of such a shift concentrating here on a recent 
development in photography, the performative practice of ‘Performed 
Photography’. We move on to consider further questions of the 
performative/temporal as potential strategies within the visual arts that begin to 
evoke the temporality of event over the spatiality of picture/representation. Next 
we will look at the further potential for ruptures in mainstream practice from 
which more experimental modalities might emerge. Deleuze and Guattari write of 
these ruptures as ‘minor’ practices that are developed from within their major 
expression or dominant discourse. Our question CPDIOE? is designed to facilitate 
the thinking of minor practices and we will identify Performed Photography as a 
contemporary example. To depart from and dissolve the classical perspective of 
photography involves the invocation of the philosophical paradigm of difference, 
as initiated by Henri Bergson at the turn of the twentieth century. Deleuze adopts 
the concept of difference as a major tenet of his philosophy of becoming and we 
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will follow its trajectory into his key philosophical work Difference and 
Repetition ([1968] 2004a) in order to see if it offers us the possibility of an 
alternative paradigm of expression.  
 
Section II: Crypto[graphy] asks the question what lies beyond representation? 
Introducing a more detailed interrogation of the forces of difference. Here I will 
take on the role of cryptographer (as suggested by Deleuze) and we shall take the 
reader out of the light of photography into the metaphorical darkness of the crypt 
of CPDIOE?. As an encryption it introduces us to the obscure realm of difference. 
We shall employ as guides, to navigate us through the labyrinthine depths of 
difference, such luminaries as G.W. Leibniz, Walter Benjamin, Bergson and 
Deleuze himself. A recurring theme will be the concept of the distinct/obscure as 
it relates to multiple perspectives and differing aspects of our object of study. In 
our journey we will encounter the strange world of the Leibnizian monad, before 
we return to further interpretations of difference and repetition via the dark folds 
of the crypt of our question. We revisit the question of ‘questions within 
questions’ before encountering Benjamin again and the question of legibility. 
After navigating our way through a labyrinth of uncertainty we shall tackle the 
question of language and translation. Language and words are usually formed in 
order to lead us towards certainty, yet we often find that they propel us further 
into the depths of the indiscernible. Finally we shall draw a veil over the Section 
by looking at Jaques Derrida’s discussion on vision and blindness. This opaque 
Section consists of a series of enigmatic questions, which purposefully repel all 
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notions of clarity as they reveal the intensive states that constitute the differing 
dimensions of our question CPDIOE?. 
 
Section III: Zero[graphy] is more speculative in intent as it attempts to formulate a 
new perspective within the expanded field (concept) of photography as a mode of 
perception/expression. Beginning with an analysis of ‘degree zero’ as utilised in 
the semiotic experiments of Roland Barthes, and then as reinterpreted in terms of 
the photographic by Geoffrey Batchen, the Section employs the metaphor of a flat 
plane after the depths of the crypt. Here a flat grey light illuminates our 
ruminations as we develop a theory of zero[graphy] from the cusp of 
consciousness, the liminal boundary between sleep and waking. In the territory 
now of Marcel Proust and once again Benjamin, we consider the uncertainty of 
the moment of the events of thought and expression. Returning to Barthes, we 
continue with deliberations on the similarities between his writing degree zero and 
his famous third or obtuse meaning, particularly the absence of the signifier and 
the signification of absence. This notion of absence and zero is transferred to the 
thought of Japanese philosopher Keiji Nishitani and his field of śūnyatā or 
emptiness. Employing Norman Bryson’s essay ‘The Gaze in the Expanded Field’ 
(1988), we contrast Western theories of subjective vision as espoused by John-
Paul Sartre and Jacques Lacan to the esoteric ideas of Nishitani and his notion of 
the dissolving of the boundaries between entities or objects in what Bryson calls 
the ‘remainder’ of the visual field. After a short detour into quantum physics by 
which we consolidate our ideas on uncertainty and indeterminacy, we move 
tentatively toward the extreme edges of reason with the imaginary science of 
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`pataphysics in order to further qualify a shift from the world of as is to the many 
potential worlds of the as if. The literary poetics of Stéphane Mallarmé, in 
particular his seminal work Un Coup de Dés jamais n’abolira le Hasard  (‘A 
Throw of the Dice will Never Abolish Chance’) (1897) provides us with a second 
case study that we will interpret initially from the perspective of Alain Badiou. 
Utilising his unique conception of event he interprets Mallarmé’s purposefully 
indecipherable poetics of place and situation to his own end. His aim to prove 
ultimately that it is never possible to prove the veracity of any event. That in the 
end the relation of event to situation and place is shrouded in a fog of 
indeterminacy. From here we return to the concept of zero and address a rare 
occurance of the phrase ‘zerography’ as it appears in critical literary discourse, 
particularly in relation to Friedrich Nietzsche in order to assess its usefulness to 
our own rendering of zero[graphy]. Finally, returning to Deleuze, we will consider 
the concepts of immanence and becoming as they impact on the perspective of the 
thesis, before contrasting his innovative process-led conception of event with that 
of his philosophical rival, Badiou. 
 
The conclusion will take an extensive view of our intensive process-led matrix of 
questions and draw together the central points made through the three sections 
into some sort of resolution. Here we will consider briefly the future possibilities 
of the medium of photography and the potential ramifications of dissolving the 
classical perspective of the concept of photography. We will speculate on the 
possibilities that a theory of zero[graphy] could afford future photographies, and 
attempt to focus some of our findings on my own experiments. Some 
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consideration will also be given here to areas of possible post-doctoral study that 
might prove fruitful, such as the radical immanence of François Laruelle and his 
concept of non-philosophy/photography. We hope to prove by the end of the 
thesis that some light will have been shed on the potential coexistence in concept 
of representation and difference within an expanded field of photography, both as 
a practice and a mode of thought.  
 
 
-o- 
 
 
A few notes on language here, I have kept all translations in their original spelling 
(this mainly concerns American texts – the s/z for example) and any grammatical, 
spelling or punctuation errors in quotations remain unaltered in order to remain 
faithful to the quoted author. Concerning translations themselves, there are a 
number of instances, particularly in Walter Benjamin and Stéphane Mallarmé 
where in differing translations meanings can be altered quite significantly, 
therefore offering us a productive uncertainty. Where possible in the bibliography 
of the thesis, I have acknowledged the translator of the text in order to attribute 
the appropriate significance to their valued work. Each Section has its own 
distinctive voice in the way that it narrates its particular content; the first 
analysing from a perspective of clarity, the second feeling its way through the 
darkness and the coded questions as an intensive experience. And the last Section, 
a voice concerned primarily with blurring the boundaries of its subject matter 
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until the object of study dissolves into its own zerography. Finally the voice of the 
general ‘author’ is utilised as a guide that accompanies the reader through the 
material, engaging with them as ‘we’ to underscore the critique of a singular, 
fixed identity. This guide-like voice is also to facilitate and emphasise the 
experience of reading, discovering, and creating/inventing as a process that is 
shared in service of speculative thought. Here we may cite the authorial voice 
employed by writer and photographer Yve Lomax as a form of precedent to the 
voice I vary throughout the thesis. Lomax utilises an esoteric writing style that 
employs a form of double articulation in that she seems to be asking herself or an 
undisclosed companion questions. It is in this way that she articulates and builds a 
particular sensibility as she interrogates the interface of writing and image. 
 
And to conclude this introduction a word on our imagined reader, a reader who is 
perhaps best articulated through a brief analysis of recent thought and practical 
application on the interface of philosophy and the arts. In 1996 film-maker Daniel 
Frampton set up an email discussion list; the ‘Film-Philosophy Salon’, to enable 
debate amongst academics and interested parties into the cross-pollination 
between film and philosophy. The ‘salon’ subsequently became an online open-
access journal in 2006 and from 2016, has been published by Edinburgh 
University Press.  
 
 
 
…Film-Philosophy supports the strong argument that 
cinema can do philosophy in a way that is unique to 
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the medium. Therefore, film is not only capable of 
presenting extended thought experiments or 
illustrating philosophical concepts, but is philosophy 
itself.  
(Sorfa 2016: 3) [emphasis in original] 
 
 
 
 
In this way I hope to show that by treating photography as a concept as well as a 
practice it is also capable of doing philosophy and more ambitiously, following 
the same argument, that photography can indeed be perceived as a form of 
philosophy. If we can interpret this thesis as a form of photography-philosophy 
then we can see how it might address some of the issues taken up by the film-
philosophy movement. David Sorfa in his Introduction to the twentieth volume of 
Film-Philosophy (January 2016) links the beginnings of the movement to 
Deleuze’s work on Cinema from the 1980’s (with mention of American 
philosopher Stanley Cavell), thereby expanding the arc of thought of this thesis’ 
ideal reader. Our audience then belongs to the territory of what might be 
determined a photography-philosophy debate after Deleuze. As Sorfa observes: 
 
 
…French philosopher Gilles Deleuze’s work of film-
philosophy has become more associated with film 
theory, perhaps because when his ‘Cinema’ books 
appeared in the 1980’s, there was no such term as 
‘film-philosophy’, and they were taken up by film 
theorists. Whatever the case, Deleuze and Cavell are 
among the first to explicitly claim that films can do or 
be philosophy. 
(Sorfa 2016: 4)  
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The constituency of the thesis then and hence it’s readership, falls largely into the 
broad field of ‘non-philosophy’, of which its proponents claim that the 
philosophical project can be taken forward through inter-disciplinary links with 
related practices such as the arts. In particular, that approached from the correct 
perspective certain practices such as film, theatre, and photography for instance 
can do or be philosophy. This is a concept close to the work of Deleuze and taken 
up again more radically by Laruelle to whom we shall return in the Conclusion. 
This form of interdisciplinarity, taking philosophy as one axis, has taken hold in 
many areas of academia, most notably in the Arts and Humanities and so one of 
the ambitions of the thesis is to extend this practice into my own medium of 
photography. In The Deleuze Connections (2000), John Rajchman intends his 
book to be “…a map meant for those who want to take up or take on Deleuze 
philosophically as well as those engaged in what Deleuze called the 
‘nonphilosophical understanding of philosophy’.” (Rajchman 2000: 5). Therefore, 
our reader is invited to consider anew the potential of photography as an expanded 
field or concept tested against certain philosophical perspectives “…in which both 
art and thought come alive and discover their resonances with one another.” 
(Rajchman 2000: 115). 
 
Although the thesis deals with complex theories from photographic theory to 
continental philosophy and critical literary discourse, the thesis is conceived as an 
assemblage and written as a poetic construction. “We write only at the frontiers of 
our knowledge, at the border which separates our knowledge from our ignorance 
and transforms the one into the other.” (Deleuze [1968] 2004a: xx).  
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We learn nothing except by deciphering and 
interpreting. But the plurality of worlds is such that 
these signs are not of the same kind, do not have the 
same way of appearing, do not allow themselves to 
be deciphered in the same manner, so do not have an 
identical relation with their meaning.  
(Deleuze [1964] 2008: 4)  
 
 
-o- 
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Endnotes to Introduction 
 
 
 
1 This thesis is the result of an advertised bursary by Swansea Metropolitan 
University (now UWTSD) to study in the Faculty of Art and Design in the 
research area of Performed Photography. 
 
2 As Deleuze states: 
 
The important thing here is that the decomposition of the composite reveals to us 
two types of multiplicity. One is represented by space (or rather, if all the nuances 
are taken into account, by the impure combination of homogenous time): It is a 
multiplicity of exteriority, of simultaneity, or juxtaposition, of order, of 
quantitative differentiation, of difference in degree; it is a numerical multiplicity, 
discontinuous and actual. The other type of multiplicity appears in pure duration: 
It is an internal multiplicity of succession, of fusion, of organization, of 
heterogeneity, of qualitative discrimination, or of difference in kind; it is a virtual 
and continuous multiplicity that cannot be reduced to numbers… 
(Deleuze [1966] 1988a: 38)  
 
3 “The slashes in a/r/tography (and other related words) purposefully illustrate a 
doubling of identities and concepts rather than a separation/bifurcation of ideas” 
(Irwin et al. 2006: 70 n.1) 
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Section I: 
Photo[graphy] 
 
 
…to pose the problem is instead to invent and not 
only dis-cover; it is to create, in the same movement, 
both the problem and its solution.  
(Alliez 2004: 113) [emphasis in original] 
 
 
…the manner in which we are led away from the most 
important task, that of determining problems and 
realising in them our power of creation and decision.  
(Deleuze [1968] 2004a: 337) 
 
 
…out of this interaction they may be able to produce 
something that is itself equally new. But they must 
share with philosophers like Deleuze one ambition at 
least and that is to render the world problematic by 
elaborating questions. To simply offer solutions is not 
enough. 
  (Thrift 2008: 18) 
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Introduction 
 
It is our task in this initial Section to look beyond the illusion of three dimensions 
that photography maintains, and toward the construct of two-dimensional 
representation based as it is on perspective, which utilises a vanishing point to 
present an imaginary sense of depth. That is, a two-dimensional plane that gives 
the appearance of three-dimensional space. In this Section we shall be examining 
the concept of photography as it exists in a mainstream practice that can trace its 
roots back into Enlightenment thought thereby enabling us to speak of a ‘classical 
perspective’ in the medium of photography. The hypothesis of the thesis is an 
enigmatic one, as we ask the question can photography describe its own event? 
(CPDIOE?), and as mentioned above in the Introduction, we shall be taking a 
multi-perspectival approach to this. The first Section named ‘Photo[graphy]’ will 
be analysing the concept of photography as it exists in its Enlightenment aspect, 
specifically shining a light on the object of photography from the perspective of 
the mainstream conventions that we will name for our purposes as the classical 
perspective. We will be interrogating the formation of photography’s conventions 
from the Positivist era of its invention, through the modern and the post-modern 
periods in order to ascertain a position from whence we may look at the 
possibilities of a paradigm shift. By considering contemporary tropes such as 
performativity and event-based photographic practices we will be testing new 
instances of the medium, such as our case study of ‘performed photography’ 
against contemporary philosophical perspectives provided principally by French 
philosopher Gilles Deleuze. As we consider photography from the aspect of its 
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mainstream history, we shall begin to interrogate its conditions utilising our 
enigmatic title/question (CPDIOE?) to discover how the medium stands up to 
new creative philosophical perspectives. This will begin the process of the 
dissolving of the classical perspective and provide us with some context and a 
departure point for when we begin our more radical experiments into 
‘Crypto[graphy]’ and ‘Zero[graphy]’ in Sections II and III respectively. However, 
now we can commence our considerations of the questions within our question. 
 
One of the principal strategies of the thesis takes the form of a quotation by Henri 
Bergson that is reproduced near the beginning of the Introduction1, in which 
Bergson lays emphasis on the stating, the positing and the uncovering of a 
problem, as opposed to merely attempting to solve it. By this, he purports that the 
answer to a problem is inherent in a well-stated question, which is attempted in 
our primary title/question – can photography describe its own event?, the enigma 
of which we hope to explore over the next three Sections. As a preamble to 
Section I, the opening three quotations by different authors are re-positing 
Bergson’s thesis; they are reiterations of Bergson’s ideas of problematisation or 
the notion of a Bergsonian problem. This Section is concerned with what I have 
termed here the ‘problematisation of photography’ in its present form, and 
conducts a critique of mainstream photographic practices. It shall provide an 
opportunity to apply Bergson’s strategy to the investigation and outlines both the 
possibility and the necessity for a paradigm shift for contemporary photographic 
practices. It is pertinent to consider relevant aspects of the status quo of 
mainstream photographic practice in order to begin to recognise and also to 
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articulate newer conceptions of the medium, aided and abetted by philosophers, 
theorists and photographic practitioners who have provided partial responses to 
some of the questions raised by the thesis. To fully comprehend the possibility of 
a paradigm shift in the practice, communication and concept of photography, 
more established ‘formations’ and theoretical definitions of the medium that are 
currently in use shall be outlined and challenged in this Section.  
 
The above quotation by Eric Alliez offers a succinct précis of the original 
Bergson quotation that is under scrutiny in Alliez’s discussion on Bergson’s work 
The Creative Mind: An Introduction to Metaphysics (1946), in particular, the 
‘Introduction (Part II): Stating the Problems’. The emphasis that can be drawn out 
from this particular phrasing by Alliez is that it is possible that there is credibility 
in the assertion that by positing a question well enough, both the problem and its 
solution reveal themselves in a double movement. Moving on to the next 
quotation by Deleuze in Difference and Repetition ([1968] 2004a), which 
although not cited, is so close to Bergson’s quotation it almost reads as a 
paraphrasing of it, it becomes clear that of interest here, is the power of invention 
and creation in the very determining of problems. We aim to embrace both of 
these perspectives on the question of the question as we move through the thesis. 
Finally, Nigel Thrift in Non-Representational Theory: Space, Politics, Affect 
(2008) is speaking of his perception of the role of the social scientist with 
reference to Deleuze’s text Empiricism and Subjectivity: An essay on Hume’s 
Theory of Human Nature ([1953] 1991); “[i]n fact, a philosophical theory is an 
elaborately developed question, and nothing else; by itself and in itself, it is not 
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the resolution to a problem, but the elaboration, to the very end, of the necessary 
implications of a formulated question” (Deleuze [1953] 1991: 116). Coupled with 
the Thrift quotation above, the importance of interpreting2 and elaborating well-
formulated questions as proffered here is paramount, and indeed is one of the 
central concerns of the thesis.  
 
 
 
The problem as it exists 
 
The title of the thesis contains an enigmatic question; can photography describe 
its own event?. This Section will attempt to interrogate that Bergsonian question 
in all its ‘aspects’ in order to draw out perspectives on those six words. As it has 
been noted, it shall be necessary to observe the photographic field as I perceive it 
and to critique and problematise (not necessarily look for solutions) the classical 
perspective of photography as it exists at present. It follows that providing these 
questions are dealt with sufficiently and posited well enough, it is possible that 
they will shed some light on the enigmatic central question; can photography 
describe its own event?. What is crucial here is the aspiration to address these 
concerns fully enough in order to leave them, to flee from them. This propulsion 
to move forward (and also away) from the existing state of photography has an 
association with Deleuze and Guattari’s ‘lines of flight’. Lines of flight are points 
of departure and as O’Sullivan attests; “[w]e might see one of the roles of art as 
being an entry point on/into this smooth space, a line of flight from 
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representational habits of being and thought on/into the multiplicity of the world.” 
(O’Sullivan 2006: 29). 
 
 
…the rhizome is constantly creating a new ‘line of 
flight’ that enables it to deterritorialise. Along this 
line of flight it has the potential to move into (and 
onto) new territories. Lines of flight are created at 
the edge of the rhizomatic formation, where the 
multiplicity experiences an outside, and transforms 
and changes. At this border there is a double 
becoming that changes both the rhizome and that 
which it encounters.  
(Sutton and Martin-Jones 2008: 6) 
 
 
The rhizome is a biological term used to describe an acentered root system and in 
A Thousand Plateaus ([1987] 2004a), Deleuze and Guattari apply it to theoretical 
work as a means of promoting connections between heterogeneous locations and 
events. One of the key attributes of the rhizome is that it is non-hierarchical and 
composed not of points, but of the lines between these points. As the above 
quotation suggests, lines of flight facilitate a transformation of the rhizome and 
that which it encounters; “[a] ‘line of flight’ is a path of mutation” (Lorraine 2010: 
148). Therefore, if we perceive mainstream photographic practices in rhizomatic 
terms, then the research contained within the thesis can be regarded as lines of 
flight (plural) towards new ways of thinking photography based on the distilled 
question can photography describe its own event?. During this process of 
transformation, the ‘double becoming’ that Sutton and Martin-Jones highlight is 
also an interconnected process of deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation3.  
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Deleuze and Guattari provide an example of this process with an analogy of a 
wasp pollinating an orchid: 
 
 
How could movements of deterritorialization and 
processes of reterritorialization not be relative, 
always connected, caught up in one another? The 
orchid deterritorializes by forming an image, a 
tracing of a wasp; but the wasp reterritorializes on 
that image. The wasp is nevertheless 
deterritorialized, becoming a piece of the orchid’s 
reproductive apparatus. But it reterritorializes the 
orchid by transporting its pollen. Wasp and orchid, 
as heterogeneous elements, form a rhizome. 
(Deleuze and Guattari [1987] 2004a: 11) 
 
 
The task is to interpret the central question beyond or perhaps through the enigma 
that the question is couched within. The further encrypted questions that are held 
in the six-word arrangement are in the process of being discovered, not through 
any sense of an overarching question as it resides on the surface of the enigma, 
but through the multiple interpretations or possible ‘folded’ worlds that this 
enigmatic question holds. The many perspectives and inflections that produce 
vibrations and possible ‘events’, constituting a multiplicity (infinity) of harmonics 
and rhythms waiting to be uncovered. It is precisely through an excavation of the 
question that the invention and creation of new modalities of the concept of 
photography will appear. I have adopted the position of the ‘cryptographer’, 
experimenting with the possibilities afforded by this simply stated question, in 
that its status as question is so vital that it is collapsed into its own enigma.  
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In Deleuze’s words:  
 
 
A ‘cryptographer’ is needed, someone who can at 
once account for nature and decipher the soul, who 
can peer into the crannies of matter and read into the 
folds of the soul.  
(Deleuze [1993] 2003: 3) 
 
 
Perhaps the multiple interpretations of this enigmatic question can be deemed a 
virtual difference in kind, with each interpretation afforded the possibility of 
being converted into an actualisation through this very process. It is necessary to 
foreground these six words and perhaps each actualisation (interpretation) can be 
understood as a temporal/allegorical dimension of the question. In Deleuze’s 
conception of the actualisation of concepts and events in the world, it is the realm 
of the virtual, which holds precedence as it unfurls into actualisation as a process. 
Many thinkers prioritise the actual in this process, suggesting that there is some 
transcendent event in play, whereas Deleuze places emphasis on the 
interdependency of the two states in an oscillation of process resulting in 
actualisation, in other words, it is an immanent process. “Most important for 
Deleuze is that the virtual is not to be understood as duplicating or resembling the 
actual, nor should it be taken to mean transcendence. Simply put, problems do not 
resemble or represent their solutions.” (Boundas in Parr 2010a: 302). We will 
consider this process further in Section III of the thesis. In this Section however, 
we seek to interpret the contemporary state of photography as it resides in a 
potential new moment and will investigate the possibilities of redressing the 
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balance between the spatial concerns of the medium and newer conceptions of the 
medium that draw on it’s temporal qualities. In order to do this, the emphasis of 
the Section shall be placed on temporality as opposed to spatialisation. In spite of 
this, it must be noted that the thesis is not attempting to argue for temporal 
concerns over spatial ones, but it will begin to highlight the paradigm of 
difference over that of representation in order to eventually attain some state of 
entropy in terms of a resting equilibrium between the two. Our programme here is 
to rectify the imbalance that exists within the medium in terms of a system of 
spatial representation and the potential of a system premised on temporal 
difference. An often-used example of entropy increasing in nature is ice cubes 
melting in a glass of water, and it is this state of the diffusion of one element 
within another that will help us to perceive of dissolving the classical perspective 
of photography (representation) into the complementary perspective of 
philosophical difference. This is reminiscent of Bergson’s famous example of 
difference in kind, which he illuminates through the example of sugar dissolving 
in a warm glass of water. In terms of the two major contemporary systems of 
philosophical thought, representation and difference, certainly for Deleuze, the 
possibility of these two paradigms running alongside one another is at least 
productive, and can even be a source of creation. A creation born out of a 
synthesis between the two systems and resulting in the emergence of pure 
difference. Pure difference being in Deleuzian terms the difference between 
difference and its alternate, representation. The notion of a synthesis in this 
manner is of particular importance and shall be expanded upon in relation to 
Deleuze’s difference and repetition later in this Section. At this stage it is relevant 
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to note the identification of a few tentative practices/instances in the visual arts 
that shall be investigated here in order to provide points of reflection for ‘can 
photography describe its own event?’ – perhaps the most noteworthy in our 
context being Jeff’s theory of performed photography and the interpretation as 
event of Pollock’s action paintings. Can photography describe its own event? 
calls for a problematisation of photography that seeks to emerge from the 
parameters of representation and difference. It is possible to perceive of these two 
concepts within a binary arrangement, but this is not a helpful position within the 
parameters of the thesis as we shall endeavour to place the two into co-existence 
instead of setting them against each other as antinomies. We shall also be looking 
similarly to practical and theoretical models in order to advance our argument. In 
order to aid our investigations into the folding of one concept into another, it 
might be useful to consider the following quotation from Deleuze’s book The 
Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque ([1993] 2003): 
 
 
The Baroque is inseparable from a new regime of 
light and colour. To begin, we can consider light 
and shadows as 1 and 0, as the two levels of the 
world separated by a thin line of waters: the Happy 
and the Damned. An opposition is no longer in 
question. If we move into the upper level, in a 
room with neither door nor window, we observe 
that it is already very dark, in fact almost decorated 
in black, ‘fuscum subnigrum’. This is a Baroque 
contribution: in place of the white chalk or plaster 
that primes the canvas, Tintoretto and Caravaggio 
use a dark, red-brown background on which they 
place the thickest shadows […] The painting is 
transformed. Things jump out of the background, 
colours spring from the common base that attests to 
their obscure nature, figures are defined by their 
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covering more than their contour. Yet this is not in 
opposition to light; to the contrary, it is by virtue of 
the new regime of light.  
  (Deleuze [1993] 2003: 31-32) 
 
 
Above Deleuze invokes Leibniz’s multi-perspectival aspect of the monad, which 
we shall discuss further in Section II, but what is important here is the emphasis 
on the relationship between light and dark (and interestingly one and zero for our 
discussions in Section III) which will be mirrored by the relationship of Section I 
to II. As in Section II, we will be laying a dark field of difference from which the 
figure of representation can spring more vibrantly. In other words, we will try to 
reveal how representation can be enhanced by unearthing the dark crypt of 
difference upon which ground it stands.  
 
A point of clarification is necessary here with regards the space/time 
philosophical ‘dualism’, and leads on from the point made above concerning a 
Deleuzian synthesis of the spatial (representation) and the temporal (difference) in 
relation to photographic practices. As it has been established, this research is not 
merely arguing for temporal strategies over spatial ones, it does so in order to re-
adjust the balance and the perceived hegemony of the spatial in photography’s 
history. Furthermore, the emphasis on temporality here is not to denigrate 
spatiality or to contribute to the dualism as discussed above. “Within such a 
dualism, where Time is understood as the domain of dynamism and Progress, the 
spatial is relegated to the realm of stasis and thus excavated of any meaningful 
politics.” (May and Thrift 2001: 2). Instead, in developing a critical arrangement 
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that promotes syntheses rather than consolidating distinct binary oppositions, this 
research connects with the notion of ‘TimeSpace’, a concept developed in the 
social sciences and geography (May and Thrift 2001). The concept of TimeSpace 
addresses the need to “…overcome […] the very formulation of space/time in 
terms of this kind of dichotomy […] [and to recognise instead] that space and 
time are inextricably interwoven” (Massey 1994: 260-61) [my brackets]. In other 
words, we are thinking here time and space as a multiplicity rather than as a 
dualism and seek to address what Frederic Jameson called the ‘spatial turn’, when 
detecting a certain spatial imperialism in post-modern theory (Jameson 1992). 
 
 
 
The classical perspective as it exists  
 
This part of the investigation sets the scene regarding the philosophical and 
aesthetic landscape that photography inherited, and it is this matrix of ideas that 
now forms what is understood as the hegemonic form of representation. By the 
twentieth century the concept of what we know as representation was more 
broadly understood as an amalgamation of inventions, conventions and theories 
(both philosophical and practical) that date back to early fifteenth century Italy 
with the development of linear perspective by Filippo Brunelleschi (1377 – 1446). 
In addition, Leon Battista Alberti’s (1404 –1472) treatise De Pittura (On 
Painting) (1435) is widely regarded as the first rigorous theoretical interpretation 
of pictorial representation in conjunction with Brunelleschi’s practical invention. 
 56 
Both the aesthetic and technical origins of photography can be traced back to this 
point – “Renaissance perspective adopted vision as the sole basis for 
representation: every perspective picture represents its subject as it would be seen 
from a particular point of view at a particular moment.” (Galassi 1981: 12-13). 
The evolution of such ideas throughout the Renaissance and Enlightenment was 
premised on an ocular-centric attitude towards representation. As a result of the 
invention of lenses in the seventeenth century, instruments such as the telescope 
and the microscope extended the breadth of vision and aided the prevalence of the 
visual in this period and as Donald Lowe notes, the perceptual field “…was 
fundamentally non-reflexive, visual and quantitative.” (Lowe 1982: 26). The 
development of the concept of the camera obscura as a ‘visual aid’ during this 
time is important too, as an example of how an image/representation could be 
rendered via a lens – as a result there was a convergence between 
mathematical/linear perspective and optical perspective. The historical 
development of perspective is significant in that optical perspective essentially 
forms what we know to be the basis of photography; that is, light being focused 
through a lens to create an image. The development of both mathematical 
perspective and optical perspective analogous to the phenomenological experience 
of seeing became part of a set of conditions, that allied with chemical 
advancements allowed for the eventual invention of photography in the early 
nineteenth century. It is worth looking in further detail at these ‘precursors’ of 
photography because it is these same conditions that were simultaneously 
defining a whole referential system of representation based on identity and 
resemblance. A system that contemporary thinkers such as Foucault and Deleuze 
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decided to challenge. Furthermore, the invention of photography in 1839 was born 
into an environment that communicated via a concept of language by now 
concerned with an abstract naturalised form based on taxonomy and differences, 
and a philosophical model that was positivist4 in its outlook and concerned with 
‘facts’. Earlier eras utilised a system based on allegorical similarity that promotes 
imaginative interpretation5. Photography produced a transparent realism 
approximate to how we perceive through the eye and was heralded as the 
embodiment of a reality construct that had been undergoing development for 
centuries prior to its existence; as Galassi notes, it was “…the epitome of realism” 
(Galassi 1981: 12).  
 
In order to critique mainstream photography within a contemporary 
conceptualisation of representation it is necessary to examine further the 
principles that it is founded upon. The central question of the thesis is designed to 
move the argument away from a transparent conventionalised representation and 
towards new areas of inquiry, which it is hoped are going to be more fruitful than 
the current status quo. The thesis aims to consider a system of (Deleuzian) 
‘difference’ as opposed to an inherited representational model based on identity 
and a return of the ‘same’. A system that is not merely couched in terms of 
identity and resemblance, therefore promoting the concept of object6, but that 
returns difference over duration, promoting the concept of event. To ‘picture’ 
(from within a Deleuzian critique) is to freeze, to solidify and render the world 
static. It is also to fix the observer in space.  
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The preceding sentence takes a very particular perspective and we must be sure 
here to stipulate that it is a useful perspective in the context of this research, and is 
certainly not intended as a carte blanche statement regarding the construct of 
representation, and the more aesthetic considerations of the wider field. We might 
add a note of caution here, a proviso for our reader in order to clarify that it is not 
representation per se that we are taking issue with through this critique. The thesis 
in general takes up a particularly socio-political aspect of representation that 
thinkers such as Foucault and Deleuze developed into an antagonistic stance 
against the ‘classical’ perspective. This stance depended upon perceiving 
representation as resting upon the concepts of identity and resemblance in 
particular, hence ‘picturing’ the world as static and leaving little room for a more 
vitalist conception of the world encompassing ‘difference’. This can be perceived 
as a narrow conception however of representation in its many guises, particularly 
in the realm of aesthetics and more mainstream analytical philosophical as well as 
phenomenological treatments of ‘classical’ representation.7  
 
The Section divider between Sections II and III utilises J.M.W. Turner’s (1775 – 
1851) painting ‘Snow Storm: Steam Boat off a Harbour’s mouth making Signals 
in Shallow Water, and going by the Lead. The Author was in this Storm on the 
Night the Ariel left Harwich’ (1842) in order to denote the theme of 
indiscernability that runs through Section III. The inclusion of this painting in the 
thesis recognises that the issue of uncertainty in perception, and imperceptibility 
of form has its own tradition within the history of art as well as in contemporary 
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event theory. The general theme of a negative critique of representation raised so 
far is not the true purpose of the thesis, but rather to contextualise photography 
and its perceived conventionality so that we may look for a possible paradigm 
shift in both its thought and its practice. Representation is a more polysemic 
enterprise than can be encapsulated in such a specific argument. We shall take a 
moment to look at Turner here to highlight some of the aesthetic and more art-
historical concepts of representation that are beyond the scope of the thesis. 
 
Turner’s was a poetic and innovative imagination often elucidated through lyrical 
titles as above, and the inclusion of quotations and poetic fragments alongside his 
paintings, thus interweaving verbal and visual forms of meaning. Indeed, it seems 
that there was no ship called Ariel operating out of Harwich at the time (Butlin 
and Joll [1977] 1984: 247), testament to Turner’s preference for imaginative 
construction over the realistic depiction of events. Metaphor, materials, myth, 
history, topography, place and space were all important in the rendering of a 
representation. An illuminating incident that underscores the complexity of 
Turner’s method was when his patron, Walter Fawkes, asked him to: 
 
 
…make me a drawing [watercolour] of the ordinary 
dimensions that will give some idea of the size of a 
man of war […] he began by pouring wet paint till 
[sic] it was saturated, he tore, he scratched, he 
scrubbed at in a kind of frenzy and the whole thing 
was chaos – but gradually and as if by magic the 
lovely ship, with all its exquisite minutia, came into 
being… 
(Fawkes in Bailey [1997] 2013: 210) 
 
 60 
 
The above account by Edith Fawkes provides a vivid portrayal of Turner’s 
material practice but also offers an entry into the dynamic turbulent spaces in his 
paintings, full of light and atmosophere. Turner poured his many wide-ranging 
interests into the makings of his work and given his personal acquaintance with 
some of the major scientific minds of the day including Michael Faraday (1791 – 
1867) and Mary Somerville (1780 – 1872), it is not too fanciful to see his 
paintings as expressive of the thermodynamic and electromagnetic conceptions of 
matter in development at the time. To illustrate this point further, French 
philosopher Gaston Bachelard (1884 – 1962) in his seminal book The Poetics of 
Space ([1958] 1969) discusses a poem by Pieyre de Mandiargues (1909 – 1991) 
and conjures up an appropriate image to Turner’s painting: 
 
 
With what fantasy he conferred multiple curvature 
on space! This is really a fantasy on Reimann’s 
curved space. Because every universe is enclosed in 
curves, every universe is concentrated in a nucleus, a 
spore, a dynamited centre. And the centre is 
powerful because it is an imagined centre. 
(Bachelard [1958] 1969: 157) 
 
 
Therefore, although Deleuze’s conception of classical representation is one of 
repression and immobility, we must place this caveat here in the thesis to remind 
ourselves and the reader, of the imaginative power that is situated on the horizons 
and vanishing points of representation. This issue will re-emerge in Section III 
when we look at the poetry of Stéphane Mallarmé. These asides are merely to 
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show that the many connections this thesis makes in the service of philosophical 
difference as it pertains to representation, are in essence no different to the many 
connections that have been made in the service of classical representation in order 
to illuminate the myriad potentialities of the aesthetic image. It does well to 
recognise here that the primary interest of the thesis in no way denigrates or 
diminishes the inventive/creative potentialities that still exist in ‘mainstream’ 
representational modalities.  
 
 
 
Figure 2: J.M.W. Turner ‘Snow Storm: Steam Boat off a Harbour’s Mouth 
making Signals in Shallow Water. And going by the Lead. The Author was  
in this Storm on the Night the Ariel left Harwich’, 1842,  [oil on canvas]  
(91.5 x 122cm) National Gallery, London. 
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But in Turner’s ‘Snowstorm’ nothing comes to rest. 
The swathes of snow and water swing about in a 
wholly unpredictable manner, and their impetus is 
deflected by contrary movements of spray and 
mysterious striations of light. To look at them for 
long is an uncomfortable, even an exhausting, 
experience. 
(Clark 1960: 143) 
 
 
Indeed as Kenneth Clark expresses above in Looking at Pictures (1960), we can 
claim Turner’s image as an important precursor for the work of the thesis as it can 
be said to embody both representation and difference simultaneously. Whilst 
teetering on the edge of a representation of an event in the world it conveys a 
sensation of “…giddiness, intoxication and cruelty, and even of death.” (Deleuze 
[1968] 2004a: 331) hence approaching Deleuze’s ambition of enhancing the 
potentialities of representation by allowing it to co-exist with philosophical 
difference (see page 202).  
 
Although the precursors of photography are not the main remit of the thesis, (and 
it is interesting to note that Turner was indeed very interested in the ‘new’ 
invention) it is still helpful at this stage to inquire further into this inherited 
construct of reality based on appearance. In order to set the scene for a full-scale 
critique there are a few seminal texts that may prove useful. These texts provide a 
succinct précis of key points that are crucial in forming an understanding of the 
aforementioned status quo regarding representation before concerning ourselves 
with more contemporary issues – Martin Jay’s essay Scopic Regimes of Modernity 
(1988), Johnathan Crary’s Techniques of the Observer: On Vision and Modernity 
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in the Nineteenth Century (1990) and Peter Galassi’s exhibition and catalogue 
Before Photography: Painting and the Invention of Photography (1981)8. These 
are indeed seminal texts and it is perhaps to our advantage here that they are all 
late twentieth century, as they aptly and expertly sum up aspects of what we are 
terming the classical perspective of photography, premised as they are on vision. 
Set against these, we will also be utilising a contemporary essay that appears in a 
special edition of the journal Rhizomes: Cultural Studies in Emerging Knowledge9 
by Michael Kramp as an introduction to the issue, titled ‘Unburdening Life, or the 
Deleuzian Potential of Photography’ (2012), which offers an excellent overview 
of our shared concern. 
 
Perspective in Renaissance times was based on the physiology of the eye and the 
‘perspective picture’ sought to replicate and approximate the experience of 
seeing from a single fixed point of view. Peter Galassi in Before Photography 
cites Alberti’s explanation of a perspective picture in De Pittura as “…a plane 
intersecting the pyramid of vision.” (Galassi 1981: 16). He explains, “[a]t the 
apex of the pyramid is the eye. The pyramid’s base is the perimeter of the 
picture. The picture is the projection upon the intersecting plane of everything 
that lies within the scope of the pyramid, extending to infinity.” (Galassi 1981: 
16). Perhaps it is useful to consider how this conception of perspective is 
analogous to how the earlier development of the camera obscura functions via the 
‘darkened room’. The ‘intersecting plane’ of the camera obscura is the wall or 
surface of the room opposite the hole where the inverted image is visible. The 
impression of the world outside that appeared through the small hole was later 
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directed through a lens and mirror, which rendered the image in a correct 
orientation. The ‘plane’ is where painters would place their canvas to work. Both 
the subjective viewing position of the perspective picture and the hole/lens of the 
camera obscura (and later the camera) demonstrate the fixed, static attitude that 
both these strategies adopt. The camera obscura contributed greatly to the 
Renaissance conception of perspective, which “…harnessed vision as a rational 
basis of picture-making.” (Galassi 1981: 18). This system of perspective also 
metaphorically connected man and God, allowing man a privileged position from 
which to survey the world. A clear example of this can be seen in Leonardo Da 
Vinci’s (1452 – 1519) painting The Last Supper (c.1497), which uses geometric 
rules of space to position God (Jesus) and the individual viewer in diametric 
opposition to one another. The subjective viewer taking the founding position for 
the picture whilst God is represented on the axis of infinity or vanishing point. 
The use of classical perspective in the painting that forms this relation promotes 
the notion of the ‘individual’ as it alludes to a more individual relationship to 
God. God and man now stand staring in dialectical (binary) opposition to each 
other, as man is elevated via the perspectival system. Norman Bryson uses the 
term ‘Founding Perception’ to identify the metaphorical potential however of this 
static and monocular point of view of the subjective viewing position: 
 
 
…the gaze of the painter arrests the flux of 
phenomena, contemplates the visual field from a 
vantage-point outside the mobility of duration, in 
an eternal moment of disclosed presence; while in 
the moment of viewing, the viewing subject unites 
his gaze with the Founding Perception, in a 
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moment of perfect recreation of that first 
epiphany.  
(Bryson 1983: 94) 
 
 
The primacy of vision in Western thought that is so crucial to the hegemony of 
representation that we are tracing here is fundamentally due to the influence of 
French philosopher René Descartes (1596 – 1650). One of the cornerstones of 
Western thought being his famous dictum – cogito ergo sum (I think therefore I 
am). Descartes’ cogito provides a rationale for the philosophical construction of 
self and also of individual existence in relation to God. For Descartes, internal 
experience/individual consciousness is separated from the projection of the 
external world, which forms a mind/body dualism. The cogito is the primary 
statement of Cartesian representation; the separation between the mind and the 
body introduced the concept of subjectivity and an emphasis was placed on the 
individual mind (logocentric) allied to monocentric perspective. Furthermore, this 
construct of reality based on the eye, further promotes distance as it precludes the 
body. Perhaps the camera can be regarded as a ‘disembodied eye’ in that it shares 
the properties of Descartes philosophical invention promoting  “…the 
disinterested gaze of the disincarnated Cartesian spectator” (Jay 1988: 18). We 
can also consider the concept of the projector as the Cartesian primacy of the 
mind renders the external world a mere projection out into external space. Just 
like the camera obscura the mind/body dualism of Cartesian thought promotes a 
sense of the distinction between an interior intensity and an extensive exteriority.  
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This Cartesian dualism shares an affinity with the notion of perspective that has 
been highlighted so far, particularly in respect to Bryson’s ‘founding perception’ 
in which man and God share diametric roles in a dialectical yet democratic 
construction, democratic because everyman can occupy the perspectival or 
founding of view.  In Scopic Regimes of Modernity Martin Jay provides an 
examination of the competing ‘scopic regimes’10 (a term coined by Christian 
Metz) that constitute the visual culture of the modern era, and cites the dominant 
visual model as being ‘Cartesian perspectivalism’. This term unites Renaissance 
notions of perspective in the visual arts and Cartesian ideas of subjective 
rationality in philosophy (Jay 1988: 4)11.  
 
 
Cartesian Perspectivalism was thus in league with 
a scientific world view that no longer 
hermeneutically read the world as a divine text, but 
rather saw it as situated in a mathematically regular 
spatio-temporal order filled with natural objects 
that could only be observed from without by the 
dispassionate eye of the neutral researcher.  
(Jay 1988: 9) 
 
 
Photography became the representational vehicle par excellence for the 
Enlightenment project, in terms of its ability to provide a close approximation of 
our philosophical reality construct (basically Cartesian) as it was born out of the 
Renaissance and the Enlightenment, as demonstrated above. This involves a 
transparent contract with nature based on the perspectival projection of space as 
we experience it through the eye12, and an easy literal translation of our 
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environment predicated now on taxonomy and resemblance rather than similarity 
and metaphor. The Enlightenment, ‘The Age of Reason’, was concerned with the 
quest for the advancement of knowledge based on rationalism via thought on the 
one hand and empiricism, knowledge received through the senses on the other. 
The desire for clarity, lucidity and discovery in this movement can be seen as 
linked to the earlier discoveries of both mathematical and optical perspective as a 
rationalising of the world about us, and our place in it. A light was literally shone 
onto the world and our experience and connections to it. A sense of certainty was 
beginning to be constructed and increased knowledge about the world would lead 
to incremental and steady progress. This sense of light was enhanced with the 
invention of photo[graphy] which was able to perfectly render a world full of facts 
and objects, and catalogue them in the sense of the encyclopaedia that was such a 
treasured Enlightenment concept. As Alan Sekula in ‘The Body and the Archive’ 
(1986) recognises: 
 
 
…photography doubly fulfilled the Enlightenment 
dream of a universal language: the universal mimetic 
language of the camera yielded up a higher, more 
cerebral truth, a truth that could be uttered in the 
universal abstract language of mathematics. […] 
Photography promised more than a wealth of detail; 
it promised to reduce nature to its geometric essence 
(Sekula 1986: 17) 
 
 
Adopting the Cartesian perspectival visual order widened the gap between the 
spectacle and the spectator. Despite its perceived hegemony, widespread 
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philosophical critique surrounding Cartesian perspectivalism has “…denounced 
its privileging of an ahistorical, disinterested, disembodied subject entirely outside 
of the world it claims to know only from afar.” (Jay 1988: 10). In fact, an accurate 
naturalistic visual depiction of the scene was now of paramount importance (over 
the allegorical complexities of earlier works) “…as abstract, quantitatively 
conceptualized space became more interesting to the artist than the qualitatively 
differentiated subjects painted within it…” (Jay 1988: 8). It was in 1839 that 
photography took up its role as an agent of representation – showcasing its ability 
to provide a vision of the world analogous to that as seen through our eyes, as the 
perfect machine to depict the world in a way that satisfied the ideas of the time. 
As the Photo historian Beaumont Newhall remarked, “[t]he fever for reality was 
running high.” (Newhall 1964: 12) and there was a sense of  “…the ubiquity of 
vision as the master sense of the modern era.” (Jay 1988: 3).  
 
All these advances were in direct contrast to the way in which meaning was 
generated up to the cusp of the eighteenth century. In Gardens of Speculation: 
Landscape in the Draughtsman’s Contract (1983), Simon Watney analyses Peter 
Greenaway’s 1982 film The Draughtsman’s Contract in relation to allegory and 
the representation of landscape. Watney writes: 
 
 
Set in a period which still conceived its world in 
allegorical terms, prior to the encroachments of 
rationalist or positivist thought, it is a film which 
encourages modern audiences to reflect on the 
profound changes in the history of European 
representation over the last three centuries, and the 
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consequences for how we think ourselves and the 
world we share.  
(Watney 1983b: 183) 
 
 
Gardens of Speculation investigates the genesis of naturalistic language, a 
language that had migrated from being based on similarity and allegorical 
possibilities, indeed multiplicities, towards a dialect of taxonomy, and 
categorisation. This new transparent approach to language, which was equated 
with the naturalistic rendering of the world according to the eye, converged with 
the arrangement of objects in projected space (as the eye and the mind projected 
them) to form a construct of reality that is predicated on what Bergson saw as 
‘difference by degree’, how each objects differs from the next, rather than 
‘difference in kind’, how an object or process differs from itself (through 
duration). Here raising the enigmatic spectre of our founding question – can 
photography describe its own event?. Taxonomy promotes the perception of a 
world of distinct objects; this is opposed by the theory of a world of forces that 
work on those objects as change over time, a distinction that separates 
representation from difference and will prove vital to the thesis.  
 
The invention of linear/mathematical perspective facilitated the fixing of objects 
in space. These changes marked a distinct shift in how the world was represented, 
and a fundamental question in the history of representation that is acknowledged 
in both Watney and Galassi’s texts, as well as Greenaway’s, that is; do you 
represent what you see, or what you know? The distinction between ‘seeing’ and 
‘knowing’ is reflective of the changes outlined above. What is ‘known’ relates to 
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the symbolic nature of language, pre the eighteenth century, veiled in allegory and 
inviting an unfolding of interpretive possibilities. An analogy can also be made 
here between Galassi’s two forms of perspective, synthetic, which equates to the 
inventing of material on the ‘measured stage’ of the perspectival plane, and 
analytic perspective, which takes account of the world as seen as a dynamic field 
of potential pictures that the artist can throw a frame around. This analytic vision 
of the world equates obviously to what is ‘seen’, whereas the synthetic solution 
can be linked to what the artist ‘knows’ about the world. The latter’s potential for 
allegory plays a central role in The Draughtsman’s Contract and Simon Watney 
asserts the importance of this over ‘mere’ appearances: 
 
 
This is the very nature of allegory – to demand 
further elucidation and commentary, beyond any 
closure of literal narrative devices. For allegory 
invariably proceeds from a radical distrust in ‘mere’ 
appearances. It conceives the world not as a stable set 
of coherent discrete objects, but rather as an endless 
network of resemblances and associations, in which 
signification is the primary order of things. 
(Watney 1983b: 185) [emphasis in original] 
 
 
This will be the project of the latter two Sections of the thesis, to uncover the 
hidden networks of signification that lay beyond, underneath, within appearances. 
The allegorical, contemplative gardens of the seventeenth century and their 
symbolic plants could be ‘read’ through the placement of statuary and plantation; 
each formal garden told a story that could be deciphered at ones’ leisure. As 
Watney maintains, allegory demands inquisitiveness and promotes the importance 
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of not taking meaning as something that is fixed or one-dimensional. Instead it 
focuses on the ability to make connections and the potential multiplicity of 
interpretations –  “…all events are open to interpretation and re-interpretation.” 
(Greenaway 1982: u.p.). The onset of categorisation morphed these plant species 
into distinct, classifiable entities that were given Latin names to identify their 
form. This shift wiped away the imaginative potential of similarity and was in 
stark contrast to the richness and complexity of the previous mode of language. It 
was becoming more and more apparent that what was seen was taking precedence 
over what was known. Peter Galassi, speaking about Meyer Schapiro’s essay Style 
(1953) observes “…the now familiar sense of art’s history as an irreversible trend 
from tactile to visual intuitions, from knowing to seeing” (Galassi 1981: 15). 
Attempting to trace this movement as a way of providing a ‘history of seeing’, 
Galassi compares Schapiro’s essay with Ernst Gombrich’s Art and Illusion (1961) 
that suggested this change: 
 
 
…need not be explained as an ineluctable drift from 
tactile to visual intuitions. He showed, rather, that it 
should be understood in terms of the progressive 
invention of basic pictorial tools – he called them 
schemas – each derived from the existing normative 
analogue of vision and establishing a potential 
prototype of the next.  
(Galassi 1981: 15) 
 
 
The invention of pictorial tools Galassi is referring to here encompasses the 
development of perspective and subsequent inventions that aided such 
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advancements, a particularly rich history in the fifteenth, seventeenth and 
nineteenth centuries. Perspective led the way for representing the world spatially – 
artworks could now be constructed using these pictorial tools in order to produce 
works that represented a view of the world that corresponded with how it was 
seen through the eye. The fundamental concern for the perspective picture was 
that it achieved an accurate representation of the world as seen through the eye. 
The rationalised space of the perspective picture was determined by three 
fundamental choices – the arrangement of the subject, the point of view, and the 
scope of the view. These essential choices lie between two restricting cases; 
“…the point of view and the frame – the visual pyramid – are established first, 
creating a measured stage.” (Galassi 1981: 16). Alternately, “…the world is 
accepted first as an uninterrupted field of potential pictures. From the latter point 
of view, the artist scans the field with the pyramid of vision, forming a picture and 
choosing where and when to stop.” (Galassi 1981: 16). Galassi uses Paolo Uccello 
(1397 – 1495) and Edgar Degas (1834 – 1917) as contrasting examples of these 
cases. Uccello’s method is an example of the ‘measured stage’ approach 
(synthetic), using the pyramid as a static container in which he organised the 
elements, whereas Degas’s visual pyramid is mobile and active (analytic).  
 
 
Where Uccello’s painting seems comprehensive, 
Degas’s seems fragmentary, concentrating in a 
single visual aspect the vital spirit of the entire 
scene. Uccello worked from pieces to a whole: he 
synthesized. Degas worked from a whole to an 
aspect: he analyzed. 
  (Galassi 1981: 17) 
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Galassi notes that Uccello’s procedure of ‘logical construction’ gave way to 
Degas’s strategy of ‘selective description’. A comparison can be made here 
between the two polar conceptions of analytic/synthetic perspective and the 
distinction between representing what is seen and what is known. The synthetic 
perspective of Uccello has a relation to latter – like the speculative gardens of the 
Renaissance, Uccello constructs the scene himself. Degas’s analytic perspective 
however, represents what is seen – selectively describing an aspect he chooses (as 
demonstrated by the draughtsman in the film). It is significant here that there 
appears to be a reciprocal arrangement here in the sense that photography 
certainly did have an impact on Degas’ painting, that Degas marks in art history 
through an emphasis on the radical difference in perspectival modes that ‘sight’ 
precipitates. 
 
 
If photography had an impact on painting (and it 
certainly did), it is because the new medium was 
born to an artistic environment that increasingly 
valued the mundane, the fragmentary, the seemingly 
uncomposed – that found in the contingent qualities 
of perception a standard of artistic, and moral, 
authenticity.  
(Galassi 1981: 28) 
 
 
Galassi goes on to cite the development of the landscape sketch that emerged 
around 1800 as “…the emergence of a new norm of pictorial coherence that made 
photography conceivable.” (Galassi 1981: 18). 
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The landscape sketches […] present a new and 
fundamentally modern pictorial syntax of immediate, 
synoptic perceptions and discontinuous, unexpected 
forms. It is the syntax of an art devoted to the 
singular and contingent rather than the universal and 
stable. It is also the syntax of photography.  
(Galassi 1981: 25) 
 
 
Here he is talking of the change in function of sketching, from the compositional 
sketch to the observational sketch, each with its obvious alliances; “…the former 
was a record of imagination, the latter of reality.” (Galassi 1981: 20). There are 
two important nineteenth century interjections against the tide of naturalism at this 
point, one by J.M.W. Turner13, who “…of course preferred ‘pictures made up of 
bits’ (imaginative compositions) to ‘pictures of bits’ (straightforward visual 
records).” (Galassi 1981: 21). The other concerns a poet: 
 
 
… Baudelaire claimed that photography could not be 
an art. A medium that allowed the artist no right to 
compose – to meddle in the internal affairs of the 
picture – could never be a vehicle of the imagination.   
(Galassi 1981: 28) 
 
 
Both draw a distinction that in its time might have been considered reductionist 
and against the tide of a growing trend for realism. It is a distinction that will prove 
important though in the impending direction of the thesis. As representation and 
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the strategies outlined here become more and more conventionalised, there seems 
to be a turn toward what might be deemed the representation of the 
‘unrepresentable’ once more. A move against clarity and lucidity and a return to 
allegory, metaphor and a taste for multiplicity. James Elkins in his book Six Stories 
from the End of Representation (2008) talks of a new opaqueness and 
indistinctness in art and photography, and also “…a growing fascination with the 
last moments of ordinary representation.” (Elkins 2008: 16). If the age of ordinary 
representation is in its dying embers then the task for future photographers may 
well be “…to try and make an image that owes as little to ordinary photographic 
representation as possible.” (Elkins 2008: 77). We will return to this prescient 
book in Section II. At this stage of the argument, we are concerned with 
identifying key elements in the system of representation that specifically impact on 
the history of photography and might through supplement and modification, offer 
better future opportunities for the medium. The direction that this Section is taking 
is first and foremost to prepare a nuanced argument in preparation for the work of 
Sections II and III which will start to build new and different perspectives 
regarding the dissolving of the classical perspective and assessing the conceptual 
field beyond this process. 
 
The thesis will go on to trace and explore the anti-realist and anti-representational 
impulses that seem to increasingly predicate much contemporary thinking as well 
as artistic expression. In Jay’s essay Scopic Regimes of Modernity he traces not 
only the constituent parts of Cartesian perspectivalism but also the visual sub-
cultures that have grown around it in what might be deemed to evoke another of 
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Jay’s works, a ‘denigration of vision’14. The foremost of these sub-cultures is the 
‘baroque’, which as Jay explains, can be thought of in dialectical opposition to 
Cartesian perspectivalism in some ways. In Nietzsche’s terms the baroque is the 
Dionysian counterpoint to the Appollonian aspect of the Cartesian matrix15. The 
Dionysian ‘paradigm’ will be investigated more closely in Section II but for now 
it is enough to note a sea-change in representational modes and a return to forms 
of complexity and multiplicities in terms of communication. Issues are cloaked in 
opacity and folded and encrypted in baroque doublings. As the thesis explores 
these movements it also traces the ideas of the most modern of baroque thinkers, 
Gilles Deleuze.  
 
 
Numerous scholars have completed impressive 
critical studies detailing the cultural impact of the 
rise of photography on modern systems of 
knowledge such as archives, museums and libraries, 
but for reasons that are quite sound, we have not yet 
seen an abundance of Deleuzian treatments on 
photography, its history, or its aesthetic potential. 
Deleuze’s relatively sparse comments on 
photography suggest neither his philosophical 
interest in the art form nor his confidence in its 
potential to create new concepts or relationships. 
Instead, like many scholars, he often discusses 
photography as an important instrument of the 
Enlightenment system of knowledge.  
(Kramp 2012: u.p. n.2)  
 
 
Here we have the challenge of Deleuze in relation to photography, how do we 
construct a Deleuzian perspective when he dismisses the medium so readily? 
Kramp goes on to advocate that we might “…read Deleuze against Deleuze to 
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reconsider photography’s artistic capacity to engage with and generate new 
experiences of reality.” (Kramp 2012: u.p.). If we are to take Deleuze’s 
philosophy as a counterpoint to the Cartesian constructs that we have been 
discussing here as the basis of recognisable mainstream representation, then we 
must look at his opposition to the concept of identity, but also his method. 
Descartes and his rationalist, analytical deductive method according to reason, 
opposed by Deleuze’s method, which is synthetic and dialectical as developed in 
his major work Difference and Repetition, and “…depends on the view that all 
knowledge is partial and open to revision.” (Williams 2010: 51). 
 
 
Thus, any relative truth is open to extension through 
syntheses with further discoveries and through 
further experiments. The relation between these 
truths is dialectical rather than analytical and 
foundational. There is a reciprocal process of 
revision and change between them, as opposed to 
Cartesian moves from secure and inviolable bases 
out into the unknown. Where Descartes situates 
reason at the heart of his method, as shown by the 
role of thinking in the cogito, Deleuze emphasises 
sensation.  
(Williams 2010: 51-52) 
 
 
By his emphasis on sensation Deleuze can claim to be an empiricist rather than a 
rationalist, his reason usually being speculative to say the least. However one of 
the important aspects of Deleuze, and in particular in his dealings with other 
philosophers and their methods, is his own preference for synthesis, which he 
prefers to the more analytic method. This extends also to his empiricism and 
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indeed he could claim to be a transcendental empiricist, which in some ways 
could be seen to be a synthesis of sorts between his position and Descartes, as will 
be explored further through his concept of pure difference in Section II. 
 
 
Deleuze is not simply anti-Cartesian; rather, he 
extends the active subject through passivity and 
through the conditions for sensation. The cogito is 
an important moment in philosophy, but it requires 
completing through syntheses that belie its 
independence.  
(Williams 2010: 52) 
 
 
As we have begun to move out of the territory of fixed perspectives and the 
illusion of certainty, it is time to consider more closely the concept of change. We 
might ask in this current moment just as Kramp does “…if photography can free 
painting and painters to pursue novel creative opportunities, can it likewise free 
itself? Photographic practitioners, and even viewers to create and re-create 
anew?” (Kramp 2012: u.p. n.3).  
 
A word of clarification at this point concerning the ‘illustrations’ utilised 
throughout the thesis. I do not wish to retrospectively apply the theories in this 
thesis onto existing artists from the cannon of visual arts, but instead merely note 
that sub-cultures and fissures within the classical perspective have always existed. 
Indeed, it is they who have added the nuances and sophistications to the wider 
field of representation. It might prove useful here to note a photographer who 
challenged notions of fixed perspective and certainty, forming a body of work that 
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was irrational, beyond reason, where meaning was shifting, fluid and open. 
Francesca Woodman (1958 – 1981) worked largely on intuition often forgoing 
notions of identity by morphing herself into ambiguous spaces, often seeming to 
disappear into the fabric of space and place. 
 
 
…Woodman’s sense of a changeable self was not 
expressed through playful disguise. Instead, through 
the blurry images and the captured movements, she 
reveals an inner cartography that circles around 
variations on the same evasive persona. Her series 
are made up of sequences shot mostly in old houses 
and usually featuring herself, though she rarely 
shows her face.  
(Conley 2008: 227) 
 
 
     Figure 3: Francesca Woodman 1975-76, ‘Space2, Providence, 
     Rhode Island’ [black and white photograph]. 
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Here again, as with Turner, we have an artist who seems to embody the future in 
the ‘now’, a representational artist that prefigures the issues that we are exploring 
here in the thesis. A practice in which the perceived properties of an archive of 
ideas and events also holds within it the capacity for variation, flux and 
uncertainty of meaning. Woodman eschewed deep perspective in her photographs, 
preferring a flatness of image, utilising walls, wallpaper and facades, which she 
often attempted to disappear into. It almost seems as if she is trying to hide in (or 
emerge from) the very thinness of the image itself or the paper manifestation of 
the image as photograph. Like Turner, there is an attempt to use the surface as a 
place of rupture where the imagination can be led beyond the frame, evoking 
sensations from beyond geometric perspective, vanishing points that both produce 
and dissolve meaning. If we are going to critique certain tenets of mainstream 
representation in order to prepare the ground for possible new conceptual 
frameworks for photography, then photographs such as Woodman’s above can act 
as signposts when surveying the field as it stands in order to identify plateaus of 
practice perhaps not fully explored to date. There are many artists such as Turner 
and Woodman throughout the history of visual representation whose work seems 
prescient and holds the potentiality at least to prefigure change or symbolise an 
instance of Bachelard’s notion of epistemological rupture16, applied to the 
sciences when one mode of thought was displaced by another. An idea enhanced 
by the work of Thomas Kuhn into the possibilities of paradigm shifts within the 
realm of the sciences and subsequently culture.  
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Shifting paradigms 
 
The phrase ‘paradigm shift’ in this context will be used as a means of highlighting 
and uncovering the possibilities of a shift in the practice and communication of 
photography, a shift toward a more temporal interpretation of the medium and 
away from the mainstream model and its pictorial conventions: 
 
 
…to theorize photography’s creative power […], to 
produce knowledges and experience that remain 
diverse and allusive, and to imagine new kinds of 
relationships and sensations that at once have 
efficacy and explosive untapped energies. 
(Kramp 2012: u.p. n.7) 
 
 
It is relevant here to explain this notion further by referring to A.D. Coleman and 
his insightful essay The Perils of Pluralism: Thoughts on the Condition of 
Photography at Century’s End (2000). Here, Coleman discusses the prospect of a 
paradigm shift within photography and defines the phrase as “…the collapse of an 
established model of thought and its inexorable replacement by a new one” 
(Coleman 2000: 11), such a collapse he points out, signals a paradigm’s 
exhaustion. Coleman draws from the field of the history of sciences, where the 
term ‘paradigm shift’ acquired new meaning when introduced by Thomas Kuhn in 
The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1970)17. By reflecting on the ideas of 
Kuhn and attempting to apply his findings to art, Coleman identifies some 
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differences between these two areas. When an established model of thought 
collapses within science it cannot be remedied, “…it is almost invariably 
terminal” (Coleman 2000: 11). This leads to the formulation of a more innovative 
paradigm, and in this moment, during the disintegration of the current paradigm 
but before the appearance of a ‘new paradigm’, “…practitioners enter a pre-
paradigm state of confusion, restlessness and anticipation” (Coleman 2000: 11). 
In art however, Coleman observes that old paradigms never die but instead are 
converted, demoting them from a belief system into a style or ‘genre’.  
 
 
Thus it seems the time has come for some of those 
involved in the observation and criticism of 
photography to shift critical and analytical paradigms. 
Perhaps, if we did so, we might even discover a new 
way of looking at the sometimes disheartening data 
laid out here and informing it differently. In the event, 
if we have any chance of turning the international 
image community into a genuine ‘plywood culture’, 
strengthened by its opposed layers, rather than a weak 
repository made, like particle board, of fragmented 
leftovers, we will need to ask a different and more 
probing set of questions, teasing out the ‘deep 
structures’ of lens-based communication. 
(Coleman 2000: 15) 
 
 
Written over a decade ago, Coleman’s prophetic closing sentences suggest what 
potentially lay ahead for photographic practice in the dawn of a new century. The 
emphasis in the above quotation offers some clues as to how to proceed into this 
new moment, with suggestions being to find new ways of looking and interpreting 
the photographic ‘data’. ‘Disheartening’ implies that some approaches have 
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reached a point of exhaustion and perhaps we are, as Kuhn advises, in a state of 
‘pre-paradigm confusion’. It is worth noting that what Coleman seems to be 
searching for is something deeper and more complex – “…we will need to ask a 
different and more probing set of questions, teasing out the ‘deep structures’ of 
lens-based communication.” (Coleman 2000: 15). Move forward almost a decade 
and another key voice in contemporary photographic theory Geoffrey Batchen, is 
asking some similar questions. A likeness can be made between the tone of 
Batchen’s writing and Coleman’s – Batchen is also concerned with a new moment 
appearing, and the role the photographic takes in this. The quotation, from 
Photography Degree Zero: Reflections on Roland Barthes's Camera Lucida 
(2009) which appears in the Introduction to the thesis, is reproduced here as a 
point of comparison: 
 
 
 It is fair to say that we are now at a moment that sees 
itself as being after postmodernism but that has yet to 
attract the burden of a proper name or the motivation 
of an enabling politics. The invention of such a 
politics and with it a mode of critical writing that is 
appropriate for the times we live therefore remains the 
most pressing task to face the present generation of 
photography’s interlocutors.  
(Batchen 2009: 21) 
 
 
Furthermore, we uncover a quotation from Batchen that appears twelve years 
earlier in Burning with Desire: The Conception of Photography (1997) that 
emphasises his concern with this issue: 
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Perhaps photography could only be conceived at a 
moment when classical and modern epistemes were 
folding over and into each other. In other words, 
photography’s birth pangs coincided in a movement that 
involved both the demise of the premodern and the 
invention of a peculiarly modern arrangement of 
knowledges; the appearance of one was only made 
possible through the erasure of the other. Photography’s 
historical emergence is therefore best described as a 
palimpsest, as an event that inscribes itself with the space 
simultaneously marked and left blank by the sudden 
collapse of natural philosophy and its Enlightenment 
worldview.  
(Batchen 1997: 186) 
 
 
This particular moment for photography is especially anxious as in addition to the 
concerns outlined above by Coleman and Batchen, it also straddles the transition 
from analogue to digital in its mode of production. Concerning the nature of 
photography at present Derrida speculates “…does what we have available to us 
now deserve the name of photography?” (Derrida 2010: 5).  Concerning the 
‘name’ of photography, Bergson proposes that photography is analogous to 
perception, Eduardo Cadava writes: 
 
 
Photography and perception are analogous to one 
another in Bersgon not so much because perception 
works like a camera to seize reality but rather 
because, working like a camera, it fails to seize 
reality. What photography and perception do not 
perceive they do not perceive for reasons of 
principle. That is, it is because they are photography 
and perception that they do not perceive. 
(Cadava 1997: 92-3)  
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On one hand Derrida’s observation could be regarded as extremely medium-
specific in order to identify what constitutes ‘photography proper’ in the smallest 
detail. On the other hand, Bergson’s analysis states that photography is equal to 
perception – a substantial claim in comparison. To take this further, this 
difference can be interpreted perhaps through Deleuze’s discussion on the too 
large and the too small of difference18. Perhaps the too large of difference equates 
with the perspective that photography and perception are akin to each other as 
major concepts, whereas the too small off difference is reminiscent of the 
laborious medium specificity that Derrida seems to be alluding to. Whether or not 
in accordance with the current parameters of the medium, be it technological, 
theoretical or philosophical… can it still be called photography? That is, 
understood as the action of light focused through a lens onto light sensitive 
materials or sensors. Here we are merely speculating however, as maybe it is 
more apt to equate the too large of difference with representation as premised on 
difference by degree, and the too small with intensive difference based on 
difference in kind or how something changes over duration. This does not deny 
our speculative thoughts, as photography and perception are usually seen as 
differing by degree, whilst Derrida’s question can be perceived to be a question of 
‘in kind’. Hence the question, can a fixed culturally defined term such as 
photography still remain appropriate when the concept it is attached to has 
differed in kind so much that the name of the concept seems out of joint? This 
seeming double articulation of thought is an example of how difference resides 
even in language in a continuous play with representation.  
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Case Study: The Theory of Performed Photography 
 
To examine further how difference can reside in concepts in a continuous and co-
existent play with representation, we shall now evaluate a contemporary mode of 
photography for which this claim is made. Here we shall carry out a concise 
exposition of the theory of ‘performed photography’ as developed by Paul Jeff in 
his PhD thesis (2008). This provides some context and example for our critique of 
the classical perspective and also as a practice that begins to open the curtain onto 
the possibilities of a photography based as much on difference as on 
representation. Performed photography critiques photography as a static, pictorial 
medium and endeavours to supplement it with a mobile and temporally biased 
practice. Jeff’s thesis seeks to realign photography with temporality in order to 
address the imbalance that exists within the medium as a largely spatialised 
practice. One predicated on the ordering of space and pictorial conventions that 
utilises a system of representation based upon concepts of identity and 
resemblance. Whereas a temporally motivated practice however, identifies with a 
more radical conception of the medium. It is imperative to note that the emphasis 
on temporal concerns is an attempt to redress an imbalance and not merely to 
argue for temporal concerns over spatial ones. In addition to developing a time-
based conception of photography, Jeff posits a theory of At/one(mo)ment (At one 
moment) or ‘atonement’ a temporal interpretive construction that can be regarded 
as a compliment to Henri Cartier-Bresson’s (spatial) ‘decisive moment’. 
Furthermore, there are a number of practical works contained within Jeff’s thesis 
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that test or ‘open up’ these theories, which serve to provide space for further 
contemplations of possible practical explications of a radical temporally biased 
photography. Perhaps one of the most apparent influences in these works is the 
use of Deleuze’s concept of difference and repetition; marking a distinct shift 
away from identity and resemblance (the representational spatial model) and 
towards an anti-representational approach that addresses concerns of temporality 
and difference. Therein emerges a more radical conception of the medium that 
provides a compliment to traditional photographic practices, yet also a necessary 
challenge, to ensure a practice of photography that remains fully contemporary as 
a mode of expression at this critical stage in its history.  
 
Performed photography is an important precedent in my research and its 
constituent parts shall be investigated here, as this theory offers a strong example 
of an event/process-led practice that challenges the mainstream practice of 
photography. It is notable that the term ‘performed photography’ has been used in 
different contexts by both Jennifer Blessing (1997) for the exhibition ‘Rrose is a 
Rrose is a Rrose: Gender Performance in Photography’ at the Guggenheim 
Museum in New York and RoseLee Goldberg (1998: 98) before Jeff’s coherent 
theory (2008). More recently, curator and writer Susan Bright has highlighted 
Jeff’s theory in her publication Auto Focus: The Self-Portrait in Contemporary 
Photography (2010), thus giving credence to the contemporary significance of 
this approach to rethinking photography; “…[performed photography] is an 
important addition to the genre of self-portraiture, as it pushes photography far 
from the traditions that have dominated the medium” (Bright 2010: 183). We 
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should recognise here that Bright places performed photography within the 
‘genre’ of self-portraiture for the purpose of the publication, however this 
abridgement of the concept is misleading as it has far wider implications. 
Performed photography can be recognised as an inter-disciplinary genre that 
highlights the relationship between the performative act and the act of 
photography and so can also be equated with performance/theatre and live art 
practices. The dramaturge Mike Pearson has placed equal importance on the 
theory and practice of performed photography as a mode of live art or 
experimental theatre in his book Site-Specific Performance (2010). Performed 
photography draws out the concept of performativity as applicable in the visual 
arts in order to justify a new temporal paradigm. Precedents for this can be 
situated in particular works by Jackson Pollock, Richard Avedon and Phillip 
Auslander. However to uncover it’s theoretical origin, it is necessary to go back to 
John Longshaw Austin and his articulation of the performative. In How to do 
Things with Words (1961) the linguist J.L. Austin relates the performative to 
language in order to draw attention to the clear distinction between the descriptive 
and the performative in terms of utterance: 
 
 
For Austin, performatives are a special category of 
language, distinct from ‘constatives’ or those 
utterances that describe or are statements of fact. A 
performative utterance is one in which saying and 
doing are the same; in each case, words ‘accomplish 
an act through the very process of their enunciation’. 
(Blocker 2004: 114) 
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Pollock’s paintings in the late 1940’s of drip-smeared canvases became known as 
‘action paintings’, a term coined by critic Harold Rosenburg in The American 
Action Painters (1952). Rosenburg speculated that “[a canvas was] an arena in 
which to act” (Rosenburg 1952: 22) and that “[w]hat was to go on the canvas was 
not a picture but an event” (Rosenburg 1952: 22). (It is Pollock’s work via 
Rosenburg’s critique that leads to an important quotation for the aspiration of 
performed photography by artist Ralph Rumney that appears later in this case 
study). Such interpretations of Pollock’s art as ‘event’ are owed to the 
photographs and films of Pollock’s documenter, Hans Namuth. Namuth’s work 
can be implicated into Phillip Auslander’s ‘The Performativity of Performance 
Documentation’ (2006) as the dispersal of such documentation raised questions 
over Namuth’s relationship to Pollock and his art19. As Tracy Warr notes, in their 
essay ‘Jackson Pollock, Painting and the myth of Photography’ ([1983] 1996a) 
Fred Orton and Griselda Pollock consider “…how far does the photographer 
document what happened and how far does he or she create the ‘documented’ 
phenomenon?” (Warr 2003: 32). The word create is significant here in that 
photography is one of the mediums that can be said to define the parameters of 
representation in that it is constative (descriptive, in a way very true to nature) 
rather than performative in terms set out by Austin. These ideas permeate the title 
of the thesis – can photography describe its own event?, and as such then, does it 
perform its own event in Austin’s terms, or are we left merely to allude to 
photography’s position as a descriptive medium in the popular imagination.  
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What now becomes apparent is the possibility of a ‘performative’ photograph, as 
we can introduce it via the conception of the theory of performed photography. 
Outlined below are some of the key theoretical concerns that contribute to an 
understanding of performed photography, whilst also helping to highlight some 
prospective ideas that will reverberate for our enigmatic question CPDIOE? at 
later stages in the thesis. Jeff takes his standpoint from performance and time-
based arts in an attempt to revive a practice of photography that was seemingly 
exhausted and as the vehicle par excellence for depicting (and contributing to the 
hegemony of) spatial concerns, operating as an agent of representation. One of the 
key elements that contribute to a formulation of a practice/theory of performed 
photography concern performance and the question of its record. American 
portrait photographer Richard Avedon draws attention to the idea of the 
performative in relation to photographic portraiture in his essay Borrowed Dogs 
(1989): 
 
 
Portraiture is performance, and like any 
performance, in the balance of its effects it is good 
or bad, not natural or unnatural. I can understand 
being troubled by this idea – that all portraits are 
performances – because it seems to imply some kind 
of artifice that conceals the truth about the sitter. But 
that’s not it at all. The point is that you can’t get at 
the thing itself, the real nature of the sitter, by 
stripping away the surface. The surface is all you’ve 
got. You can only get beyond the surface by 
working with the surface. All that you can do is 
manipulate the surface – gesture, costume, 
expression – radically and correctly. 
  (Avedon 1989: 17) 
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In the essay, Avedon proposes that an intrinsic relationship exists between 
portraiture and performance. Initially, this may allude to the suggestion that 
portraiture is merely an artificial representation, however Avedon furthers his 
argument by proposing that it is necessary to work with the ‘image surface’ (as a 
photographer) in conjunction with the sitters ‘body surface’; this being a 
reciprocal process. This introduces the possibility of performance and as Peggy 
Phelan posits, it is in this dual manipulation that the performative emerges (Phelan 
1993: 37). It is the conception that “[a]ll portrait photography is fundamentally 
performative” (Phelan 1993: 35) that runs in tandem with the suspicion of 
artificiality; as Phelan remarks, the ‘art-fiction’ (Phelan 1993: 36) of portraiture. 
As in Avedon’s case, and indeed the inspiration for the title of his essay, his 
family album appears to be “…built on some kind of lie about who we were and 
revealed a truth about who we wanted to be” (Avedon 1989: 15); he recalls 
dressing up and posing with borrowed dogs and “…in front of expensive cars, 
homes that weren’t ours” (Avedon 1989: 15). Despite this, photography has a 
natural affiliation with truth as the photograph acts as ‘proof’ in the popular 
imagination, though this is put into question when considering photographic 
portraiture as Phelan highlights; “[t]he performative nature of portrait 
photography complicates the traditional claims of the camera to reproduce an 
authentic ‘real’” (Phelan 1993: 36). 
 
The notion of performativity is augmented through essays by Phillip Auslander 
and Amelia Jones. Auslander and Jones have written extensively in this area and 
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two key essays that collectively develop a contemporary understanding of 
performativity and the documentation of performance are ‘Auslander’s The 
Performativity of Performance Documentation’ (2006) and Jones’ ‘‘Presence’ in 
absentia: Experiencing Performance as Documentation’ (1997). Auslander’s 
seminal article proposes that performance documentation falls into two categories 
– the ‘documentary’ and the ‘theatrical’. In reference to Jones’ 1997 article, 
Auslander notes that the documentary vein of performance documentation 
suggests an ontological connection and acts as “…evidence that it actually 
occurred” (Auslander 2006: 1). It is within the theatrical category that Auslander 
situates the term ‘performed photography’, which “…suggests that such works be 
understood as a kind of photograph rather than as performances” (Auslander 
2006: 3). Auslander draws attention to “…cases in which performances were 
staged solely to be photographed or filmed and had no meaningful prior existence 
as autonomous events presented to audiences” (Auslander 2006: 2). He advises 
that these theatrical images “…are not performances at all and the images are not 
documents, but something else, another kind of art work perhaps” (Auslander 
2006: 3). Well known examples of this may be artists such as Cindy Sherman and 
Francesca Woodman, where a fabricated performance is made solely for the 
camera.  This is as far as Auslander goes in attempting to define the notion of 
performed photography; the first coherent theoretical definition is posited in Jeff’s 
thesis. Performance and the question of its record/documentation is discussed at 
length in Jones’ article, who raises some interesting questions relating to viewing 
performance solely through its documentation. That is, how the photograph acts 
as document and in her case, a substitute for the performance, and how the 
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photograph becomes testimony to the events occurrence. Auslander extends this 
definition by positing that a performance can continue to act performatively to 
secondary audiences through an ongoing performative function of the 
documentation. 
 
Drawing on performance and the question of its record, Jones’ interest lies in the 
concerns and strategies of documenting performance, and the issue of subjectivity 
and intersubjectivity in relation to engagement and interpretation by the audience 
of the performances/documentation. Jones writes about performance entirely 
through its documentation and raises the concern of not only how the photograph 
acts as document (or in Jones’ case a substitute for the performance) but 
additionally, the straight contract between event and photograph becomes 
energised as the photograph continues to perform the meanings of the ephemeral 
event to subsequent audiences. In Performing the Body/Performing the Text 
(1999) Amelia Jones and Andrew Stephenson discuss the emergence of 
performativity within art practices over the last fifty years and consider how this 
has impacted on interpretive possibilities; “…artistic meaning can [now] be 
understood and enacted through interpretive engagements that are themselves 
performative in their intersubjectivity.” (Jones and Stephenson 1999: 1). Also, 
many of these performative art practices “…enact the body or subject in a 
performative fashion (Performing the Body) in order to point to the act of 
interpretation itself as a kind of performance (Performing the Text).” (Jones and 
Stephenson 1999: 1) [emphasis in original]. Recognising the importance of the 
spatial/temporal balance for Jeff’s research, there are three ‘founding quotations’ 
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that illuminate his premise and shall be summarised here in order to contextualise 
the argument.  
 
Firstly, due to the capabilities of the medium to operate as a harbinger of truth and 
to provide an accurate (representational) depiction of reality, it is possible that the 
reason for a perceived stagnation of the medium is a result of photography 
becoming a slave to the depiction of space, to the detriment of its other constituent 
parts – the passing of time. The following quotation is from Walter Benjamin in A 
Short History of Photography ([1931] 1972): 
 
 
The procedure itself caused the models to live 
inside rather than outside the moment. During the 
long duration of these shots they grew as it were 
into the picture and in this way presented an 
extreme opposite to the figures on a snapshot. 
(Benjamin [1931] 1972: 17) 
 
 
Here, Benjamin is concerned with the durational nature of early photographic 
exposure times. The portrait of the Newhaven Fishwife20 that he is discussing 
embodies Benjamin’s interest with the temporality and aura within early 
photographic portraiture. This portrait reveals a moment that is imbued with 
duration (a temporality that instant shutter speeds expel) and as a result of the 
considerable duration of the early photographic exposure times, it could be said 
that these early portrait sitters had to reside within the photographic moment. Here 
we have a worthwhile insight for this present thesis (CPDIOE?) in that Benjamin 
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appears to be advocating an immanent practice. An instance where the sitter and 
the medium come together, existing within and coexisting in the photographic 
moment as the event of photography. This is in conflict with the estrangement 
between the event/referent and its representation that mainstream photography 
promotes. The significance of this quotation for performed photography provokes 
Jeff to ask – “…how to get back inside the moment?” (Jeff 2008: 14). Benjamin 
emphasised that as a result of increasingly fast shutter speeds brought about by 
increases in lens and emulsion technology, the subject and by extension the 
viewing subject were expelled from the photographic moment, only able to 
observe ‘a passing reality’21 from outside. Paradoxically equating the 
technological improvements of the time with the decline of photography22, 
Benjamin was certain that such changes were detrimental to the medium –  
“[i]mmobilizing and interdicting the passage between the photograph and the 
photographed, the decline of photography names both the involuntary conjuring 
of a distance, of an aura, and the forgetting of this ghostly emergence.” (Cadava 
1997: 15). Eduardo Cadava writing on Benjamin in Words of Light (1997) 
remarks on this distance that appeared between the photograph and the 
photographed in the age of mechanical reproduction (the much discussed notion 
of estrangement that has concerned most photographic theory since Benjamin). A 
correlation can be seen here in the separation between the event/referent and it’s 
representation that still exists in mainstream photography today. A central concern 
of performed photography is to diminish this distance and regain what has been 
lost in technological developments that have pushed us outside the photographic 
moment, “[i]t is fair to say that in performed photography the work emerges from 
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the ‘instance of duration’ rather than being captured via the concept of the instant” 
(Jeff 2008: 27). Here we can perceive in Benjamin’s insightful writing an inherent 
tension between the largely transcendent properties of photography as practiced, 
and the potentialities of a sub-cultural immanent practice. Secondly, coupled with 
the above assertion, this quotation by Roland Barthes holds particular significance 
to the aspirations of performed photography: 
 
 
Yet it is not (it seems to me) by Painting that 
Photography touches Art but by Theater [sic].  
(Barthes 1982 [2000]: 31) 
 
 
Barthes is also fascinated by the temporality of photography but recognised too 
that, photography had more in common with theatre than ‘art’, as painting is a 
spatial medium and theatre is a temporal/performative medium. Considering that 
photography is one of the mediums that can be said to define the parameters of 
representation in that it is constative (descriptive), naturalistic and predicated on 
vision, rather than performative in terms set out by Austin, this proposition by 
Barthes is at the very least intriguing and certainly illuminates the potential for 
this affiliation to be further explored; a theatrical style of photography. Finally, in 
thinking about the possibilities of a temporally motivated practice, an element that 
shall be expanded upon here is the proposition that this term aligns photography 
with a practice built around a founding event that leaves a trace. Performed 
photography exemplifies the element that is of interest here, the prospect of 
collapsing the event and its record (or trace) together, until they are folded around 
 97 
each other and resemble something akin to Austin’s performative utterance. Artist 
and Situationist Ralph Rumney makes the point: 
 
 
The trace of an act can be interpreted as an absolute 
realism. The act of making a trace is a whole other 
ball game. It’s obvious it’s not the same thing… the 
act of making a trace implies that you attribute 
significance to the trace, whereas the trace itself 
may or may not carry this significance. 
 (Woods 2000: 154) 
 
 
A crucial distinction is to be made between these two perspectives. In Rumney’s 
quotation, “[t]he trace of an act can be interpreted as an absolute realism” 
coincides with Roland Barthes’ noeme of photography; That-has-been. “In 
Photography I can never deny that the thing has been there. There is a 
superimposition here: of reality and of the past.” (Barthes [1980] 2000: 76) 
[emphasis in original]. However, “[t]he act of making a trace” is a reference to the 
largely pictorial history of photography; and observing the pictorialist tradition, 
the aesthetics and composition of the image are paramount. Graham Clarke writes 
about the concerns of Peter Henry Emerson, who was a central figure in 
‘pictorialism’; “…detail, light and the formal composition of the scene are central, 
but it was the seen rather than the scene that remained crucial.” (Clarke 1997: 51-
52). Therefore in general terms, if Rumney’s quote is applied to photographic 
practice it seems to imply an emphasis upon an act or event over its representation 
in terms of an absolute realism. That is, the promotion of the act, or performative 
action that can leave a trace beyond the rationale of making a trace. In making a 
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connection with the spatial/temporal models of photography, it is the spatialised 
model (representation) that is premised on the ordering of space and pictorial 
conventions, whereas a temporal model is concerned with a practice that is built 
around a founding event that leaves a trace, a movement from within itself. 
Temporally motivated practices bring the event to the fore and place the emphasis 
on event over document, and mobility over stasis, marking a departure from a 
picture base in favour of an event base. This highlights a resistance to the 
depiction of a tableau (even in the contemporary theatrical practices of Jeff Wall 
or Gregory Crewdson for instance), in order to place the emphasis on a durational 
performance. The resulting record being implicated into the event as something 
that will carry the event forward, even to the point of being indistinguishable from 
the event. Moreover, there is the further possibility that the event itself is 
photographic, with the photograph acting as a record of its own process. This 
touches yet again upon our central question – can photography describe its own 
event?. If the process of photography is central to the event designed then it 
follows in this case, that it is possible that one could say that photography is 
describing its own event. This is the essence of ‘performed photography’ and 
Rumney’s important distinction provides a fitting analogy between temporal and 
spatial concerns, and their corresponding traces. Thus when we emphasise the 
making of a trace in Rumney, we are concentrating on the act of representation. 
This is where the fetishisation of the object of photography lies in mainstream 
practice, that is, paying particular significance to the polishing up of the trace and 
making it self-important through editing, printing and display – these are all 
characteristics of a spatial practice. On the other hand, the trace of an act speaks 
 99 
of temporality and belongs to a new practice – a practice based on experiential 
flux, process and the concept of event – performed photography being a case in 
point.  
 
So far we have summarised some of the central theoretical concerns of performed 
photography. It is now necessary to provide a more functional outline that will 
help to further illuminate how performed photography can actually be practiced. It 
is also necessary to clarify here that this case study is useful to our general 
hypothesis in that it proves that there are practices being explored that are 
beginning the task of dissolving the classical perspective in photography. 
Practices that are currently engaged with new strategies of making meaning 
beyond a reliance on empirical observation and that are starting to reject some of 
photograpy’s core values. Space, clarity and producing order from chaos typify 
the great formalist era of the medium, values from which photography must 
eventually turn in order to progress. To do this it must arguably look beyond its 
own boundaries and adopt more non-specific codes23 (multi-disciplinarity) that 
can be seen to epitomize the trajectory of many other representational mediums 
during the last decades of the twentieth century. 
 
 
Historically, performance art has been a medium 
that challenges and violates borders between 
disciplines and genders, between private and public, 
and between everyday life and art, and that follows 
no rules. In the process it has energised and affected 
other disciplines - … photography as performance.  
(Goldberg 1998: 30-31) [my emphasis] 
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As Goldberg attests, performance art has been recognised as a medium that has 
the capability to revitalise other disciplines and by its very nature as an 
experimental and sometimes provocative practice24, seeks to challenge boundaries 
and conformist perceptions. Arguably, when placed in a contextual arrangement, 
notions of performativity and the practice of photography can provide suitable 
conditions for challenging more traditional conceptions of all mediums 
concerned. By drawing on the performative elements inherent in the medium, 
performed photography seeks to reconfigure the relationship between the act 
(event) of photography and its record, suggesting here that it is possible for 
photography to describe its own event. As has been discussed above, in 
mainstream photographic practices the event and its record are usually separate 
and exist independently of one another. The record subsequently becomes 
fetishisted as ‘object’, which creates a further distance as “…the event being 
ephemeral, disappears, leaving the photographic record standing highly visible in 
its role as mausoleum” (Jeff 2008: 25-6), containing nothing but ghosts. Whereas 
in performed photography, the distance between event and record is diminished 
by designing an event or situation that has its own resultant document placed at its 
core. Due to the experimental nature of performed photography, it should be 
noted that there are many levels and layers to this practice, however for the 
purpose of providing an overview, the most transparent ‘variant’ shall be 
discussed. In the same way that a subject matter is ‘chosen’ in mainstream 
photography, in performed photography, an event is designed to address a 
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particular question, and is often carried out in public where the 
spectators/audience are invited to attend or often encounter the event en passant.  
 
 
Once discovered, the audience becomes party to 
the event, and subsequently also party to, and 
observer of the photographic act. They witness the 
usually unseen process of photographing and often 
get to see the photographic results of that process 
during the event (Polaroid or digital). In this way 
process, edit and exhibition are collapsed into the 
event, giving photography an approximation to live 
are or theatre, and as a consequence taking on the 
immediacy, fluidity and ephemeral nature of 
(experimental) theatre.  
(Jeff 2008: 27) [emphasis in original] 
 
 
The model of empirical observation that photography relies upon as a naturalised 
truth bearer is replaced via a designed event by ‘provoked’ observation, denoting 
true experimentation. Exhibition is replaced by event in performed photography 
and instead of being passive observers to an end product of framed photographs 
hung on a gallery wall for example; the audience takes an active role from within 
the duration of the event. By experiencing the event/act of photography in this 
way, the mode of interpretation by the audience becomes active and performative, 
and in some cases, the event actually relies on audience participation for the work 
to be realised. In other cases, each designed ‘project’ is undertaken 
collaboratively, which can be identified by the PAUL+A pseudonym that Jeff 
operates under – the protagonist plus ‘another’ who often varies from work to 
work. The pieces are usually shown via projection, which adds another level of 
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temporality to the work and as screenings often with music, the durational 
element and feeling of endurance resembles an experience similar to theatre. As 
the works are process-based and the emphasis is not on the photographic ‘object’, 
it seems more fitting to use a method of presentation (transient, mobile, 
temporary) that subverts more traditional ideas of photographic exhibition, as 
stasis gives way to flux. 
 
Jeff’s own practice of performed photography reveals its anti-representational 
tendencies through the deployment of Deleuze’s concept of ‘difference and 
repetition’, in order to facilitate the interpretation of the photographic act as a 
time-based medium. (See here an excerpt from the PAUL+A project ‘I Watched 
Her Until She Dissappeared’ (2006) on page 206.) If the concerns of photography 
are to shift balance somewhat from a spatialised model toward a more temporal 
one, then it follows that the general framework cannot be wholly representational, 
as we have already ascertained that representation itself is a system based on 
space. To find an alternative one must look for a way to interpret the world in a 
more process led, temporal manner, the most workable alternative is Deleuze’s 
concept of difference and repetition25. This concept was devised to provide both a 
balance and an alternative to spatial representation and works by returning 
difference rather than the ‘same’ as in representation. Difference and repetition 
subverts and energises the system of model and copy employed by representation 
and serialises it so that it is the difference between a complex repetition (as 
opposed to the simple repetition of representation) that becomes productive in the 
search for any meaning. In Jeff’s practice of performed photography he employs 
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this serial strategy of the return of repetition itself in order to produce an 
enigmatic difference that becomes both creative as well as productive. The notion 
of identity is fractured by this complex series of repetition and the four precepts of 
the representational system as identified by both Foucault and Deleuze are 
nullified. Section I proper will expand upon the notion of difference and repetition 
as highlighted here, and shall investigate how such a concept can operate in 
relation to a contemporary practice of photography in order to produce a new 
‘image of thought’26.  
 
It is my assertion that Jeff’s development of a temporally biased strategy 
concerning photography might provide the first tentative steps away from 
photography’s reliance on representation and into a new and more challenging 
realm based on Deleuze’s conception of difference and repetition, itself a 
temporal strategy in opposition to the hegemony of representation. If we were to 
concur with Michel Foucault’s quip that perhaps the twenty-first century would be 
called ‘Deleuzian’27, then I would argue that it is credible that here is an area of 
photography that is yet to be developed. The seeds of which could be seen to lie in 
the conception of a temporally attuned practice, in this case performed 
photography. Though Jeff’s elucidation of a practical model of performed 
photography relies on difference and repetition amongst other things, I anticipate 
alternative conceptions of a temporal practice of the medium that takes inspiration 
from some of the areas discussed here, concentrating particularly on formulating a 
Deleuzian methodology based perhaps on seriality. Perhaps we can speculate an 
‘intensive’ practice that takes account of difference in kind as it deals with an 
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‘extensive’ projection of space. An early model of what we might call a 
‘photography degree zero’ could be Vito Acconci’s (b. 1940) work Blinks (1969) 
(see page 157 for a further elucidation on this project). Here the artist walks down 
a city street pressing the camera shutter each time he blinks, producing an 
arbitrary ‘blank’ document, of which the concept or idea plays a predominant role 
over and above the representation of the street.  
 
The thesis title can photography describe its own event? speaks of a conception of 
photography where event and record are folded around each other, being both a 
descriptive and a performative utterance at the same time. In this way, it is 
possible that performed photography provides some answer as to whether 
photography can describe its own event – that is, can it utter performatively and 
describe simultaneously? My title has intimations of Deleuzian difference in kind 
(as influenced by Bergson) and alludes to the potential of Austin’s linguistic 
distinction between constative (descriptive) and performative in terms of utterance 
in relation to photography’s position as a descriptive medium. Moreover, drawing 
on the temporal inflection inherent in these concerns, this investigation will 
unfold the concept of ‘event’ in its many impressions. This concern developed 
from the utilisation of performativity and shifts from an object/picture base 
(spatial) towards an event based (temporal) framework that can be recognised in 
performed photography. I shall attempt to extend these considerations to 
encompass philosophical ruminations of the notion of  ‘event’ in order to posit a 
new conception of the practice of photography but perhaps more importantly, of 
the concept of photography.  
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Although we have discussed above the premise of a paradigm shift within the 
practice of photography, my intention in the thesis is more to uncover what may 
be considered the hidden conditions and possibilities inherent within the medium. 
In the same instance it may be possible to intuit new future orientations of 
photography. This assertion is underpinned by Coleman and Batchen’s arguments. 
What can be seen to unite the two writers is that both their observations offer a 
shared belief that the conditions are fertile for change within the medium. 
Whether this manifests itself as an emergent practice or a rupture in the trajectory 
of photography may become evident later in the thesis. For now, a contemporary 
practice of photography that challenges the current paradigm, providing a 
significant change in its tenets and methods, can be recognised in ‘Performed 
Photography’. Performed Photography critiques photography as a static, pictorial 
medium and endeavours to replace it with a mobile and temporally biased 
medium. It is the first practice to combine creatively the traditional 
representational mode with the potentiality of difference. It is my belief that 
performed photography can be regarded as enough of a challenge to constitute a 
paradigm shift because the major elements that construct an understanding of 
mainstream photography are brought into question. This research trajectory 
suggests a move from the spatial to the temporal, from the descriptive to the 
performative, from representation to event. The thesis takes this conception of 
photography as its starting point and is centred around potential photographic 
processes that are re-energised as time-based enigmatic actions built around a 
founding event that ripples with traces, rather than a static re-presented pictorial 
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record. It concerns photography as an enigmatic event that can both iterate its own 
actions and describe them simultaneously. It is therefore necessary to identify 
some of the key arguments and characteristics of Performed Photography in order 
to outline the constituency of thought that is adopted by this thesis, and may yet 
provide a platform for a ‘leap into the void’. 
 
 
 
You cannot hang an event on the wall, only a picture28 
 
Having investigated our question can photography describe its own event? 
through the concept of Performed Photography, it is possible that we can instigate 
a productive encounter between my six-word arrangement and Jackson Pollock’s 
‘action paintings’. We have already ascertained the importance of Pollock in 
relation to performativity in the visual arts in the case study, however it will be 
pertinent now to look at Pollock’s work as it sits on the cusp of spatial 
representation and temporal act, that is, between representation and difference. In 
our very specific argument, we should stipulate here that we are presenting a 
particular perspective as it pertains to a general shift in the art of the mid twentieth 
century toward performativity and event. This concerns Pollock’s work in a 
perceived conceptual manifestation and is not meant to impinge on the many 
other important nuances that this artist brings to aesthetics and the practice of 
painting in which cases he was also highly innovative. The argument we are 
building here is in service of a temporality and performativity, which might be 
 107 
utilised for photography and so will subsequently owe a debt to Pollock the 
painter. 
 
As discussed earlier in the Section in relation to paradigm shifts, in the history of 
the sciences when an earlier system or ‘paradigm’ collapses or is rejected a new 
one is formed that is detached from its predecessor. For Thomas Kuhn, the 
previous paradigm becomes elapsed and redundant. A.D. Coleman notes that this 
‘cutting adrift’ of previous paradigms as in the sciences is not characteristic of 
what occurs in the arts, and that old paradigms in this instance are merely 
‘downgraded’ but not forgotten. As such, we can read through Deleuze’s 
Difference and Repetition and find a philosophical analogy. It is not a case of 
consigning representation to history, but of balancing and supplementing it with 
more contemporary ideas of temporal difference. Deleuze himself takes up this 
concept and utilising one of Nietzsche’s aphorisms from The Birth of Tragedy 
(1993), ably explains the tension between systems of representation and 
difference through an analogy with Ideas. “Ideas as they exist in themselves are 
distinct-obscure. Opposed to the clear-and-distinct of Apollonian representation, 
Ideas are Dionysian, existing in an obscure zone which they themselves preserve 
and maintain.” (Deleuze [1968] 2004a: 350). This is a basic dialectical coupling 
that we shall point out here is mirrored in the content of Sections I and II of the 
thesis. In the course of the thesis, we speak in various instances of the concepts of 
synthesis and coexistence and it is important to note here that although they are 
not identical in the concept, they are interrelated, the boundary between the two 
being often blurred. Similar to events, concepts can overlap, exist in parallel and 
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move in and out of relation with each other, therefore our use of the terms will 
always be interrelated and dynamic in a process of oscillation.  Considering the 
importance of forming a synthesis as highlighted here, our examination of 
Pollock’s action painting serves to explicate a means of creation29 between more 
traditional binary configurations and their constituent parts. It could be argued 
that this area of Pollock’s work appears to operate at the interstices between such 
binary arrangements in their numerous semblances and on a variety of levels. 
Furthermore, this resonates with Amelia Jones’ note on the significance of Allan 
Kaprow’s 1958 essay ‘The Legacy of Jackson Pollock’ and how it “…forms a sort 
of pivot between the static Pollock of modernism and the performative Pollock 
who would have spoken as one of many origins for postmodernism.” (Jones 1998: 
56). The fundamental importance of Pollock’s work in the 1940’s was that it 
altered the public perception of painting as a spatial (picture based) practice 
towards an event based, performative practice. For Jones, the “Pollockian 
Performative” (Jones 1998: 55) is a term used to express the Jackson Pollock as 
seen through the writings by Harold Rosenburg, Allan Kaprow, Clement 
Greenberg, but also through the photographs and films that were in widespread 
circulation taken by Pollock’s documenter Hans Namuth. The way Pollock was 
perceived as a result was unprecedented; the photographs exposed the process of 
creating his action paintings, which provided a previously unseen perspective to 
his work. In addition it transpired that these writings, particularly Rosenburg’s 
The American Action Painters (1952) where he claimed that Pollock and other 
American artists used the canvas as an arena to stage an event within (Rosenburg 
1952: 22), were a response to the Pollock as documented by Namuth as opposed 
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to the finished paintings as seen in a gallery space. As Barbara Rose notes: “[i]n 
retrospect, I realize Rosenburg was not talking about painting at all; he was 
describing Namuth’s photographs of Pollock.” (Rose 1980: u.p.). This gives some 
indication as to the impact the photographic documentation had on Pollock’s 
reception (here we are back on the ground of Auslander’s ‘The Performativity of 
Performance Documentation’). There is a temporality inherent in Pollock’s work 
that is central to our investigation if we are to consider the action paintings as an 
event. Firstly, we witness the event of painting through Namuth’s photographs, 
we see the artist nimbly dancing around the canvas (on the floor) and splattering 
the paint – we see the process of creation, the performative action. Subsequently, 
we see the painting in a frame hung on a gallery wall. There appears to be a 
transitionary period where the paint dries and it is prepared for display and in this 
process it is converted into a spatial representation. It may be an apt metaphor that 
as the fluid paint solidifies the event evaporates and the flux and flow of the 
action becomes stilled. What becomes interesting is that Pollock’s action 
paintings provide us with the ability to witness the shift between the temporal act 
and the spatialised picture. As Rosenburg observes in his preface to the second 
edition of The Tradition of the New (1960): “[p]ainting, however, is  in the 
‘realm’ of things made, not of deeds done; and art wins against the painter by 
changing his ‘act’ back into a  picture.” (Rosenburg 1960: 5). This directional 
flow, seemingly towards representation, is evoked by Historian Michael Lesy in 
his book Wisconsin Death Trip (1973) when he poses the counter problem. “The 
only problem is how to change a portrait back into a person and how to change a 
sentence back into an event.” (Lesy 1973: u.p.). He also states further down the 
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page “[t]he thing to worry about is meanings, not appearances.” (Lesy 1973: u.p.) 
which resonates again for our question CPDIOE?. This boundary in Pollock 
signals the shift between the ‘act’ or event, and the ‘picture’ in action painting, 
and confirms that ultimately, the work does convert to a spatialised representation 
from a temporal act. This happens in the move from the flat plane of the floor to 
the vertical plane of the wall, and prompts Rosenburg to ask: 
 
 
…must an Action Painting, which reflects a 
consciousness of the changed nature of the work 
of art in our time, inevitably lose its character as 
an event in the interval following its creation? 
Will it not rather augment its activity the 
moment it leaves the studio?  
      (Rosenburg 1960: 7-8) 
 
 
It appears to be the documents of Namuth that indeed augment this activity, 
especially when considering how the photographs and films function in 
connection with Auslander’s performativity of the performance document. 
Pollock is such a pertinent example here because his work not only reveals a shift, 
but also shows how the two modes of representation exist in a state of oscillation 
and coexistence. We may speculate that in terms of an estrangement between the 
event of a work and its record (here the painting on the wall) it is the act of 
photography that paradoxically here, mediates and facilitates the two realms of 
temporality and spatiality, and brings the process into the light. In the case of the 
earlier event, the painting becomes a document of its own event/act and to use 
Ralph Rumney’s term “…the trace of an act can be interpreted as an absolute 
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realism” (Woods 2000: 154). The document and the event are conflated into the 
same instance in terms of the work – the painting, folded together in an intensive 
becoming of the event/painting/object. They are folded into each other in the 
manner of a Deleuzian fold and the difference between these folds is not an 
external difference by degree, but an internal difference in kind: 
 
 
The outside is not a fixed limit but moving matter 
animated by peristaltic movements, folds and 
foldings that altogether make up an inside: they 
are not something other than the outside, but 
precisely the inside of an outside.  
(Deleuze 1988b: 96-97) [my emphasis]  
 
 
Once Pollock’s painting is hung on the wall it becomes a record, a record of the 
event of its own making. It is here that we can make a connection to our central 
question can photography describe its own event? as the painting becomes the 
constative utterance of the performative event of its making. The event appears at 
different levels – the creation of the work and the document of the event take 
place on the same ‘plane’; the canvas is at once an event and a document – a 
movement from itself and a folding in or out of itself. Thus it is impossible to 
perceive these as separate entities when they are both one and the same, the 
canvas in this way operating in line with Deleuzian ‘difference in itself’, or an 
intensive process30. Intensity in this sense concerns the temporality of the 
painting. If we consider the painting as event, and therefore process, this reveals 
the levels of differentiation it has endured or how it has differed in kind, rather 
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like Bergson’s sugar cube melting in a glass of warm water. The painting, moved 
from the performative horizontal of Pollock’s floor to the vertical ‘page’ of the 
gallery wall reveals its extensive attributes as a spatialised pictorial measurable 
space but now at the expense of the intensive process it has gone through. By 
“…privileging extension and extended magnitudes we bypass the intensive 
genesis of the extended” (Boundas 2010: 133), Pollock’s process as revealed by 
Namuth’s documents shows us the intensive states that are inherent in the spatial 
object of every painting. Pollock and Namuth together help us to encounter the 
intensity inherent in the visual image, to become aware of difference in itself as 
the condition of ‘absolute realism’.  
 
If we reflect on Pollock’s action painting as a document of its own event, then it is 
imperative to understand how the other ‘forms’ of document in circulation 
function in relation to this. Perhaps the most significant of these documents in this 
instance takes the form of Namuth’s photographs and films and indeed, the 
interpretation of Pollock’s painting as an event is largely down to this 
documentation that was released and published extensively. However, this level 
of documentation is secondary to the ‘painting as document’ because despite 
contributing to a wider appreciation of the process behind Pollock’s work, the 
photographs are not embedded in the creation of the painting, but are embedded in 
the wider event of the painting. In Deleuzian terms, the relationship between the 
painting/event and the photographs is one of difference by degree – the 
photographs are external to the event of the painting and Namuth remains a 
detached observer. The relationship between the event and the photograph in 
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performed photography however, is one of difference in kind as the photographs 
are actually implicated into the event. As we have just attempted to prove with 
Namuth’s documentation of Pollock’s process. Namuth’s photographs do take on 
another role as document as they carry the originary event of the painting forward 
and facilitate the conditions for further interpretations (such as our interpretation 
here), whilst also providing an example of Auslander’s performativity of the 
performance document. In this way, the writings on Pollock can also be regarded 
as another form of ‘document’ as they provide additional interpretations of the 
paintings. To some extent, this level of interpretation could be deemed as 
reverberations of the action paintings because (particularly in Rosenburg’s case) 
this art criticism is written from the perspective of viewing the paintings in 
conjunction with the documentary photographs31. Namuth’s photographs become 
implicated with the painting as the ‘trace of an act’ and therefore can be 
interpreted also as being implicated into the absolute realism of the event. Here 
we can recognise the paradox of Namuth’s photographs – as operating within the 
representational mode and so external to the event whilst in coexistence, being 
implicated, folded into the event of the painting, consequently engaging in an 
intensive relationship with the paintings event. 
 
This analysis of Pollock illuminates how his action paintings reveal what we 
might now call a synthetic coexistence; a productive conflation of the terms 
synthesis and coexistence as discussed earlier. One that similar to Galassi’s ideas 
concerning perspective, brings together as an arrangement, the temporal and the 
spatial, the performative and the descriptive, representation and difference into an 
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image of thought, and producing what Rumney terms an absolute realism.  When 
investigated through the Deleuzian concept of difference, Pollock’s work allows 
us to see that it is possible to find a border which is somewhere between each ‘set’ 
of antinomies – and what potentially could be perceived as pure difference. The 
notion of a synthesis as an eruption from an unfixed point that is between the 
traditional dualisms also offers a baroque sensibility to the encounter. Through 
this investigation the very process of forming a synthesis has been expounded, 
and we see it as a form of ‘superposition’ where an idea forms as both distinct and 
obscure, or where in Nietzsche’s terms the Apollonian and the Dionysian exist 
within the same concept. In a discussion of The Birth of Tragedy (1993), Michael 
Tanner in Nietzsche (1994) elaborates: 
 
 
He rapidly moves on to dealing with the ‘opposition’ 
between the Appoline and the Dionysiac, but that 
should not be taken to mean that they are enemies. 
As his exposition unfolds, it immediately becomes 
clear that ‘These two very different tendencies walk 
side by side, usually in violent opposition to one 
another, inciting one another to even more powerful 
births,’ until they seem ‘at last to beget the work of 
art that is as Dionysiac as it is Appoline-Attic 
tragedy.’ This kind of opposition which yet 
contrives to be immensely more fruitful than 
anything that could be produced by either of the 
opponents going it alone, is characteristic of 
ninenteenth-century German philosophy… 
(Tanner 1994: 9) 
 
 
Two possible articulations that can help to provide partial reflections on our 
question can photography describe its own event? have been expounded here. 
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Performed photography offers a practical model of photography that addresses 
some of these concerns and the investigation of Pollock provides a precursor for 
such an argument when viewed from a Deleuzian perspective. Can photography 
describe its own event? is a productive paradox, which has what James Williams 
recognises as a ‘generative function’ (Williams 2011: 53). Each time my six-word 
question is stated the problem transforms itself in each recurrence, and each 
repetition alludes to difference in itself.   
 
 
...one of the distinctive features of Deleuze’s 
philosophy of time is to embrace paradoxes for their 
productive power. This is related to the power 
ascribed to problems in Difference and Repetition; 
like problems, paradoxes cannot be resolved but 
must rather be transformed creatively within a 
necessarily speculative model. It could be said that 
paradoxes prepare the way for problems through a 
critical clearing of the commonsense certainties of a 
field and through the generation of a structure of 
opposed, yet connected and irreducible principles.  
(Williams 2011: 63) 
 
 
An affinity can be seen here between Deleuze’s productive paradox and the notion 
of a Bergsonian problem as discussed earlier in this Section. By positing the 
question well enough in a Bergsonian sense, it is considered that both the problem 
and its solution can be revealed, whilst the determining of problems (as with 
paradoxes) has its own space for creative transformations and inventions.  
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Photography becoming-minor 
 
We shall now consider the operations of the minor in Deleuze and Guattari’s 
thought, and posit that our enigmatic question CPDIOE? instigates a becoming-
minor for photography. Deleuze and Guattari put the term to use in relation to 
literature, particularly in their book Kafka: Towards a Minor Literature (1986a) 
and also in A Thousand Plateaus ([1987] 2004a). In Kafka, they disclose that the 
minor ‘mode’ of practice  “…stops being representative in order to now move 
towards its extremities or its limits” (Deleuze and Guattari 1986a: 23). Taking this 
further, O’Sullivan underlines that, “…a minor art pushes up against the edge of 
representation; it bends it, forces it to the limits and often to a certain absurdity” 
(O’Sullivan 2006: 73). Here we notice a resonance for CPDIOE? in that as a 
paradoxical construction that purposely eludes straightforward definition, we can 
acknowledge a certain level of absurdity intrinsically folded into our 
code/question. Let us contemplate that a minor-photography operates from within 
major (mainstream) conceptions of the medium and seeks to reconfigure the very 
concept of photography so that it operates in a minor key. This can also be said 
for a practice of photography that challenges more recognisable modes, such as 
performed photography and my practical experiments for IPCRES – the 
International Project Centre for Research into Events and Situations. Thus, 
minor-photography is a disruption or a rupture from the major, (spatialised) 
practices of photography. 
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…a minor literature does not occur ‘elsewhere’ or 
‘apart from’ a major literature (this is not a dialectic) 
but on the contrary operates from within, using the 
same elements as it were but in a different manner. 
In fact, it is not so much a question of the minor of 
the major but of a becoming minor in the sense of 
producing movement from ‘within’ the major… 
(O’Sullivan 2006: 71) [emphasis and 
brackets in original] 
 
 
As the above quotation suggests, instead of recognising the minor as a distinct 
entity from the major, we should think of it more as a process, a becoming from 
within the major. It is worth noting that ‘minor’ does not signify a numerical 
minority, instead it is a concept that deterritorialises the ‘major’ and it is by this 
process that ‘becoming-minoritarian’ takes place. Working from a peripheral 
position then, a minor-photography advocates an alternative practice of 
photography that engages with a more radical conception of the medium. That is, 
by changing the conditions that surround photography from being concerned with 
representation to inhabiting the realm of difference, we can think of this as ‘using 
the same elements but in a different manner’. Here we might turn our attention to 
an edited book that was published in 2012 by the Lieven Gevaert Research Centre 
for photography in Leuven, Belgium, titled Minor Photography: Connecting 
Deleuze and Guattari to Photography Theory, which examines the notion of ‘the 
minor’ as espoused by Deleuze and Guattari in connection with photographic 
theory. Despite offering a seemingly interesting inquiry on the outset, especially 
given our concerns here, the book is limited in its use as most of the essays try to 
contextualise existing works within the operations of the minor. They attempt to 
overlay Deleuze and Guattari’s ideas onto the surface of existing practices of 
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photography. Beyond my own practical experiments, the illustrations included in 
this thesis are intended to be evocative of the general argument and not to act as 
examples of the theories I am promoting. There is no attempt to apply my theories 
retrospectively onto existing works. It is my opinion that these publications fall 
short in fully embracing the potential Deleuze and Guattari’s thought offers and 
perhaps these tentative writings tend to fall more into an examination, or 
explication to use Deleuze’s term32, rather than harnessing more creative and 
inventive strategies that work towards a future-orientated practice – a 
photography yet to come. Aside from the essays that directly engage with 
photography, Simon O’Sullivan provides an introductory essay to the book; a 
reworking of some of his previous works in the form of the text ‘From Stuttering 
and Stammering to the Diagram: Towards a Minor Art Practice’ (2012). We must 
note here that O’Sullivan does not venture into developing the concept of a minor 
photography but instead talks about the minor in more general terms, save for his 
conclusion where he reflects: 
 
 
If stuttering and stammering are the mode in which 
literature becomes minor, and the figural and the 
diagram are painting’s specifically minor mode–then 
what might be the character or components–of a 
specifically minor photography? […] It seems to me 
that here a turn is required away from the notion of 
the minor as it has already been deployed in 
Deleuze, and indeed myself, towards photography 
and to its own specificity. Indeed, I take this to be 
one of the intensions of this edited collection – to 
excavate a minor tradition of photography that is 
particular to its medium and as a practice. In such an 
enquiry and exploration it seems to me that the very 
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definition of the minor (an possibly of photography 
also) will necessarily change. 
(O’Sullivan 2012: 15) 
 
 
Whilst we should recognise that the concept of a minor photography is not our 
main concern in the thesis, this insightful rumination prompts a valid questioning 
of what reflects photography’s minor tradition. For now though, we will return to 
O’Sullivan’s earlier book Art Encounters Deleuze and Guattari: Thought Beyond 
Representation (2006) and consider the minor mode less specifically, via an 
engagement with the expanded field of contemporary art practice. The role of the 
minor within art then, is concerned with the producing of “…a break with habitual 
formations and dominant signifying regimes.” (O’Sullivan 2006: 69). In relation 
to art practices that operate in this minor key, O’Sullivan makes some practical 
suggestions as to what we might consider as minor-practices of contemporary art 
which shall help us ascertain whether the concept CPDIOE? (and related 
practices) can be regarded as a becoming-minor for photography. Practices that 
are minor to the major tradition of Modernism such as post-modernism and other 
critiques can offer one example, as well as “…those marginal and dissonant 
practices that were themselves part of modernity but which also in some senses 
turned against it; modernity’s ‘other voice’ as it were.” (O’Sullivan 2006: 72). 
Here, O’Sullivan is referring to dissident manifestos by groups such as Dada, 
Futurism and the Situationists. In addition, O’Sullivan suggests we might 
“…characterise those practices as minor which abandoned the canvas 
(happenings, performance and so on)” (O’Sullivan 2006: 72). Furthermore, “[t]he 
expanded practices of today would be but the last moment in this genealogy of a 
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minor art positioned explicitly outside the gallery and indeed ‘outside’ typical and 
traditional definitions of art.” (O’Sullivan 2006: 72). As we can see, performed 
photography is a particularly pertinent example of a minor practice here as this 
practice unequivocally takes place outside the gallery and ‘outside’ archetypal and 
conventional definitions of photography. In Kafka, Deleuze and Guattari discuss 
the characteristics of a minor literature and the most relevant to note here is that 
for them, a minor literature is always collective (Deleuze and Guattari 1986a: 17). 
(IPCRES works are also participatory and event-based). The emphasis on the 
collaborative nature of the minor can also be recognised in performed 
photography as practiced under the guise of PAUL+A – each designed ‘project’ is 
undertaken by the protagonist plus (and) ‘another’ as alluded to by the 
pseudonym. Interestingly, concerning the ‘+’ as a mechanism for connections, 
Verena Conley notes: 
 
 
The minority is nodenumerable, but it may have 
many elements. The non-denumerable is 
characterised by the presence of connections, that is, 
the additive conjunction ‘and’ or the mathematical 
sign ‘+’: a minoritarian language is ‘x + y and b + 
traits a + a and…’. It is produced between sets and 
belongs to neither. It eludes them and constitutes a 
line of flight.  
(Conley 2010: 167) 
 
 
Here we can recognise further how the minor is implicated into the notion of 
Deleuzian becoming as a mode or process of connection, and as a creative 
stammering that causes the deterritorialisation of the major. The focus of the 
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movement is on becoming; “…on relations, on what happens between: between 
actions, between affections, between perceptions. For Deleuze, a minor cinema is 
situated in a logic and an aesthetics of the ‘and’. It is a creative stammering 
(and…and…and)…” (Verevis 2010: 169-170). The creative stammering of the 
‘and…and…and’ invokes a movement from within the concept of photography 
and calls forth a practice that perpetually differs from itself. (We shall return to 
the concept of the ‘and’ in Section II). In literal terms, PAUL+A (as the 
practitioner of performed photography) is a collective enunciation, which in itself 
is mutable from one work to the next. And in our crypt/code CPDIOE?, we create 
a stuttering and a stammering between each enunciation of our central question, as 
its surrounding conditions are in a dynamic flow of continuous variation. 
Additionally, the ‘and…and…and’ is a rupturing of representation, that generates 
a photography that disrupts its own reading as each repetition of our question 
evokes difference. Deleuze and Guattari conceived the conception of major and 
minor first and foremost as an operation of language/literature. What we are 
interested in here is how something new emerges from within the conventions of 
the status quo, or even, how the dissolving of a convention can change the 
expanded field. Both actions can create a new event. 
 
 
A major use of language limits, organises and 
controls and regulates linguistic materials in support 
of a dominant social order, whereas a minor usage of 
language induces disequilibrium in its components, 
taking advantage for the potential for diverse and 
divergent discursive practices already present within 
the language. 
(Bogue in Parr 2010a: 170-171)  
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Bergson and the dissolving of an object into an event 
 
A major literature repeats forms of the past, and 
subjugates itself to some supposed identity which all 
those forms express. A minor literature repeats 
nothing other than the power to be different; its 
becoming is not within time but it is untimely. 
Difference is not the difference between different 
forms, or the difference from some original model; 
difference is the power that over and over again 
produces new forms. 
(Colebrook 2002: 122-123) [emphasis in 
original] 
 
 
The above quotation lies at the heart of the thesis, in our quest to find minor 
modalities within the concept of photography that can emerge from within the 
major tradition (the classical perspective) and fracture the field of representation 
through the power of difference. This attitude is embodied in our central question 
(CPDIOE?) as the enigmatic aspect of that question is produced from the paradox 
of its construction, where the first three words ‘can photography describe’ 
(representational paradigm) are disrupted by the last three words ‘its own event?’ 
(paradigm of difference). It is from the perceived fracture in the sentence that the 
force of the enigma emerges, and proceeds to disrupt its own meaning. “The 
principle of enigma is the coincidence of the rational and the irrational.” (Perniola 
[1990] 1995: 16). This becomes an important principle of the thesis and one that 
we will demonstrate over and over again by applying different sets of research to 
our enigmatic question. The result will help us in our hypothesis by revealing that, 
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as Mario Perniola attests in Enigmas: The Egyptian Moment in Society and Art 
([1990] 1995) “…enigma is capable of simultaneous explanation on many 
different registers of meaning, all of which are equally valid…” (Perniola [1990] 
1995: 10). It is also worth stating here that enigma by its very nature resides in 
temporality and this is underscored by its indiscernability.  
 
In order to address the prospect of photography being accepted as a time and 
process-based medium and as an equal and complimentary possibility to the 
mainstream spatialised models of photography, some tensions between the spatial 
and the temporal shall be reviewed here. In order to identify some of the inherent 
problems of spatialisation, it is necessary to examine Henri Bergson’s critique of 
spatial thought. By adopting Bergson’s philosophical project and thinking in 
terms of time rather than space, it allows photography to be explored as a 
temporal, as opposed to a primarily spatial practice. Bergson is a central figure to 
the thesis as his anti-Cartesian phenomenology focused on mobility, flux and the 
dynamic. There has been a resurgence of interest in his work in recent years and 
Deleuze owes much of his inspiration for his writings in this area to Bergson. 
Bergson postulated that if we think spatially, we only see the world in differences 
of degree; how one object or concept differs from the next, but if we introduce 
temporal aspects such as duration and memory we are able to see the world 
unfolding by differences in kind. That is, how each object or concept changes over 
time in terms of itself ‘in itself’. He offers the famous analogy of the dissolving of 
a lump of sugar. Deleuze in Bergsonism ([1966] 1988a) elucidates Bergson’s 
aphorism ‘I must wait until the sugar dissolves’: 
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Take a lump of sugar. It has a spatial configuration. 
But if we approach it from that angle, all we will ever 
grasp are differences in degree between that sugar and 
any other thing. But it also has a duration, a way of 
being in time that is at least partially revealed in the 
process of its dissolving, and that shows how this 
sugar differs in kind not only from other things, but 
first and foremost, from itself. This alteration, which 
is one with the essence or the substance of a thing, is 
what we grasp when we conceive of it in terms of 
Duration.  
(Deleuze [1966] 1988a: 31-32) 
 
 
To elaborate on this, difference by degree promotes the notion of an ‘object’ by 
prioritising how things differ from other things, thereby objectifying the world as 
a site of discrete entities in a spatial field. It is this world-view that promotes 
identity in the object and gives rise to the representational paradigm. A challenge 
to this hegemonic viewpoint arises from Bergson’s complimentary notion of 
difference in kind (or difference in itself) which perceives the world as dynamic 
and in constant change. Difference here speaks of the difference of an object or 
concept over a duration in time, producing a world that is in continuous variation. 
It is interesting to note that the former which leads to the fixity of identity and 
representation is the dominant world-view, whereas the world we experience is 
never fixed but in continual flux. It is difference in kind that offers a world of 
events and processes and qualitative experience. The spatially orientated realm of 
difference by degree allows for a quantitative experience that holds the measure as 
the mark of everything. This is the world of the picture where in photography’s 
overwhelming proclivity for an analytic perspectival system allows for optical 
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reality to be organised as spatial configurations within a frame. For our enigmatic 
question CPDIOE?, the act of describing ones own event correlates to Bergson’s 
notion of difference in kind, and so moves the inference regarding photography 
from the spatial to the temporal. In his doctoral dissertation published as Time and 
Free Will: An Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness ([1889] 2001), 
Bergson suggested there are different conceptions of time that need to be 
identified. He posited that the spatial could be connected to a quantitative, 
homogenous conception of time, which is measurable, mathematical and linear – 
what can be understood as ‘clock-time’. In contrast to ‘clock-time’ was 
experiential ‘living time’, which he termed la durée and it is Bergson’s assertion 
that la durée was a qualitative heterogeneous multiplicity. What becomes 
necessary is to get back to this mode of experience somewhat – to balance the 
quantitative with the qualitative and in our treatise on photography, to fulfil 
Benjamin’s wish to reside within the moment of photography once more. 
 
 
[O]ur life unfolds in space rather than in time; we 
live for the external world rather than for ourselves; 
we speak rather than think; we ‘are acted’ rather 
than act ourselves. To act freely is to recover 
possession of oneself and get back into pure 
duration. 
(Bergson [1889] 2001: 231-232) 
 
 
Making an association with Bergson’s conceptions of time as mentioned above, 
‘differences by degree’ correlate to the quantitative view of time, and ‘differences 
in kind’ are commensurate with la durée; a qualitative construal of time. It can 
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also be identified that endurance and experience are attributes of the concept of la 
durée, as it is the accumulation and evolution of these occurrences that give rise to 
this ‘living’ time. In terms of our case study on performed photography, as a 
minor practice it attempts to capture a durational qualitative moment, what Jeff 
calls ‘an instance of duration’ that is indistinguishable from (or folded into), and 
equal to, the spatialised representational instant of capture. Performed 
photography in its efforts to ‘collapse’ (Jeff’s term) an event and its record into 
the same instance, what he terms At/one(mo)ment (from the phrase ‘at one 
moment’) or ‘Atonement’, invents a photographic moment that is analogous to a 
cosmological black hole, or a singularity. A point in time in which concepts and 
narratives can be collapsed into and which perform mobility in the concept via a 
strategy of complex repetition (see below) returning difference through seriality.33 
In the quotation below from Copy, Archive, Signature: A Conversation on 
Photography (2010), Derrida is contemplating the possibility of a record or 
archive that is conflated with the event it represents, and can perhaps be read as an 
articulation of performed photography: 
 
 
It’s a question of point of view, and you are touching 
on the most acute point [la pointe] of the difficulty. 
Is it possible to think otherwise than from the point 
of view of that point?  But is it possible also to think 
from a point of view? How to imagine an archive 
that is somehow immediate, a present that consists 
of its own memory or its own reproduction?  
(Derrida 2010: 2) [emphasis and brackets in 
original] 
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We might add here, can photography describe its own point of view? In order to 
develop this argument further, there are related Deleuzian concepts that are 
pertinent to mention in relation to these areas of Bergson’s work, which shall 
provide points of comparison and may accentuate some connections to be made 
between Bergsonian/ Deleuzian thought. Deleuze was a bricoleur and drew 
inspiration from a range of significant thinkers. What is useful about Deleuze is 
that his contemporary writings can in some ways be regarded as ‘updated’ 
versions of concepts laid out for him to pick up and revitalise. For example he 
dedicated a series of monographs to the works of philosophers and artists, 
Spinoza, Foucault, Kafka, Bacon, Nietzsche, Kant, Leibniz, Proust and Bergson 
amongst others. Drawing from these writings, Deleuze formulated his own 
concepts that are often closely linked to his interpretations of aspects of these 
originary works. It is this taking up of concepts and subjecting them to the force 
of change and variation that we might see as analogous to the concept of 
difference in kind (in itself).  
 
Perhaps the most notable achievement of Deleuze is his book Difference and 
Repetition, which details his concept of ‘pure difference’ and ‘complex 
repetition’. It will serve us well here to look more closely at this aspect of 
Deleuze’s work to gain a valuable perspective on our code/question CPDIOE? 
(and to prepare us for Section II where we will be putting these ideas to use). For 
Deleuze, repetition can be seen as dependent on difference from within the same 
concept, as the whole concept emerges on different levels, just as in Bergson’s 
concept of difference in kind that we have described above. Whereas mainstream 
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representation (as we understand it in the context of the thesis) is a product of 
spatialisation, Deleuze’s concept is conceived from within a temporal field 
beyond rationality and as such, proposes a critique of the former perspective. 
Representation (simple repetition) allows for an understanding of how one 
concept or object differs from another - difference by degree. However, the 
repetition of difference (complex repetition) moves towards an understanding of 
how something can differ in itself and can be related back to Bergson’s ideas on 
duration.  
 
At this stage, we can recognise the primary motivation of the thesis and arguably 
one of the most important aspects of Deleuze’s thought, that of continuous 
variation and becoming. Deleuze purports that we should not perceive existence 
as a combination of separate entities that join together to make a whole, but 
instead, existence must be characterised as the mobilisation of variation into a 
continuous flow of movement and change. This line of thought can be traced all 
the way back to Greek philosopher Heraclitus (c. 535 – c.475 BC) whom Deleuze 
mentions on occasion. In Nietzsche and Philosophy ([1983] 2006b) he makes 
reference to Heraclitus being dubbed ‘The Obscure’ philosopher and remarks; 
“Heraclitus is obscure because he leads us to the threshold of the obscure: what is 
the being of becoming? What is the being inseparable from that which is 
becoming?” (Deleuze [1983] 2006b: 23). (We might point out that we are also 
moving towards more obscure modes of thought as we move from this Section 
and into the next.) Heraclitus’ famous dictum two thousand five hundred years 
ago concerned the ever-present change that exists in the universe; ‘you cannot 
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step in the same river twice’. As such a significant precursor to Deleuze’s entire 
philosophy, we will take a moment to summarise an area of study pertinent to the 
thesis that stems from this thought (and was a source of inspiration for Deleuze); 
process-relational philosophy and the work of Alfred North Whitehead (1861–
1947). Heraclitus’ student Cratylus (date unknown) went one step further and 
posited that you can’t even step in the same river once, as C. Robert Mesle in 
Process-Relational Philosophy: An Introduction to Alfred North Whitehead 
(2008) elaborates: 
 
 
The river changes as we step into it, and so do we. 
Some things change very slowly, but all things 
change. Or to put it better, the world is not finally 
made up of ‘things’ at all, if a thing is something 
that exists over time without changing. The world is 
composed of events and processes. 
(Mesle 2008: 8) 
 
 
Whitehead will appear in later parts of the thesis, though most explicitly in 
Section III where we will appreciate how his theories of event came to influence 
Deleuze’s rendering of this concept to a great extent. In short, in Whitehead’s 
thought an event is denoted through the relational aspect between concepts or 
objects, to the extent that objects are perceived as very slow events. He believed 
that every real life-object might be understood as a similarly constructed series of 
events and processes. Whitehead is important to this area of study, as his process 
philosophy of event over object, dynamic change over stasis, relates directly to a 
critique of the classical perspective of photography, as a central tenet of our 
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reliance on representation. It is worth reminding ourselves here that one of the 
questions we are asking of the medium of photography is, can it react to a 
worldview of process philosophy and still remain meaningful, when not wholly 
employed in a representational mode? Another question might be, can 
photography ever give access to the sensation of existence, to go beyond mere 
appearance and to help us adapt to an ever-changing environment? James 
Williams asks a similar question on a more human scale: 
 
 
…if we are to understand how to act in such a way 
as to make our lives intense and individual and to 
understand and react to the intensity of our 
environments, then we must allow our thoughts and 
bodies to turn into intensities, to difference in itself. 
(Williams 2003: 11)  
 
 
Let us now validate photography’s credentials within the representational 
paradigm, by looking at the constituent elements of representation from the socio-
political perspectives of Michel Foucault and Gilles Deleuze. Foucault in The 
Order of Things ([1966] 2009) and Deleuze in Difference and Repetition ([1968] 
2004a) define the ‘four iron collars of representation’; “…identity in the concept, 
opposition in the predicate, analogy in judgement and resemblance in perception” 
(Deleuze [1968] 2004a: 330). As Deleuze explains, these are the four dimensions 
of the classical world of representation which co-ordinate and measure it (Deleuze 
[1968] 2004a: 330). The possibility of a system based on difference will be 
examined through the thesis by using these four dimensions as starting points in 
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order to uncover where possible fractures may occur within mainstream 
representational theory. In simple terms, by avoiding or at least subverting these 
four precepts it is possible that we might find our way beyond the limits of 
representation. If we look further into the four ‘iron collars’ of representation we 
can understand better how they function and define the parameters of 
representation. Identity is the referential link that names an entity or concept, 
however because reality is a process of becoming and is inscribed by difference 
then the concept is too limited to correspond to the continuous variation of life. 
Opposition refers to the workings of the dialectic and promotes reason; if we can 
nullify opposition in the concept then we can also exit the rational too, as will be 
demonstrated in the following Section. Analogy forms yet another link with 
reason and so aids understanding of the concept, and resemblance employing 
mimesis as an aid to perception. What we must attempt to do in order to fracture 
the notion of identity in representation is to multiply the instances of the concept 
(complex repetition), which will also nullify opposition and simple reason, and as 
resemblance is complicated analogy too is nullified leaving judgement and 
understanding in an obscure zone. These are the workings of a complex repetition 
that Deleuze advocates in order to produce pure difference through a system of 
‘simulacra’ in place of representation, as simulacra divert from the model and 
copy of representation to take the form of series. Such a series also works to 
dissolve the notion of an original until it is not the one or the other but the 
and…and…and…of the series (see Section II). 
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A singularity is the point of departure for a series 
which extends over all the ordinary points of the 
system, as far as the region of another singularity 
which itself gives rise to another series which may 
either converge with or diverge from the first. 
(Deleuze [1968] 2004a: 348) 
 
 
 
Encounters with knowledge and photography 
 
In Proust and Signs ([1964] 2008) Deleuze provides us with an invaluable 
methodology with which to evade the fixity of representation with its resultant 
clichés in that he makes a distinction between the object of an encounter and the 
object of recognition. “Truth depends on an encounter with something that forces 
us to think and to seek the truth.” (Deleuze [1964] 2008: 12). When we recognise 
something, what we already know is reconfirmed and we take recourse to habitual 
thought. The object of recognition is something that is always already in place and 
now is merely re-presented, the only process that takes place is the reaffirmation 
of a way of being in, and thinking about the world. With a true encounter we are 
forced to thought as our habitual thought processes undergo a rupture in the face 
of the truly new or novel. Once we have assimilated the encounter our world is 
renewed and we have a moment of affirmation of new conditions, old ways are 
challenged, existing knowledge is disrupted. The encounter then, encompasses 
creativity as it is in service of the production of the new. 
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Something in the world forces us to think. This 
something is an object not of recognition but of a 
fundamental encounter. 
(Deleuze [1968] 1994: 139) 
 
 
We shall conclude this Section with an instance of photography’s encounter with 
itself, as it was brought to thought by artist Yves Klein (1928 – 1962) and his 
Leap into the Void (1960). In this seemingly straightforward black and white 
documentary photograph of a mundane Paris side-street, we are confronted by the 
image of a man (Klein himself) launching himself off a wall from which he will 
inevitably crash down into the street. The reality of the material photograph 
however is that Klein remains suspended in mid-air for eternity, in the photograph 
he will never fall. Indeed, it was as much Klein’s wish that the image would be 
read as a man floating upwards rather than falling downwards. To quote Cadava 
from Words of Light (1997), “…the thesis condenses a network of relations into a 
frame whose borders remain permeable. A photograph in prose, the thesis names a 
force of arrest. It signals in writing the interruption of writing.” (Cadava 1997: 
xx). The instance of Leap into the Void therefore signals in photography the 
interruption of photography. The photograph strikes at the very heart of the 
medium’s contract with rational truth and our desire to believe the evidence of 
photographs, especially when they propose to be the document (trace) of an act. 
Set against this miraculous photograph where we as viewers are more concerned 
with the instance after rather than the instance of, are a set of purportedly known 
facts, that is, the photograph consists of two halves, of which the original lower 
half showed the tarpaulin held by friends that he was going to fall into. Also, that 
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Klein put two photographs into circulation – one with a man on a bicycle cycling 
away into the distance, the other without. This assemblage surrounding the 
seeming event of the photograph precisely interrupts what we would like to 
believe about that event. With this work Klein challenges the veracity of 
documentary photography and its substantiating credentials. If Klein intuits that 
all events are ostensibly unknowable or indiscernible, then he achieves this insight 
with a brilliant pictorial version of Werner Heisenburg’s ‘Uncertainty Principle’ 
(1927) (to which we will return in Section II). Whereas we can plot Klein’s 
position, we cannot plot his movement simultaneously. Klein leaves the situation 
of his leap in an indeterminate state due to the conditions of his experiment with 
photography. In a slight of hand reminiscent of Erwin Schrödinger’s famous 
thought experiment concerning a cat in a box34 with a flask of poison that may or 
not be broken, Klein is simultaneously floating upwards and crashing downwards. 
The alternate photographs of the safety net, and with or without the cyclist, give 
the possible conditions upon ‘opening the box’. These ‘realities’ must be regarded 
as possible realities now, and mark the limit of when the potential conditions of 
the situation collapse into one possibility or another. In the situation of Klein’s 
photograph the box remains unopened, we can know nothing for sure of the event 
depicted. In deference to Marcel Proust’s (1871 – 1922) proclivity for describing 
photographs in his great novel In Search of Lost Time ([1913 – 1927] 1996), we 
will withhold Klein’s artwork here. We will simply replicate the inscribed 
dedication on the back of a photograph of Edgar Aubert, given to Proust by the 
young man; “[l]ook in my face: my name is Might Have Been; I am also called 
No More, Too Late, Farewell.” (Brassaï 2001: 17) [emphasis in original]. 
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The age of resemblance is drawing to a close. It is 
leaving nothing behind it but games. Games whose 
powers of enchantment grow out of the kinship 
between resemblance and illusion; the chimeras of 
similitude loom up on all sides, but they are 
recognised as chimeras; it is the privileged age of 
trompe-l’oeil painting, of the comic illusion, of the 
play that duplicates itself by representing another 
play, of the quid pro quo, of dreams and visions; it is 
the ages of the deceiving senses; it is the ages in 
which the poetic dimension of language is defined 
by metaphor, simile and allegory.  
(Foucault [1966] 2009: 57) [emphasis in 
original] 
 
 
Before we follow Klein and take a leap into our next Section, writings that in 
many ways evoke the concept of the void as we attempt to describe a multiplicity 
of perspectives on difference, we must take stock and offer an overview of the arc 
of the research so far. 
 
 
 
A summation and the trajectory of enquiry 
 
The purpose of this opening Section has been to establish a degree of 
understanding of the classical perspective in the concept of photography. This 
provided a starting point from which to identify potential outmoded 
methodologies and allowed some thought of how to address areas that could be 
useful in the generation of new paradigms of the medium. Using the Bergsonian 
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problem as method the thesis began to ask questions of the current status of the 
medium. By introducing the notion of ‘event’ into the matrix that makes up 
contemporary photographic theory, we began to lay the foundations for a practice 
of temporality, to be set against and compliment present conventionalised 
(spatialised) models of photography. This allowed us to move from the spatialised 
status quo of a pictorialised practice into speculative notions of temporal event-
based practices of photography. Next we introduced a major element of 
philosophical thought of concern to the thesis, principally through the work of 
Henri Bergson and Gilles Deleuze – that of a complimentary system of 
philosophical difference, to be both set against and to enhance existing 
representational modes. This coexistence of perspectives in continental 
philosophy offers a model for how a complex medium such as photography can 
build from its representational basis enabling it to flourish in innovative 
directions, as yet unimagined. By identifying a temporally biased Case Study 
(Performed Photography) that seemed to hold some promise for our project, we 
started to unpick the potentiality of time in its ability to offer a hithero unforeseen 
perspective for photography. It was shown through an analysis of Pollock’s 
paintings that this shift into temporality via the performative had already occurred 
in other artistic mediums and it was my assertion that the conditions were ripe for 
change within the medium of photography. From this point, it was suggested that 
through experimentation in these areas, new photographies could emerge from 
within the hegemony of mainstream expressions of the medium. Furthermore, 
how our question CPDIOE? (the thesis) instigates, performs, and facilitates a 
‘becoming-minor’ for photography (moving towards its extremities or limits). 
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The Section used the metaphor of light to describe already exisiting modes of 
photography (an Enlightenment invention) and set the medium’s descriptive 
characteristics against potential performative modalities. At the end of the Section 
we set the tone for Section II by metaphorically turning out the lights of vision 
and reason by analysing Klein’s extraordinary Leap into the Void thereby setting 
the scene for the work of Section II. The trajectory of enquiry that will be carried 
through Section II will introduce a more enigmatic, opaque writing style in order 
to reflect the material. This will prove a variation from the more academic voice 
of Section I. In the following Section, rather than attending to the illusion of 
three-dimensionality in photography, we shall be concentrating specifically on the 
potentiality of depth that the application of philosophical difference might 
speculatively offer the medium. In effect, we will counter the (presumed) stasis 
and fixity of current modes of photography with the potential for flux, variation 
and indeterminacy of meaning. By inducing the metaphor of a crypt and moving 
from the light into the dark, we will be exploring the thought of such Baroque 
thinkers as G.W. Leibniz, Walter Benjamin and in further depth, the 
contemporary work of Deleuze. The arc of the research at this point will allow us 
to introduce a key counter-balance and compliment to the system of 
representation explored in part in Section I. Central to this is Deleuze’s seminal 
work, Difference and Repetition ([1968] 2004a), which both critiques and seeks to 
enhance classical representation. The purpose of this inquiry is to look at 
photography as a much more complex concept and begin to look beyond its 
classical horizons towards a new opacity that can properly reflect perceived 
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uncertainties in a new age. We may conclude from Section I that photography in 
its representational mode might in fact be showing signs of exhaustion through 
it’s history so far. Moreover, in agreement with Batchen, Coleman, Kramp et al, 
the Section confirms that photography in its present moment could and arguably 
should be ready for change with regards to a paradigm shift within the medium. 
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Endnotes to Section I: Photo[graphy] 
 
 
1 The truth is that in philosophy and even elsewhere it is a question of finding the 
problem and consequently of positing it, even more than of solving it. For a 
speculative problem is solved as soon as it is properly stated. By that I mean that 
its solution exists then, although it may remain hidden and, so to speak, covered 
up: The only thing left to do is uncover it. But stating the problem is not simply 
uncovering, it is inventing.  
(Bergson 1946: 58-59) [my emphasis] 
 
2 In Difference and Repetition ([1968] 2004a) Deleuze relates ‘explicating’ to 
representation, whilst ‘interpreting’ conveys the paradigm of difference. 
Explicating has links to logical explanation and has an inherent linearity, whereas 
interpreting speaks of a more subjective and discontinuous multiplicity of 
readings. See Deleuze [1968] 2004a: 359. 
 
3 Deterritorialisation is concerned with the “…breaking up of order, boundaries 
and form to produce movement and growth, especially where this involves the 
survival or the creation of a new life […] or the disturbance of arbitrary or social 
rules” (Sutton and Martin-Jones 2008: 142) whilst reterritorialisation seeks “the 
re-establishment of order, boundaries and forms to produce stable embodiments or 
static identities. This might also include the incorporation of radical ideas or 
practices into dominant social formations.” (Sutton and Martin-Jones 2008: 143).  
 
4 Positivism is a ‘philosophical system recognizing only that which can be 
scientifically verified or which is capable of logical or mathematical proof, and 
therefore rejecting metaphysics and theism’. 
(http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/positivism).  
 
5 For further elucidation of this concept see Watney ‘Gardens of Speculation: 
Landscape in the Draughtsman’s Contract’ (1983a). 
 
6 See later in Section I for object/process and critique of representation and as a 
progression of the concept see Section II for difference and repetition. 
 
7 To read more on this issue see a number of key texts; Nelson Goodman’s 
Languages of Art (1976), followed by a critique of Goodman by Dominic Lopez 
in Understanding Pictures ([1996] 2004) and an additional critique in Art and 
Imagination, Photography and Representation (1974) by Roger Scruton. John 
Campbell’s Reference and Consciousness (2002) also tackles related issues 
concerning representation and reference, perception, denotation, mimesis and 
expression. 
 
8 Galassi’s exhibition and catalogue Before Photography is often regarded as a 
touchstone for providing an overview of the role of vision in art that subsequently 
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led to the invention of photography. Nevertheless, a number of critics have taken 
issue with the ‘artful convenience’ of Galassi’s choice of paintings and 
photographs that comply with his argument for the exhibition at the Museum of 
Modern Art in 1981. 
 
9 The Rhizomes Manifesto 
‘Rhizomes oppose the idea that knowledge must grow in a tree structure from 
previously accepted ideas. New thinking need not follow established patterns. 
Rhizomes promotes experimental work located outside current disciplines, work 
that has no proper location. As our name suggests, works written in the spirit of 
Deleuzian approaches are welcomed but not required. We are not interested in 
publishing texts that establish their authority merely by affirming what is already 
believed. Instead, we encourage migrations into new conceptual territories 
resulting from unpredictable juxtapositions.’ 
http://www.rhizomes.net/files/manifesto.html 
 
10 See page 61 of Metz The Imaginary Signifier: Psychoanalysis and the Cinema 
(1982). 
 
11 It is noteworthy that the scope of the essay is broader than summarised here – 
this part of the Section is looking specifically at the history of perspective and the 
implications this had on the invention of photography. The accompanying 
argument that Jay puts forward in the second half of the essay concerns the 
rupture of the baroque and other visual subcultures that are in contention with the 
hegemony of a Cartesian world-view. 
 
12 The mind/body dualism that Cartesian Persectivalism promotes was challenged 
in the late 1960’s by artist Vito Acconci (b. 1940). For example, in his work 
Stretch (1969), Acconci breaks up the Cartesian construct and dislocates the eye 
and the mind by removing the camera from its assumed position and takes a series 
of four photographs from the extremities of his arms and legs almost as a way of 
‘mapping’. The resulting photographs were then accompanied with a text and 
displayed in a grid so that “…each photograph maps the limits of the body while 
connecting those limits to the larger visual field.” (Poggi 1999: 257). During this 
time, Acconci experimented with works that challenged the notion of performance 
documentation and perceptions of vision, for example Blinks (1969) and Lay of 
the Land (1969). We will briefly return to the work Blinks later in the Section. 
Within the Cartesian construct, the object/subject is always ‘over there’; at the 
apex of where the lines of perspective meet, in Acconci’s case however, he 
incorporates his corporeal self into this construct and though doing so, embodies 
vision. 
 
13 See the Section II/III divider image of J.M.W. Turner’s ‘Snow Storm: Steam 
Boat off a Harbour’s Mouth’ (1842). It is perhaps of note here that we have used a 
section (bit) of the image. 
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14 This phrase forms the sub-title to Jay’s book Downcast Eyes: The Denigration 
of Vision in Twentieth-Century French Thought (1994). 
 
15 For this concept see Nietzsche’s The Birth of Tragedy (1993) page 14-18. 
 
16 For further elucidation on the concept see Gaston Bachelard The Formation of 
the Scientific Mind: A Contribution to a Psychoanalysis of Objective Knowledge 
([1938] 1986). 
 
17 Kuhn’s study “…designates the intellectual horizon of science during a certain 
period, determining a threshold beyond which it cannot go unless it fundamentally 
shifts its tenets and methods.” (Foster et al. 2004: 687). 
 
18 It is a question of extending representation as far as the too large and the too 
small of difference; of adding a hitherto unsuspected perspective to representation 
– in other words, inventing theological, scientific and aesthetic techniques which 
allow it to integrate the depth of difference in itself; of allowing representation to 
conquer the obscure; of allowing it to include the vanishing of difference which is 
too small and the dismemberment of difference which is too large; of allowing it 
to capture the power of giddiness, intoxication and cruelty, and even of death.  
               (Deleuze [1968] 2004a: 331) 
 
19 See Tracey Warr ‘Image as Icon: Recognising the Enigma’ (2003) in Adrian 
George, Art, Lies and Videotape: Exposing Performance, London: Tate, page 32. 
 
20 The photograph Benjamin was discussing was by Robert Adamson and David 
Octavius Hill of Mrs Elizabeth (Johnstone) Hall, The Newhaven Fishwife, c. 1843.  
 
21 [w]e take snapshots, as it were, of the passing reality, and, as these are 
characteristic of this reality, we have only to string them on a becoming, abstract, 
uniform and invisible, situated at the back of the apparatus of knowledge, in order 
to imitate what there is that is characteristic in this becoming itself. Perception, 
intellection, and language proceed this way in general. Whether we would think 
becoming, or express it, or even perceive it, we hardly do anything else than set 
going a kind of cinematograph inside us. . . . The mechanism of our ordinary 
knowledge is of a cinematographical kind.  
(Bergson [1907] 1944: 322) [emphasis in original] 
 
22 See Benjamin [1936] 2008a – The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical 
Reproduction for a general discussion on the paradox between technological 
advance and auratic decline.  
 
23 This term was coined by Christian Metz, for further reading see his seminal text 
The Imaginary Signifier (1982). 
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24 By this Goldberg is speaking of perhaps a golden age of performance art, 
incorporating the works of artists such as Chris Burden, Vito Acconci and Carolee 
Schneemann. See for instance Adrian George Art, Lies and Videotape: Exposing 
Performance (2003). 
 
25 There are contemporaneous works that explore difference from other 
perspectives, such as Derrida’s Of Grammatology ([1967] 1976). For further 
reading see Patton and Protevi’s (edited) Between Deleuze & Derrida (2003). 
 
26 See Deleuze Difference and Repetition [1968] 2004a chapter 3.  
 
27 “…One day, perhaps this century will be called Deleuzian.” (Foucault 1970: 
885). 
 
28 “You cannot hang an event on a wall, only a picture.” (McCarthy in Rosenburg 
1960: 5)  
 
“But a painting hangs on the wall. It reminds me of the  old joke about the 
herring: ‘you can hang it on the wall.’  Is its occupancy of the wall the function by 
which painting  today is to be defined, so that the idea of its ‘activity’  results in 
what Miss McCarthy calls ‘a weird contradiction’? Only if, through the habit of 
looking back to other  times, we forget the multiple existence which a painting 
 now enjoys in separation from its physical body: its ghostly  presence through 
reproduction in books and magazines that  carry it as picture far from its durable 
being of paint and  canvas; the intellectual character it takes on from the 
interpretations irremovably tacked to it by critics, art historians, psychiatrists, 
philosophers of culture; its role in the  political rivalry of states and factions and 
in the educational activities of international institutions; the power of 
 transformation it wields over its own creator through the energy it accumulates 
on its passage through the social  orbit.”  
(Rosenburg 1959: 7) 
 
29 “In truth, all the arts require a performance, the painter executes or ‘performs’ a 
portrait… Creation is performance” (Dufrenne [1953] 1973: 30). For further 
discussion, see also Jones Body Art: Performing the Subject (1998) page 55.  
 
30 “…intensities are incommensurable and their ‘distance’ from one another 
makes each one of them a veritable difference in itself.” (Boundas 2010: 132). 
 
31 See here Auslander ‘The Performativity of Performance Documentation’ 
(2006). 
 
32 “One is developed and must be explicated; the other is enveloped and must be 
interpreted.” (Deleuze [1968] 2004a: 359) ‘One’ in this case referring to 
representation, the ‘other’ refers to the paradigm of difference. 
 
 143 
                                                                                                                                 
33 For further reading on Jeff’s practice see Watt ‘Transgressing the witness at 
three sites of knowledge’ (2007), Bright Auto Focus: The Self-Portrait in 
Contemporary Photography (2010) and Pearson Site-Specific Performance 
(2010). 
 
34 Schrödinger’s Cat (1935) presents a paradoxical situation that is known in 
quantum mechanics as quantum superposition. See Gribbin In Search of 
Schrödinger’s Cat (1991) and Section III of the thesis.  
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Section II: 
Crypto[graphy] 
 
 
A ‘cryptographer’ is needed, someone who can at once account for 
nature and decipher the soul, who can peer into the crannies of matter 
and read into the folds of the soul.  
(Deleuze [1993] 2003: 3) 
 
As Tintin could tell you, if there are secret operations going on in this 
degree-zero zone of writing, then these can only be approached by 
overlaying, reading across, reading through. That is what we will be 
doing in this book. As we do so we should arm ourselves with Tintin’s 
intuition that while some texts (like the pilot’s puzzle), complete on 
their own, can simply be decoded so as to point to information hidden in 
the world, others (like each of the three parchments) need 
supplementing before meaning starts emerging, while others still will 
generate layers of meaning never intended in the first place when they 
are connected via some link, however spurious, to another scene, 
another context might have emerged quite independently of them […] 
And we should be forewarned that, even when we manage to gather all 
the texts, scenes and contexts together and hold them up for inspection, 
their real content may still remain invisible, hiding in the light.  
  (McCarthy 2006: 33)  
 
Tirelessly the process of thinking makes new beginnings, returning in a 
roundabout way to its original object. This continual pausing for breath 
is the mode most proper to the process of contemplation. For by 
pursuing different levels of meaning in its examination of one single 
object it receives both the incentive to begin again and the justification 
for its irregular rhythm. Just as mosaics preserve their majesty despite 
their fragmentation into capricious particles, so philosophical 
contemplation is not lacking in momentum. Both are made up of the 
distinct and the disparate; and nothing could bear more powerful 
testimony to the transcendent force of the sacred image and the truth 
itself. The value of fragments of thought is all the greater the less direct 
their relationship to the underlying idea, and the brilliance of the 
representation depends as much on this value as the brilliance of the 
mosaic does on the quality of the glass paste. The relationship between 
the minute precision of the work and the proportions of the sculptural or 
intellectual whole demonstrates that truth-content is only to be grasped 
through immersion in the most minute details of subject-matter.  
(Benjamin [1963] 2009: 28-29) 
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Introduction 
 
To repeat is to begin again; can photography describe its own event? (CPDIOE?). 
This Section will make use of a different approach to consider this question, its 
structure itself formed by a series of questions. In both Difference and Repetition 
and A Thousand Plateaus (with Guattari) Deleuze uses the form and structure of 
these works to echo the content in some way. That is, in Difference and Repetition 
for instance, each chapter covers the same concept from a different perspective, 
thereby creating several intensities of the originary idea. Each chapter as it stands 
in for the whole thesis performs the intensive strategy of difference and repetition, 
a complex repetition producing pure difference. This Section is a modest attempt 
to enact this same function, and just as stated in the Benjamin quotation above, as 
this Section will take on a mosaic like form then “[t]he value of fragments of 
thought is all the greater the less direct their relationship to the underlying 
idea…”. (Benjamin [1963] 2009: 28-29). The underlying idea or concept here, is 
photography. Here we attempt to supplement photography in its representational 
mode with a sub-culture of ideas that have arguably been ever present (if hidden) 
in the dark recesses of the medium, and perhaps best equated with Martin Jay’s 
concept of a baroque scopic regime always in the shadow of Cartesian 
perspectivalism (Jay 1988). These esoteric ideas were always present in the 
photographic writings of Walter Benjamin and now more contemporaneously are 
best explored perhaps through the work of Gilles Deleuze; two writers from 
whom I hope to draw many allusions and parallels.  
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Taking Deleuze’s advice, I am adopting the guise of ‘the cryptographer’ in order 
to investigate the concept of photography as a crypt. It is my contention here that 
whereas the photography of Section I might have been analogous to the great 
Enlightenment library, future photographies following contemporary 
philosophical imperatives and even the formidable invention of the internet could 
be more appropriately conceived through the metaphor of the crypt. This marks a 
departure from the light of photography in the previous Section, as we descend 
into the darkness of the crypt that is CPDIOE?. This metaphorical darkness forces 
us to deal with encounters instead of recognitions as it withholds the privileging 
of sight and the ability to analyse in terms of appearances. “Something in the 
world forces us to think. This something is an object not of recognition but of a 
fundamental encounter.” (Deleuze [1968] 1994: 139) [emphasis in original]. 
Recognition after all is vital to representation which inevitably leads to a reliance 
at base level to fixed meanings and a form of stasis, whereas the encounter is a 
rupture, a moment of both affirmation and creation1. This breaks the spell of 
representation as the ‘blindness’ imposed by the crypt encourages our other senses 
to become more perceptive, which will help us make the necessary encounters to 
decipher the crypt.2 If cryptography can be considered as an “…art of inventing 
the key to an enveloped thing” (Deleuze [1993] 2003: 143 n.4)3, then the 
questions that punctuate the Section can also be thought to function in a similar 
way – perhaps they are attempts to invent a key or keys to multiple readings and 
novel interpretations of CPDIOE?. 
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Deleuze:  
 
 
…we learn nothing except by deciphering and 
interpreting. But the plurality of worlds is such 
that these signs are not of the same kind, do not 
have the same way of appearing, do not allow 
themselves to be deciphered in the same manner, 
do not have an identical relation with their 
meaning.  
(Deleuze [1964] 2008: 4) 
 
 
As a construct then, our code/question CPDIOE? has many aspects and may 
appear differently, depending upon the perspective we view it from. How might 
you ask, does this six-word enigma differ from the same arrangement that 
appeared in the previous Section? For this task, let us reconsider our crypt as a 
productive paradox and embrace the fluidity and instability of this enigmatic 
question, let us think in terms of difference. The quotation above from Proust and 
Signs ([1964] 2008) can help reveal something of this endeavor. The signs emitted 
by CPDIOE? do not have the same way of appearing and so need to be 
deciphered and interpreted in multiple ways – “…it is true that these signs 
themselves are not homogeneous. At one and the same moment they are 
differentiated…” (Deleuze [1964] 2008: 4). If this is the case, then perhaps we 
must continue to address these creative transformations that emanate from our 
central question.  
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Towards the end of the previous Section, we were offered some guidance that will 
ameliorate our negotiation of the crypt ahead of us. The concept of difference was 
introduced in a way commensurate with the rest of the Section. In this Section, we 
shall be exploring the more obscure depths of difference in a way more 
appropriate to the content. Taking this further, Deleuze, speaking of 
representation and difference suggests that “One is developed and must be 
explicated; the other is enveloped and must be interpreted.” (Deleuze [1968] 
2004a: 359). ‘One’ in this case referring to representation, the ‘other’ refers to the 
paradigm of difference. This is something that will be investigated later in the 
Section, but for the purposes of unfolding CPDIOE? it is useful to raise this point 
here. If we contemplate what this means for us at this stage, it seems to suggest 
that we have only completed half of the task. Section I then, developed and 
explicated the question, it identified it in its constituent parts, it was extensive. 
The extensive here having links to spatiality, but meaning that it was utilising the 
rationale of linear clarity and the perceptible (transparency) in order to attempt to 
bring precise meanings to light. By the same token this Section will envelop and 
interpret the question, it shall be intensive, employing a system of difference 
inherently aligned to temporality, evoking a baroque paradigm of the obtuse and 
irrational; the imperceptible. In Bergson’s terms we can again make analogies to a 
pure difference between difference by degree (extensity) and difference in kind or 
in itself (intensity). 
 
CPDIOE? is an intensive construction in itself, denying explanation but inviting 
interpretation. This interpretation however, is not one that desires a fixed 
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meaning; instead it calls for multiple interpretations and continually invites new 
readings. For James Williams, a problem “…can only lead to a series of creative 
reactions rather than to a lasting solution.” (Williams 2003: 121). In this way, the 
‘key’ we are trying to invent here to our crypt, CPDIOE?, is not singular but 
plural – we require a series of keys to help us get further into the crypt.  
 
 
 
Six intensive plateaus from which to gain new perspectives on 
photography as its own event: or how many surrounding hilltops 
does Leibniz require in order to perceive the township below in its 
full dimensions? 
 
It is important to remind our reader here that our study into potential future 
photographies is formed largely from a Deleuzian perspective, and the writings of 
this Section whilst necessarily oblique are concerned with the intersection of 
photography and Deleuzian philosophy. This follows the Deleuzian turn we made 
in Section I and our task here will be to unlock some of his concepts to the benefit 
of photography. One of the keys we are trying to invent to unlock our question 
concerns the notion of intensities. The concept of intensities can provide a means 
of getting further into the crypt of CPDIOE? as the very question of something 
describing itself reveals the intensive element that is folded into the question. We 
shall attend to this proposition through a series of six quotations that are either 
about or from Deleuze’s seminal work Difference and Repetition ([1968] 2004a). 
These quotations take the form of six ‘plateaus’, with each plateau differing in 
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kind through the intensive nature of its interpretation. Furthermore, the writings 
that surround each quotation reflect on how Deleuze’s cryptic convoluted thought 
resonates throughout CPDIOE? and what it can offer to help us decipher this six-
word enigma. So, one answer to the question ‘what lies beyond representation’ is 
difference, as we refer more and more to Deleuze’s contrary concept of 
understanding a world beyond a system predicated on the constituent parts of 
Cartesian perspectivalism, or in a word, identity. In order to fracture identity we 
need to look beyond the extensive qualities of an object/thing, its discreteness, 
and peer into the intensive ‘crannies’ of how some-thing differs in itself (in kind).  
 
This exercise will be useful in order to better understand the enigmatic nature of 
intensities as they relate to objects of representation. Only by understanding 
minute difference in variation ‘between states’ in concepts and objects/things can 
we begin to think through the sophistications of thought necessary to develop 
supplements to representational photography. The intention here is not to apply 
philosophy or concepts to the category of the image, as it is recognised that the 
image itself already holds an enigmatic position in relation to concepts and is 
never amenable ‘in itself’ to the imposition of them. The Section instead attempts 
to proffer insights that might supplement the interrogation and hopefully 
production of a photographic image construction.  
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(1) 
 
…intensities cannot be subdivided without a 
corresponding change in their nature. Therefore, 
intensities are incommensurable and their ‘distance’ 
from one another makes each one of them a veritable 
difference in itself.   
(Boundas 2010: 134) 
 
 
So what we are dealing with here is not an external difference by degree but an 
internal difference in kind. Deleuze’s ontology is premised on the promotion of 
how something can differ in itself over a duration and we must also think about 
intensities in this way – that is, they cannot be measured because they are in a 
constant state of change. It can be said that intensities can extend “…as far as the 
too large and the too small of difference” (Deleuze [1968] 2004a: 331). An 
assertion that needs to be made here is that our enigmatic question is undeniably 
irrational and the reason for its irrationality can be unlocked through utilising the 
concept of intensities. Attempts to understand the question as a rational sentence 
were futile as its very construction as an enigma repels both clarity and coherence. 
Its formation is such that it requires to be read as an intensity, as a difference in 
kind, rather than an extensive construction that is logical or linear. Each repetition 
of CPDIOE? infers difference. By speculating that the arrangement CPDIOE? 
can be considered a question of intensities, we begin to understand why the 
previous Section did not yield enough clues to decipher this six-word enigma. 
Through subjecting the question to a dissection, it became rationalised as it was 
interrogated from the standpoint of a representational model based on extensive 
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qualities. In relation to this, perhaps we can enable a metaphor for intensity in the 
same way that time is shown as strata in an archaeological excavation – via a 
cross section. A dissection can be aligned to a breakdown of constituent parts 
(horizontal) whereas a cross section reveals intensity through the variation that 
takes place between strata (vertical); between the interpretations enveloped in 
CPDIOE?. 
 
As an intensity, the phrase is at once an expression of an idea – CPDIOE?, yet its 
‘position’ is incommensurable in the depth of intensities. Despite this, at that level 
and in the instance it is uttered each iteration of the question describes the whole 
concept; the whole concept is collapsed into the enigmatic phrase (crypt/code) 
CPDIOE?. Therefore, if we think of the question as an indivisible totality and 
instead approach each repetition of CPDIOE? as a new beginning, then the 
difference between each utterance becomes an internal difference. This is how we 
think the question as intensity and connect to difference in itself.  In this sense, as 
we move through these plateaus we are not solely concentrating on one quotation 
at a time but must also be aware of how the six work together, on the extensive 
plane. With this writing on plateaus I am putting into practice the concept of 
intensity in my explanation of intensities; each one providing an intensive 
difference via repetition. 
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(2) 
 
Between the intensive and thought, it is always by 
means of an intensity that thought comes to us. The 
privilege of sensibility as origin appears in the fact 
that, in an encounter, what forces sensation and that 
which can only be sensed are one and the same 
thing, whereas in other cases the two instances are 
distinct. In effect, the intensive or difference in 
intensity is at once both the object of the encounter 
and the object to which the encounter raises 
sensibility.   
(Deleuze [1968] 2004a: 182) 
 
 
An intensity that forces us to thought is also an encounter, and as Deleuze advises 
in the quotation above, “…what forces sensation and that which can only be 
sensed are one and the same thing…” (Deleuze [1968] 2004a: 182). To make a 
comparison here, in the construction CPDIOE?, photography and event are also 
one and the same thing within the assemblage (as mentioned earlier, in performed 
photography they are also indistinguishable from one another), whereas in 
mainstream conceptions of photography the two instances are detached from one 
another. Two divisible parts collapse to form an indivisible totality – here 
essentially we are talking about the event of photography. CPDIOE? is both an 
intensity and an encounter then, and it remains an encounter even when repeated 
because the conditions that surround the question are in perpetual variation. It 
cannot become habitual or reliant upon recognition because each time we ask the 
question we are always starting anew.  
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(3) 
  
Qualitative contrariety is only the reflection of the 
intense, a reflection which betrays it by explicating it 
in intensity. It is intensity or difference in intensity 
which constitutes the peculiar limit of sensibility. As 
such, it has the paradoxical character of that limit: it 
is the imperceptible, that which cannot be sensed 
because it is always covered by a quality which 
alienates or contradicts it, always distributed within 
an extensity which inverts and cancels it.  
(Deleuze [1968] 2004a: 296-297) 
 
 
Perhaps the first thing to say here is that CPDIOE? exists in an absolute field of 
qualitative contrariety. This enigmatic phrase contains both a difference and an 
inconsistency in so far as it is not pinned to a particular meaning and each 
enunciation of the question is a qualitative explication – CPDIOE? envelops 
plurality in its ensemble of intensive interpretations. To guide us through this 
plateau, let us imagine a series of photographs arranged mosaic style. By first of 
all focusing our attention on the ‘one’ and not the ‘many’ in the series, the 
surrounding photographs fade into the background and at both the moment of 
photographing and the moment of looking (or reading, Benjamin’s famous now-
time4), the one becomes the most contracted and most concentrated of the many 
possible interpretations.5 So when we are dealing with the one intensity (the one 
photograph), the whole concept (the whole series of photographs) is enveloped by 
that intensity; the one stands in for the whole concept. Now when we attempt to 
see the whole series simultaneously, this action converts the intensity into an 
extensity by rendering the representation of the series as a whole as spatial. By 
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struggling to perceive more than one intensity in this way we come up against that 
‘peculiar limit of sensibility’ and the intensive becomes ‘distributed within an 
extensity which inverts and cancels it’. In other words, as we are thrown out of the 
intensive moment the construction becomes spatial and we are left dealing with 
extensities once more. From difference in kind to difference by degree. 
 
To consider the relationship between the many and the one in the series of 
photographs is to be attentive of the understanding that both are enhanced by the 
knowledge of the other. That is to say there is an oscillation between focusing on 
the one and the awareness that the one is part of the whole series, and how the 
whole series (the many) allows us to comprehend how the one can stand in for the 
whole at each moment or instance. The variables of ‘many’ and ‘one’ should not 
be plotted/determined without consideration of the other, and our experience of 
each is richer if we remain mindful of their correlation. This brings to mind the 
relationship of the One to the multiple in Leibniz’s famous monad; “… a unity 
that envelops a multiplicity, this multiplicity developing the One in the manner of 
a ‘series’.” (Deleuze [1993] 2003: 23). Deserving significantly more attention 
than it is given here, the concept of the monad shall be addressed later in the 
Section, however its relevance should be noted here in light of the emphasis of 
this ‘plateau’. “As an individual unit each monad includes the whole series; hence 
it conveys the entire world, but does not express it without expressing more 
clearly a small region of the world, a ‘subdivision,’ a borough of the city, a finite 
sequence.” (Deleuze [1993] 2003: 25) [emphasis in original]. 
 
 157 
If we return here briefly to a work mentioned in Section I, Vito Acconci’s ‘Blinks’ 
(1969), where the artist collapses perception into representation through the act of 
walking down a city street and taking a photograph each time he is forced to blink 
in order to fill the gaps in his visual perception of the walk. The gridded twelve-
image work illustrates vividly the interdependence between the intensive variation 
of view as he moves down the street with the embodied experience of the walk as 
a whole. We can perceive here an oscillation between the individual photographs 
and the whole concept (the series of photographs) where each image can stand in 
for the whole event in each moment or instance. Again, this conjures up the notion 
of a unity that envelops a multiplicity in the manner of a series. Acconci’s piece 
becomes another instance of representational experimentation prefiguring some of 
the concepts that we are exploring through the thesis. 
 
 
Figure 4: Vito Acconci 1969, ‘Blinks, November 23 1969, afternoon, Greenwich   
Street New York City; Kodak Instamatic 124’ [black and white photographic 
piece].  
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The intensive nature of CPDIOE? operates in a similar way, each interpretation 
standing in for the whole at that particular moment as the whole concept emerges 
on different levels. In Difference and Repetition too, each section is a 
‘contraction’ of the rest of the book – “…each section develops others to lesser or 
greater degrees of density. So each section is the complete book, but more or less 
clear (and obscure) on each aspect.” (Williams 2003: 23). Most importantly 
though, is that one section does not enjoy privilege over another section and does 
not provide the last word on the topic, as we crucially miss the point by merely 
focusing our attention on one. This is commensurate with how each interpretation 
functions for the assemblage CPDIOE?. As a convoluted or enigmatic assemblage 
it is important to acknowledge that within the field of difference it has not one 
particular aspect or appearance but as Deleuze himself says it must take the form 
of a ‘swarm of appearances’6. This notion of a ‘swarm of appearances’ is first 
expressed by Leibniz in his concept of perception, which he said “…is nothing 
other than the representation of multitude in the unity” (Leibniz in Antognazza 
2009: 498). He held that the physical world was no more than a collection of 
chimeras and images, and for instance, if a group of people views a city from a 
series of hilltops (plateaus) each would have just one perspective, all different. No 
one perceiver could see the whole city three hundred and sixty degrees around but 
each perception is referred to a supposed objective city, a fictional extrapolation 
from multiple individual perspectives. Leibniz therefore deduced that the 
objective world was merely the sum of a multiplicity of viewpoints or 
perspectives that represented to us a mathematically certain geometric world – a 
swarm of appearances. The ‘representation of multitude in the unity’ is 
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approximate to the concept of intensities, an extensive whole made up of 
intensities, or differences in kind to form an indivisible totality. 
 
 
(4) 
 
An intensive quantity may be divided, but not 
without changing its nature. In a sense, it is therefore 
indivisible, but only because no part exists prior to 
the division and no part retains the same nature after 
the division.  
(Deleuze [1968] 2004a: 297)  
 
 
To perceive photography as an event is to take two concepts and combine them. 
The act of combination of ‘photography + event’ fuses together two disparate 
concepts, making them intensive and indivisible. What Deleuze is speaking of 
here and what Constantin Boundas seems to be paraphrasing from this in ‘Plateau 
1’ is the production of difference through repetition. Considering the possibility 
of the combination of concepts for CPDIOE?, Henry Somers-Hall in his essay 
‘Time Out of Joint: Hamlet and the Pure Form of Time’ (2011) puts forward a 
useful analogy that can be applied here. Somers-Hall offers an analogy of a red 
apple in relation to Kant’s account of the relationship between intuition and 
understanding. This relationship is born out of a synthesis, which Kant in the 
Critique of Pure Reason (1929) defines as “…the act of putting different 
representations together, and of grasping what is manifold in them in one act of 
knowledge” (Kant in Somers-Hall 2011: 61). So the synthesis of the notion of 
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‘apple’ and of ‘redness’ allow for an understanding of a ‘red apple’. Taken 
slightly out of context perhaps (though these ideas will be developed in Section 
III) we can contemplate that it is the event of photography that becomes analogous 
to the ‘red apple’; bringing together the determinations of ‘photography’ and 
‘event’, ‘apple’ and ‘redness’. Accordingly, for CPDIOE?, we could consider the 
temporal relationship between event and photography as different intensities of a 
synthesised event. Photography and event are now differing in kind as intensities 
of the same concept; they are no longer differing by degree because the collapse 
of photography into event and event into photography has formed an indivisible 
totality.  
 
To take this one step further and speculate a while, let us consider the relationship 
photography has with perception in Bergson’s writings, and the implications this 
has for CPDIOE?. As Bergson writes in Creative Evolution ([1907] 1944):  
 
 
[w]e take snapshots, as it were, of the passing 
reality, and, as these are characteristic of this reality, 
we have only to string them on a becoming, abstract, 
uniform and invisible, situated at the back of the 
apparatus of knowledge, in order to imitate what 
there is that is characteristic in this becoming itself. 
Perception, intellection, and language proceed this 
way in general. Whether we would think becoming, 
or express it, or even perceive it, we hardly do 
anything else than set going a kind of cinematograph 
inside us. . . . The mechanism of our ordinary 
knowledge is of a cinematographical kind.  
(Bergson [1907] 1944: 322) [emphasis in 
original] 
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For Bergson photography and perception can be considered analogous to one 
another, and in this way, perhaps we can contemplate that the event of 
photography is also the event of perception. Crucially this allows us an insight 
into our central question, for we may now say can perception describe its own 
event? and Bergson hints that it can, via a cinematographical process. Making 
analogies between human perception and cinematography in the way the mind 
records the passing reality, he suggests in Matter and Memory ([1988] 2005) that 
“[t]he whole difficulty of the problem that occupies us comes from the fact that 
we imagine perception to be a kind of photographic view of things, taken from a 
fixed point by that special apparatus which is called an organ of perception…” 
(Bergson [1988] 2005: 38). Furthermore, Cadava in Words of Light citing 
Bergson, recognises that “…from the very moment that there is thought, there is 
photography, even if it is a photography before photography as we know it…” 
(Cadava 1997: 90). This perhaps sheds some light on the perception/perspective 
of photography utilised throughout the thesis. In some senses, we are inverting the 
relationship between thought and/or perception and photography in order to 
investigate the very concept of photography beyond the practice of the medium. 
As in our work on the enigmatic construct CPDIOE?, this takes us into the realm 
of hermeneutics and interpretation; an attempt to ‘peer into the crannies of matter 
and read into the folds of the soul’7. In terms of the event of photography it 
becomes analogous to the process of perception, therefore interpretation, so 
perhaps what we are asking in simple terms then, is how do we perceive the event 
of photography? 
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The experience of perceiving an event is then essentially photographic for 
Bergson and we can conceive of an event, its perception and the photographic 
coinciding as an intensive event. Therefore perception, photography and event can 
be thought of as folded into each other as they present themselves as related 
intensities. This also has resonances to the theory of performed photography as 
detailed in Section I. If the three concepts can be merged to form an indivisible 
totality then each can be seen as a different intensity of a new concept. As 
“…intensity cannot be reduced to measure and, hence, to identity. That is why 
intensity can only be a matter of sensation or of the transformation of an identity 
beyond its known boundaries in an event.” (Williams 2003: 188). It is precisely 
the incommensurable nature of intensity that avoids any connection to be made 
with the notion of identity. It follows that as independent concepts, event, 
perception and photography lose some of their prior ‘identity’ when they are 
understood as intensities of the new folded concept. Thus, the resultant synthesis 
of these terms produces something akin to what Whitehead encourages in Process 
and Reality ([1929] 1978) (and to which we will return at the end of this Section); 
a ‘stretching’ of words and phrases to their limits that enables definitions already 
in circulation to be re-defined.  
 
 
 
 
 
 163 
(5) 
 
This is why Ideas have the logical character of being 
simultaneously both distinct and obscure. They are 
obscure (undifferenciated and coexisting with other 
Ideas, ‘perplicated’ with them) in so far as they are 
distinct [omni modo determinata]. The question then 
is what happens when Ideas are expressed by 
intensities or individuals in this new dimension of 
implication.  
(Deleuze [1968] 2004a: 314) 
 
 
If photography as an event is an Idea, as an Idea, there are aspects that are both 
simultaneously distinct and obscure. If we imagine a series (mosaic) of 
photographs once more, and concentrate on one, that intensity (photograph) 
becomes distinct as the other intensities around it become necessarily obscure. 
Instead of a series of photographs, we shall now imagine a mosaic. The whole 
mosaic represents the whole concept, but the fragments can also stand in for the 
whole as explained above. Let us recall the third opening quotation of this Section 
by Walter Benjamin that addresses his analogy of the mosaic as a method of 
writing, and reflect on how this approach resonates for CPDIOE?. Also, we will 
make connections between the ‘distinct and the obscure’ that simultaneously 
occur in Ideas for Deleuze and the ‘distinct and the disparate’ that form the pieces 
of the mosaic for Benjamin. Benjamin advocated that a text should make the 
reader continually pause for breath in order to create a space for reflection; “…the 
writer must stop and restart with every new sentence.” (Benjamin [1963] 2009: 
29). This ‘break’ is often referred to as a caesura of thought and perhaps a 
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comparison can be made here with Deleuze’s notion of an encounter; an 
encounter forces us to thought whereas the caesura offers a pause, an interval to 
thought before beginning the encounter anew. Nevertheless, the task of engaging 
in different levels of meaning as a way of examining ‘one single object’ is most 
certainly the project of CPDIOE? as we must remember that each time we ask the 
question we are always starting anew. For Benjamin these differing levels of 
meaning or a multiplicity of interpretation produces an irregular rhythm, and as 
each interpretation of CPDIOE? differs from the next (as an internal difference) it 
is conceivable that the rhythm it produces would also be irregular. Just as our 
enigmatic question is in a state of perpetual variation, the beat that emanates from 
each level of interpretation is in a state of constant change and mutation too, 
which accounts for its irregular pulse. It is this ‘pause for breath’ and differing 
levels of interpretation that possess a fragmentation that Benjamin equates with 
the mosaic in the ‘Epistemo-Critical Prologue’ to The Origin of Tragic Drama 
([1963] 2009).  
 
So as with each interpretation of our question, each tiny piece of glass that makes 
up the mosaic also functions as an intensity. Yet, if we step back from the mosaic 
and view the whole ‘concept’ as a series of glass pieces, their individual charm 
becomes indistinct/is lost as the intensities morph into an extensive whole. To 
view the whole in this manner as a spatial representation is at the expense of 
perceiving the majesty that each fragment holds. We must now turn our attention 
to what secures the mosaic together – the glass paste. For Benjamin, “[t]he value 
of fragments of thought is all the greater the less direct their relationship to the 
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underlying idea, and the brilliance of the representation depends as much on this 
value as the brilliance of the mosaic does on the quality of the glass paste.” 
(Benjamin [1963] 2009: 28-29). This ‘binding agent’ allows the individual pieces 
of glass to be connected to each other as intensities of the same concept. Perhaps 
it is also the space of the Deleuzian ‘and’ (the conjunctive ‘and’ that replaces the 
‘is’ of identity) as it introduces the concept of ‘relations’ into the equation, 
evoking a movement as well as a connection from within the intensities (between 
each piece of glass). It is important to note that this takes place when we carry out 
an intensive interpretation as we focus our attention on each fragment and then 
another fragment and another, by doing this we are able to witness the glass 
pieces as a difference in kind, as intensities of the same concept. Perhaps to 
speculate again, it is in this liminal space that we encounter enigma as an 
intensive construction; between the intensive and the extensive, between the 
distinct and the indistinct and so on; even between the actual and the virtual, 
where clarity plunges into obscurity. These terms however should not be 
interpreted as binary constructions, one does not enjoy privilege over the other, 
they are always part of a process, where succession and co-existence must collide; 
and so they must be regarded as fluid and unfixed co-ordinates from which 
meaning can be produced. This space also opens up the notion of the productive 
paradox once more in terms of its generative function. Regarding our enigmatic 
construction CPDIOE?, meanings are produced or generated from a point where a 
productive paradox is created, where succession (representation) and co-existence 
(difference) collide. 
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(6) 
 
…all the intensities are implicated into one another, 
each in turn both enveloped and enveloping, such 
that each continues to express the changing totality 
of Ideas, the variable ensemble of differential 
relations.  
(Deleuze [1968] 2004a: 314-315) 
 
 
The relationship between intensities and envelopment is one of connection; 
intensities being both enveloped and enveloping is suggestive of the process of 
infinitesimal variation taking place. This is because “… singular intensities do not 
divide or diminish – instead they include one another in different ways.” 
(Williams 2003: 183). In this way, intensities avoid the logic of negation because 
of their unfixed co-ordinates – they do not conform to a binary 
arrangement/configuration as there is a perpetual process of change/relation 
between two or more points, which is played out in an act of oscillation between 
what is concealed and what is revealed, between what is enveloped and what is 
enveloping. Imagining a series (mosaic) of photographs once more, in the act of 
regarding a particular intensity (photograph), that intensity is enveloped by the 
other intensities that make up the whole. And so it follows that by focusing on 
another intensive moment, then the previous intensive moment has differed from 
its capacity as one that is enveloped to one that envelops; the relationship that is 
formed from the enveloped and enveloping takes place in difference in kind. The 
intensity that is the focus of our attention at this particular moment takes a central 
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position in terms of its ‘connectedness’ to the other intensities that encircle it; “… 
clarity comes from being at the centre, in the sense of greatest number of 
connections [sic], of a nexus of relations and obscurity from a peripheral 
position.” (Williams 2003: 199). This expresses once again the relation of the one 
to the multiple and shows the myriad different aspects that can be sensed through 
the “…expression of all intensities, though in different configurations of 
envelopment.” (Williams 2003: 191). Once again this has deep resonances with 
Leibniz’s concept of the monad, essentially a singularity surrounded by 
‘ordinaries’, a concept we will return to later in the Section. 
 
To return to the question of What Lies Beyond Representation?, representation as 
we speak of it here is basically a system that returns the same, as opposed to 
Deleuze’s conception of Difference and Repetition that is anti-representational in 
that it returns difference. As already stated, difference by degree is a perspective 
on the world that is couched in spatialisation and leads to and distinguishes 
between a world of discrete objects, an extensive world-view ideally constructed 
for representation. Difference in kind speaks of temporality and duration, a world 
of process where things change over/through time, the degrees or depths of that 
change are intensities. From a Deleuzian perspective then, it can be argued that 
what lies beyond representation is difference, although it must be stressed that 
these two ‘systems’ are also co-existent.  
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Can we find Deleuze/Benjamin in the distinct/obscure concepts of 
Benjamin/Deleuze? 
 
The work of this Section is to begin the translation of a photography in the 
classical perspective to one that engages with contemporary ideas of difference. 
To aid this process we must also begin to make a translation between the thought 
of Walter Benjamin and that of Gilles Deleuze. Benjamin was the great 
commentator of the classical period; Deleuze will be our guide into future 
potentialities. Both prefer the convoluted ‘darkness’ of the Baroque period at the 
expense of a transparency of thought. The metaphorical darkness that is imposed 
by our crypt forces us to make mental connections and to allow ideas to spring to 
light, that will help move closer towards solving the enigma of our question. From 
this position, engulfed by darkness, I sense that there are some as yet uncovered 
links that can be made between the baroque writer par excellence Walter 
Benjamin and Gilles Deleuze. If we consider Benjamin’s writings as crypts to be 
deciphered, it is my conviction that we can re-open Benjamin with a Deleuzian 
‘key’ of intensities. To carry out this task we must read Benjamin through 
Deleuze (and Deleuze through Benjamin), with particular reference to the six 
intensive plateaus we set up earlier in this Section. This is no easy job as we have 
a double process of interpretation to carry out; firstly, we need to investigate the 
depths of the crypts that Benjamin arguably sets up for us in order to re-interpret 
his complex ideas through a Deleuzian optic and laterally; we must consider how 
to use our findings to get us further into our crypt – CPDIOE?. 
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To begin, it seems pertinent to remark on the dubious lack of acknowledgement 
between these two figures, despite their mutual sources of inspiration. Benjamin 
(1892–1940) was writing before Deleuze (1925–1995) however there is 
surprisingly little written on their connections and crossovers by critics or scholars 
in either field of study. Let us consider a number of examples to plot against each 
other in order to detect a Benjaminian presence in Deleuze via two figures that 
link them, Bergson and Leibniz. I propose that in some ways, Benjamin operates 
as a dark precursor in Deleuze’s works; he is obscured from view but 
nevertheless remains folded into Deleuzian concepts. Deleuze asks, “…what is 
this agent, this force which ensures communication? Thunderbolts explode 
between different intensities, but they are preceded by an invisible, imperceptible 
dark precursor…” (Deleuze [1968] 2004a: 145) [emphasis in original]. It is the 
dark precursor that causes communications between heterogeneous locations and 
events and in this case, we will seek to map8 connections between Deleuze, 
Bergson and Leibniz via Benjamin.  
 
It must be noted that Benjamin was a contemporary of Henri Bergson (1859–
1941) therefore both their stars were shining brightly at the same time. Perhaps 
what Benjamin takes most from Bergson is a sense of the importance of 
temporality and a certain type of spatialisation that was the antithesis of Bergson’s 
durée. These Bergsonian ideas also formed the strong foundations upon which 
Deleuze’s whole conception of time was developed, largely expounded in 
Difference and Repetition and Bergsonism. In addition, Deleuze drew on 
 170 
Bergson’s concept of difference to form an unashamed ‘update’ via the fold, 
which reflects on the concept of the relationship of the fold as difference in itself.  
 
Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716), another source of inspiration for both 
Benjamin and Deleuze was a catalyst for Benjamin’s famous dialectical image, 
based on Leibniz’s monad and as Michael Löwy has noted in Fire Alarm, the two 
terms appear to be interchangeable for Benjamin and we can intuit this double 
articulation in an intensive reading of ‘Thesis XVIII’ from Theses on the 
Philosophy of History ([1940] 1969b). For Deleuze, perhaps his most famous 
token of gratitude to Leibniz comes in the form of his book The Fold ([1993] 
2003), suitably subtitled Leibniz and the Baroque and it is in this book where 
Deleuze’s appreciation of both Bergson and Lebniz converge. Though this is not 
the place to conduct an extensive critique of the intersections that can be observed 
between these four great thinkers, it provides a context for arguing that these 
connections inevitably point to the questionable lack of acknowledgement of 
Benjamin by Deleuze, despite seeming to be so intrinsically connected via 
Leibniz and Bergson. This part of the Section seeks to uncover some of these 
‘coincidences’. 
 
Benjamin’s dense allegorical texts are open to continual re-interpretation as they 
refuse to be stabilised or fixed to any one reading and the fragmentary method he 
employed ensured that his ideas remained in oscillation and required an active 
engagement from the reader. In the introduction to his Trauerspiel book, 
Benjamin identifies “…the ideas that gather together the dispersed elements of 
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thought” (Cadava 1997: 28) as  ‘configurations’ or ‘constellations’. This part of 
the Section then, will provide a reflection on Deleuze’s intensities via Benjamin’s 
notion of constellations. Furthermore, it is in this way that the formation of this 
Section is akin to a constellation of ideas, where an assemblage of ideas shine out 
momentarily before fading back into darkness. The stars that form these 
constellations can be read in multiple ways, depending on their configuration at 
any one time. This is true for the constellation of questions that form this Section 
as they all seek to interpret our central question CPDIOE?, and each question is 
an attempt to move further into the crypt. Perhaps when we look back at the 
questions as a matrix forming a whole, a configuration will shine out to us, which 
will provide the key to unlocking our enigmatic code – CPDIOE?. On the other 
hand, maybe we are closest to solving this puzzle when we are tirelessly toiling 
with the ‘minute details of subject-matter’ as Benjamin suggests we do. As Tom 
McCarthy recommends in Tintin and the Secret of Literature (2006: 33), we must 
approach the secret operations as Tintin does by ‘overlaying, reading across, 
reading through’ to help us move further into the crypt. 
 
I suggest that Benjamin is capable of being translated via Deleuze in order to 
shed new light on reading Benjamin in a contemporary Deleuzian context. This 
also helps our project as a whole as we are attempting a translation from within 
the concept of photography. Benjamin himself was familiar with carrying out 
such a task as in The Origin of German Tragic Drama he posits Hamlet as 
Trauerspiel and as Graeme Gilloch notes,  “…the play is uprooted from its 
conventional context, and repositioned and illuminated afresh as a fragment of a 
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different idea.” (Gilloch 2002: 71). The very nature of a constellation has the 
potential to bring together fragments that form new combinations, new 
interpretations.9 Gilloch, discussing Benjamin’s analogy of the mosaic recognises 
that, “[f]ragments which seem inconsequential may be the most precious for the 
purpose of oblique representation.” (Gilloch 2002: 68). As it will become evident, 
at different times and in different texts, Benjamin often used different words to 
describe related concepts and ideas. Arguably, this is another way that he creates 
crypts for his reader because of the instability that results from his changeable 
terminology; forcing the reader to make their own connections and consider how 
this manifold of meaning impacts on the coherence (or incoherence) of 
Benjamin’s oeuvre. As a result, the texts themselves gain an additional level of 
encryption that is further intensified when the works are translated; this issue of 
translation will be discussed at the end of the Section. We have encountered an 
instance of this here; each individual tessera of the mosaic is equivalent, if not 
analogous to, each star that forms the constellation. Furthermore, if we remind 
ourselves of the connections we made between intensities and mosaics earlier in 
this Section, we begin to open up some of the consistencies that can be mapped 
between Deleuze and Benjamin. Bearing this in mind, Max Pensky describing the 
process of formation of a constellation notes: 
 
 
…the constellation emerges – discloses itself – only 
insofar as the concept divests the particulars of their 
status as merely particular, refers them to their 
hidden arrangement, but also preserves their material 
existence. At that point, a meaningful image jumps 
forward from the previously disparate elements, 
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which from that point onward can never be seen as 
merely disparate again.  
(Pensky 1993: 70) [emphasis in original] 
 
 
If we cast our mind back to our series of photographs arranged mosaic-style, the 
image that jumps forward for Pensky can be equated with the mosaic, as suddenly 
recognised as a discrete image in its own right. By the same token, each 
individual tessera in its intensity also stands in for the whole mosaic, as there is a 
unique relationship formed between the one and the multiple. This is precisely 
what we discussed in relation to Deleuzian intensities, and read from a 
Benjaminian perspective, we can equate the very notion of an ‘idea’ in its relation 
to ‘objects’ (intensities) being analogous to the relation of constellations to stars. 
 
 “Ideas are to objects as constellations are to stars.” (Benjamin [1963] 2009: 34). 
 
For Benjamin, image is “…dialectics at a standstill”, (Benjamin 1999a: 462) and 
this moment, his famous lightning flash, is the moment in which two opposing 
concepts/ideas are in complete tension with one another.10 If we re-interpret this 
from a Deleuzian perspective in relation to the two types of difference, it is 
difference by degree (extensity) and difference in kind (intensity) that are held in 
tension with one another and it is in these circumstances that we witness the 
production of pure difference. In this way, when an intensive moment comes out 
of an extensive construct in a flash the intensity comes “…to legibility” 
(Benjamin 1999a: 462). This blinding flash is the moment of reading and of 
learning, it is when we recognise the intensity as an intensity; let us remind 
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ourselves of the generative function of productive syntheses once more. It must be 
noted however that we are not speaking of ‘recognition’ in representational terms 
here (that produces stasis) because for Benjamin, “[t]he now of recognizability is 
the moment of awakening.” (Benjamin 1999a: 486). 
 
 
It’s not that what is past casts its light on what is 
present, or what is present casts its light on the past; 
rather, image is that wherein what has been comes 
together in a flash with the now to form a 
constellation. In other words, image is dialectics at a 
standstill. For while the relation of the present to the 
past is a purely temporal, continuous one, the 
relation of what-has-been to the now is dialectical: is 
not progression but image, suddenly emergent. – 
Only dialectical images are genuine images (that is, 
not archaic); and the place where one encounters 
them is language.  
(Benjamin 1999a: 462) 
 
 
In a well-known passage from ‘Convolute N’ in The Arcades Project, Benjamin 
sheds some light on the concept of the dialectical image, where its emergence 
marks a temporal interruption, a “…caesura in the movement of thought” 
(Benjamin 1999a: 475). Certainly, to form a constellation with intensities 
emerging from an extensive plane alludes to the correlation between the one and 
the multiple again (if we recall the relationship of the tessera to the mosaic), with 
the resultant ‘image’ erupting as dialectics at a standstill. In a historical sense, the 
‘what has been’ and the ‘now’ in the context of the thesis also forms a similar 
relationship to Benjamin’s dialectical image – the ‘then’ of Benjamin, of Deleuze 
(and by extension of Bergson and of Leibniz) comes together with the ‘now’ of 
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my reading to form a constellation of interpretations, suddenly emergent. This 
arrangement or configuration requires the work of a cryptographer to ‘peer into 
the crannies’ of thought developed by Benjamin and Deleuze in order for us to 
perceive the mosaic of seemingly distinct concepts as difference in kind as 
opposed to difference by degree. It becomes productive to consider the 
relationship between each philosophers ‘version’/update of a particular concept as 
fresh intensities of a concept that differs in kind over a duration, with each 
philosopher providing an additional perspective. We must not think in terms of 
the ‘model and copy’ as in representation but instead recognise the multiple 
interpretations as internal differences, where no privilege is placed on any one 
interpretation. For this let us look to Benjamin’s thought on the term of ‘origin’ as 
he explains in the ‘Epistemo-Critical Prologue’: 
 
 
Origin [Ursprung], although an entirely historical 
category, has, nevertheless, nothing to do with 
genesis [Entstehung]. The term origin is not 
intended to describe the process by which the 
existent came into being, but rather to describe that 
which emerges from the process of becoming and 
disappearance. Origin is an eddy in the stream of 
becoming…  
(Benjamin [1963] 2009: 45) 
 
 
The important distinction Benjamin makes between the terms ‘origin’ and 
‘genesis’ enables us to make a comparison to a Deleuzian perspective; where the 
process of becoming is always privileged over stasis and fixed identities, and 
where meanings are both mobile and mutable. Crucially for Deleuze, the very 
 176 
notion of becoming speaks of a process of de- and re-territorialisation, where what 
is territorialising and that which is being territorialised undergo a reciprocal 
process of transformation. In fact, it is this ‘double becoming’ that invokes a state 
of flux and state of perpetual variation. Benjamin’s interpretation of ‘origin’ 
evokes a similar process in that ‘the existent’ remains open to a continuous 
temporal modulation/moulding11, thus de-stabalising the permanence that is 
implied by the term origin as it is generally understood (as a synonym of 
‘genesis’). Each interpretation of a particular concept then, comes together to 
form a multiplicity, a constellation.  
 
And so Benjamin’s stream of becoming is rhizomatic, always in motion and 
seeking connections, just as a stream is part of a connected network of streams, 
rivers and seas. The eddy disrupts the unidirectional flow of the stream as the 
current doubles back on itself; it is a moment of interruption. It is in this way that 
origin as a vortex in the stream of becoming resonates with our question 
CPDIOE?, and I suggest that (for the purpose of this analogy) this enigmatic code 
represents an eddy in the stream of representation. The eruption of this question 
results in a break in representation (that produces stasis) and offers an encounter 
as it forces us to try to decipher what is meant by the question can photography 
describe its own event? Instead of the linear arrangement of ‘event – photograph – 
representation’ that was interrogated in Section I, CPDIOE? speaks of a 
photography where event and photograph are folded into each other, around each 
other, and this very action creates an eddy which disrupts the conventional ‘flow’ 
of mainstream photographic representation. Regarding the impact this has in 
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terms of temporality that concerned the previous Section of the thesis, Graeme 
Gilloch notes that “[o]rigin is a temporal disturbance, an ‘eddy in the stream of 
becoming’ as time is folded back upon itself.” (Gilloch 2002: 73). And so we can 
interpret the process of folding ‘event’ into ‘photography’ to become a single 
iterance as a ‘double becoming’ – a reciprocal process of transformation and 
renewal between these previously disparate terms. Indeed, there is also a sense of 
perpetual collapse in how performed photography negotiates the mainstream 
(linear) procedure of ‘shooting – editing – exhibition’, in that it disrupts this 
conventional practice in favour of collapsing these three components into a 
continuous stream of becoming. Thus at this time, it is not the wasp and orchid 
that partake in a dance of de- and re-territorialisation along the rhizome, but event 
and photography. One might also say that our larger endeavour of synthesising the 
classical perspective in photography with difference is also one of de- and re-
territorialisation. 
 
The reading of this constellation also allows us to get further into the crypt. It is in 
our now-time [jetztzeit] that the constellation comes together in a flash to unlock 
the latent connections to be made between these concepts/thinkers and as Carol 
Jacobs notes; “[t]he moment of interpretation, what Benjamin calls the perception 
of similarities, takes place from no privileged, external vantage point. Rather, the 
reader-astrologer is taken into the constellation in a flash…” (Jacobs 1999: 71).  
 
 
The perception [of similarity] is in every case bound 
to an instantaneous flash. It flits by… it offers itself 
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to the eye just as fleetingly, transitorily as a 
constellation of stars. The perception of similarities 
therefore appears bound to a moment of time. It is 
like the supervention [Dazukommen] of the third, of 
the astrologer, to the conjunction of two stars that 
wishes to be grasped in the moment.  
(Benjamin 1979c: 66) 
 
 
In ‘Convolute N’ of The Arcades Project Walter Benjamin relays to Ernst Bloch 
how his conception of the dialectical image was comparable in method “…to the 
process of splitting the atom” (Benjamin 1999a: 463). By this we can take it to 
mean that natural laws are being broken when two or more intensities emerge in a 
flash of legibility to form a dialectical image. As mentioned in the discussion on 
intensities above, the very nature of an intensive magnitude is that it is indivisible. 
If we try to experience more than one intensive moment in the now of our reading 
we come up against the “…peculiar limit of sensibility” (Deleuze [1968] 2004a: 
296). Thus, we can experience only one intensity at any one moment as any other 
intensive moment will immediately replace the first and force it to fade back. As 
Benjamin notes there may always be an exception and if it was possible to 
perceive two or more intensities at once then they would come together in a 
blinding flash against the laws of natural physics just like the splitting of the atom. 
It is worth noting that Benjamin is writing at the birth of the quantum era and his 
imagination is taken with the possibilities that particles/elements can potentially 
be in two places at once.12 Certainly the inverse also holds, that if more than one 
intensity could potentially emerge at once in the same moment then the 
impossible could also occur when an ‘indivisible’ intensity could split. This is the 
basis of dialectics at a standstill, or the dialectical image and the potential forces 
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of history that it could unleash. It is therefore possible in concept at least to 
“…liberate[s] the enormous energies of history that are bound up in the ‘once 
upon a time’ of classical historiography. The history that showed things ‘as they 
really were’ was the strongest narcotic of the century.” (Benjamin 1999a: 463). 
 
The ‘what has been’ can also be interpreted as the extensive whole, and the ‘now’ 
is the intensity (Nietzsche’s gateway called ‘moment’)13. As it was illuminated by 
the ‘six intensive plateaus’ earlier in the Section, any intensity stands in for the 
whole at that particular moment. Read from the perspective of the ‘reader-
astrologer’, the eruption of intensities from the whole marks a contraction into 
now-time – it is the time of our interpretation.  This moment reveals the tension 
between the extensive and the intensive, suspended in a process of oscillation that 
extends to infinity. This is dialectics at a standstill, it is also Deleuze’s notion of 
pure difference, emerging from the paradox of extensity and the intensive. 
Perhaps a comparison can be made here between the reader-astrologer’s 
relationship to the constellation of stars, and the role the photographer takes in 
performed photography. Just as the reader-astrologer is brought into the 
constellation in a flash – “…the astrologer does not perceive the constellation or 
name it from the outside.” (Jacobs 1999: 100), the photographer in performed 
photography also operates from inside the event. So neither the astrologer or the 
photographer takes up an external viewing position, instead they become 
subsumed, enveloped, into the constellation of an extended event. This is an 
interesting proposition in light of our central question CPDIOE? and as Cadava 
attests, “…the photographic event interrupts the present; it occurs between the 
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present and itself, between the movement of time and itself.” (Cadava 1997: 61). 
This resonates for our enigmatic central question as we begin to catch glimpses of 
a folded, even quantum understanding of photography that emerges from the 
darkness, and offers a foretaste of what we might uncover as we move further into 
the crypt. 
 
 
 
Monad or Nomad? 
 
In an effort to prove that the concept of difference has always somehow, and in 
many different manifestations, been folded into the classical perspective, we will 
turn to Leibniz now in order to better understand the process of folding and 
unfurling. Hopefully this can illuminate how we can take the concept of 
photography and submit it to a folding, unfolding and refolding in order to 
instigate change. 
 
 
The idea is a monad. The being enters into it, with 
its past and subsequent history, brings – concealed 
in its own form – an indistinct abbreviation of the 
rest of the world of ideas, just as, according to 
Leibniz’s Discourse on Metaphysics (1686), every 
single monad contains in an indistinct way, all the 
others.  
(Benjamin [1963] 2009: 47) 
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Here we encounter another of Benjamin’s mélange of expressions, this time using a 
Leibnizian concept. Having already ascertained that the idea is a constellation, we 
now discover that it is also a monad. As another way of detailing the concept of the 
idea and the monad using an astronomical metaphor, Benjamin explains; “[e]very 
idea is a sun and is related to other ideas just as suns are related to each other.” 
(Benjamin [1963] 2009: 37). This opens up the possibility of the quantum again as 
we consider the connections between Benjamin’s suns in relation to the Baroque 
fold, which “…unfurls all the way to infinity.” (Deleuze [1993] 2003: 3). So each 
monad is related to other monads, which are related to other monads, and so on. I 
suggest that it is in this way that each tessera that forms the mosaic can take on the 
guise of a monad, with each piece of glass shining its light onto the surrounding 
fragments whilst holding its own dark secret. Just as there are universes within 
universes and suns within suns, there are folds within folds and intensities within 
intensities, as after all, “…every single monad contains in an indistinct way, all the 
others.” (Benjamin [1963] 2009: 47). Concerning the traits of Leibniz’s concept of 
the monad, Benjamin also remarks that it is of no surprise that the philosopher of 
The Monadology (1898) was also the founder of infinitesimal calculus (Benjamin 
[1963] 2009: 48). Perhaps we are moving towards uncovering an infinitesimal 
philosophy of photography in the thesis, as we peer into the crannies of what is 
‘concealed in its own form’; of what is concealed in the form of our question – 
CPDIOE?. 
 
This issue of connectivity brings us back to Deleuzian rhizomatics. As with 
Benjamin’s notion of ‘origin’ that is in a perpetual process of transformation and 
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becoming, we must consider the rhizome as a nomadic multiplicity that is in a state 
of indeterminate movement, as opposed to a movement toward a fixed destination. 
Just as origin is not the start point for Benjamin of a concept or an idea, the 
movement of a rhizome is not unidirectional or towards an end point, instead it 
remains indefinite and in constant flux. Perhaps we can note a comparison here to 
psychogeography and the Situationist practice of the dérive (drift) as nomadic 
action, and as Guy Debord notes: “[f]rom the dérive point of view cities have a 
psychological relief, with constant currents, fixed points and vortexes which 
strongly discourage entry or exit from certain zones.” (Debord in Ford 2005: 35). 
The dérive then, is a practice that is open-ended in duration and its character is that 
of uncertainty and encounter. Debord’s explanation resonates with our 
understanding of how the rhizome operates, and the currents and vortexes are 
suggestive of what Benjamin evokes in the relationship of origin to becoming. The 
dérives of the Situationists took place in the streets of Paris and were akin to a 
‘mapping’ of the city, with the map being a space of multiplicity, of performance: 
 
 
The map is open, connectable in all its dimensions, 
and capable of being dismantled; it is reversible, and 
susceptible to constant modification. It can be torn, 
reversed, adapted to montages of every kind, taken 
in hand by an individual, a group or a social 
formation. […] Contrary to the tracing, which 
always returns to the ‘same’, a map has multiple 
entrances. A map is a matter of performance, 
whereas the tracing always refers to an alleged 
‘competence’.  
(Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 26) 
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In the closing pages of The Fold, Deleuze tantalisingly offers an incidental 
comment that helps to make clear his trajectory: “…to overtake monadology with a 
‘nomadology’.” (Deleuze [1993] 2003: 137). It is this play between the ‘monad’ 
and ‘nomad’ that signals a two-way oscillation between the singular and the 
rhizomatic and suggests the occurrence of ‘double becoming’. This double 
becoming reveals itself as both an interconnected process of de- and re- 
territorialisation and as a productive paradox. Furthermore, it could be argued that 
in his works on other philosophers, Deleuze is engaging in a complete act of 
nomadology and to conclude his book on Leibniz, he writes – “[w]e are all still 
Leibnizian, although accords no longer convey our world or our text. We are 
discovering new ways of folding, akin to new envelopments, but we all remain 
Leibnizian because what always matters is folding, unfolding, refolding.” (Deleuze 
[1993] 2003: 137). Indeed, our crypt is made up of an infinity of folds and so it will 
serve us well to become accustomed to the art of convolution if we are to fully 
comprehend the possibilities for CPDIOE?. Arguably, it is the process of folding, 
unfolding and refolding that represents Deleuze’s approach to both Bergson and 
Leibniz’s philosophies, and the very nature of bricolage that he was so often held 
accountable for.14 It is a nomadic movement that de- and re- territorialises the work 
and in doing so, Deleuze builds a new constituency of thought, a new constellation 
out of Bergson, Leibniz and Kant et al. As with Benjamin’s interpretation of 
‘origin’ and as it has been posited above, we can perceive Deleuze’s ‘re-workings’, 
his ‘re-foldings’ of such works as newer intensities of these concepts. 
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To return to the notion of the dérive for a moment, perhaps the first and greatest 
perambulatory figure was Charles Baudelaire, the nomad-poet of Benjamin’s 
imagination. The intensive poet forever emergent from the dark mass[es], the 
flâneur moving against the flow of the crowd: 
 
 
This [passage] suggests two insights. For one thing it 
tells us about the close connection in Baudelaire 
between the figure of shock and contact with the 
urban masses. For another, it tells us what is really 
meant by these masses. They do not stand for classes 
or any sort of collective; rather, they are nothing but 
the amorphous crowd of passers-by, the people in 
the street. This crowd, whose existence Baudelaire is 
always aware of, does not serve as the model for any 
of his works; but it is imprinted on his creativity as a 
hidden figure, just as it constitutes the figure 
concealed in the excerpt quoted above. [sic] We can 
discern the image of the fencer in it: the blows he 
deals are designed to open a path for him through 
the crowd. To be sure, the neighbourhoods through 
which the poet of ‘Le Soleil’ makes his way are 
deserted. But the hidden constellation – in which the 
profound beauty of that stanza becomes thoroughly 
transparent – is no doubt a phantom crowd: the 
words, the fragments, the beginnings of lines, from 
which the poet, in the deserted streets, wrests poetic 
booty.  
(Benjamin 2006b: 180-181) [my brackets] 
 
 
As a point of comparison, we shall now re-interpret what Benjamin is writing here 
about Baudelaire in The Writer of Modern Life: Essays on Charles Baudelaire 
(2006b) in the context of the thesis, to make connections that will help illuminate 
the way as we move into the depths of our crypt. The masses, the phantom crowd 
that Baudelaire senses constitutes the figure of extensive magnitude for us, indeed 
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the crowd is imprinted on his creativity as a hidden figure; just as the intensive 
magnitudes of CPDIOE? are latent within the enigma of its form. The poet/fencer 
becomes the cryptographer in our scenario, as each blow the fencer deals will help 
him carve out a path to move further through the crowd, and alternatively each 
question we ask represents an attempt to get further into our crypt. Arguably, at 
times throughout the Section, the ‘cryptographer’ also takes on the additional 
guise of the poet-cryptographer, which perhaps more fittingly portrays the role 
undertaken by us in particular instances. And it is the beginnings of lines in the 
above quotation that form the rhizomatic lines of flight in our crypt; our question. 
These lines are capable of revealing the true value of this endeavour, as from 
these dark crypts, these deserted streets, we uncover the rewards that such a 
convoluted task offers, transmitted to us as a hidden constellation to be unlocked; 
a crypt to be deciphered.  
 
 
Benjamin thus seeks to create a textual space in 
which speculative, intuitive, and analytical 
intelligence can move, reading images and the relays 
between them in such a way that the present 
meaning of ‘what has been comes together in a 
flash.’ This is what Benjamin calls the dialectical 
image. And ‘The Paris of the Second Empire in 
Baudelaire’ is the finest, most fully realized example 
of the critical practice informed by the theory of the 
dialectical image.  
(Jennings 2006: 13) [emphasis in 
original] 
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Out of the amalgamation of essays contained within Benjamin’s book, as the 
above quotation suggests, one particular work comes forward as an example of his 
infamous dialectical image. This work, ‘The Paris of the Second Empire in 
Baudelaire’ ([1938] 2006c) allowed for a conjunction of disparate ideas to present 
themselves as an illuminating constellation, with new configurations shining a 
light on issues such as capitalism and modernism. Indeed, we can note a similarity 
here to the formation of the Section, in that it brings together seemingly disparate 
ideas that emanate from/around CPDIOE? in the form of a series of questions. 
Our central question is undergoing a process of interrogation from multiple 
perspectives, with the interpretations presenting themselves as different intensities 
of CPDIOE?. As we speculated in the opening pages of the Section, perhaps these 
questions will form a constellation able to unlock the ‘true value’ of our 
endeavour, to unlock the crypt/code, whilst shining a light on new interpretations 
of photography.  
 
As we ascertained earlier in the Section (question), the idea for Benjamin is both a 
constellation and a monad, and as Michael Löwy recognises in Fire Alarm (2005) 
“[i]t is the task of remembrance, in Benjamin’s work, to build ‘constellations’ 
linking the present and the past. These constellations, these moments wrested 
from empty historical continuity are monads.” (Löwy 2005: 95). Benjamin creates 
crypts through encrypted writings. Perhaps the most seminal and well known of 
these crypts is the ‘Theses on the Philosophy of History’ ([1940] 1969b), which 
we will peer into later in this chapter, employing Michael Löwy as guide. 
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Whence identity once the threshold is crossed? 
 
Let us shift focus from the ‘clear-and-distinct’ nature of the previous Section 
(Photo[graphy]) as we attempt to move towards the ‘obscure zone’. In order to 
make this transition from clarity to obscurity, we began the Section by opening 
the door to the crypt and crossing over the threshold; is this also the threshold 
between representation and what lies beyond it? The crypt we speak of in 
metaphoric terms is the dark, the illegible, and that which is encrypted is our 
question – CPDIOE?. As we move into the depths of the crypt of CPDIOE?, we 
realise that we have got far enough over the threshold now, as the light from the 
Renaissance that illuminates representation fades behind us. It is time to 
find/invent another key to the darkness of CPDIOE?, and for this let us turn to 
Deleuze and his magnum opus Difference and Repetition ([1968] 2004a) to make 
an effort to unlock some of the complexities that lie in the depths of our crypt.  
 
To help us in the darkness, we must remember what was uncovered about Ideas 
and intensities earlier in this Section from the six intensive plateaus, in terms of 
their dual capacity to both envelop and be enveloped. We shall now interpret this 
from the perspective of what James Williams suggests is perhaps one of the most 
important metaphors in Difference and Repetition ([1968] 2004a) – that of clarity 
and obscurity, or light and shadow (Williams 2003: 151). This metaphor 
illuminates the importance placed on principles of connectivity and rhizomatic 
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relations in Deleuze’s oeuvre as the very construction of ‘light’ and ‘shadow’ 
must not be considered binary but dialectical.  
 
 
The obscurity of some things is the cause of the 
clarity of others, in the sense that some things have 
to fade into the background for others to come to the 
fore. Clarity does not make sense unless we 
understand how obscurity has allowed it to come 
about.  
(Williams 2003: 152) 
 
 
As with our mosaic of photographs that helped us to understand intensities, we 
return to the process of oscillation, this time between clarity and obscurity and, 
moving further into our crypt, between light and darkness. What Deleuze wishes 
to convey in Difference and Repetition is the interrelatedness between the 
antinomies of clarity and obscurity as “…Ideas contain all the varieties of 
differential relations and all the distributions of singular points coexisting in 
diverse orders ‘perplicated’ in one another.” (Deleuze [1968] 2004a: 257). This 
notion of ‘perplication’ is a term Deleuze used to signal the coexistent state of 
Ideas, and if we remember that ‘pli’ in French means ‘fold’, we can deduce that 
for Deleuze, Ideas are folded, unfolded and refolded into one another. Williams 
notes that it is this sense of folding that evades any misinterpretation of the light 
and shadow metaphor, this metaphor also “…reinforces the opposition between 
Deleuze’s philosophy and the Cartesian legacy. Deleuze does not accept that 
things can be distinct, only more or less clear and more or less obscure.” 
(Williams 2003:151-152).  
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Deleuze writes: “Ideas as they exist in themselves are distinct-obscure. Opposed 
to the clear-and-distinct of Apollonian representation, Ideas are Dionysian, 
existing in an obscure zone which they themselves preserve and maintain.” 
(Deleuze [1968] 2004a: 350). Here Deleuze evokes Nietzsche in his use of the 
forces of the Apollonian and Dionysian from The Birth of Tragedy (1993) to 
present the dichotomy between the ‘clear-and-distinct’ and the ‘distinct-obscure’. 
As it was addressed in Section I of the thesis, the Apollonian represents clarity, 
rationality and light, whereas the Dionysian is associated with chaos, irrationality 
and excess.  
 
 
The ‘clear and distinct’ itself is inseparable from the 
model of recognition which serves as the instrument 
of every orthodoxy, even when it is rational. Clarity 
and distinctness form the logic of recognition, just as 
innateness is the theology of common sense: both 
have already pushed the Idea over into 
representation. The restitution of the Idea in the 
doctrine of the faculties requires the explosion of the 
clear and the distinct, and the discovery of a 
Dionysian value according to which the Idea is 
necessarily obscure in so far as it is distinct, all the 
more obscure the more it is distinct. Distinction-
obscurity becomes here the true tone of philosophy, 
the symphony of the discordant Idea.  
(Deleuze [1968] 2004a: 184) [emphasis in 
original] 
 
 
It seems pertinent here to interpret this Deleuzian position in relation to 
photography and dispel the well-rehearsed myth that photography is absolutely 
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clear or truthful (or should we say ‘clear-and-distinct’), and suggest that perhaps 
in the context of the thesis, what photography concerns itself with is being more 
or less clear or more or less obscure. This proposition is at least interesting if we 
make connections to Apollo and Dionysius above, in the sense that it could serve 
photography well to align itself with the ‘force’ of irrationality. Indeed, the 
project of CPDIOE? is one that strives to disassociate itself with clarity in order 
to encounter the obscure, to allow something of the Dionysian intoxication to 
permeate the glaring light of clear-and-distinct Apollonian representation. “In 
short, it is a question of causing a little of Dionysus’s blood to flow into the 
organic veins of Apollo.” (Deleuze [1968] 2004a: 331).  
 
A text that can provide an interesting perspective on the issue of ‘distinction-
obscurity’ here is James Elkins’ Six Stories from the End of Representation 
(2008). The book is written from the unusual position of attempting to conflate six 
fields of study: painting, photography and four branches of physics – astronomy, 
microscopy, particle physics and quantum mechanics. His concern is to study 
images from these six fields as an investigation into the limits of representation 
and as Elkins explains, the images he collected “… seemed to have a common 
theme: they were images that did not simply depict objects, but demonstrated how 
some objects resist depiction.” (Elkins 2008: xv). Though the book is quite 
heavily focused on a close, almost microscopic, analysis of an assemblage of 
images (and as a result much of the discussion is directed towards issues of 
representation in terms of technological apparatus), Elkins’s overarching study 
offers a novel way of thinking about some of the broader concerns of the thesis. It 
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appears that as we progress through the book we move further and further towards 
obscurity, with the final chapter investigating quantum mechanics, something we 
will be confronted with later in the Section.  
 
If we are to draw on the concept of ‘enigma’ here for a moment, Elkins discusses 
a specific example briefly that is of use to us in relation to obscurity. He examines 
what the painter Giorgio De Chirico (1888–1978) cited as the inspiration for his 
work – ‘the enigma’. Elkins notes that “…De Chirico’s main concern was a 
specific kind of conceptual opacity. ‘Enigma’ was an apotropaic magic word, 
meant to ward off interpretations that would dissect his allusions.” (Elkins 2008: 
15). Interestingly, De Chirico’s concept of ‘the enigma’ was seen to have 
developed from personal experiences and memories of the city of Turin and his 
thoughts about Nietzsche (Elkins 2008: 15-16), for whom the city held particular 
significance15. In the context of ‘distinction-obscurity’ then, it is useful to 
consider enigma as a kind of conceptual opacity, as something that repels clarity. 
The idea of conceptual opacity can be understood as the ‘obscure’ for the sake of 
this interpretation in the sense that it is difficult to decipher, and so we can align 
enigma with the obscure, the imperceptible and the cryptic. It is true that we can 
see De Chirico himself as an enigma as he was notorious for his “…nebulous, 
cryptic statements about his work and intentions, […] this habit certainly 
reinforced his mysterious and enigmatic persona, his sense of unknowableness.” 
(Walker 2012: u.p.). Let us turn briefly to Nietzsche’s influence on De Chirico’s 
work, an issue that has been the subject of much art-historical debate. In her essay 
‘Spectres in the City – De Chirico’s Mythologized Streetscapes’ (2010), Deborah 
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Walker offers some examples of the artists’ paintings that have particular 
resonance with key themes in Nietzsche’s texts. For instance, in works such as 
The Red Tower (1913) and The Enigma of the Day (1914), Walker observes “[i]t 
is possible to see the interdependence of the Apollonian-Dionysian unity in these 
works…” (Walker 2012: u.p.). In light of the concerns of the thesis, it is pertinent 
to note that much of De Chirico’s painting was quite deeply inspired by the notion 
of duality and paradox. Let us take this example from The Birth of Tragedy 
(1993): 
 
 
Only in so far as the genius is fused with the primal 
artist of the world in the act of artistic creation does 
he know anything of the eternal essence of art; for in 
that state he is wonderfully similar to the weird 
fairy-tale image of the creature that can turn its eyes 
around and look at itself; now he is at once subject 
and object, at once poet, actor and audience. 
(Nietzsche 1993: 32) [my emphasis] 
 
 
Interestingly, whilst illuminating the notion of paradox in Nietzsche that we find 
in De Chirico, it is undeniable that this quotation has strong resonances for our 
central question, our cryptic code – CPDIOE?. Perhaps photography in this 
instance becomes the creature that Nietzsche speaks of that can turn its eyes 
around and look at itself; where photography is folded into itself as it becomes 
both subject and object. This sense of collapse, of folding, is what Kennan 
Ferguson calls Nietzsche’s ‘at-onceness’, it is “…a call to plurality of identity 
[…] it is the crossing of established positionings–that the audience can in part 
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become the creator and the creator can become the audience.” (Ferguson 2007: 
14). Certainly this entanglement of roles between poet, actor and audience can be 
read in connection with the concerns of performed photography in Section I, 
though this observation is not something to be expanded upon here16. We shall 
now investigate further the plurality of identity, or even, the breaking up/down of 
identity in the crypt. If we consider the ‘breaking up’ of identity, this suggests a 
division or a split in identity where identity becomes fractured, however these 
‘fragments’ can still be recognised as facets of ‘identity’ per se. These fragments 
of identity come together to form a multiplicity of identities, where identity 
morphs from singular to plural in its form. A ‘breaking down’ of identity on the 
other hand, has more destructive connotations in its evocation of a sense of 
collapse, from which there is no return. Perhaps what this provocation reveals is 
that when identity is broken up, there is still a chance for redemption, identity can 
be pieced back together and salvaged. However when identity is broken down, 
there is an irrevocable shift in ‘states’; identity is left in ruins. Perhaps the crypt 
will allow for both these events to take place in a double-movement (breaking 
up/breaking down), as a double-becoming where identity has the capacity to 
rupture but also to collapse into itself. As Deleuze remarks in Nietzsche and 
Philosophy ([1983] 2006b); “[t]here is no event, no phenomenon, word or thought 
which does not have a multiple sense” (Deleuze [1983] 2006b: 4). 
 
To consider the metaphor of the crypt once more, is to be attentive to the 
indiscernability we face that results from being in the darkness. If we are able to 
ascertain that we are moving further into the crypt (I hasten to add that this 
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movement is not unidirectional), we become conscious of a sense of movement, 
though we remain unaware of our position. Here we can make a connection with 
quantum mechanics via Werner Heisenburg’s ‘Uncertainty Principle’ (1927), 
which (speaking of particles) states that, “…it is not possible simultaneously to 
have perfect knowledge of both position and momentum.” (Polkinhorne 2002: 
33). For Heisenberg, the pairs of physical properties of a particle are inextricably 
related because the more accurately we are able to plot the position of the particle, 
the less accurately we can obtain data regarding its momentum, and vice versa. In 
this way, perhaps this Section of the thesis is focused on concerning itself with 
momentum; which in this context is the movement through the questions as 
intensities in order to get further into the crypt of CPDIOE?. For this reason, we 
can use such an allusion of position and movement to think about the breaking 
up/down of identity in the crypt. Touching upon the issue of the ‘clear-and-
distinct’ and the ‘distinct-obscure’ once more, identity is allied to the notion of the 
‘clear-and-distinct’ and to the logic of recognition, yet when we speak of 
something becoming indistinct (more or less clear or more or less obscure), we 
enter into the realm of distinction-obscurity. If we think of identity as the position 
of something at any one time, it can be linked to a world of discrete objects and of 
difference by degree. However, without the privileging of sight we move through 
the darkness of the crypt with uncertainty – unable to determine any accurate 
position, yet with a heightened sense of movement. In this instance, we are able to 
experience the mobility of thinking in terms of difference in kind as we  “…allow 
our thoughts and bodies to turn into intensities, to difference in itself.” (Williams 
2003: 11). We become powerless in our ability to spatialise our position in the 
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crypt and as a result, the indeterminate movement through this dark space is 
imbued with a sense of open-ended temporality. As we move through this 
indistinct space, we must remember the plight of Deleuze’s cryptographer – “…to 
peer into the crannies of matter and read into the folds of the soul.” (Deleuze 
[1993] 2003: 3), and so it is our task to find the keys that will take us into the 
crannies of darkness and into the folds of the crypt of CPDIOE?. In way of 
orientation at this point in the thesis, we can state that taking the role of the 
cryptographer is allowing us to decode the assumed transparency of the classical 
perspective by looking through the opaque optic of difference. The method is to 
see photography as a fully rounded concept beyond its obvious two-
dimensionality and to multiply and enrich the many possible perspectives that we 
can gain on the medium.  
 
 
 
Difference and Repetition, the key to thresholds yet to come? 
 
Now we must invent another key to CPDIOE?, and perhaps this iteration will 
allow us to get closer to the enigma of our question as each repetition provides a 
different ‘configuration’ that presents itself as an intensity. The very act of 
intensively interpreting this enveloped code opens up the crypt to reveal the depth 
and obscurity that is inherent in our question, and that through repetition we can 
make effort to access what this enigmatic phrase holds secret. It is appropriate 
then, that this ‘key’ concerns the issue of difference and repetition, which will 
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address the process that we are employing in this Section as a way of drawing 
attention to some of the intricacies of the construction of CPDIOE?.  
 
“The world, as a multiplicity, is constituted by moments of, and differences in, 
intensity.” (O’Sullivan 2006: 31). 
 
It is Deleuze’s task in Difference and Repetition ([1968] 2004a) to conduct a 
critique of mainstream representation, and in doing so, he hoped to destabalise the 
fixity of classical representation. As we noted in the closing pages of Section I, 
Deleuze and Foucault determine four ‘iron collars’ of the classical world of 
representation, which co-ordinate and measure it (Deleuze [1968] 2004a: 330). To 
remind ourselves, these four dimensions are: “…identity in the concept, 
opposition in the predicate, analogy in judgement and resemblance in perception” 
(Deleuze [1968] 2004a: 330). As we investigated in the previous Section of the 
thesis, representation in this context can be understood as a product of 
spatialisation, whereas difference and repetition is to be found in temporality and 
beyond rationality – indeed it was theorised in order to escape from the canon of 
mainstream representation, as outlined above. In this way, we can surely catch 
glimpses of the potential of such a developed strategy that is concerned with 
temporality and the irrational to get us further into the crypt of CPDIOE?.  
 
In conjunction with the challenge to representation that difference and repetition 
presents, it is also important to acknowledge another aspect, that is, the promotion 
of the concept of difference that is not based on a relationship with sameness, 
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what Cliff Stagoll calls Deleuze’s ‘liberation’ of difference (Stagoll 2010: 75) 
from the model of representation. As Deleuze himself proclaims, “[d]ifference is 
not and cannot be thought in itself, so long as it is subject to the requirements of 
representation.” (Deleuze [1968] 2004a: 330). So in order to experience an 
intensive difference in itself (difference in kind), as opposed to an extensive 
difference by degree, it is crucial that we must think difference differently – as a 
difference not controlled by identity or similarity, but as a ‘conceptual’ difference. 
Furthermore, repetition is connected to, and produced by, difference in its 
capacity as a productive process of continuous variation that occurs through each 
repetition.  
 
 
For Deleuze, repetition is produced via difference, 
not mimesis. It is a process of ungrounding that 
resists turning into an inert system of replication. In 
fact, the whole Platonist idea of representing in order 
to produce copies is completely undermined by 
Deleuze. For Deleuze maintains this approach is 
deeply flawed because it subsumes the creative 
nature of difference under an immobile system of 
resemblance. 
(Parr 2010b: 225) 
 
 
It is here that we can understand the reciprocal relationship that is played out 
between difference and repetition and it becomes our task at this stage to free both 
counterparts from their impoverished meaning within representation. By liberating 
difference and repetition from these constraints, we are able to speak not of 
representational difference and simple repetition, but of pure difference and 
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complex repetition, which is produced out of this emancipation. We are already 
aware of how this aforementioned intensive ‘difference in kind’ operates, so let us 
turn briefly to its relationship with Deleuze’s notion of complex repetition, and 
similarly, how this can help to decipher CPDIOE?. Rather than a material and 
bare repetition of the same that takes place within representation, in order to 
access a clothed, ‘complex repetition’ Deleuze utilises a system of simulacra, 
which divert from the model and copy of representation to take the form of series. 
As Deleuze attests, “[s]imulacra are those systems in which difference relates to 
different by means of difference in itself. What is essential is that we find in these 
systems no prior identity, no internal resemblance.” (Deleuze [1968] 2004a: 372-
373) [emphasis in original]. 
 
 
Systems of simulacra affirm divergence and 
decentring: the only unity, the only convergence of 
all the series, is an informal chaos in which they are 
all included. No series enjoys privilege over others, 
none possesses the identity of a model, none the 
resemblance of a copy. None is either opposed or 
analogous to another. Each is constituted by 
differences, and communicates with the others 
through differences of differences. Crowned 
anarchies are substituted for the hierarchies of 
representation; nomadic distributions for the 
sedentary distributions of representations.  
(Deleuze [1968] 2004a: 348) 
 
 
Indeed it seems pertinent to remark that in this way, perhaps our enigmatic 
question CPDIOE? employs the principles of simulacra in its continuous 
recurrence, as the repetitions multiply to form a rhizomatic, non-hierarchical 
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series. In fact, in order to ‘overthrow Platonism’ and subvert the world of 
representation, Deleuze, in The Logic of Sense ([1990] 2004c) stresses, “[t]he 
simulacrum is not a degraded copy. It harbors a positive power which denies the 
original and the copy, the model and the reproduction. […] There is no longer 
any privileged point of view except that of the object common to all points of 
view.” (Deleuze [1990] 2004c: 299) [emphasis in original]. We can see 
resonances here with Leibniz’s writings on perspective and his example of the 
multiple viewpoints of a city, as one particular view is not afforded the luxury of a 
privileged position, instead, the perspectives come together to form a multiplicity, 
a series. Aside from this, if we return to the above quotation from Difference and 
Repetition ([1968] 2004a), our perceptions are heightened as we become acutely 
aware of the inner workings of CPDIOE? and how this cryptic code operates, as 
each repetition of the question is constituted by differences and communicates 
with the others through differences of differences.  
 
Certainly the qualities Deleuze attributes to difference and repetition strike a 
chord with the broader concerns of the thesis, and the more pointed inquiries of 
this Section on cryptography in particular; “[t]he powers of repetition include 
displacement and disguise, just as difference includes power [sic] of divergence 
and decentring.” (Deleuze [1968] 2004a: 360). As we have ascertained thus far in 
investigations concerning intensities and the issue of distinction-obscurity, it is 
worth noting the significance of repetition having the capability to displace and 
disguise. Moreover, such a proclivity is commensurate with being in the darkness 
of the crypt of CPDIOE? as we search for clues that will help us unlock this 
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enigmatic conundrum. Let us look more closely at the two forms of repetition that 
Deleuze puts forward: 
 
 
One has fixed terms and places; the other essentially 
includes displacement and disguise. One is negative 
and by default; the other is positive and by excess. 
One is of elements, extrinsic parts, cases and times; 
the other is of variable internal totalities, degrees and 
levels. One involves succession in fact, the other 
coexistence in principle. One is static; the other 
dynamic. One is extensive, the other intensive. One 
is ordinary; the other distinctive and involving 
singularities. One is horizontal; the other vertical. 
One is developed and must be explicated; the other 
is enveloped and must be interpreted. One is a 
repetition of equality and symmetry in the effect; the 
other is a repetition of inequality as though it were a 
repetition of asymmetry in the cause. One is 
repetition of mechanism and precision; the other 
repetition of selection and freedom. One is bare 
repetition which can be masked only afterwards and 
in addition; the other is a clothed repetition of which 
the masks, the displacements and the disguises are 
the first, last and only elements.  
(Deleuze [1968] 2004a: 359) [emphasis in 
original] 
 
 
Perhaps the first point to be made here is that for Deleuze, true difference lies 
between the two forms of repetition, as outlined above. In the quotation, ‘One’ 
can be aligned to representation, which Deleuze links with identity, and the 
‘other’ represents the heterogenous group, and is connected to difference and 
temporality. If we remind ourselves of the generative power of productive 
syntheses once more, it becomes clear that we are not merely focusing on 
representation or difference, as such a synthesis enables us to redress the balance 
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of the perceived hegemony of representation over a Deleuzian system of 
difference. It is from this process that we enable succession (representation) and 
co-existence (difference) to collide. To return to the question of photography for a 
moment, let us contemplate the difference between the two types of repetition in 
order to shed some light onto our question CPDIOE?. For instance, ‘One is of 
elements, extrinsic parts, cases and times’ and ‘the other is of variable internal 
totalities, degrees and levels’. This is a particularly apt example given that 
extrinsic parts, cases and times seems to suggest some sort of ex-ternal or 
distanced relationship, which, given the concerns of the previous Section, we can 
perhaps align with a photography that is committed to spatial concerns from a 
representational standpoint. On the other hand, variable internal totalities, 
degrees and levels evokes something more convoluted and labyrinthine, and calls 
forth a complex photographic potentiality… CPDIOE?.  
 
As with the creative power Deleuze ascribes to the positing of problems, we must 
also recognise the possibilities for transformation and invention that emanate from 
the act of repetition, as Adrian Parr notes, “…repetition dissolves identities as it 
changes them, giving rise to something unrecognisable and productive.” (Parr 
2010b: 226). This is the encounter of repetition that rejects stasis in favour of the 
dynamism and flux of difference in itself. Indeed, it is important to remember that 
repetition is not unidirectional towards an already predetermined destination –  
“…repetition calls forth a terra incognita filled with a sense of novelty and 
unfamiliarity.” (Parr 2010b: 226). From our perspective then, such an experience 
of repetition leading into the unknown is undoubtedly heightened as we move 
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deeper into the crypt of CPDIOE?. Whilst there is no ‘end point’ which repetition 
seeks to arrive at, there is neither any ‘object’ of repetition – what is repeated is 
repetition itself, and it is the act of repetition that produces pure difference.  
 
 
It is a question of extending representation as far as 
the too large and the too small of difference; of 
adding a hitherto unsuspected perspective to 
representation – in other words, inventing 
theological, scientific and aesthetic techniques 
which allow it to integrate the depth of difference in 
itself; of allowing representation to conquer the 
obscure; of allowing it to include the vanishing of 
difference which is too small and the 
dismemberment of difference which is too large; of 
allowing it to capture the power of giddiness, 
intoxication and cruelty, and even of death.  
  (Deleuze [1968] 2004a: 331) 
 
 
Perhaps the thesis offers a response to the task of the above quotation in that it 
seeks to add a hitherto unsuspected perspective to representation. I would suggest 
that this ‘unsuspected perspective’ in the context of this investigation and 
photography, takes the form of a minor-photography, as it emerges as a rupture 
from within the major, spatialised practices of the medium in question. It is this 
movement, this rumble of the minor, that has the potential to produce a paradigm 
shift within the medium by creating lines of flight that moves us out towards the 
peripheries, and extends representation to its limits. Furthermore, the ‘technique’ 
we have invented to enable us to integrate the depth of difference in itself  has 
arguably been expounded in this Section – it is revealed as our question, our code, 
CPDIOE?. Now turning towards a baroque complexity, it is well to consider that 
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the crypt of CPDIOE? wishes to conquer (encounter) the obscure, whilst still 
allowing representation to capture the power of giddiness and intoxication. Here 
Deleuze evokes Dionysius once more in order to stir the irrationality that this 
impulsive figure of excess conjures up in our imagination. In relation to our 
endeavour, this suggests that whilst concerning ourselves with the minute details 
of the question in a multiplicity of attempts to conquer the obscurity of CPDIOE?, 
perhaps this six-word enigma withholds any sense of rationality in favour of that 
which is aligned to a baroque imperceptibility, as it retains its mystique in the face 
of such an interrogation. 
 
 
 
Questions and questions and questions in questions – the ultimate 
crypt? 
 
As we attempt to invent another key to the crypt of CPDIOE?, let us focus our 
attention on the Deleuzian ‘and’ and the concept of the fold to get us further into 
the darkness. At this stage it will serve us well to recall the notion of a 
‘Bergsonian problem’, in order to reflect on the way that we are set to work at 
uncovering and positing our question fully, as opposed to hopelessly searching for 
a steadfast or lasting ‘solution’ to the problem. In a short interview for Cahiers de 
Cinéma in 1976, Deleuze offers a response to Jean-Luc Godard’s mini-television 
series Six Fois Deux/Sur et sous la communication (Six Times Two/On and 
Beneath Communication) (1976). Published in Negotiations (1995) under the title 
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‘Three Questions on ‘Six Times Two’, Deleuze discusses ideas relating to the 
broadcast. He begins by drawing on a well known saying by Godard “…not a just 
image, just an image.” (Godard in Deleuze 1995: 38), and suggests that perhaps 
philosophers should also make it their task to carry this out in their activities and 
explains, “…the just ideas are always those that conform to accepted meanings or 
to established precepts, they’re always ideas that confirm something…” (Deleuze 
1995: 38). Alternatively, “…‘just ideas’ is a becoming-present, a stammering of 
ideas, and can only be expressed in the form of questions that tend to confound 
any answers. Or you can present something simple that disrupts all the 
arguments.” (Deleuze 1995: 38). Here we can draw our resonances with the 
Bergsonian problem once more, in that ‘answers’ do not present themselves to us 
when considering ‘just ideas’, and so we are left with questions… questions… 
questions. Perhaps we can attest that our question CPDIOE? is ‘just an idea’ in 
this sense, in that the very task of its formation as a crypt/code/question is to 
perplex and confuse and, following the above quotation, is deceiving in its 
supposed simplicity whilst it operates as a force of disruption. Let us now 
consider how CPDIOE? produces a creative stammering through both its 
repetition and its use of the conjunctive ‘and’ to evoke a multiplicity: 
 
 
…a multiplicity is not defined by the number of its 
terms. We can always add a 3rd to 2, a 4th to 3, etc., 
we do not escape dualism in this way, since the 
elements of any set whatever can be related to a 
succession of choices which are themselves binary. 
It is not the elements or the sets which define the 
multiplicity. What defines it is the AND, as 
something which has its place between the elements 
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or between the sets. AND, AND, AND–stammering. 
And even if there are only two terms, there is an 
AND between the two, which is neither the one nor 
the other, nor the one which becomes the other, but 
which constitutes the multiplicity. This is why it is 
always possible to undo dualisms from the inside, by 
tracing the line of flight which passes between the 
two terms or the two sets, the narrow stream which 
belongs neither to the one nor to the other, but draws 
both into a non-parallel evolution, into a 
heterochronous becoming. 
(Deleuze and Parnet [1987] 2002: 26) 
[emphasis in original] 
 
 
So it is our task at this stage to remain within a qualitative appreciation of the 
‘and’, that is, we must turn our backs to a numerical, quantifiable understanding, 
we must not concern ourselves with how many times we ask our question 
CPDIOE?, but instead focus our attention on the act of repeating, of asking 
again… CPDIOE?. Indeed, this question of numbers appears in Godard too, 
prompting the interviewer to ask Deleuze what these numbers mean. In riposte, 
Deleuze nimbly puts forward his notion of creative stammering that is enveloped 
in the conjunctive ‘and’ – “…AND, ‘and…and…and…’ is precisely a creative 
stammering, a foreign use of language, as opposed to a conformist and dominant 
use based on the verb ‘to be’.” (Deleuze 1995: 44): 
 
 
A and B. The AND is not even a specific relation or 
conjunction, it is that which subtends all relations, 
the path of all relations, which makes relations shoot 
outside their terms and outside the set of their terms, 
and outside everything which could be determined 
as Being, One, or Whole. The AND as extra being, 
inter-being. Relations might still establish 
 206 
themselves between their terms, or between two sets, 
from one to the other, but the AND gives relations 
another direction, and puts to flight terms and sets, 
the former and the latter on the line of flight which it 
actively creates. Thinking with AND, instead of 
thinking IS, instead of thinking for IS…   
(Deleuze and Parnet [1987] 2002: 43) 
[emphasis in original] 
 
 
 
Figure 5: PAUL+A 2006, ‘I Watched Her Until She Disappeared’ (excerpt) 
[performed    photography, black and white 5x4 Polaroid photographs]. Courtesy 
of the artist. 
 
 
 
We shall return briefly here to Jeff’s experiments in performed photography under 
the pseudonym PAUL+A. In the work ‘I Watched Her Until She Disappeared’ 
(2006), Jeff utilises Deleuze’s conception of difference and repetition in an 
attempt to genergate meaning in the conjunctive spaces between photographs. It is 
precisely the works’ utilisation of this notion of creative stammering enveloped in 
the conjunctive ‘and’ that turns against a conventional photographic language. 
The work is concerned with the generation of emotion or sensation through a 
 207 
constructed situation that attempts to unfurl a traumatic experience, in this case 
the abduction and imprisonment of young women in Mexico by the drug cartels. 
Located in a prison cell in Northern Ireland, the work interrogates the parallel 
situations of being imprisoned, both in reality and metaphorically as well as via 
gender, within photographic representation. This one image was generated every 
hour for a whole week (one hundred and sixty eight Polaroid photographs), the 
pose remaining the same with only the inscribed feelings of the imprisoned 
woman and the black or white dress producing variation. Rather than describing 
the condition of being imprisoned, the serial nature of the work constitutes a 
multiplicity, opening up new directions by which to interpret an event in all its 
rammifications. Here one could argue that photography is thinking with AND 
instead of thinking IS, instead of thinking for IS. 
 
It seems productive here to consider the relationship between the conjunctive 
‘and’ that replaces the ‘is’ of identity, and the concept of the fold as the 
relationship of difference with itself. As we have acknowledged thus far, the ‘and’ 
operates as an agent of connection between elements or sets and deftly constructs 
relations that form a multiplicity – “AND is neither one thing nor the other, its 
always in-between, between two things; it’s the borderline, there’s always a 
border, a line of flight or flow, only we don’t see it, because it’s the least 
perceptible of things.” (Deleuze 1995: 45). Still, the fold can be said to function in 
a similar way in that it advocates an intensive process, and maybe along each 
crease of each fold we sense the practice of the ‘and’ which has been set to work 
along these lines. “The problem is not how to finish a fold, but how to continue it, 
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to have it go through the ceiling, how to bring it to infinity.” (Deleuze [1993] 
2003: 34). Perhaps what becomes apparent is that such a relationship between the 
two signals a ‘principle of connectivity’, hence, it could be argued that both the 
‘and’ and the ‘fold’ share the same motive in that they both seek to rupture the 
permanence of ‘being’ by a process of ‘becoming’. 
 
The fold must surely take us further into the crypt of our question, as its very 
construction is one that contains folds – CPDIOE? is an ineluctable enigma – can 
photography describe its own event?. Certainly, it becomes pertinent to consider 
the inner workings of the fold, as O’Sullivan notes, “…the fold can also be 
understood as the name for one’s relation to oneself (or, the effect of the self on 
the self).” (O’Sullivan 2010b: 107), and points out that it was the Greeks to first 
discover this technique of folding, or ‘self mastery’ (O’Sullivan 2010b: 107). This 
notion of ‘self mastery’ is a particularly revealing term to use in relation to 
CPDIOE?, as the task of fully comprehending the possibilities for this complex 
question becomes an apprenticeship of sorts. As Deleuze attests in Proust and 
Signs ([1964] 2008), “[t]o learn is first of all to consider a substance, an object, a 
being as if it emitted signs to be deciphered, interpreted. There is no apprentice 
who is not ‘the Egyptologist’ of something.” (Deleuze [1964] 2008: 4). 
 
Indeed, the workings of this apprenticeship signifies what is detailed in the thesis, 
and we must not underestimate the importance the role that the cryptographer 
takes in such an endeavour – deciphering and interpreting the crypt of CPDIOE?. 
As we determined in the opening pages of the Section, it is our task here to 
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intensively envelop and interpret the question, in contrast to the concerns of the 
previous Section which developed and explicated CPDIOE?. In terms of how our 
question/code utilises folds, let us take inspiration from a Deleuzian folded 
architecture, as Graham Livesey explains,  “A folded, or pliant architecture is able 
to interconnect with a context/site in a seamless manner, and is able to create 
complexity from a single gesture.” (Livesey 2010: 110). Thus, our folded 
question/code creates complexity in the single gesture of its utterance.  
 
 
 
The crypt encapsulated; doors wide shut? 
 
Key to this next sub-section in terms of the dissolving of the classical perspective 
in photography is the evocation of a darkness hiding in the full light of reason. By 
returning to the concept of the monad, we move into the darkest part of the crypt. 
This dark enigmatic space is made up of an infinity of folds, in which the whole 
world of monads are encapsulated, hidden. The monad as a unit then, is both 
completely contained, a crypt, yet also communicates with other monads. This 
supposed paradox is made clear through the metaphor of the two-floored baroque 
house – the lower floor forms connections to the world (and other monads), 
whereas the upper floor contains the soul and is completely incommunicable – 
“[t]he world of matter, open to the universe (exteriority), and the world of the 
soul, closed in on itself and without windows and doors (interiority).” (O’Sullivan 
2006: 123). As Deleuze explains in an interview on Leibniz: 
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Leibniz’s most famous proposition is that every soul 
or subject (monad) is completely closed, windowless 
and doorless, and contains the whole world in its 
darkest depths, whilst also illuminating some little 
portion of that world, each monad, a different 
portion. So the world is enfolded in each soul, but 
differently, because each illuminates only one little 
aspect of the overall folding.  
(Deleuze 1995: 157) 
 
 
Here we can make a connection with what we uncovered about the distinct-
obscure earlier in this Section, in the sense that clarity only appears because of 
obscurity. As O’Sullivan (following Deleuze) concisely explains, each monad 
includes a ‘clear zone’, which contains an element that is uniquely attributed to 
that specific monad, what Bergson terms a ‘zone of perception’ (O’Sullivan 2006: 
123). We learn in The Fold, that “[e]ssential to the monad is its dark background: 
everything is drawn out of it, and nothing goes out or comes in from the outside.” 
(Deleuze [1993] 2003: 27) [emphasis in original]. Indeed, what is outside the 
‘clear zone’ of the monad makes up this dark background, which represents the 
obscure for the monad in question, but would constitute the ‘clear zone’ for other 
monads (O’Sullivan 2006: 123). Here we can make an analogy perhaps to the 
classic conception of the latent image in analogue photography. A dark 
background imbued with pure potential that forms a threshold with the clear zone 
of the image.  
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The ability to reconcile opposites, a hallmark of 
Baroque art and architecture, means that inside and 
outside (coextensive space), illusion and reality, 
light and dark, movement and stasis, finite and 
infinite and space and mass, interact in complex 
interplays, both unifying and blurring the 
distinctions between each.  
(Livesey 2010: 109) 
 
 
The above quotation reminds us of one of the key principles of Deleuze’s 
philosophy that he seemingly developed from the traits of Baroque art and 
architecture; namely, the possibilities for productive syntheses between 
antinomies. As a central tenet of the thesis, the principle has been expounded in a 
variety of ways thus far, though now we must investigate the relationship between 
the one and the multiple in relation to monads and divergent and convergent 
seriality. The emphasis here will be placed on the connection between monads; 
how each monad indistinctly contains the whole world of monads within itself, 
encapsulated in the enigma of its form. The one is enveloped in the multiple and 
the multiple enveloped in the one.17 Earlier in the Section we saw how Deleuze 
and Parnet utilised the ‘and’ as a way of opening up, of undoing dualisms from 
the inside, and so it is our task here to think not of the ‘one’ and the ‘multiple’ as 
binary oppositions, but to consider how they both include the other and indeed, 
the process of oscillation that occurs between them. As O’Sullivan notes, “[i]t is 
in this sense that the Baroque is at one and the same time the multiple and the 
One, a constant interplay, or resonance, between the two – the two floors of the 
Baroque house.” (O’Sullivan 2006: 137). And so the monad itself speaks of the 
relationship of the one to the multiple, enveloped in a single point of view. We 
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can see how the oscillations, vacillations, between the one and the multiple 
reverberate for CPDIOE? in the way that each iteration of our crypt/code forms 
an interconnected ‘web’ with all other actual/virtual articulations of our enigmatic 
question. CPDIOE? as a question then, is infinite in its variation.  
 
 
A new or another dualism? No. A problem in 
writing: inexact expressions are absolutely necessary 
in order to designate something exactly. And not at 
all because one has to pass through them, nor 
because one can proceed only through 
approximations: inexactitude is the exact path of 
what is done, and not at all an approximation.  
(Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 47) 
 
 
Here, Deleuze and Guattari in ‘Rhizome’18; first published in On the Line (1983) 
and subsequently as the Introduction to A Thousand Plateaus ([1987] 2004a), 
describe the process of enacting a rhizomatic gesture between dualisms – “[w]e 
invoke one dualism only in order to challenge another. […] Each time, mental 
correctives are necessary to undo the dualisms we had no wish to construct but 
through wish we pass.” (Deleuze and Guattari [1987] 2004a: 22-23). It is through 
this process that we arrive at Deleuze and Guattari’s ‘magic’ paradoxical formula: 
“PLURALISM = MONISM” (Deleuze and Guattari [1987] 2004a: 23). 
Furthermore, given that the major trajectory of the thesis is concerned with 
positing our question (CPDIOE?) well in the Bergsonian sense (as opposed to 
looking for a ‘lasting solution’ to the question/problem), the term inexact 
expression from the above quotation is particularly revealing. In fact, perhaps the 
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questions that form the Section constitute ‘inexact expressions’ of CPDIOE? and 
that it is only when all questions come into alignment (as in a constellation), are 
we able to comprehend the possibilities afforded by our simply stated question. 
Our crypt follows the path of inexactitude.  
 
 
We begin with the world as if with a series of 
inflections or events: it is a pure emission of 
singularities. Here, for example, are three 
singularities: to be the first man, to live in a garden 
of paradise, to have a wife created from one’s own 
rib. And then fourth: sinning. Singularity events of 
this kind hold a relation with ‘ordinaries’ or 
‘regulars’ (the difference here being minimal). A 
singularity is surrounded by a cloud of ordinaries or 
regulars. 
(Deleuze [1993] 2003: 60) 
 
 
According to Deleuze, Leibniz’s world-view was one of  “…an infinity of 
converging series, capable of being extended into each other, around unique 
points.” (Deleuze [1993] 2003: 60). These ‘unique points’ are singularities, and in 
Difference and Repetition, they are points of “…perpetual recommencement and 
of variation.” (Conley 2010: 256). So the convergence and divergence of all series 
form a connected network through these ‘points’, always in a state of flux and 
renewal. Singularities can instigate new series, which may extend and overlap 
with other series generated from other singularities. This very notion of series by 
Leibniz is continued by Deleuze in Difference and Repetition, where he puts 
forward a system of simulacra as a challenge to the ‘model and copy’ of 
representation. As we uncovered earlier in the Section, simulacra take the form of 
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a non-hierarchical series and communicate via difference; we can arguably see 
resonances of Leibniz’s connected network of series here. At this juncture, it is 
well to remember how the conjunctive ‘and’ operates as an agent of connection, 
as we suggested with the glass paste that holds together the tesserae of Benjamin’s 
mosaic, and also more recently, the ‘AND’ that activates a “…heterochronous 
becoming” (Deleuze and Parnet [1987] 2002: 26) between dualisms, that in turn 
constitutes a Deleuzian multiplicity.  
 
Now, considering our interest in the relationship between monads, we will 
concentrate our attention here on the ‘opening up’ of the monad that we touched 
upon briefly in an earlier question of this Section (‘monad or nomad?’), which 
arguably instigates new kinds of folding, new envelopments. Tom Conley in his 
translator’s foreword to The Fold addresses this transformation of monadology 
into nomadology as he suggests, “[t]he two worlds must fold into each other.” 
(Conley [1993] 2003: xv-xvi). Perhaps the most well known example Deleuze 
uses to offer a contemporary interpretation of the monad is that of the speeding 
car of Tony Smith – “[s]omething has changed in the situation of monads, 
between the former model, the closed chapel with imperceptible openings, and the 
new model invoked by Tony Smith, the sealed car speeding down the dark 
highway.” (Deleuze [1993] 2003: 137).  
 
The quotation suggests that the ‘opening up’ of the monad includes an integration 
of speed and movement – the monad becoming nomad. Accordingly, “[w]hen 
Glenn Gould speeds up the performance of a piece, he is not simply being a 
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virtuoso; he is transforming the musical points into lines, and making the 
ensemble proliferate.” (Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 15). As the monad is 
mobilised (the sealed car speeding down the highway), it instigates its own line of 
flight and puts all other monads into perpetual movement; points are transformed 
into lines. In terms of Heisenburg’s ‘Uncertainty Principle’ (1927) which we 
investigated earlier, the more precisely we can plot the position of particles, the 
less information we can gather about their speed or the momentum. In this way, 
we are shifting gear in our understanding of the monad to incorporate the ‘other’ 
dimension – that of movement as opposed to that of position. Just as speed causes 
the multiplication of Gould’s musical ensemble, this act of nomadology enables 
more channels of communication to be activated between monads. As Deleuze 
recognises, “[t]here’s nothing more unsettling than the continual movement of 
something that seems fixed. In Leibniz’s words: a dance of particles folding back 
on themselves.” (Deleuze 1995: 157). Thinking of the continual movement of the 
rhizome again, it is the lines of flight that instigate a perpetual process of de- and 
re-territorialisation of the rhizome and that which it encounters:  
 
 
There is a rupture in the rhizome each time the 
segmentary lines explode into a line of flight, but the 
line of flight is part of the rhizome. These lines 
never cease to refer to one another, which is why a 
dualism or a dichotomy can never be assumed…  
(Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 18)  
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In relation to this, if we remember that for Benjamin, all monads indistinctly 
contain all other monads, then we can begin to see that perhaps this intrinsic (yet 
not always visible) connecting element is precisely what a contemporary 
interpretation of the monad reveals in a more explicit manner. So if we can 
identify the need for flight then from what are we fleeing? (Is fleeing inherently 
negative in connotation?). Perhaps it is the rigidity of systems, the habitual 
rationale in need of deterritorialisation? In a certain sense then, to relate this 
Section back to Section I, it may be the flight from legibility itself, in search of 
new forms of creativity. Let us remind ourselves of Deleuze’s definition of 
Leibniz’s famous monad: “…a unity that envelops a multiplicity, this multiplicity 
developing the One in the manner of a ‘series’.” (Deleuze [1993] 2003: 23). And 
so we move forward leaving the legible to Section I and the light of photography, 
just as we are now engaged in interrogating the dark elements of the concept, and 
as we will move on again in Section III to the emergence of the photographic 
event from the plane of zero.  
 
 
Walter Benjamin – a dream of legibility? 
 
In order to dispel the dream of legibility (or at least the illusion of it) as it pertains 
to photography, we have been supplementing/dissolving the classical perspective 
with the concept of difference. This is a central tenet of our hypothesis and as we 
move towards the end of the Section, we shall now investigate a possible site of 
convergence of the major concepts detailed thus far, which can arguably be found 
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in a recollection of a dream by Walter Benjamin. The concepts we will be 
considering include intensities, monads, difference, multiplicities and notions of 
enigma and cryptography. Perhaps this meeting place will allow some of the 
convolutions we have been fostering throughout this cryptic journey to come 
together to form a new constellation, a new interpretation of our code CPDIOE?, 
which will enable us to invent another key to get further into our crypt. It seems 
pertinent to note at this stage that, in keeping with the concerns of the thesis, we 
are going to eschew a more predictable Freudian analysis in deciphering the 
dream, in favour of employing the figure of the cryptographer to carry out this 
task. Consequently, we will draw on the knowledge gained along our crypts’ 
paths of inexactitude to interpret the dream for creative possibilities relating to our 
general trajectory of enquiry. We shall now look further into the scenario of the 
dream. Let us return to the Baroque writer par excellence, and in particular, a 
letter Benjamin wrote in October 1939 (the final year of his life) to good friend 
Greta Adorno (1902 – 1993), in which he details his profound experience. 
Benjamin’s dream was an enigma; it preoccupied the rest of his work as he spent 
the last months of his life trying to decipher this unfathomable allegory. Indeed 
the space of the dream is a space displaced beyond rationality and it is interesting 
that as a purposefully cryptic writer, Benjamin was struck by such an allusive 
encounter himself.  
 
Let us turn to Buci-Glucksmann’s account of Benjamin’s dream: 
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Benjamin narrates that he was in the company of 
Doctor Dausse (who had cured him of malaria) and 
that, having left some other people, they found 
themselves at an excavation site. Almost at the level 
of the ground: ‘Couches of a strange kind, the length 
of sarcophagi’. But in fact, in ‘half kneeling down, I 
realized that we were softly sinking into it as in a 
bed’. It was all ‘covered with moss or ivy’ so that 
‘the whole thing resembled a forest’. Suddenly the 
view changes: the forest becomes like a ‘nautical 
construction’ and ‘on the deck . . . were three 
women with whom Dausse was living. This sight 
does not disturb him anymore than the discovery 
that I made at the very moment when I was leaving 
my hat on a grand piano. It was a real straw hat, a 
panama that I had inherited from my father. As I was 
ridding myself of it, I was struck by a wide fissure 
that appeared in the upper part . . . with traces of red 
on the edges.  
Then follow a number of events linked with 
women. The first of these women, a graphology 
expert, is particularly unsettling for the dreamer. 
‘I feared that some of my intimate traits might 
thereby be disclosed. I drew closer. What I saw 
was a fabric covered with images.’ The only 
writing he can distinguish on it is the upper part 
of the letter D, the more ‘spiritual’ part. Some 
conversations then take place about this writing, 
and Benjamin retains a clear textual and oral 
memory. At a certain moment he said the words: 
‘The point was to change some poetry into a 
scarf.’  
But scarcely had I said these words than 
something very intriguing happened. I notice that 
among the women was a very beautiful one lying 
in a bed. When she heard my explication she has 
a brief moment like a flash of lightning . . .  and 
drew aside a tiny piece of the blanket . . .  But 
what she wanted to show me was not her body 
but the pattern of the sheet, which displayed 
imagery similar to that which I had to write many 
years ago when giving a present to Dausse. I 
knew very well that the lady was making that 
movement. But what told me this was a kind of 
supplementary vision. For the eyes of my body 
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were elsewhere and I could not at all make out 
what the sheet had fleetingly thrown open to me. 
End of dream, insomnia, intense happiness.  
(Buci-Glucksmann 1994: 83) 
  [emphasis in original] 
 
 
Aside from revelling in the enigma of the dream, we will now undertake our own 
act of cryptography on Benjamin’s behalf to draw out some connections to be 
made, but with the concerns of the thesis in mind. Perhaps the first thing we 
notice is the abundance of fractured narratives and discrete images melded 
together in the dream, and the instability and fluidity that result from such an 
amalgamation. It is worth noting that these traits are of significance for the 
structure of Baroque narratives in general as for example, Deleuze, commenting 
on Leibniz’s Théodicée (1710) notes that, “[t]he text responds marvelously to the 
general criteria of Baroque narrative: stories enclosed one in the other, and the 
variation of the relation of narrator-and-narration.” (Deleuze [1993] 2003: 61). 
Certainly we can see why such convolutions were of interest to the author of The 
Fold ([1993] 2003), and the possibility of stories and ideas being enclosed in each 
other resonates for us here in relation to Benjamin’s enigmatic dream. 
Furthermore, this enfolding and unfolding of stories can also be understood in 
relation to what we recently uncovered about how monads indistinctly contain all 
other monads. Alongside the variability of locations and narratives in the dream, 
perhaps what is also reduced to fragments is identity – it is shattered by the 
‘AND… AND… AND…’. It is in this way that Benjamin sees the whole dream 
like his concept of the mosaic, and it is by the conjunctive ‘and’ and the glass 
paste that these fragments are always held in relation. The doctor and the forest 
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and some moss and a boat and three women and one woman and images and 
blankets AND a lightning flash? 
 
Benjamin’s encounter with the first of the women is particularly unsettling as he 
observes a fabric covered in images; are these images some sort of code? As a 
graphology expert the woman’s presence is important, though Benjamin only 
seems able to decipher the possible writing on the fabric as the top half of the 
letter D; ‘the more spiritual part’. This could well be an allusion to the more 
‘spiritual’ top floor of the Baroque house, the windowless monad, and perhaps 
also signals a reference to Doctor Dausse. We can speculate that Dausse is 
important to Benjamin as he rid him of a fevered irrationality when he contracted 
malaria. Towards the end of the dream Benjamin is confronted by yet more 
cryptographic symbols on a blanket of a bed, are these patterns or words? Just as 
James Elkins in What Photography Is (2011) describes the surface of a 
photographic print as “…a griffonage (an illegible handwriting) of marks and 
scratches” (Elkins 2011: 26)19, the marks Benjamin is trying to decipher are also a 
griffonage of mark making. Furthermore, as Deleuze advises in Proust and Signs 
“…every act of learning is an interpretation of signs or hieroglyphs.” (Deleuze 
[1964] 2008: 4). Perhaps these symbols are a way of revealing the hidden depths 
enveloped in the dream that cannot be grasped on surface level, here represented 
by a griffonage, a scrambled code, a crypt. Their presence in the dream is an act 
of displacement and disguise, arguably the very subject of Baroque allegory.  
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To return to the lightning flash in the dream, perhaps we can recognise here a 
particularly telling allusion to Benjamin’s other famous lightning flash – the 
dialectical image. As we posited earlier in the Section, if the dialectical image is 
analogous to the splitting of the atom, it is because of the potentially explosive 
nature of going beyond the bounds of the possible, by perceiving an extensive 
construct that appears to have multiple emergences of intensities in the same 
moment it can almost be seen as an inversion of the splitting of the atom, but with 
the same explosive effect. This is the definition of the dialectical image where 
images of past, present and future emerge together in a lightning flash of 
dialectics at a standstill. Regarding the work we carried out on intensities earlier 
in this Section, perhaps we can suggest that the dream represents the breakdown 
of legibility where more than one intensity struggles to emerge at the same time. 
In addition, the dialectical image reveals an instance of this possibility; indeed it 
is an impossibility in essence, which is why it emerges only for the flash of an 
instant, barely perceptible in a soup of quantum potentiality. The resultant 
perceptual ‘image’ becomes fractured and fractal and, to return to Leibniz, is 
transmitted as a ‘swarm of appearances’: 
 
 
Thus there is nothing fallow, nothing sterile, nothing 
dead in the universe, no chaos, no confusion, save in 
appearance, somewhat as it might appear to be in a 
pond at a distance, in which one would see a 
confused movement and, as it were, a swarming of 
fish in the pond, without separately distinguishing 
the fish themselves. (Theod. Pref. [E. 475 b; 477; G. 
vi. 40, 44].) 
(Leibniz 1898: 257 §69) 
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And so the dream represents the confusion or swarm of emergent 
intensities/singularities as the disparate images produced in the dream cannot be 
grasped in the same moment. Such multiple emergences fracture the cohesion or 
sense of the extensity from which they materialise in the way that out of an 
extensive scene/construct it is usually only possible for one intensity to be clear at 
once, the remainder cloaked by a field of obscurity. Thus, when Benjamin looks 
for a resolution to the meaning of the dream he is faced with more than one 
intensive moment vying for attention within the same moment, or perhaps in other 
words, pure enigma. The enigmatic dream leaves us in the zone of 
indiscernibility. Yet for a fleeting moment Benjamin is confronted by the flash of 
legibility of dialectics at a standstill or a dialectical image, which is generated by 
the cryptic symbols on the sheet, though as we know all too well, there is a sense 
of legibility that disappears as soon as it is sensed – the dialectical image emerges 
and disappears in the flash. We are left in darkness. Arguably what Benjamin tries 
to do is illuminate the unknowable, the intensive thought that plunges back into 
obscurity. In a vain attempt to bring the image back into intelligibility, Benjamin 
falls back on the notion of translation, which for him in ‘The Task of the 
Translator’ ([1923] 1999c) is a site of pure creativity.  
 
 
Fragments of a vessel which are to be glued together 
must match one another in the smallest details, 
although they need not be like one another. In the 
same way as a translation, instead of resembling the 
meaning of the original, must lovingly and in detail 
incorporate the original’s mode of signification, thus 
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making both the original and the translation 
recognizable as fragments of a greater language, just 
as fragments are part of a vessel.  
(Benjamin [1923] 1999c: 79) 
 
 
Benjamin, using an analogy of fragments again (though this time of a vessel and 
not a mosaic), notes the importance of translation working on a deeper level than 
mere resemblance and how the task of translation must be considered a creative 
act in its own right. The very nature of translating therefore requires an 
attentive/immersive, even emotional (‘loving’), investment in the text in order to 
convey the implications of the original accurately and with aplomb. Regarding 
meaning, “…the language of a translation can – in fact, must – let itself go, so that 
it gives voice to the intentio of the original not as reproduction but as harmony, as 
a supplement to the language in which it expresses itself, as its own kind of 
intentio.” (Benjamin [1923] 1999c: 79). So the translation strives to achieve a 
harmony with the original as opposed to a ‘reproduction’, which reiterates the 
importance placed on creativity here in the conveyance of meaning, of intention. 
The cryptic message on the sheet in the dream then, represents the enigma of what 
is beyond translation and understanding, other than in the moment of the blinding 
flash of the dialectical image, and so Benjamin sets about interrogating the dream 
from the perspective of something comprehensible; language. In relation to his 
writings on translation then, perhaps we can suggest that Benjamin hoped to find 
resolution through approaching his dream from an oblique angle – in attempting 
to create something more akin to a ‘harmony’ with the unfathomable dream, in 
fear of leaving it painfully unresolved. Offering a simile to help elucidate his case 
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for translation further, Benjamin speaks of the way in which a tangent touches a 
circle at one point, as a translation also “…touches the original lightly and only at 
the infinitely small point of the sense, thereupon pursuing its own course 
according to the laws of fidelity in the freedom of linguistic flux.” (Benjamin 
[1923] 1999c: 81). The notion of ‘linguistic flux’ is particularly important here, in 
terms of the instability and fluidity that accompany the possibilities of creation 
that exist in the translation of language. To provide another perspective, it is worth 
noting the plight of Alfred North Whitehead in Process and Reality ([1929] 1978), 
who, writing at the same time as Benjamin, advocated overcoming the limits of 
language by performing a ‘stretching’ of words and phrases as they are commonly 
understood, to enable new experiences and interpretations. (Whitehead [1929] 
1978: 4). We can compare this to a comment by Benjamin that “[e]ven words with 
fixed meaning can undergo a maturing process.” (Benjamin [1923] 1999c 73-74). 
Interestingly, in the opening pages of the book, Whitehead also speaks of a flash 
of insight, which has resonances with Benjamin’s flash of the dialectical image as 
it signals a coming to legibility –  “[t]here is no first principle which is in itself 
unknowable, not to be captured by a flash of insight.” (Whitehead [1929] 1978: 
4).  
 
Let us concentrate for a moment on how the concept of translation “…touches the 
original lightly and only at the infinitely small point of the sense” (Benjamin 
[1923] 1999c: 81) and note a connection here between this quotation and the 
definition of Leibniz’s concept of the monad. We can speculate that perhaps the 
surrounding ‘zone of communication’ around each monad touches lightly the 
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zones of communication of the neighbouring monads. By this same touch, almost 
imperceptible at times, each monad indistinctly reflects the whole world/universe 
of monads within itself. Here we can make an allusion to Benjamin’s writing on 
mosaics in the ‘Epistemo-Critical Prologue’ to The Origin of German Tragic 
Drama where he suggests that “[t]he value of fragments of thought is all the 
greater the less direct their relationship to the underlying idea…” (Benjamin 
[1963] 2009: 28-29). So just as we discovered in the fragments of the vessel 
mentioned above, the tesserae need not match or resemble each other exactly, and 
perhaps it is their difference that renders the representation (and the idea) all the 
more valuable.  
 
To return to the issues of translation and difference, Benjamin remarks “…no 
translation would be possible if in its ultimate essence it strove for likeness to the 
original.” (Benjamin [1923] 1999c: 73). Now we must address further this 
possibility of transformation and renewal of the original text, via the process of 
translation. A useful perspective can be offered by Carol Jacobs, who 
contemplates a German proverb: ‘Wie man in den Wald hineinruft, so schallt’s 
heraus’ – “As one calls into the forest, so it will resound.” (Jacobs 1999: 85-86). 
She goes on: 
 
The proverb speaks of an unproblematic 
reverberation not necessarily at play in Benjamin’s 
version of it. Still, translation’s call into the forest of 
language is not a repetition of the original but the 
awakening of an echo of itself. This signifies its 
disregard for coherence of content, for the sound that 
returns is its own tongue become foreign. Just as the 
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vase of translation built unlike fragment on unlike 
fragment, only to achieve a final fragmentation, so 
the echo of translation elicits only fragments of 
language, distorted into a disquieting foreignness.  
(Jacobs 1999: 86) 
 
 
The scenario described above resonates profoundly for what this Section as a 
whole seeks to communicate in that essentially, we can read Jacobs’ analysis of 
the echo in the forest from a Deleuzian perspective – almost as a treatise on 
difference in kind. After calling into the forest, the echo that returns is its own 
tongue become foreign; it has undergone an internal transformation as it differs in 
itself over the duration of the original call and the reverberation of the echo. If we 
bellow loud enough, the reverberation has the capability to multiply itself, further 
exposing this inherent Deleuzian difference – “[d]ifference inhabits repetition.” 
(Deleuze [1968] 2004a: 97). In addition, the quotation below from Eduardo 
Cadava in Words of Light evokes the continual renewal and fluidity of language 
as something that is always in a ‘process of becoming’. These becomings, like 
Benjamin’s dream are fleeting and ineffable, yet in a lightning flash, the pasts, 
presents and futures of language can reveal themselves and emerge together, as if 
a constellation.  
 
 
That a language is always in the process of 
becoming different from itself–that it is in fact never 
itself–can be understood in relation to the fugacity of 
images. Like the image that flits past cognition, 
language eludes the grasp of the translator.   
(Cadava 1997: 17) 
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As we have been intimating in the preceding pages, it seems it is our task here to 
side-step the very construct of perceiving the ‘original’ and the ‘translation’ as 
something akin to the notion of the ‘model’ and ‘copy’ as in representation, and 
instead consider the ‘original’ and ‘translation’ as fragments of something larger, 
of the web of language in general perhaps. This evades the negative connotations 
of the translation being ‘inferior’ to the original in that, if we are in agreement 
with Benjamin’s conviction that the act of translation is the site of creation, then 
we must surely attribute appropriate significance to the task of the 
translator/cryptographer. We can also make a further connection to what we 
uncovered earlier in the Section regarding the links between Deleuze, Bergson 
and Leibniz via Benjamin, and how we can witness a number of concepts 
developed by these four great thinkers being ‘updated’ or ‘renewed’ by each 
other. This is no new occurrence in the history of philosophy, however the 
importance lies in the notion that ideas themselves form an interconnected 
rhizomatic web, and that confounded by translation, the resultant ‘image’ is 
indeed made up of a mosaic of fragments. Furthermore, Benjamin also enjoyed 
playing with the interchangeability of his concepts creatively which in turn 
emphasised the oscillations of meaning that come with precise combinations of 
words/phrases and their etymological roots. As we are now acutely aware, the 
process of translation heightens this activity further. And so meaning is dependent 
on consensus and interpretation, and as we see in both Benjamin and Whitehead, 
words and phrases are not fixed but fluid and self-differing, which reveals the task 
ahead. These concerns bring us closer our next question, which seeks to further 
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elucidate the task of the translator and the act of cryptography. To conclude our 
work here as cryptographers of Benjamin’s elusive encounter, we can also 
interpret the dream from the Deleuzian problem of succession (representation) and 
co-existence (difference). The dream signifies co-existence on the level of 
multiple intensities appearing at the same time, which results in the fracturing of 
identity and consequently representation. Rather than struggling to unlock the 
dream, what becomes significant is the difference (co-existence) between the 
fragments of the dream (the AND…AND…AND…). This is precisely why our 
attempts to understand the dream in terms of succession (representation) are futile, 
as we are incapable of translating co-existence into succession. Instead, co-
existence and succession must be held in tension (oscillation) with one another 
and it is this action that produces pure difference and perhaps also, pure enigma.  
 
Even in Benjamin’s attempt at translating the dream, he remains on the cusp of 
legibility, unable to decipher the symbols under the corner of the sheet. Their 
emergent revelation in the flash of dialectics at a standstill was only too brief, yet 
despite this, he has a suspicion that they are the key to the crypt of his dream. 
Herein lies the possibility that perhaps the key to our crypt CPDIOE? is wrapped 
up in this scenario too. In the way that our enigmatic question repels clarity, the 
blanket and its embellished symbols that caused Benjamin such unrest elude any 
coherent explanation. Perhaps the reason the dream troubled him so much was 
that all the facets and tropes of his life’s work lay bound up in its enigma. We 
must remember that Benjamin did illuminate one part of the dream, the top part of 
 229 
the letter ‘D’, though perhaps from our perspective, this letter may be more 
profoundly the letter ‘P’; is this the axis on which our inquiry turns? 
 
 
 
Translation, or how to change some poetry into a scarf? 
 
To reiterate, the major work of this thesis can be perceived as a project concerning 
translation. The object is not to obliterate a representational photography, 
replacing it with something else (as in the sciences), but to translate it in a way 
that aids a becoming-new ‘in itself’. Perhaps we can speculate that the 
relationship between the original text and the translation is akin to the process of 
de- and re- territorialisation (see Section I for Deleuze’s analogy of a wasp 
pollinating an orchid), and note how both the original language and the language 
of translation are affected in their convergence; in a double-becoming. Benjamin 
acknowledges – “[f]or in its afterlife – which could not be called that if it were not 
a transformation and a renewal of something living – the original undergoes a 
change.” (Benjamin [1923] 1999c: 73). These transformations go some way to 
regaining what Benjamin refers to as a ‘pure language’ that extends boundaries 
between language and translation. In addition, Benjamin, quoting Stéphane 
Mallarmé recognises that: 
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The imperfection of languages consists in their 
plurality, the supreme one is lacking: thinking is 
writing without accessories or even whispering, 
the immortal world still remains silent; the 
diversity of idioms on earth prevents everybody 
from uttering the words which otherwise, at one 
single stroke, would materialise as truth.  
(Mallarmé in Benjamin [1923] 1999c: 78) 
 
 
We shall now conduct a more ‘technical’ interrogation of the notion of translation, 
concentrating in particular on a number of German words used (and on occasion, 
invented) by Benjamin in his texts that will be pertinent to our investigation. We 
must remember too that the site of translation is imbued with creativity. Some of 
these words will be familiar to us, having already encountered them earlier in this 
Section and others will be more obscure, only coming to the surface as a result of 
the provocations initiated by our enigmatic question CPDIOE?. Translation forms 
a synthesis with the original text and it is this synthesis that allows for 
reverberations to be felt across space and through time, with novel or differing 
translations emerging. As we suggested in the previous ‘question’, these renewals 
and transformations of the text form a connected web and hold the possibility of 
activating new translations and interpretations. Our web has rhizomatic qualities 
in this sense, with new lines of flight continually being elicited. It is the task of 
the cryptographer-translator as always then with Benjamin’s texts, to illuminate 
some of the obscured depths that will help provide a bridge to the next Section, as 
we move out of Crypto[graphy] and into Zero[graphy].  
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To begin we will investigate Benjamin’s now-time [Jetztzeit] – his ‘alternative 
Messianic time’ that is in stark contrast to the empty time of positivism, and 
which he articulates in the ‘Theses on the Philosophy of History’20; “[h]istory is 
the subject of a structure whose site is not homogenous, empty time, but time 
filled with the presence of the now [Jetztzeit].” (Benjamin [1940] 1999d: 252-
253). The note alongside this in the text reads, “Benjamin says ‘Jetztzeit’ and 
indicates by the quotation marks that he does not simply mean an equivalent to 
Gegenwart, that is, present. He is clearly thinking of the mystical nunc stans.” 
(Arendt in Benjamin [1940] 1999d: 253). This nunc stans represents an eternal 
time, “…the abiding now, the instant that knows no temporal articulation, where 
distinctions between now, earlier and later have fallen away or have not risen.” 
(Loewald 1978: 65). Furthermore, these moments are “…unique and matchless, 
complete in themselves and somehow containing all there is in experience.” 
(Loewald 1978: 65). Benjamin’s contraction into now-time is also the time of 
reading and the moment of truth, which reveals itself in the lightning flash of 
dialectics at a standstill.  
 
We shall now concentrate on the notion of now-time as being a force of arrest, and 
the very action of being brought to a standstill, which the Langenscheitdt 
Dictionary (1973) (which we will use throughout this section) refers to as 
stillstand, or to be at a standstill, stillstehen. For this task we shall use Benjamin’s 
‘Thesis XVII’ from ‘Theses on the Philosophy of History’ and two translations to 
be scrutinized. The first of the translations is from the essay as it appears in 
Illuminations, though we shall use Carol Jacobs’ transcript as it appears in her 
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Chapter ‘Emergency, Break’ from the book In the Language of Walter Benjamin 
(1999), as her version differs slightly from a later copy. The second translation is 
by Dennis Redmond (2005).  
 
 
To thinking belongs not only the movement of 
thoughts but also their bringing to a standstill 
[Stillstellung]. Where thinking suddenly stops in a 
constellation [Konstellation] sated with tensions, 
there it imparts to the constellation a shock by which 
it crystallizes itself as a monad. The historical 
materialist approaches a historical object there and 
only there where he encounters it as monad. In this 
structure he recognizes the sign of the messianic 
arrest [Stillstellung] of happening. 
(Benjamin [1940] 1969b: 262-293, cited 
in Jacobs 1999: 102) 
 
 
Thinking involves not only the movement of 
thoughts but also their zero-hour [Stillstellung]. 
Where thinking suddenly halts in a constellation 
overflowing with tensions, there it yields a shock to 
the same, through which it crystallizes as a monad. 
The historical materialist approaches a historical 
object solely and alone where he encounters it as a 
monad. In this structure he cognizes the sign of a 
messianic zero-hour [Stillstellung] of events, or put 
differently, a revolutionary chance in the struggle for 
the suppressed past. 
(Benjamin [1940] 1974 trans. Redmond 
2005: u.p.) 
 
 
If we look more closely at this term ‘stillstellung’, a word Benjamin invented, we 
can see that it is made up of ‘still’, translated as to be silent or to hold one’s peace, 
and ‘stellung’, which speaks of position; posture; arrangement; constellation. We 
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will return to this term constellation in a moment. As we can see in the above 
quotation, its use signals an interruption, particularly pertinent to our next Section, 
a zero-hour. It is worth acknowledging that ‘zero’ in German is ‘null’; translated 
back to English as nought, cipher, nonentity, neutral point (‘nullpunkt’) and zero-
hour as ‘nullzeit’, or ‘zeitpunkt’, or interestingly, a term used by Heidegger – 
‘augenblick’, to signify a ‘moment of vision’.21 This etymological deconstruction 
of the German words and phrases can help us get closer to understanding what 
Benjamin strove to portray in his distinctive word ‘stillstellung’. In his translator’s 
foreword to the essay, Dennis Redmond (2005) elucidates this term further: 
 
 
Jetztzeit was translated as “here-and-now,” in order 
to distinguish it from its polar opposite, the empty 
and homogenous time of positivism. Stillstellung 
was rendered as “zero-hour,” rather than the 
misleading “standstill”; the verb “stillstehen” means 
to come to a stop or standstill, but Stillstellung is 
Benjamin’s own unique invention, which connotes 
an objective interruption of a mechanical process, 
rather like the dramatic pause at the end of an 
action-adventure movie… 
(Redmond 2005: u.p.) 
 
 
Next we turn to the term constellation [Konstellation], a synonym of position and 
arrangement, from the German noun ‘stellung’ that forms part of Benjamin’s 
‘stillstellung’, as mentioned above. We can also find a slightly different 
interpretation of constellation as we move from English to German, which refers 
to astrology, that is, a constellation of stars that represent the twelve signs of the 
zodiac; translated as ‘sternbild’. The oscillations in meaning between 
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‘konstellation’ and ‘sternbild’ are (not surprisingly) utilised to full effect by 
Benjamin in his texts, particularly in The Origin of German Tragic Drama. 
Furthermore, as it was revealed earlier in this Section, each star that forms the 
constellation can be regarded as equivalent, if not analogous to each individual 
tessera that forms the mosaic, thus the constellation and the mosaic in Benjamin 
are intrinsically connected, folded into each other to form an extensive magnitude. 
Hence, looking to ‘mosaic’ in German we find the word ‘mosaik’ but also the 
words ‘luftbild’ and ‘reihenbild’… is there anything to be uncovered here? Indeed 
what we notice is the inclusion of ‘bild’ in all these terms, including our zodiacal 
constellation ‘sternbild’; ‘bild’ signifies a picture, image or photograph. This is 
commensurate with the way the stars fall into particular configurations that are 
recognised as fixed patterns, ‘images’ for each of the twelve zodiac signs (out of 
interest, Benjamin’s sign was Cancer). Moving further into the crypt that is 
translation, ‘luftbild’ is translated as an aerial (or air) photo(graph), an aerial view, 
or a vision or a phantasm. Interestingly, in his Preface to Words of Light, Eduardo 
Cadava touches upon Theodor Adorno’s ‘Introduction to Benjamin’s Schriften’ 
([1955] 1992), in which he makes a connection between Benjamin and the 
photographer Nadar; who is said to have invented aerial photography. Cadava 
summarises – “[l]ike Nadar’s aerial photographs, Benjamin’s writings seek to 
capture the shifting world beneath his gaze…” (Cadava 1997: xxi). Concerning 
the appearance of aerial photographs in the translation above then, this reference 
to Cadava helps to highlight the transience of luftbild, whilst also bringing a 
perspective to the alternative translation as a vision or a phantasm, something 
shifting and ephemeral. Furthermore, in conjunction with ‘reihenbild’, which 
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means ‘serial photographs’, we begin to catch glimpses of an intriguing 
correlation to be made that resonates for the concerns of this investigation and our 
crypt/code CPDIOE?.  
 
Returning, as Benjamin would say, in a roundabout way to our original object, let 
us contemplate what this dérive (drift) through the language and translation of 
Walter Benjamin has revealed to us. By carrying out the task of translation and 
paying close attention to particular appearances of words and synonyms that are 
of significance to the thesis in general, and this Section in particular, we have 
stumbled upon some connections that will, we anticipate, come to illuminate the 
hypothesis. Taking a step back to survey the scene before us, and to offer a précis 
to this complex web we have woven, we have discovered that Benjamin felt the 
need to invent words to communicate a particular idea precisely. For this reason, 
‘stillstellung’ is a necessarily obscure reference and fragile in the hands (or the 
pen) of the translator. Perhaps the most revealing explanation in terms of the 
concerns of the next Section: Zero[graphy],  is from the Redmond translation: 
“[t]hinking involves not only the movement of thoughts but also their zero-hour 
[Stillstellung].” (Benjamin [1940] 1974, trans. Redmond 2005: u.p.). Certainly, 
the possibilities that emanate from this intersection shall be addressed in the 
following Section, though we must acknowledge their ‘germination’ here. Then, 
the intrinsic relationship between Benjamin’s constellation 
[konstellation/sternbild] and his mosaic [mosaik/luftbild/reihebild] was examined, 
and it was through the process of translation between English and German that we 
were able to uncover an almost undetectable relationship to be traced to 
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photography maybe, in this endeavour. By placing these words and their 
translations together in this rhizomatic web, we have arguably speculated a new 
perspective on our central question CPDIOE?. This perspective/interpretation 
seems to point towards the possibility for a practice of photography based on the 
notion of series, from a neutral, mechanical position. It also takes the position of 
zero and calls forth a moment of interruption, is this what we are alluding to when 
we ask …can photography describe its own event? We have also sensed the 
agility that comes with working with oscillations between fixed and fluid 
meanings and how this very process of fluctuation reveals that, often it is in their 
combination; at the very core of their instability, that meanings are at their most 
illuminating.  
 
 
 
How to produce an event - Ex Nihilo? 22 
 
To conclude this Section on cryptography and its relation to our question 
CPDIOE?, we need to bring to mind the importance of the notion of ‘event’ once 
more, in order to prepare ourselves for the next Section, where its appearance will 
become more visible. Indeed, this part of the thesis has necessarily concerned 
itself with an exegesis of CPDIOE? and as such, has been focused on 
hermeneutics and intensive interpretations of the crypt/code/question. It is worth 
noting that the concept of ‘event’ is inherently bound up in much of these 
activities yet in an indistinct way, only materialising more lucidly on occasion, 
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whereas Section III: Zero[graphy] will deal with such concerns in a more explicit 
manner. As we prepare to move out of the metaphorical darkness of our crypt and 
onto a different plane, let us reflect for a moment on the imposed ‘blindness’ that 
has consumed this Section. To do this let us look to a suitably titled book 
concerning vision, representation and art, Derrida’s Memoirs of the Blind (1993):  
 
 
By praying on the verge of tears, the sacred allegory 
does [fait] something. It makes something happen or 
come, makes something come to the eyes, makes 
something well up in them, by producing an event. It 
is performative, something vision would be 
incapable of if it gave rise only to representational 
reporting. 
(Derrida [1990] 1993: 122) [emphasis in 
original] 
 
 
The quotation above recognises a shift from passive contemplation to energised 
action… how to produce an event? The importance placed on producing an event 
reveals itself through the emphasis and repetition of  “…makes something happen 
or come, makes something come to the eyes, makes something well up in them…” 
(Derrida [1990] 1993: 122) [my emphasis]. The event then, is a performative act 
through which we can access the sacred allegory, and as the last part of the 
quotation suggests, is unable to be grasped within the parameters of a system of 
mainstream representation. Derrida’s dense (performative) writing style also 
commands the reader to encounter his metaphorical prose in an energised and 
active way, much like Benjamin’s caesura causing the reader to continually pause 
for breath.  
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The act of praying engages the imagination and in this way relies on a sense of 
displacement from the real, it is a time where the very act can provoke an 
awakening, a moment of reconciliation, or an encounter – to make something 
happen we are forced to thought. We can also note a connection to Benjamin’s 
now-time [jetztzeit], which was recognised earlier as the moment of reading or 
interpretation that crucially, takes place from within the event/constellation. 
Perhaps this is akin to the force of making something happen, which reaches a 
climax when something causes the tears to well up, indeed an event wells up from 
within the event of prayer. Let us remind ourselves of what Carol Jacobs 
describes as a newly conceived ‘moment of interpretation’ of the reader-astrologer 
– “...both completes and is assimilated into the constellation in a flash, a 
constellation that is not one until the astrologer joins the two stars that otherwise 
form no figure at all.” (Jacobs 1999: 100)23. Perhaps we can interpret Jacobs’ 
description from our own perspective here – just as the astrologer is central to the 
forming of the constellation, the sheer intensity and concentration of praying close 
to tears conjures up the sacred allegory. Hence, the event produced by the sacred 
allegory is ‘activated’ by the praying figure and as such, does not exist 
independently of it, is not external to it, but internal and enveloped into the event. 
The sacred allegory being perhaps the communion between man and God as 
witnessed by Christ’s ascension from the cross and developed through the theory 
of transubstantiation where the bread and the wine somehow become the body 
and the blood of Christ through a miraculous event. It is praying on the verge of 
tears that forces this communion and thus produces an event that is beyond sight 
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or representational reporting, and where vision becomes hallucination and is 
transferred to the mental image or imagination. Also pertinent is the invisible and 
highly subjective nature of such a practice or process, which is intensive, 
internalised and imbued with sensation, in some ways only becoming perceptible 
by the tears welling up as a culmination of emotion. The prominence placed on 
the distorting of vision that accompanies the act praying on the verge of tears is of 
particular relevance to the Section, in an investigation that has taken place without 
the privileging of sight. Arguably, as we suggested in the opening pages of the 
Section, this metaphorical blindness has encouraged our other senses to become 
more perceptive to allow us to get further into the crypt of our question, and 
perhaps we can now speculate/appreciate that such enforcement has brought our 
imagination to the forefront of this endeavour. Moreover, it is important for 
Derrida that the loss of sight is not at the expense of a loss of ‘vision’: 
 
 
Deep down, deep down inside, the eye would be 
destined not to see but to weep. For at the very 
moment they veil sight, tears would unveil what is 
proper to the eye. […] The blindness that opens the 
eye is not the one that darkens vision. The revelatory 
or apocalyptic blindness, the blindness that reveals 
the very truth of the eyes, would be the gaze veiled 
by tears. It neither sees or does not see: it is 
indifferent to its blurred vision. It implores: first of 
all in order to know where these tears stream down 
and from whose eyes they come to well up. From 
where and from whom this mourning or these tears 
of joy? This essence of the eye, this eye water?  
(Derrida [1990] 1993: 126-127) 
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Thus, Derrida’s veil of tears calls for a performative practice, which takes pace 
on a verge, a threshold between vision and blindness, between clarity and 
obscurity. As we are now aware, such a practice is unable to operate from within 
the constraints of a system of representation, and so as Derrida recommends, it is 
crucial that we become attuned to producing an event. And so the project of 
CDPIOE? strives to negotiate this liminal zone, it’s very code evoking the 
possibilities concerning the notion of ‘event’, with each iterance providing an 
intensive interpretation of the six-word enigma and each repetition inferring 
difference. “For in order for any message to carry real force, it must negotiate a 
danger zone, cross a frontier, transgress a prohibition.” (Bourriaud in McCarthy, 
Critchley et al. 2012: 18)24. Perhaps this signals our position… have we reached 
the threshold of the crypt? 
 
 
Perceived from the point of view of a coded 
message, referring back to the history of language in 
wartime, writing (for the INS), again, carries an aura 
of danger, like those phosphorescent organisms 
whose properties are only revealed in darkness. 
Sometimes, the powerful spotlights of meaning must 
be shut off for another kind of radiation to appear. 
(Bourriaud in McCarthy, Critchley et al. 
2012: 21) 
 
 
The quotation above arguably reveals the importance of our endeavour. In our 
negotiating of the threshold between Photo[graphy] and Crypto[graphy] and the 
entering of the crypt of CPDIOE?, we switched off ‘the powerful spotlights of 
meaning’ in order to encounter other kinds of radiation, namely – the intensive, 
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the obscure, the cryptic. Now that we leave the crypt into unknown territories, 
we must now test our question yet again. Here we must ask ourselves, what form 
will the interrogation take on this new occasion? As we shall see the nature of 
any event is uncertain just as we have found in this little section on Derrida. By 
attempting to supplement or even translate the classical perspective of 
photography via concepts of difference we must hope to have produced 
something new by our work in the thesis so far. The next Section will deal with 
this indeterminacy of the new as it unfolds via a series of thought experiments 
regarding the concept of emergence from the zero degree of communication.  
 
 
 
A summation and the trajectory of enquiry 
 
The main emphasis of Section II was to introduce the element of the enigmatic 
and the opaque into the concept of photography, whereas previously we argued 
(in agreement with Michael Kramp) that it had existed in a more transparent 
mode and with greater certainty in how it reflected the world. Using our central 
question CPDIOE?, we have explored the notion of difference, whilst keeping in 
mind how it could perhaps be utilised in the service of photography (if only 
obliquely). The premise of this Section was to flip photography so we perceive it 
as a crypt or code instead of an agent of exposure to knowledge and facts. It was 
our assertion in this part of the thesis that we can relocate photography into a 
new encounter with the world in order to introduce novel concepts and fresh 
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directions into the field of study. Perhaps it would be possible from this 
perspective to excavate new minor photographies that reveal the object of 
photography as having more than one aspect. As an analogy, we might think of 
the dark side of the moon that makes a sphere out of what was once perceived as 
a flat disk, something larger, (literally) more rounded and with more potential. 
By applying variation and ‘difference in itself’ to the concept of photography, 
we have described the arc of passage from a descriptive practice to one that 
performs meaning in an overt sense, with all the inherent instabilities that might 
imply. Difference reveals seriality from within an essence (intensities from 
within an extensity) and through oscillating between these states we can also 
transcribe the arc of thought from a picture to an event, from object/essence to 
serialisation.  
 
At this point in the thesis, we are able to see how Section I and Section II work 
together to form a synthesis – that is, how representation supplemented and 
supported by difference, offers a paradigm shift in both the concept and practice 
of photography. If representational photography is by necessity a transcendent 
practice, then the journey so far in the research has brought us to a stage where 
we can speculate further upon an emergent, immanent form of photography. 
This zerography, which we shall investigate in Section III, is unsurprisingly 
difficult to imagine and in order to ameliorate these complexities we shall 
perform an interrogation of the cultural resonances of the concept of zero. 
Zerography is an enabling concept, a certain perspective that does not ‘name’ a 
new practice, but rather should be considered an interpretive tool analogous to 
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Rudolf Kuenzli’s innovative readings of the work of Friedrich Nietzsche. It 
creates a sense of paradox within the concept that moves away from readings of 
clarity and certainty to those of ambiguity, invention, and in the final analysis, 
indiscernability. In the tradition and spirit of such ideas Section III will 
contemplate a zone of indeterminacy, as it moves into the realm of event theory 
in all its uncertainty. This trajectory will take us from Barthes’ ruminations on a 
zero degree of communication, through to Eastern alternate philosophies of 
vison that uncouple the subject-object axis of western representation.  
 
Following this, we will explore the irrational world of quantum mechanics as 
well as the ‘surrational’ world of `pataphysics, at each stage reflecting on how 
these might form a constituency of thought for a useful zerography. After 
assessing Nietzsche’s ‘zerography’ (the only other use of the word in circulation 
from critical theory), we shall spend some time considering the hazy world of 
events in some of their diverse manifestations using a seminal poem by Stéphane 
Mallarmé in order to unlock the nature of the event at its zero degree. By the end 
of this final Section we hope to have mapped out the space of zero as it pertains 
to a cultural enquiry into the concept, and perhaps have prepared the way for 
future photographies to perform in this zone of undecidability. Where Section I 
and II together formed a synthesis of representation and difference in order to 
enrcich the concept and practice of photography, Section III hopes to peer 
beyond present horizons, laying some foundations for an immanent practice of 
photography yet to come. 
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Endnotes to Section II: Crypto[graphy] 
 
 
1 O’Sullivan sees this moment of affirmation as “…a way of seeing and thinking 
this world differently. This is the creative moment of the encounter that obliges us 
to think otherwise. Life, when it truly is lived, is a history of these encounters, 
which will always necessarily occur beyond representation.” (O’Sullivan 2006: 
2). 
 
2 “To be sensitive to signs, to consider the world as an object to be deciphered, is 
a doubtless gift. But this gift risks remaining buried in us if we do not make the 
necessary encounters…” (Deleuze [1964] 2008: 18) 
 
3 This phrase is used in ‘Further Notes’ to The Fold, the endnote reads: 
“On cryptography as an ‘art of inventing the key to an enveloped thing,’ see 
Fragment, Un livre sur l’art combinatoire . . . (C, Opuscules). And the Nouveaux 
essais sur l’entendement humain. IV, chap. 17, § 8: the fold of Nature and the 
‘summaries’.” (Deleuze [1993] 2003: 143 n.4). 
 
4 Benjamin’s concept of now-time concerns a coming to legibility in the act of 
reading. See Benjamin 1999a page 473 and Löwy 2005 page 2. 
 
5 If a difference is necessarily (in depth) part of the superficial repetition from 
which it is drawn, the question is: Of what does this difference consist? This 
difference is a contraction, but in what does this contraction consist? Is it not itself 
the most contracted degree or the most concentrated level of a past which coexists 
with itself at all levels of relaxation and in all degrees? This was Bergson’s 
splendid hypothesis: the entire past at every moment but at diverse degrees and 
levels, of which the present is only the most contracted, the most concentrated.  
(Deleuze [1968] 2004a: 358) [emphasis in original] 
 
6 Deleuze insisted that if we really want to accept the appearance of the world 
without judgement or presupposition then we will not refer to appearances as 
appearances of some world; there will be nothing other than a ‘swarm’ of 
appearances – with no foundation of the experiencing mind or subject.  
(Colebrook 2001: 6) [emphasis in original] 
 
7 See Deleuze [1993] 2003, page 3. 
 
8 The map is open, connectable in all its dimensions, and capable of being 
dismantled; it is reversible, and susceptible to constant modification. It can be 
torn, reversed, adapted to montages of every kind, taken in hand by an individual, 
a group or a social formation. It can be drawn on a wall, conceived of as a work of 
art, constructed as a political action or as a meditation. […] Contrary to a tracing, 
which always returns to the ‘same’, a map has multiple entrances. A map is a 
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matter of performance, whereas the tracing always refers to an alleged 
‘competence’. 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 26)  
 
9 “It is the power of their combination and arrangement, not of their ‘encyclopedic 
accumulation’ (OGTD, p. 33), which is important.” (Gilloch 2002: 67-68) 
(Referencing Benjamin The Origin of German Tragic Drama [1963] 2009 inside 
the quotation). 
 
10 To thinking belongs the movement as well as the arrest of thoughts. Where 
thinking comes to a standstill in a constellation saturated with tensions – there 
the dialectical image appears. It is the caesura in the movement of thought. Its 
position is naturally not an arbitrary one. It is to be found, in a word, where the 
tension between dialectical opposites is greatest… 
(Benjamin 1999a: 475) 
 
Interestingly, in a different version we can map the relationship with the monad: 
 
To thinking belongs not only the movement of thoughts but also their bringing to 
a standstill [Stillstellung]. Where thinking suddenly stops in a constellation 
[Konstellation] sated with tensions, there it imparts to the constellation a shock by 
which it crystallizes itself as a monad. 
(Benjamin [1940] 1969b: 262-263) 
 
11 “…modulating is molding in a continuous and perpetually variable fashion.” 
(Simondon in Deleuze [1993] 2003: 19).  
 
12 As an intellectual living through huge breakthroughs in science, concepts such 
as the Copenhagen Interpretation and quantum superposition would have had a 
great impact on Walter Benjamin. 
 
13 ‘Behold this gateway, dwarf!’ I went on: ‘it has two aspects. Two paths come 
together here: no one has ever reached their end. 
‘This long lane behind up: it goes on for an eternity. And that long lane ahead of 
us – that is another eternity.’ 
‘They are in opposition to one another, these paths; they abut on one another: and 
it is here at this gateway that they come together. The name of the gateway is 
written above it: ‘Moment’.’  
(Nietzsche 1961: 178) 
 
14 Deleuze on writing on other philosophers; an ‘intellectual buggery’: 
“…I supposed the main way I coped with it at the time was to see the history of 
philosophy as a sort of buggery or (it comes to the same thing) immaculate 
conception. I saw myself as taking an author from behind and giving him a child 
that would be his own offspring, yet monstrous.” 
(Deleuze 1995: 6)  
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15 Nietzsche’s mental breakdown in 1889 is purported to stem from an incident in 
Turin where he witnessed the flogging of a horse. Nietzsche ran to protect the 
horse but then collapsed to the ground. For further reading see Anacleto 
Verrecchia ‘Nietzsche’s Breakdown in Turin’ (1988). 
 
16 For example, see the work of performance artists Hayley Newman and Jemima 
Stehli.  
 
17 The life of a monad does not seem as solitary as it in fact is. Each monad, 
according to Leibniz, has within itself a ‘mirror’ of the entire universe - a picture 
of what is happening everywhere at all times and how its own activities ‘fit in’. 
Thus monads are essentially mindlike. That is, they have a faculty of 
perception that constructs for them a picture of the ‘external’ world, and a faculty 
of apperception that registers an awareness of this process of perception itself. By 
means of these ‘mirrors’ of consciousness, each monad replicates the entire 
universe of monads within itself; and so each monad is a ‘universe in prototype’. 
Leibniz refers to this strange vision of worlds within worlds as ‘the principle of 
macrocosm and microcosm’ - meaning that the microcosm contains or replicates 
the macrocosm all the way down to the infinitely small. He expresses the same 
notion in his claim that the ancient doctrine that ‘All is One’ must now be 
supplemented with the equally important corollary that ‘One is All’. 
(Stewart 2005: 245) 
 
18 The question of translation, one that we will approach very soon, is something 
to also be acknowledged here in relation to a text written by Deleuze and Guattari 
called ‘Rhizome’. ‘Rhizome’ was first published in a little book called On the 
Line (1983, translated by John Johnston) and subsequently appeared as 
‘Introduction: Rhizome’ in A Thousand Plateaus ([1987] 2004a, translated by 
Brian Massumi). There are slight but notable variations in emphasis in the 
translations of these texts, and so a combination of the two translations will be 
utilised as opposed to merely adhering to one ‘version’, in service of properly 
comprehending the text. 
 
19 James Elkins in What Photography Is (2011) likens photography to black ice: 
Black ice is a horizontal window that looks down onto nothing visible. You see 
into it as is into a thick deep darkness: you do not see a black surface like the wall 
of a room at night, but a place where light becomes weak, where it loses energy, 
slows, and dies in some viscous depth. […] That place beneath the black ice, 
where I know that water must be, admits light but does not give back any image. 
[a reference to Mallarmé’s poem Le vierge about the frozen swan].  
(Elkins 2011: 19) 
 
Concerning the surface of the photograph or the pixels on a screen Elkins 
observes: 
My eyes can touch the surface of the photograph. If it is a print made in a 
darkroom, I can see its surface as a griffonage (an illegible handwriting) of marks 
and scratches. If it’s on screen I can barely make out the fuzzy mosaic… 
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(Elkins 2011: 26)  
 
20 This work is also referred to as ‘On the Concept of History’, particularly by 
American scholars. 
 
21 See Heidegger Being and Time ([1927] 1992) page 376. 
 
22 This is a reference to Leibniz’s theory of co-existence between mathematics and 
metaphysics:  
“His novel contribution was to make the numbers binary. Just as the whole of 
arithmetic could be derived from one and zero, so the whole universe was 
generated out of pure being (God) and nothingness.” (MacDonald Ross 1984: 
101) [emphasis in original]. Unus ex nihilo Omnia fecit – One made all Things ex 
nihilo. 
 
23 In an endnote to this part of the text, Jacobs notes that it is this connection 
between reading, writing and the constellation is the fundamental point of 
Benjamin’s essay ‘Doctrine of the Similar’ (1979c). “There, reading and writing 
are imbedded into in the rapid temporality, the flash we have seen to take place in 
the constellation.” (Jacobs 1999: 129 n.11). 
 
24 In a guest-written Introduction to the International Necronautical Society’s 
(INS) The Mattering of Matter (2012), Nicholas Bourriaud attempts to tap into 
this enigmatic organization as he addresses (in relation to the INS operations 
concerning the space of death) this notion of the threshold. 
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Section III: 
Zero[graphy] 
 
 
The second problem arising in connection with 
privative opposition is that of the unmarked term. It is 
called the zero degree of the opposition. The zero 
degree is therefore not a total absence (this is a 
common mistake), it is a significant absence. We have 
here a pure differential state; the zero degree testifies to 
the power held by any system of signs, of creating 
meaning ‘out of nothing’: ‘the language can be content 
with an opposition of something and nothing.’  
(Barthes [1964] 1984e: 138) [emphasis in 
original] 
 
 
NOTHING / WILL HAVE TAKEN PLACE / BUT THE PLACE: 
… or was the event brought about in view of every null 
result. 
  (Mallarmé in Badiou [1988] 2005: 191) 
 
…NOTHING of the memorable crisis in which the event 
may have happened in view of every null result. 
  (Mallarmé in Meillassoux 2012: [x]) 
 
…NOTHING of the memorable crisis or if it were the 
event fulfilled in light of all voided outcomes.  
  (Mallarmé [1898] 2015: 20-21) 
 
 
This play of building and destroying, of asserting and 
doubting, of riding old myths and parodying them, of 
lyrical flights and self-parody seems to form 
Nietzsche’s zerography. This circular motion, which 
rhythmically passes through the moments of forgetting 
and remembering, puts everything into question  
(Kuenzli 1981: 113)
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Introduction 
 
As we leave the crypt we emerge onto a flat plain/plane. Here light and dark have 
cancelled each other out and it is an even grey, the eighteen percent grey of zone 
five perhaps, from a time when the photographic zone system was still relevant.1 
It is a space of entropy, a plane of consistency where we will encounter 
photography degree zero. It is the space of Barthes, Mallarmé and Nietszche. In 
our investigation into the concept of zero we shall be looking to its cultural and 
philosophical origins in the writings of the three figures named above. At this 
point, it must be acknowledged that of the three terms used as Section titles, this 
term ‘[zero]graphy’ is my own conceptual invention and through our investigation 
it is hoped that the term can come to describe a new perspective on photography. 
Although the term zero is common currency in mathematics, and used less 
commonly in cultural and literary theory, I have found only two references to the 
term zerography, one only as a subheading in Garrett Stewart’s Reading Voices: 
Literature and the Phonotext (1990), and the other more useful citation in a text 
about Nietzsche by Rudolf Kuenzli. Written in 1981, his essay ‘Nietzsche’s 
Zerography: Thus Spoke Zarathustra’ is concerned with Critical Literary 
Discourse and we will return to this later in the Section. After the depths of the 
crypt in Section II, this Section will be concerned with exploring the flatness of 
the plane; planes of consistency, planes of immanence, zones of indeterminacy, 
and the levels of zero degree. We are concerned primarily with the cusp of 
emergence, a twilight world of synthesis, entropy, oscillation and coexistence.  
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For the purpose of this Section on zero[graphy], let us consider that the first two 
Sections offer somewhat of a binary – photo[graphy]/crypto[graphy], or light/ 
dark in metaphoric terms. This then, gives us clues as to how the third part of the 
thesis functions; in some respects it will create a synthesis of the two – 
photo[graphy] + crypto[graphy] = zero[graphy]. Or light plus dark shall be 
synthesised together to produce a grey flatness perhaps, that offers us a starting 
point for an exploration into the concept of zero[graphy]. At this point, it shall be 
useful to look closer at how the notions of oscillation and coexistence can help 
elucidate how this Section operates in relation to the previous two Sections. In 
turn, we shall touch upon these concepts in a broader sense in order to offer a 
bridge from Crypto[graphy] to Zero[graphy]. The Section shall be written in a 
more thetic manner producing an archipelago of ideas forming connections 
(constellations) reminiscent of the plateaus of Section II. This is an attempt to 
connect a matrix of ideas that might describe a hypothetical zerography. In terms 
of the aims of the thesis, this state of zerography will encompass or approximate 
to an imagined field of meanings and communications covering new 
differentiated photographies. It hoped that zerography will provide an elusive and 
metaphorical ‘third’ aspect to the synthesis of representation and difference as it 
pertains to photography. Now it is time however to reintroduce our enigmatic 
question can photography describe its own event? (CPDIOE?). In this Section, 
our question will erupt periodically as we investigate different concepts, flights of 
thought that are pertinent to our enquiry as we wrestle with its latent potential. To 
be aware of ones own event, there needs to be an acknowledgement of its 
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emergence from within oneself. To summon an awareness of ones own event will 
surely require a heightened sense of consciousness. With the crypt behind us as 
the light dawns, perhaps it is possible to slowly awake, to conjure an awareness of 
ones own condition that is, in photography’s own terms, to glimpse the latent 
image within. A latent image that still requires developing, to cross the threshold 
from one state to another; from the possible to the real, or the virtual to the actual, 
or perhaps a synthesis as process. There are two writers in particular who have 
attempted to describe this liminal condition, this coming to consciousness, Marcel 
Proust and Walter Benjamin.  
 
 
 
Awakenings 
 
To meet a familiar figure once more, it is Walter Benjamin who locates the 
concept of awakening between the oscillation of light and dark, and as discussed 
in Section II, he also describes it as a moment of recognition, the ‘now of 
recognizability’2, a coming to thought. In addition, it is at the very beginning of 
Marcel Proust’s In Search of Lost Time (published [1913 – 1927] 1996) that we 
experience the oscillation between night and day, sleeping and waking, where we 
encounter a narrator who is falling asleep even as he wakes up, struggling to 
locate his position or that of his furniture even in a whirl of darkness. 
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For it always happened that when I awoke like this, 
and my mind struggled in an unsuccessful attempt to 
discover where I was, everything revolved around 
me through the darkness: things, places, years. My 
body, still too heavy with sleep to move, would 
endeavour to construe from the pattern of its 
tiredness the position of its various limbs, in order to 
deduce therefrom the direction of the wall, the 
location of the furniture, to piece together and give a 
name to the house in which it lay.  
(Proust [1913 – 1927] 1996a: 4) 
 
 
As Eduardo Cadava notes, “ [t]his coincidence of sleeping and waking conjures 
the twilight state…” (Cadava 1997: 73). It is in this state and at this fugitive 
moment that we become aware of the swirling sea of antinomies that surround us, 
around Proust’s narrator, emerging and lapsing between sleep and consciousness. 
The cusp is the grey between the black and white; it is the zone of indeterminacy. 
Benjamin too, sees these alternate concepts as existing simultaneously, perhaps in 
the manner of Scrödingers Cat being at once both alive and dead. As Cadava 
expresses the concept “[c]onsciousness is perhaps what it is only to the extent that 
it remains both awake and asleep at the same time.” (Cadava 1997: 68). The point 
here is to emphasise the simultaneous nature of both states occupied during the 
process of awakening. Furthermore, to quote Benjamin himself “[w]here waking 
does not part from sleeping/Luminousness makes its appearance” (Scholem and 
Adorno 1994: 96). Here we have the potential for the emergence of recognition. 
The double articulation of such a metamorphosis moving equally in both 
directions is reminiscent of Benjamin’s ‘Convolute N’ in The Arcades Project 
where he famously states that it is not a matter of the past casting its light on the 
present or vice versa, but more that these two positions (like Section I and Section 
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II) (1999a: 462) “…deconstitute one another in their relation.” (Cadava 1997: 71). 
We can perceive this process as an oscillation, a state of flux and continuous 
momentum, two perspectives that when coexisting better describe an idea. Section 
I in the ‘major’ perspective, Section II can be seen as a ‘minor’ perspective, both 
hold truth, but in truth both are co-existent. 
 
 
Is awakening perhaps the synthesis of dream 
consciousness (as thesis) and waking (as antithesis)? 
Then the moment of awakening would be identical 
with the ‘now of recognizability,’ in which things 
put on their true–surrealist–face. Thus, in Proust, the 
importance of staking an entire life on life’s 
supremely dialectical point of rupture: awakening. 
Proust begins with an evocation of the space of 
someone waking up.  
(Benjamin 1999a: 463-464) [emphasis in 
original] 
 
  
However the synthesis of dreaming and waking also exists in the grey fog that 
permeates their coexistence. This is the estrangement of the rational or the 
‘rearrangement of the furniture’ of consciousness. Here lies the paradox of the 
moment of awakening as it is both dark and light simultaneously. “This sleep and 
darkness – the conditions of the self’s disassociation from itself – are what Ernst 
Bloch calls ‘the darkness of the lived moment’.” (Cadava 1997:78) [emphasis in 
original]. Bloch’s ‘darkness’ (Bloch 1986: 290) constitutes a blind spot, the 
fugitive nature of experience that Benjamin relates to happening as in the space of 
a “darkroom” (Cadava 1997: 80). It is worth noticing that Proust also alludes to 
the photographic metaphor of an ‘inner darkroom’ when speaking of processing 
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experience, returning us to ‘the darkness of the lived moment’ and the suggestion 
“…that the point at which experience touches us – at which we experience 
experience – is a blind spot.” (Cadava 1997: 78).  
 
 
I had become myself again. Pleasure in this respect 
is like photography. What we take, in the presence 
of the beloved object, is merely a negative, which 
we develop later, when we are back at home, and 
have once again found at our disposal that inner 
darkroom the entrance to which is barred to us so 
long as we are with other people. 
  (Proust [1913 – 1927] 1996b: 522) 
 
 
This blind spot is exactly the territory of our question CPDIOE? in that it explains 
the difficulty of understanding how a subject/concept can be truly aware of itself. 
Can photography describe its own event? The indication is that where we do 
indeed experience ourselves is a place of estrangement, and like Proust’s narrator 
we can only grasp at it in the double articulation of awakening. “The light of 
photography never arrives alone. It is always attended by darkness. We may even 
say that the relay between light and darkness that names photography also gives 
birth to it.” (Cadava 1997: 66). In an interesting if literal inversion Douglas 
McCulloh makes the following observation; “[b]lind photographers operate at the 
heart of the medium; they are the zero point of photography” (McCulloh 2012: 9) 
which in light of the above has increased resonance.  
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At this point it may be appropriate to observe that the first two Sections in their 
ostensibly binary relationship demonstrate that the light of representation lies in 
opposition, or more correctly in oscillation with the crypt of difference. As 
Deleuze concludes, pure difference resides, erupts, between the concepts of 
representation and difference, therefore we can site the concept of awakening (in 
terms of CPDIOE?) between photography’s ability to describe events in the world 
and the potential for it to describe its own event. The blind spot that we have 
identified, this darkness of the lived moment, lies on the cusp of the rational and 
the irrational, the Apollonian and the Dionysian in Nietzsche’s terms. It returns us 
to Benjamin’s ‘distinct and the disparate’ and Deleuze’s ‘distinct and obscure’ 
that forms the basis of every idea or concept. This coincides with the two aspects 
of photography that we are trying to articulate, firstly the distinct ability to 
describe an event in the world, and then the obscure potential for it to describe its 
own event. The former belongs to the realm of representation and the latter to the 
paradigm of difference. What we are attempting to describe here is the potential 
for the two to coincide in the double articulation that is inscribed in the concept of 
awakening, as developed by both Proust and Benjamin. To summarise, we are 
dealing here with the idea of a transcendent representation and the concept of an 
immanent difference. The notion of ‘awakening’ or residing between the two 
should in Benjamin’s conception allow us to recognise (illuminate), if only 
briefly, the fugitive and fleeting resolution or decryption of our code CPDIOE? A 
question that “…puts everything into question”. (Kuenzli 1981: 113).3  
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How do you describe something that does not represent anything?4 
 
Here as we begin to explore the possible degree zero of the sign, it will be useful 
to consider these concepts in terms of a thought experiment regarding the classical 
perspective in photography. As the consequence of interoducing the zero degree 
of expression to photography might well result in the stripping away of most of 
what was hitherto recognisable. Thus reinventing photography as an encounter 
with the world. As a starting point, we shall address what is arguably the most 
well known of the coincidences between classic photographic theory and zero, 
which comes in the form of the first book written by Roland Barthes in 1953 – 
Writing Degree Zero.5 Although this essay is about language, the title was 
adapted by Geoffrey Batchen for his edited book Photography Degree Zero: 
Reflections on Roland Barthes's Camera Lucida (2009) which surveys the myriad 
of academic essays reflecting on Barthes’ seminal, and resolutely distinct and 
obscure, book on photography. In his introduction to the book, Batchen explains 
the choice of title as a way of linking together Barthes’ first book with his last and 
perhaps most famous; Camera Lucida: Reflections on Photography (1980). With 
the book Writing Degree Zero it was Barthes intention to both agree and respond 
to Jean-Paul Sartre’s 1947 book What is Literature?, where as well as supporting 
the premise that “…all texts involve a mutually productive exchange of 
responsibilities between reader and writer” (Batchen 2009: 4) he goes on to argue 
that the form of a text is of equal importance to this exchange as the content. He 
advocates a ‘colourless writing’ striving for a neutral or ‘zero degree’ of form, 
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however this is not a type of neo-Realism as Barthes himself states; “[t]he writing 
of Realism is far from being neutral, it is on the contrary loaded with the most 
spectacular signs of fabrication” (Barthes [1953] 1984d: 56). Here we might 
recognise classical documentary photography for example. There are instances in 
film and literature however, of artists attempting to approach a degree zero of 
articulation. Barthes himself is interested in the tension between writing as a 
communication in order to engage the reader, and writing as a mode of silence 
that promotes form over content and in ‘Writing Degree Zero’ declares that 
“…the disintegration of language can only lead to the silence of writing” (Barthes 
[1953] 1984d: 63) which is a desirable state. He is looking for a condition where 
words resonate in an empty zone and in which speech patterns no longer 
reverberate, even “…the complete abandonment of communication.” (Barthes 
[1953] 1984d: 63). Another book that takes its title from paraphrasing Barthes’ 
seminal text is Timothy Scheie, Performance Degree Zero (2006) in which he 
states: 
 
 
The only escape Barthes proposes is to destroy 
literature altogether, to pare the conventions of the 
literary down to their zero degree, to strip away the 
signs of literature to reach the pure literality of a 
‘white writing’ with no literary shadow.  
(Scheie 2006: 25) [emphasis in original] 
 
 
Barthes himself cites Albert Camus’ Outsider as an initiator of this experiment in 
zero degree form in the twentieth century, though also notes the efforts of Jean 
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Cayrol, Alain Robbe-Grillet and indeed the American William Burroughs as well 
as recognising the contribution made by nineteenth century poet Stéphane 
Mallarmé. It was Barthes’ contention that a true zero degree remained something 
to strive for, yet in reality it would remain a utopian fantasy. A contemporary 
artist, filmmaker Jean-Luc Godard also flirted with a degree zero of cinematic 
language but he too found it difficult to balance the communicative content of the 
film with experiments “…that approach a zero-degree style through deliberate 
flatness and repetition (Sterritt 1999: 260).6 To conclude this point it seems 
pertinent (as the main protagonist of degree zero) to read Barthes’ own account of 
his invention/creation: 
 
 
Proportionately speaking, writing at the zero degree 
is basically in the indicative mood, or if you like, 
amodal; it would be accurate to say that it is a 
journalist’s writing, if it were not precisely the case 
that journalism develops, in general, optative or 
imperative (that is, emotive) forms. The new neutral 
writing takes its place in the midst of all those 
ejaculations and judgments without becoming 
involved in any of them; it consists precisely in their 
absence. But this absence is complete, it implies no 
refuge, no secret; one cannot therefore say that it is 
an impassive mode of writing; rather, that it is 
innocent. The aim here is to go beyond Literature by 
entrusting one’s fate to a sort of basic speech, 
equally far from living languages and from literary 
language proper. This transparent form of speech, 
initiated by Camus’s Outsider, achieves a style of 
absence which is almost an ideal absence of style; 
writing is then reduced to a sort of negative mood in 
which the social or mythical characters of a 
language are abolished in favour of a neutral and 
inert state of form… 
(Barthes [1953] 1984d: 64) [emphasis in 
original] 
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We shall return to the concept of the zero degree of form later in the Section but 
for now, we turn our attention to another of Barthes works, a collection of essays 
published as Image – Music – Text ([1977] 1984a). In particular ‘The Third 
Meaning’ which he wrote in 1970 and is important here as it contributes in part to 
the way this thesis is conceptually structured. In ‘The Third Meaning’, Barthes 
uses a number of film stills from works by Soviet Russian director and film 
theorist Sergei Mikhailovich Eisenstein (1898 – 1948) in an attempt to recognise 
three levels of meaning from these scenes. The essay identifies the first level of 
meaning as an informational level, “[t]his level is that of communication.” 
(Barthes [1977] 1984a: 52) and the second is a symbolic level (of which Barthes 
gives examples of referential symbolism, diegetic symbolism, Eisensteinian 
symbolism and historical symbolism), which as a whole functions as a level of 
signification (Barthes [1977] 1984a: 52). “As for the other meaning, the third, the 
one ‘too many’, the supplement that my intellection cannot succeed in absorbing, 
at once persistent and fleeting, smooth and elusive, I propose to call it the obtuse 
meaning.” (Barthes [1977] 1984a: 54) [emphasis in original]. 
 
 
 An obtuse angle is greater than a right angle: an 
obtuse angle of 100º, says the dictionary; the third 
meaning also seems to me greater than the pure, 
upright, secant, legal perpendicular of the narrative, 
it seems to open up the field of meaning totally, that 
is infinitely. I even accept for the obtuse meaning 
the word’s pejorative connotation: the obtuse 
meaning appears to extend outside culture, 
knowledge, information; analytically, it has 
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something derisory about it: opening out into the 
infinity of language… 
(Barthes [1977] 1984a: 55) [emphasis in 
original] 
 
 
If we take Barthes first two levels of meaning, the informational and the symbolic, 
then perhaps we can draw a loose analogy between the first two Sections of the 
thesis – photo and crypt, the light of information and the corresponding darkness 
perhaps of the symbolic in terms of its lack of transparency. We can then 
speculate that this third Section presents itself as an obtuse chapter in Bartesian 
terms, or to quote Tom McCarthy “…that what it holds in store is not the treasure 
of the unexpressed but, borrowing Barthes words, ‘the signifier of the 
inexpressible’.” (McCarthy 2006: 29). This takes us to another of Barthes seminal 
writings, ‘Elements of Semiology’ ([1964] 1984e) where he demonstrates the 
classification of oppositions, the best known of which is the privative or binary 
opposition. A binary consists of two polar elements such as the positive and 
negative of an electrical charge, or as Barthes states marked and unmarked, “…the 
opposition of a mark and a zero degree.” ([1964] 1984e: 141). Returning to 
Barthes’ quotation that opened the Section, we can see that the unmarked term of 
any binary opposition is not a total absence but a significant absence, that we 
might also call a defining absence. Whereas it might seem obvious to associate the 
mark with the exceptional, and the unmarked with a sense of normality, we can 
get the idea that the unmarked is somehow secondary or docile in relation to the 
mark or even “…derived from the marked by a subsequent subtraction” (Barthes 
([1964] 1984e: 138) [emphasis in original] and therefore negative. Barthes 
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however appears to see this as too simplistic as the distinction is made via an 
appeal to content and not purely form. Alternately, the mark can be seen as an 
additional significant element that does not throw the unmarked into the negative, 
but merely differentiates between two intensities of the same concept. As Barthes 
himself says “…when one wants to say more, one adds a supplementary sign” 
(Barthes ([1964] 1984e: 138), which we can perceive as a further intensity in an 
extensive whole. In this sense we can speculate how a binary opposition or 
paradox can be assimilated into the same concept, just as we are trying to prove 
with our code CPDIOE? (can photography describe its own event?). If the mark 
is a supplement and the unmarked comprises a significant absence then we might 
say we have a concept in constant oscillation and the force in this relation is 
generated from the unmarked or the zero degree. “The concept of the zero degree 
[…] lends itself to a great many applications […] a ‘zero sign’ is spoken of in 
cases where the absence of any explicit signifier functions by itself as a signifier” 
(Barthes [1964] 1984e: 138-139). Here we have a link between the obtuse 
meaning and the zero degree, summed up again perhaps in the phrase “…the 
signifier of the inexpressible, not of the unexpressed…” (Barthes [1973] 2002: 
216) which is an inversion in co-existence of the definition of the zero degree, an 
absence acting as its own signifier. Two polarities held in oscillation, the third 
meaning and the zero degree (degree zero). Barthes himself refers to part of 
theoretical physicist Jean-Louis Destouche’s (1909 – 1980) Cours de logique 
‘Notions de logistique’ (1946); “A is in the zero state, that is to say that A does 
not actually exist, but under certain conditions it can be made to appear”. (Barthes 
[1964] 1984e: 139). Therefore A in the zero state can be seen as a significant 
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absence oscillating between the invisible and the visible, the virtual and the 
actual. This is where we are situating our obtuse code/question CPDIOE? and 
hoping that from time to time it will appear and illuminate our argument.  
 
 
The obtuse meaning is a signifier without a 
signified, hence the difficulty in naming it. My 
reading remains suspended between the image and 
its description, between definition and 
approximation. If the obtuse meaning cannot be 
described, that is because, in contrast to the obvious 
meaning, it does not copy anything – how do you 
describe something that does not represent 
anything?  
(Barthes [1977] 1984a: 61) [my emphasis] 
 
 
 
Remainder 
  
In an effort to locate the zero state (degree) or blind spot in relation to the visual 
spectrum, particularly pertinent in light of classical photography’s inextricable 
link to vision, we can turn to Hal Foster’s edited book Vision and Visuality (1988) 
and an essay by Norman Bryson ‘The Gaze in the Expanded Field’ (1988). In his 
text, Bryson draws our attention to the Japanese Kyoto School of Philosophy 
where key figures such as Kitarō Nishida (1870 – 1945) and his student Keiji 
Nishitani (1900 – 1990) were engaged in reflections on Western philosophy from 
their own inherently Eastern perspective. In particular, the critique of the Western 
subject, re-imagining the work of both John-Paul Sartre (1905 – 1980) and 
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Jacques Lacan (1901 – 1981). For the purpose of our investigation, we shall 
largely be focusing on Nishitani in order to unravel how his ideas can prove 
useful in articulating our question CPDIOE?. In addition to Bryson’s 
contribution, we shall be using an edited book on Nishitani by Taitetsu Unno and 
a number of essays in order to gain a more rounded reflection of the philosopher’s 
work, whilst specifically focusing on the aspects that pertain to our interests in 
this Section. It is worth noting that much of these ideas are yet to reach a wider 
audience due to delays in translation and its associated issues.7 To précis Bryon’s 
introduction to provide some context here, he proposes that Nishida and Nishitani 
go further than the arguably better-known philosophers Sartre and Lacan in their 
ideas concerning visuality. They especially offer a challenge to the notion that 
vision is seen as a field in which the subject is placed at the centre. Bryson begins 
with Sartre and his story of a subject alone in a park – “…everything in the park is 
there for him to regard from an unchallenged center of the visual field.” (Bryson 
1988: 88). However, the watcher in the park is then disturbed by the 
entry/irruption of another figure: 
 
 
…now another perspective opens up, and the lines of 
flight race away from the watcher self to meet this 
new point of entry. For the intruder himself stands at 
his own center of things, and draws towards and into 
himself everything he sees; the watcher self is now a 
tangent not a center, a vanishing point not a viewing 
point, an opacity on the other’s distant horizon. 
(Bryson 1988: 89)  
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As we can see, the arrival/addition of a second figure into the scene (that 
represents the dismantling of the centralized subject) produces two fixed points, 
where a tension is created between the viewing point and the vanishing point of 
each ‘watcher’. Each figure is at once both the watcher and the watched, 
occupying both the space of the viewing point and the vanishing point in one 
moment. This produces a binary situation where the two polarities annihilate (to 
use Bryson’s term) each other’s subjective centralized viewing point, and vision 
becomes caught up in a play of binaries of subject/object. Now Bryson turns to 
Lacan’s story, which takes place on a boat off the coast of Brittany and concerns 
the pieces of flotsam the fisherman and Lacan observe. Of particular importance 
is the presence of a sardine can – which one of the men remarks that whilst Lacan 
can see the sardine can, the sardine can cannot see Lacan. This semantic tongue 
twister can perhaps itself be seen as a worthy (witty even) metaphor for the 
complex relationship of the subject and the object in the field of vision. This 
troubles Lacan because he feels that “…the world of inanimate objects to some 
extent always looks back on the perceiver.8 […] Lacan’s account depends, not on 
the irruption of another personal viewer but the irruption, in the visual field, of the 
Signifier.” (Bryson 1988: 91). Indeed this brings into play the centre ground in 
this scenario, the space between the subject and the signifier in the world, as it 
appears as a matrix or network of meanings. A web (net) of discourse on 
visuality, a ‘screen of signs’ –  “[f]or when we look through the screen, what we 
see is caught up in a network that comes to us from the outside: mobile tesserae of 
signification, a mosaic that moves.” (Bryson 1988: 92) [my emphasis]. Here 
signifiers seem to lose their object-ness, appearing and disappearing in the visual 
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environment, we are reminded again of the fleetingness and indeterminacy of the 
third meaning, “…the obtuse meaning can only come and go, appearing-
disappearing.” (Barthes [1977] 1984a: 63). This screen as Bryson talks about in 
relation to language is beyond the control of the subject. The subject is de-
centered precisely because these networks, either language or visual, exist before 
any act of language or seeing is articulated, rendering the subject tangential rather 
than the centrality they imagine for themselves.  
 
This network of signification which we can now see existing between Sartre’s 
binary subject positions in the park takes us forward somewhat in the notion of an 
expanded field of vision. Despite Sartre’s seminal work Being and Nothingness 
([1943] 1956) being a criticism of the Cartesian self-enclosure of the cogito, 
Nishitani writes his Religion and Nothingness (1982) in order to go further than 
Sartre in the pursuit of breaking down the twin polarities of subject and object. 
Nishitani’s aim is to dismantle this scenario of Western vision and instead 
consider the wider field, the question of vision’s ‘wider frame’ (Bryson 1988: 96). 
In the cogito subject and object exist in fixity, the subject looks out from a 
position of universal centrality onto a field of separate objects. As we mentioned 
in Section I: Photo[graphy], there is a distance between subject and object in the 
cogito, a separation that exists between two points. For Nishitani’s critique of the 
centralized subject, he posits the use of the term śūnyatā, which is translated as 
‘emptiness’, ‘radical impermanence’, ‘blankness’ and ‘nihility’ (Nishitani 1982: 
116). The term’s etymology offers a foretaste of how these ideas can begin to 
resonate for us in this Section on zero[graphy], as it is from the Sanskrit noun 
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from the adjective for zero, nothing (śūnya, śhūnya).9 The use of the word śūnyatā 
does not denote an object or fixed entity, rather it signifies a field or space, not 
unlike the concept of (plane of) immanence that we shall discuss later in the 
Section. Nisihtani’s argument is that the subject and object in Sartre’s park 
scenario remain intact. “The subject, from its position of center amidst the world 
of things, looks out on its objects and perceives them as separate entities.” 
(Bryson 1988: 96) [emphasis in original]. The inference being that objects have 
an independent self-existence, are located in a single place and have a fixed form. 
The field of śūnyatā however, has a profound effect on all entities – causing the 
subject-entity and the object-entity to break up under the conditions of radical 
impermanence (Bryson 1988: 97). For our purposes here we may see the radical 
impermanence as the field of difference and in particular difference in itself or 
constant variation. Perhaps we can make a connection here between this concept 
of emptiness (śūnyatā) to Barthes’ concept of zero degree (when what is 
inexpressible is actually signified by the absence of a signifier) in that what we 
are marking here is not the narrow field of vision or zone of signification but the 
remainder. Hence we can be said to be marking the unmarked.  
 
 
If the object is say, a flower, its existence is only as 
a phase of incremental transformations between seed 
and dust, in a continuous exfoliation or perturbation 
of matter: at no point does the object come under an 
arrest that would immobilize it as Form or eidos. 
Moved on to the field of śūnyatā or radical 
impermanence, the entity comes apart. It cannot be 
said to occupy a single location, since its locus is 
always the universal field of transformations: it 
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cannot achieve separation from that field or acquire 
any kind of bounded outline.  
  (Bryson 1988: 97-98) [emphasis in original] 
 
 
Here we learn that the object cannot exist in this emptiness as a discrete fixed 
entity, it is radically destabilised by the field of śūnyatā and its location becomes 
nullified by the surrounding universal field of transformations. To momentarily 
revisit another flower analogy from Section I, this notion conjures up the 
rhizomatic relationship between Deleuze and Guatarri’s wasp and orchid. Their 
concept of de-/re-territorialization becomes recognisable in Nishitani’s notion of 
radical impermanence. We are also reminded of Benjamin’s mosaic where each 
tessera or piece of glass melts away as we look to another or indeed the whole. 
The difference between the intensive fragment and the extensive whole is also 
invoked in this quotation: 
 
 
In Nishitani’s description, an object’s presence can 
be defined only in negative terms. Since there is no 
way of singling out an object x without at the same 
time including it in the global field of 
transformations, what appears as the object x is only 
the difference between x and the total surrounding 
field.  
(Bryson 1988: 98) [emphasis in original] 
 
 
Here may be an optimum moment to transcribe these ideas onto our enigmatic 
question CPDIOE?. The ‘classical’10 conception of photography is far more 
analogous to Sartre’s park scenario with subject and object being held in a binary 
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relationship, the photographic act of looking being exactly that of Sartre’s in his 
analogy. In this way of course, the idea of the subjective viewing position 
(photography) describing its own event makes little sense. This stems from the 
fact that both subject and object are seen as discrete entities and fixed points 
occupying distinct space. If we apply Nishitani’s field of śūnyatā or radical 
impermanence all entities empty out, they lose their object-ness, they are literally 
dismantled by the surrounding universal field of transformations. They move from 
the marked to the unmarked, from a zone of signification to that of the remainder. 
Each entity is in constant flux and so cannot attain a state of fixed form or eidos. 
If we align Photography with perception11 then all of its subject/object positions 
lose their boundaries and fixity within Nishitani’s field of thought, again 
rendering them part of the remainder via the concept of śūnyatā. In the classical 
sense photography cannot describe its own event as this equates to the Sartrean 
condition of the viewing position and the vanishing point annihilating each other 
(as in the park scenario), as they mirror each other in their binary existence.  
 
 
The viewpoint and the vanishing point are 
inseparable: there is no view point without vanishing 
point, and no vanishing point without viewing point. 
The self-possession of the viewing subject has built 
into it, therefore, the principle of its own abolition: 
annihilation of the subject as center is a condition of 
the very moment of the look. 
(Bryson 1988: 91) 
 
 
 270 
This relationship as embodied in the photographic represents only a fraction of the 
field of universal surround, which defines the remainder. It is confined to a 
narrow field of vision between the subject and the object and describes only this 
narrow conception of the world. Nishitani’s wider conception of the universal 
field of transformations incorporates both photography and the entire field of 
multiple co-existent events including of course its own event. And so by placing 
the object of photography onto the expanded field, the emptiness of śūnyatā 
would allow us speculatively to conceive of it describing its own event, as part of 
a totality of invisibility. Under the conditions of śūnyatā, there is no self-existence 
as the ground of all being is the existence of everything else. With no bounded 
outline what appears as the object is only the difference between the object and 
the total surrounding field. As stated above therefore, photography and any event 
(including its own event) is only a matter of the difference between itself and the 
total surrounding field. Without tying the terms into a language of objects then 
our speculative question CPDIOE? can suggest new potentialities, photography 
collapses into an undifferentiated domain that contains its own event. Two 
divisible entities collapse to form an indivisible totality – here essentially we are 
talking about a co-existent event of photography.12 Bryson points to a useful 
comparison between vision and language in that Ferdinand Saussure (1857 – 
1913) maintains that an individual word means nothing in itself, it does not have 
the attributes of an entity, but is constituted in its difference from all other words. 
Nishitani argues for the same state in the existence of objects, and like Lacan’s 
account of vision, it is the ever shifting matrix between entities or positions that 
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takes precedence in delivering any meaning: a matrix or network that pre-exists 
all communication. 
 
 
Meaning in a sense never arrives, and in the same 
way, for Nishitani, being never arrives (beings never 
arrive). The form of the seed is already turning into 
the form of the flower, and the flower is already 
becoming dust. The present state of the object 
appearing as the flower is inhabited by its past as 
seed and its future as dust, in a continuous motion of 
postponement whose effect is that the flower is 
never presently there, anymore than the seed or dust 
are there.  
(Bryson 1988: 98-99) [emphasis in original] 
 
 
Walter Benjamin might call this a dialectical image in the sense that the true 
nature of the flower incorporating both seed and dust simultaneously emerges in a 
flash of legibility in terms of the concept ‘flower’ as a boundless entity. Just as 
meaning never arrives and is constantly deferred, as with the unbounded form of 
an entity or object we can see similarities with the concept of awakening as stated 
above in that consciousness/perception too is in a constant process of deferral. 
Proust articulates this deferral in his description of the furniture objects that swirl 
in a sea of antinomies.  
 
Nishitani illustrates his idea using a number of ancient Eastern aphorisms; ‘Fire 
does not burn fire’, ‘water does not wash water’, ‘The eye does not see the eye’ 
(Nishitani in Unno 1989: 31) [my emphasis].  
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The burning that takes place when the fire burns 
firewood points to the selfness of fire, but so does 
the fact that fire does not burn itself. The two are 
here one and the same. As something that burns 
firewood, fire does not burn itself; as something that 
does not burn itself it burns firewood. This is the 
mode of being of fire as fire, the self-identity of fire. 
Only where it does not burn itself is fire truly on its 
own homeground. In other words, we speak not only 
of the selfness of fire for us, but also the selfness of 
fire for fire itself.  
(Nishitani in Unno 1989: 31) [emphasis in 
original] 
 
 
It is at this point perhaps that we arrive at the nearest resolution that may be 
possible to the question that defines this thesis – can photography describe its 
own event? In the above quotation, if we map across and substitute the words 
‘photography’, ‘describe’ and ‘event’, for ‘fire’, ‘burn’ and ‘firewood’ we begin 
to recognise a basic truth in the words of Nishitani: 
 
 
The describing that takes place when photography 
describes an event points to the selfness of 
photography, but so does the fact that photography 
does not describe itself. The two are here one and 
the same. As something that describes an event, 
photography does not describe itself; as something 
that does not describe itself it describes an event. 
This is the mode of being of photography as 
photography, the self-identity of photography. Only 
where it does not describe itself is photography truly 
on its own homeground. In other words, we speak 
not only of the selfness of photography for us, but 
also the selfness of photography for photography 
itself.  
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In the above exercise of substitution, what we can take from Nishitani’s logic is 
that the essence of photography is that is describes, yet it cannot describe itself. 
“It cannot exist in self-enclosure” (Bryson 1988:99). It can describe everything 
but itself, and to be itself it must extend beyond the enclosure of photography as 
entity and into the surrounding field, the remainder. Therefore it is part of the 
surrounding field, mutable, an unbounded entity. 
 
Photography for us is when it describes the world, however photography for itself 
is only when it describes its own event. In the co-existence of these two 
perspectives we have the true nature of photography, only when it describes its 
own event is photography truly on its own ‘homeground’. The ‘self-identity’ of 
photography consists in describing events in the world and in describing its own 
event. Unno elucidates Nishitani’s phrase ‘in itself’ (jitai) as explaining the mode 
of being of entities in the field of śūnyatā is beyond representation and so to an 
extent counter-intuitive. “…śūnyatā indicates the standpoint of ‘in itself’, which is 
completely free from all representation – representation not only in terms of the 
subject-object duality, but also in terms of nihility which overcomes that duality.”  
(Unno 1989: 30) [emphasis in original]. In this sense then we might speculate that 
śūnyatā may be equated with a Bergsonian/Deleuzian difference (in itself) as 
irradiated in Section II. 
 
In order for us to further comprehend the challenge Nishitani offers in his analysis 
of vision, we shall now focus on a metaphor that is fittingly photographic. As we 
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have come to realise, whilst presenting a reflection on the subject/object duality in 
his watchers in the park scenario, Sartre’s binary tension remains unbroken.  
Bryson points out that in Sartre, the object is what appears to the subject “…so to 
speak at the end of a viewfinder.” (Bryson 1988: 100). This framing apparatus – 
viewfinder, camera, picture frame, perspective, instills a distance between the two 
fixed points, but also crucially, is discriminating in what it chooses to include in 
the ‘picture’, that is, it creates a tunnel vision that screens out the surrounding 
field in terms of perception (Bryson 1988: 100). Nishitani however, seeks to 
dissolve the framing apparatus and break down the distance between the subject 
and the object, so that the object is no longer ‘over there’, but instead exists “…in 
the total field of the universal remainder. The object opens out omnidirectionally 
on to the universal surround, against which it defines itself negatively and 
diacritically.” (Bryson 1988: 100) [emphasis in original]. 
 
 
The viewer who looks out at the object sees only one 
angle of the global field where the object resides, 
one single tangent of the 360 degrees of the circle, 
and of the 360 degrees in all directions of the 
radiating sphere of light spreading out from the 
object into the global envelopment. 
(Bryson 1988: 100) 
 
 
The ‘total field of the universal remainder’ therefore describes a system that is 
diametrically opposed to Sartre’s narrow field of perspective that produces a 
subject and an object, a tunnel vision. The remainder is therefore the total sum of 
perspectives that is not that of Sartre’s viewing subject. Of course, we are using 
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Sartre as our example but his scenario is commensurate with Cartesian 
perspectivalism and geometric perspective, all of which rely on a founding 
subjective viewing position with a corresponding vanishing point. Systems, that 
are at the root of classical representation. We could indeed speculate 
metaphorically that the field of the universal remainder exists beyond the 
vanishing point via its very invisibility, and therefore beyond representation. The 
sum of the non-subjective perspectives that constitute the remainder remind us of 
Leibniz’s allusion to an ideal townscape in his Monadology: 
 
 
And as the same town, looked at from various sides, 
appears quite different and becomes as it were 
numerous in aspects; even so, as a result of the 
infinite number of simple substances, it is as if there 
were so many different universes, which, 
nevertheless are nothing but aspects [perspectives] 
of a single universe… 
(Leibniz [1714] 2008: 13) 
 
 
 
The total field of the universal remainder therefore corresponds with Leibniz’s 
“…representation of multitude in the unity” (Leibniz in Antognazza 2009: 498), 
that is, detailed in another image from The Monadology: 
 
 
Thus there is nothing fallow, nothing sterile, nothing 
dead in the universe, no chaos, no confusion save in 
appearance, somewhat as it might appear to be in a 
pond at a distance, in which one would see a 
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confused movement and, as it were, a swarming of 
fish in the pond, without separately distinguishing 
the fish themselves.   
(Leibniz [1714] 2008: 13) 
 
 
Here we can see a parallel between Nishitani’s ‘expanded field of blankness’ 
(śūnyatā), or Bryson’s “…dark or unmarked remainder” (Bryson 1988: 101), 
which we can perhaps trace back to his teacher Nishida, whom we know was 
influenced by Leibniz in his philosophical writings (Heisig 1990: 76). In this field 
of total vision (the sum of all perspectives) the fish as entity becomes unbounded, 
lose their object-ness in space. Indeed, Leibniz believed that objects are only 
mental constructs, for each viewer has a different perspective on them revealing 
only the frontal aspect of the object. The object therefore is no more than a 
fictional extrapolation from all the perspectives, as no single perspective offers a 
perceptual image corresponding to the geometrical description of a solid object; 
objects are mere chimeras, a fiction. Subjects merely mistake an aspect or profile 
for an object. Returning to Nishitani, he offers us another metaphor by which to 
elucidate his concept of emptiness13, that of “making things transparent” (Hase 
n.d.: 78) in which he speaks of two rooms. In order to dissolve the boundaries of 
these two entities he imagines that the wall between the rooms is transparent, not 
that it disappears but that it is transparent. In this way, the entities or rooms can be 
seen as part of each other rather than separate. These unbounded entities now 
form part of a whole as each object or entity merges into a transparent unity. This 
is analogous to Leibniz’s ‘representation of multitude in the unity’ in that 
perspectives and boundaries are dissolved as the many are seen in relation to the 
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one. This is a reciprocal dissolution concerning subject as well as object;  “[i]n the 
field of śūnyatā the centralized subject falls apart; its boundary dissolves, together 
with the consoling boundary of the object.” (Bryson 1988: 106). The concept of 
śūnyatā then, as being non-subjective can be perceived as “the surrounding 
envelope of invisibility” (Bryson 1988: 103), a field without signifiers and so the 
absence of a signifier that paradoxically acts as the signifier of the inexpressible, 
the unmarked, that reveals we have reached the zero-degree.  
 
 
But once that frame is dissolved on the field of 
śūnyatā or emptiness, the narrow angle is found to 
be enveloped on all sides by a surround of 
invisibility. Once dis-framed, the brightly luminous 
segment is found actually to be constructed from 
within the invisible, the dark or unmarked remainder 
that extends beyond the edge of peripheral vision 
into the space that wraps its way round behind the 
spectator’s head and behind the eyes. What can be 
seen is supported and interpenetrated by what is 
outside sight, a Gaze of the other enveloping sight 
on all sides.  
(Bryson 1988: 101) [emphasis in original] 
 
 
The brightly luminous segment then, constitutes the invisible hiding inside the 
visible. It appears as a field of vision but in reality, only in oscillation with the 
remainder – the invisible. “The obtuse meaning, then, has something to do with 
disguise.” (Barthes [1977] 1984a: 58) … “The obtuse meaning can only come and 
go, appearing disappearing.” (Barthes [1977] 1984a: 63). 
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…surely we now stand at the very limits of 
representation. From this point on, only a technique 
which undermines the frame can stand in for the 
invisible which the frame excludes. And if we try to 
picture to ourselves the Gaze of śūnyatā or 
blankness, it must be in terms of the 
nonrepresentational or the anti-representational.  
(Bryson 1988: 101) 
 
 
As boundaries and perspectives dissolve so does the dual centrality of the subject-
object polarity. A radical decentered subject “…comes to know itself in 
noncentered terms, as inhabiting and inhabited by a constitutive emptiness.” 
(Bryson 1988: 106). The subject-centered account of the world is dissolved as the 
subject is exposed to its own radical impermanence and becomes aware of the 
remainder hiding within it. This may be the zero degree of consciousness. Here 
we may ascertain that the subject of photography too as it is presently understood, 
is also exposed to its own radical impermenance and in the context of this thesis, 
it becomes aware of a remainder hiding within its perceived boundaries. A 
remainder we might term difference, and one we may glimpse in artists such as 
Woodman. 
 
 
 
Boundless states 
 
Certainly I was now well awake; my body had 
veered round for the last time and the good angel of 
certainty had made all the surrounding objects stand 
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still, had set me down under my bedclothes, in my 
bedroom, and had fixed, approximately in their right 
places in the uncertain light, my chest of drawers, 
my writing-table, my fireplace, the window 
overlooking the street, and both the doors. 
(Proust [1913 – 1927] 1996a: 7-8) 
 
 
Let us momentarily return to Proust’s narrator as an introduction to this part of the 
Section, which concerns a collection of illogical uncertainties. Just as Proust’s 
furniture at the moment of awakening succumbed to the ‘good angel of certainty’, 
here we shall make allusions to quantum theory and the prevalent inconsistency of 
the question of certainty within this field. The ‘good angel of certainty’ in the 
quotation above serves a purpose here in that it corresponds to the point of view 
of the first Section of the thesis; ‘Photo[graphy]’ and the mainstream perspective 
of ‘classical’ photography. A viewpoint that is markedly different from the 
position we currently find ourselves in, and the ideas that surround us. 
Furthermore, we can also equate it with ‘classical’ physics in its relation to its 
quantum counterpoint (quantum physics/quantum mechanics). “Classical physics 
describes a world that is clear and determinate. Quantum physics describes a 
world that is cloudy and fitful.” (Polkinhorne 2002: 26). We must now leave the 
good angel of certainty behind yet again, as we take some tentative steps towards 
a zone of indeterminacy.   
 
It is here that we shall conjure up our findings from within the crypt of the 
previous Section regarding the ideas of quantum mechanics and Heisenburg’s 
‘Uncertainty Principle’ whilst uncovering another experiment that seems pertinent 
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to our investigation; the ‘Double-Slit Experiment’ of quantum physics. We are 
reminded that what Heisenburg was grappling with was the problem that it is 
possible to plot a particles’ movement or a particles’ location, yet it is impossible 
to record both aspects in tandem, at one moment: 
 
 
The implication is that one increasingly loses 
knowledge of what the electron’s momentum will be 
after the position measurement. There is an 
inescapable trade-off between the increasing 
accuracy of position measurement and the 
decreasing accuracy of knowledge of momentum. 
This fact is the basis of the uncertainty principle: it 
is not possible simultaneously to have perfect 
knowledge of both position and momentum.  
  (Polkinhorne 2002: 33) 
 
 
So attempting to synthesise speed and position is futile, and what remains is 
inexpressibility.14 Tapping into the realm of uncertainty here, “…the cloudy 
unpicturability of quantum processes” (Polkinhorne 2002: 67) reveals itself. “The 
physical world is laid out before the potentially all-seeing eye of the scientist. In 
the quantum world, by contrast, the physicist’s vision is partially veiled.” 
(Polkinhorne 2002: 32). As we set to work, carrying out our investigations in this 
grey half-light, the possibilities for a future photography, a ‘photography yet to 
come’15 perhaps, start to form. So just as quantum physicists’ need to dismiss 
logic and the powers of deduction in order to approach an area of study that is 
riddled with paradox, it will serve us well to leave behind more logical, rigid 
conceptions of photography and continue to deliberate its more abstract 
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manifestations. As Nobel Prize-winning physicist Erwin Schrödinger (1887 – 
1961) humorously remarked on the nature of quantum mechanics, “I don’t like it, 
and I’m sorry I ever had anything to do with it. (Schrödinger in Gribbin 1991: 
inside cover). 16 Notions of indeterminacy, inexpressibility, ‘unpicturability’, and 
the grey cloud (fog) that surrounds quantum theory strike chords with our 
enigmatic question CPDIOE? as they offer an irrational, imaginative 
interpretation of what impact this could have on more ‘classical’ conceptions of 
photography. The exciting potentiality that is inherent in this field of study can 
illuminate the way for more novel formulations of contemporary photography. 
Proust’s good angel of certainty is nowhere to be found. 
 
We now return to an enigma that (another) Nobel Prize-winning physicist Richard 
Feynman believes lies at the heart of quantum mechanics; the double-slit 
experiment. It entails ‘a source of quantum entities’ (Polkinhorne 2002: 22) and 
an ‘electron gun’ that fire a steady stream of particles/electrons at two slits A and 
B, whilst recording the subsequent positions of these electrons on an observing 
(detector) screen. As the electrons arrive on screen one at a time, its point of 
impact is marked and demonstrates that the electrons behave in a particle-like 
mode. Nevertheless, when there has been a large accumulation of marks on the 
screen the pattern that has been created shows the form of what physicists 
recognise as an ‘interference effect’. It is this diffraction pattern that reveals the 
illogicality of this quantum problem; when the electrons arrive one after the other 
they can be seen to be showing particle-like behaviour, yet the collective 
interference pattern points towards electrons behaving in a wavelike mode. The 
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results are puzzling because on the observing screen appears an elusive ‘third’ slit 
– a point between the two slits of the ‘double-slit’, that shows detection of 
electrons. “There is an intense dark spot on the screen opposite the point midway 
between the two slits, corresponding to the location where the largest number of 
electron marks have been deposited.” (Polkinhorne 2002: 23). This experiment 
also illustrates the ‘superposition principle’, which actually permits the electron to 
go through both of the slits simultaneously; “[w]hat classically were mutually 
distinct possibilities are entangled with each other quantum mechanically.” 
(Polkinhorne 2002: 41). What appears to have one aspect is actually in oscillation 
with a multitude of aspects, just as in Benjamin’s famous mosaic. 
 
 
In classical physics, measurement is unproblematic. 
It is simply the observation of what is the case. […] 
measurement in conventional quantum theory is 
different because the superposition principle holds 
together alternative, and eventually mutually 
exclusive, possibilities right until the last moment, 
when suddenly one of them alone surfaces as the 
realized actuality on this occasion […] all the 
probability collapses onto this single actuality. 
(Polkinhorne 2002: 44-45) 
 
 
 
Perhaps it is worth making a correlation here between the complex ambiguity of 
these quantum experiments and the shifting, hard to pin down ‘third meaning’ of 
Barthes from earlier in this Section. The third (obtuse) meaning shares some of 
the traits in the way that it resists/eludes definition, it is hard to locate; it is 
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subjective and can sometimes remain imperceptible. As in our earlier discussion, 
the third meaning can hide in the first two as a remainder, a field of invisibility or 
zero degree. The invisible third slit of the experiment hides within/behind the two 
visible slits and marks the remainder in its inexpressibility. Likewise, zerography 
as we are determining it here can be seen to hide within/behind the philosophical 
ground of the first two Sections. In both circumstances we are left with the 
remainder as an imaginary field, the ‘darkness of the lived moment’, our blind 
spot. 
 
 
 
What if the as is of the world is superseded by the as if? 
 
To recapitulate; if Section I speaks of a photography that perceives the world as 
is, a world of empirical data, and Section II adds depth and variation to surface 
appearances, then it falls to this Section to ask a further question; what place 
might there be for a photography whose task it could be to measure the very 
uncertainty of events? Perhaps a theory of zerography can enable some resolution 
to such questions, as its very nature is that of indiscernability and uncertainty. Let 
us now move further into this world of the inexpressible. 
 
“Isn’t the imaginary a mode of calculation – that which involves itself with 
probabilities and uncertainties?” (Lomax 2000a: 52) 
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To take a side step for a minute, a brief swerve, we shall investigate a practice that 
offers a perspective unlike one we might find anywhere else, a realm that, similar 
to our enigmatic question CPDIOE?, resists definition and is purposefully 
obscure; the world of `pataphysics. Indeed, it is certainly problematic (and in 
itself extremely unpataphysical17) to pin down a set of parameters in which to 
enclose such a capricious cluster of ideas. `Pataphysics itself remains resolutely 
unbounded and has no ambitions to become an enclosed entity.18 In fact, to refer 
back to Nishitani, it literally prides itself on its transparency as object and its 
ability to infuse a multitude of disciplines. In a seminal text on `pataphysics, 
Christian Bök acknowledges that “[e]ven this survey may not explain the 
existence of `pataphysics so much as conjure `pataphysics into existence.” (Bök 
2002: 10). Here again we have the notion of oscillation of appearing and 
disappearing as Barthes notes of his own ‘obtuse meaning’. `Pataphysics is the 
obtuse incarnate. It is the science of indeterminacy, where everything is 
equivalent to everything else, it is a form of intellectual entropy in that it measures 
the disorder that exists in any system and more importantly, celebrates it, creates 
it even. But by some way of an introduction we can attempt an imprecise 
description, `pataphysics can be recognised as a pseudo-scientific literary and 
philosophic collection of eccentric concepts created by French poet Alfred Jarry 
(1873 – 1907). “Pataphysics is the science of imaginary solutions, which 
symbolically attributes the properties of objects, described by their virtuality, to 
their lineaments.” (Jarry [1911] 1996: 22). That is, to pick up our deliberations 
above, that an object can be described by the potentiality of what it could be as 
much as what it appears to be if we consider its form. Again, the notion of de/re-
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territorialisation is brought to play once more on the concept of objects, just as it 
can equally be applied to a concept such as photography in order to unlock its 
future potential forms. 
 
“`Pataphysics represents a supplement to metaphysics, accenting it, then replacing 
it, in order to create a philosophical alternative to rationalism.” (Bök 2002: 3). 
Therefore, the realm of `pataphysics takes up the position of third in relation to 
what we consider reality. If we take a sideways step from the concept of reality 
(physics) into metaphysics, then one further step takes us into the realm of 
`pataphysics. ‘Meta’ standing for beyond and ‘pata’ meaning beside. “Pataphysics 
is to metaphysics as metaphysics is to physics.” (Hugill 2012: 4). `Pataphysics in 
its shift from the rational to the irrational to the surrational reminds us of Barthes’ 
three levels of meaning – the informational level (one), the symbolic (two) and 
the obtuse; the third meaning. In our thesis, we can equate this again with our 
three sections, photo[graphy], crypto[graphy] and finally zero[graphy], a place of 
indeterminacy. `Pataphysics takes the rational view of the world as ‘what is’ and 
prompts a translation into a fictionalised ‘what if’. Evoking Nishitani, 
`pataphysics ruptures the self-enclosed nature of things, making objects 
transparent to all emergent potentiality. Therefore in its own absurd way, 
unleashing the field of śūnyatā into all relations.  
 
 
`Pataphysics thus behaves as if it is a Philosophie 
des Als Ob. Vaihinger observes that the phrase ‘as 
if’ constitutes a ‘comparative apperception’ ([1911] 
1966, 91), juxtaposing two concepts somewhere in 
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the interzone between the virtuality of a figural 
relation and the actuality of a literal equation. 
Neither rhetorical nor theoretical, the as if 
constitutes a paradox of contingency, since reference 
is made to an impossibility, but from this possibility 
an inference is made: ‘reality… is compared with 
something whose… unreality is at the same time 
admitted’ (98). The as if posits the possible 
consequences of an impossible inconsequence. The 
as if is simply the imaginary solution to the question 
what if.  
(Bök 2002: 25-26) [emphasis in original] 
 
 
Nishitani’s radical field of transformations is reinterpreted by `pataphysics by 
purposeful misreading and the conjuring up of all other perspectives, virtual or 
actual, in order to make us aware of the remainder beyond fixed meanings. The 
invisible always resides within the visible. Indeed Bök tells us (after Bergson and 
Deleuze we might add): “[q]uestions always define in advance the regime of their 
answers. The problem always persists in the very paradigm that allows the 
solution to make sense as a solution. No enigma is solved so well as its status of 
enigma ceases to exist. A solution is infinitely imaginary.” (Bök 2002: 45). In 
effect, after Deleuze, this reinforces the point that solutions and problems are co-
existent and I am hoping to prove that if my question CPDIOE? is elegantly 
enough stated within the thesis then any ‘solution’ along with its inherent enigma 
will be preserved also. Here see the initial discussion regarding the determining of 
problems at the beginning of Section I. 
 
It is the task of the pataphysicist to be concerned with a creative misunderstanding 
and not just to understand the world of the ‘as is’ as this is merely a reactive truth. 
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To base one’s understanding on purposeful error is to be creative and to invent the 
world ‘as if’. (Bök 2002: 18). This necessitates utilising the information of the 
world in an obtuse manner and by taking the decision to willfully facilitate 
creation and invention over the status quo we free ourselves from the servitude of 
the good angel of certainty. “Pataphysics will examine the laws which govern 
exceptions, and will explain the universe supplementary to this one; or, less 
ambitiously, will describe a universe which can be – and perhaps should be – 
envisaged in the place of the traditional one” (Jarry [1911] 1965b: 145). This 
dark, alternate universe surely equates with Nishitani’s field of emptiness, and is a 
call to describe the remainder, as discussed in an earlier part of this Section. If 
`pataphysics evokes a supplementary universe to this one, then we have here 
another example of Barthes’ concept of the marked and the unmarked, “…the 
opposition of a mark and a zero degree.” (Barthes [1964] 1984e: 141). Therefore, 
the pataphysical universe of ‘as if’ as the unmarked term can be seen as a 
significant absence, indeed the absence of the signifier. `Pataphysics can therefore 
be seen as the zero degree of ‘reality’, and as Bök says, “[w]e see science itself 
vanish before the zero degree of its own antiscience.” (Bök 2002: 4). We can infer 
from this perhaps that the fictional has a direct relationship to reality in the way 
that Barthes’ mark can be seen as merely differentiating between two co-existent 
intensities of the same concept. Thereby, the real and the fictional (the actual and 
the virtual) can be brought into the same orbit merely by applying the concept of 
the zero degree. The inexpressible remainder where photography can describe its 
own event lies within the pataphysical universe of the ‘as if’, whereas as rational 
 288 
beings we reside in the world of ‘as is’ where photography describing its own 
event remains an unanswerable paradox.  
 
This returns us to the idea of exceptions and we are reminded by Jarry that 
`pataphysics is “…the science of imaginary solutions and arbitrary exceptions.” 
(Jarry [1911] 1965a: 192). In addition, considerate of the impossibility of 
‘defining’ `pataphysics, Andew Hugill in `Pataphysics: A Useless Guide asks, 
“[h]ow can a definition be exceptional, or contain its own contradiction?” (Hugill 
2012: 3). Accordingly, we should deem CPDIOE? then as a pataphysical 
question, in the way that its very formation expresses an enigmatic ambiguity that 
resists an undemanding explanation. We have been dealing with the matter of it 
containing its own contradiction throughout the thesis and in our ruminations on 
`pataphysics, it becomes clearer how it is possible for our question to fall into the 
category of exception. Just as CPDIOE? calls for multiple interpretations and can 
appear differently in different contextual arguments, “`[p]ataphysics passes easily 
from one state of apparent definition to another. Thus it can present itself under 
the aspects of a gas, a liquid or a solid.” (Patafluens 2001, Istituto Patafisico 
Vitellianense, Viadana 2002 in Brotchie et al. 2003: 12). 
 
 
Jarry implies that such a science can only be written 
with an invisible ink, ‘sulphate of quinine,’ whose 
words remain unseen until read in the dark under the 
‘infrared rays of a spectrum whose other colours 
[are] locked in an opaque box’ ([1911] 1965, 191-
92). Such a science cannot be seen except under a 
light that cannot be seen in a place that cannot be 
seen. Such a science exists paradoxically in an 
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eigenstate of indeterminate potentiality, not unlike 
the Scrödinger cat – both there and not there at the 
same time.  
(Bök 2002: 10) [emphasis in original] 
 
 
In the way that Barthes’ obtuse meaning has something to do with disguise, both 
appearing and disappearing simultaneously, we find that `pataphysics too shares 
the attributes of indeterminacy and quantum physics. At this stage then, our 
speculations on a zero[graphy] applicable to photography seen in the light of 
quantum physics and `pataphysics no longer belong to the world of the ‘major’ 
perspective, as we continue to make the invisible visible. `Pataphysics bears some 
relation to our recent foray into quantum theory in the way that quantum 
physicists’ approach experiments in their field of study. The relationship between 
a classical physicist and a quantum physicist is directly proportionate to the study 
of metaphysics and `pataphysics. The one being clear and lucid based on 
quantifiable fact and supposition, the other patently operating beyond that realm. 
Pataphysicists then, operate in a perpetual state of invention and indeed creation, 
attempting “…to imagine a multitude of divergent realities created simultaneously 
from the same text [or concept].” (Bök 2002: 78) [my emphasis]. This is precisely 
the task we have undertaken in the thesis as we tap into the multitude of 
potentialities that are deeply enveloped in our enigmatic central code, which on 
first glance are obfuscated by the obtuse cryptic construction of the question, 
CPDIOE?.  
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This apparent convergence of pataphysics with 
theoretical physics, however, should not lead to any 
confusion, since pataphysics views the theories of 
quantum mechanics in precisely the same way as it 
views every other theoretical, and indeed 
nontheoretical, understanding: as an imaginary 
solution. A universe comprised of exceptions 
implies an equivalence between imaginary solutions. 
This applies in physics, metaphysics and 
pataphysics. 
(Hugill 2012: 9) [emphasis in original] 
 
 
The idea of equivalence suggests a non-hierarchical series of imaginary solutions, 
none of necessity either right or wrong and therefore all standing at any one 
moment for the whole concept. In these terms, the concept/question CPDIOE? 
contains many solutions, all equivalent, and all perspectives capable of 
illuminating the many unseen potentialities of photography. The code CPDIOE? 
in its indeterminate nature merely forms an exception that can reveal these 
solutions and so situates our question in the `pataphyical territory of the clinamen. 
“The exception explicates the rule, testing its limits, defying its fields” (Bök 2002: 
71). As named by Lucretius (ca. 99 BC – ca. 55 BC), clinamen is the Latin term 
for the unpremeditated event of the swerve of the atoms that led to the creation of 
the world in Epicurian philosophy. Epicurius’ (341 – 270 BC) novel conception of 
the universe consisted of atoms that consistently rained from an absolute high to 
an absolute low, during this descent some of the atoms arbitrarily performed very 
slight swerves, deviations, (clinamen) causing them to collide with others. 
According to Epicurus this is how matter was created. From our perspective we 
might call these collisions events, each event having the capacity to change things, 
and therefore creating change and vitality in the universe. (In contemporary 
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particle physics, this process describes the opposite of what the ‘Large Hadron 
Collider’ near Geneva is attempting,19 both endeavours of an indeterminate nature 
it might be added.) In `pataphysics, the term is used as one of the three 
‘declensions of exception’, whereby exceptions can manifest themselves in 
different ways; variance (anomalos), alliance (syzygia) or deviance – the 
clinamen. The clinamen is the necessary swerve from the true that prevents 
systems from ossifying and engenders free will and creativity. 
 
 
They are the final acknowledgement the 
pataphysician makes that the universe is governed 
by chance, so the words we speak, the things we do, 
our exploits and opinions, are the products of an 
inexplicable swerve. The words we speak and the 
things we do merely serve to demonstrate the 
existence of the clinamen…  
(Hugill 2012: 16) [emphasis in original] 
 
 
The speculative claim that photography can describe its own event (CPDIOE?) 
can be demonstrated to act as the clinamen for the thesis in that it attempts to 
perform the task of producing “…the smallest possible aberration that can make 
the greatest possible difference.” (Bök 2002: 45). The aim is to deviate, disturb or 
interfere with classical thought in any manifestation and whilst within the remit of 
`pataphysics is often absurd, it is still an excellent tactic for producing the new 
and the innovative. Our obtuse code CPDIOE? operates as an interpretative 
swerve from the classical perspective of photography. This deviation from 
mainstream photographic theory is perhaps necessary for “…the movement of 
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invention among the play of constraints” (Tufail 1999: 130) for a ‘photography 
yet to come’. Hopefully our enigmatic code can be perceived as the swerve of an 
exception “…that gives extra emphasis and a twist in meaning.” (Hugill 2012: 
211). 
 
As important as the concept of the clinamen is we must now pay some attention to 
another pataphysical notion, that of the antimony, or the ‘plus-minus’, which 
consists of two opposing ideas that create a paradoxical result. We might 
speculate that (given the concerns of this Section) plus and minus numbers 
revolve around the fulcrum of the mathematical zero which can be seen to hold 
the paradox in balance. This was demonstrated in a stage instruction for Jarry’s 
imaginary 1895 Caesar-Antichrist, which detailed a revolving stick which turned 
across the stage describing at various times in its circular movement both the plus 
(+) and the minus (–) sign as it produced both a circle and a zero (0). This is also 
seen in the general pataphysical symbol of the gidouille, which inscribes a spiral. 
 
 
…the gidouille has become a general symbol of 
pataphysics, not least because drawing the spiral in 
fact creates two spirals: the one that is drawn and 
that one that is described by what is drawn. This 
echoes the plus-minus, or that which is and that 
which is not, in simultaneous coexistence. In 
pataphysics, mutually exclusive opposites can and 
do coexist.  
(Hugill 2012: 6) [emphasis in original] 
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The Nature of the Event at Zero Degree 
 
To move the argument on, Jarry was a great admirer of the French symbolist poet 
Stéphane Mallarmé (1842 –1898), whose major preoccupations we might say 
were simultaneous co-existence and the concept of indeterminacy. Also as 
Barthes states, he worked consistently toward “…the complete abandonment of 
communication” (Barthes [1953] 1984d: 63) and the destruction of language, 
(paradoxically to save it from an excess of literature) and was perhaps the first to 
search for a zero degree of language. As it is our task here to uncover a zero 
degree of expression in the concept of photography it is apt to consider how this 
has been achieved in other areas of cultural communication. As a great exponent 
of literary experimentation, Mallarmé invented a new word ‘ptyx’ in order to 
describe the workings of his Sonnet en ‘-yx’ (1887), a poem that was an allegory 
of itself and therefore an attempt to displace the meaning of its own meaning. 
(Perhaps we can also claim that our question CPDIOE? makes effort to perform 
such a displacement in its convoluted folds20 and deviations). “‘Ptyx,’ therefore, 
referred not to a thing or a place, but to something whose absence is its presence, 
as in the folds (pli) of a fan or a conch shell…” (Hugill 2012: 6)  [emphasis in 
original]. As the quotation above conveys, the pataphysical notion of the ‘plus-
minus’ is a subtle reference to Mallarmé’s ‘ptyx’ which comprises the 
concatenation of opposites, a perfect example being the pataphysical motto “I 
arise the same though changed” (Hugill 2012: 7). We might also make a subtle 
connection of our own at this point in relation to the ‘something whose absence is 
its presence’ of the ptyx. Let us recall Barthes’ definition of the zero degree or 
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sign and how we connected it to the third (obtuse) meaning –  “…a ‘zero sign’ is 
spoken of in cases where the absence of any explicit signifier functions by itself 
as a signifier” (Barthes ([1964] 1984e: 138-139) [emphasis in original]. Thus 
proving that Mallarmé’s poetry was operating in part at the zero degree in its 
endeavour to signify the inexpressible. Indeed Mallarmé’s words, as Barthes 
notes, are often typeset in empty space that perhaps symbolizes a surrounding 
field of silence or blankness. 
 
 
Mallarmé’s typographical agraphia seeks to create 
around rarified words an empty zone in which 
speech, liberated from its guilty social overtones, 
may, by some happy contrivance, no longer 
reverberate.  
(Barthes [1953] 1984d: 63) 
 
 
In the Introduction to Stéphane Mallarmé: Collected Poems and Other Verse 
(2006), Elizabeth McCombie states “…non-meaning is not an absence of meaning 
but a potentiality of meaning that no specific meaning can exhaust.” (McCombie 
2006: xii). To reiterate, zero degree substitutes an absence for a presence, whilst 
the obtuse meaning as the signifier of the inexpressible, utilises a presence to 
speak of an absence or a void. Here we can notice the double movement of the 
antinomy at play – held in oscillation and furthermore, in co-existence.  
 
Certainly, we should also broach the issue of translation once more on behalf of 
Mallarmé’s oeuvre in connection with the process of unraveling hidden meanings 
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through translation in Benjamin’s texts in Section II, especially as Mallarmé is 
considered one of the most difficult French poets to translate into English 
(Mallarmé, Blackmore and Blackmore (eds.) 2006: xxix).  Drawing on the 
inherent difficulty of the task of the translator, we can acknowledge once again 
those complexities that reverberate over multiple layers of meaning, which run the 
risk of being diluted (or even lost) by the migration from one language to another. 
Particularly for Mallarmé though, one particular layer, or intensity of ‘reading’ of 
his work takes place on a phonetic level, using sounds and words to conjure up 
points of reference. These words often hold the attributes of ‘plateaus’ as 
discussed in Section II. At the point of translation this creates a metamorphosis 
between the original French and the new language into which it is being 
translated, bringing forth its own phonetic and etymological associations. Whilst 
it is inevitable that some of the original intricacies fade back into the web of 
language and fall back into the obscure domain of ideas, translation offers a 
multitude of new interpretations and potentialities.  
 
This very issue of interpretation, of translation, reveals itself in the variety of 
differing phrasings of the title of Mallarmé’s Un Coup de Dés jamais n’abolira le 
Hasard (1897) – ‘A Throw of the Dice will Never Abolish Chance’ being the 
most widespread version. Others include a ‘roll’ of the dice, which is regarded as 
an Americanised rendering (Glazier 2015: u.p.) and in French, philosopher Alain 
Badiou’s (b. 1937) (translated) Being and Event ([1988] 2005) the poem is 
referred to as ‘A Cast of Dice…’. For continuity, we shall refer to the poem by its 
shortened French title - Un Coup de Dés, which we shall now concentrate on. 
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Badiou addresses the ‘Mallarméan enigma’ in its similarities to elements of a 
detective novel, noting “Mallarmé is a thinker of the event-drama, in the double 
sense of the staging of its appearance-disappearance…” (Badiou [1988] 2005: 
191). In Un Coup de Dés then, we become witness to a shipwreck that perhaps 
never happened – “[p]oetry is the stellar assumption of that pure undecidable, 
against a background of nothingness, that is an action which one can only know 
whether it has taken place inasmuch as one bets upon its truth.” (Badiou [1988] 
2005: 192) [emphasis in original]. Indeed, Mallarmé’s intentionally dense prose 
can elude understanding and in Unfolding Mallarmé: The Development of a 
Poetic Art (1996) Roger Pearson recognises; “[u]nfortunately the difficulty of his 
writing has meant that his readers have tended to experience the anguish of 
nightfall more acutely than the proffered splendours of stellar configuration…” 
(Pearson 1996: 295). He goes on:  
 
 
Unfolding Mallarmé has been an attempt to part 
some of the folds of darkness which this poet so 
knowingly applied, to explicate shapes–a 
constellation or a rainbow, a hyperbola, a cube, a 
scroll–and to trace the emergence of these 
configurations from the foam of linguistic 
contingency.  
(Pearson 1996: 295) [emphasis in original] 
 
 
What does become clear here is the test that Mallarmé exhorts on the limits and 
indeed the stability of language/knowledge as we try to uncover the enigma. His 
text provides us with an indeterminacy of objects in the field of vision, a 
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shipwreck appears and disappears, being both present or absent depending on our 
perspective. Perhaps we can contemplate Schrödinger’s Cat here in it being both 
alive and dead simultaneously, alongside observing an event and a non-event in 
Mallarmé (via Badiou).  
 
 
The paradox of an evental-site is that it can only be 
recognized on the basis of what it does not present in 
the situation in which it is presented. […] Mallarmé 
brilliantly presents this paradox by composing, on 
the basis of the site–the deserted Ocean–a phantom 
multiple, which metaphorizes the inexistence of 
which the site is the presentation. Within the scenic 
frame, you have nothing apart from the Abyss, the 
sea and sky being indistinguishable. Yet from the 
‘flat incline’ of the sky and the ‘yawning deep’ of 
the waves, the image of a ship is composed, sails 
and hull, annulled as soon as invoked, such that the 
desert of the site ‘quite inwardly sketches… a 
vessel’ which, itself, does not exist, being the 
figurative interiority of which the empty scene 
indicates, using its resources alone, the probable 
absence. 
(Badiou [1988] 2005: 192) [emphasis in 
original] 
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Figure 6: Hiroshi Sugimoto, 1990, ‘Seascape: Aegean Sea, Pillon’  
[Silver Gelatin photograph]. 
 
 
It is possible to see in Sugimoto’s time-exposed photographs of the sea and the 
sky such a phantom multiple, in what we could speculate to be the presentation of 
an evental-site, an abyss. Here the photographer presents a site of indeterminacy 
where things might happen, can happen, or don’t happen, at once an event and a 
non-event. Perhaps we can suggest here that the Abyss is commensurate with zero 
and that this field of zero degree can conjure up events, or at least their 
invocation. Following Nishitani, and as the above quotation suggests, just as the 
sea and sky are impossible to differentiate, we can speculate that the object or 
shipwreck exists in a boundless state and not the self-enclosed entity of an object. 
What is more, the shipwreck and its event oscillate between the virtual realm and 
forays into actuality. In Mallarmé’s own words, as quoted by Barthes in his essay 
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‘Introduction to the Structural Analysis of Narratives’ [1966] in Image Music Text 
([1977] 1984a) “[a] dramatic work displays the succession of exteriors of the act 
without any moment retaining reality and, in the end, anything happening.” 
(Mallarmé in Barthes [1977] 1984a: 124 n.1). In the poem Mallarmé gives clues 
through the distillation of words and figures to the parameters of an event. From 
these disparate, scattered intimations we are led to believe that we are witness to 
an event, but crucially, an event that only exists in the delineation of an ‘evental-
site’ circumscribed in language. Recalling perhaps the `pataphysical imaginary 
solution, “…which symbolically attributes the properties of objects, described by 
their virtuality, to their lineaments.” (Jarry [1911] 1996: 22). Situational 
fragments couched in language fragments mean it is both presented to appearance 
but oscillating in a state of non-appearance or indeed to use Badiou’s term, non-
being. It is “…the pure and cancelled occurrence of the gesture” (Badiou [1988] 
2005: 191). What is described as real is the notion of place, as in the poem it is 
from the massivity of the sea and the sky that the ship-event is rendered in its 
boundless form. Therefore (as previously cited) for both the poem and Badiou we 
have the manifestation of the “…pure undecidable, against a background of 
nothingness, that is an action of which one can only know whether it has taken 
place inasmuch as one bets upon its truth” (Badiou [1988] 2005: 192) [emphasis 
in original]. In Un Coup de Dés, the nature of the event hangs on a single gesture, 
that of the ship’s Master, whose arm is raised above the waves, his fist clutching a 
pair of dice, as if to cast them across the surface of the sea. The dice symbolise the 
connection of chance to the necessity of a result21, so we anticipate from the dice 
in the fist that there will be a throw. This shadows the condition of the event in so 
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much that what is at stake is the producing of an event out of the thought of an 
event. This is exactly the constituency of CPDIOE?, and so prompts the further 
question – can the thought of describing its own event bring such an event to 
actuality? The whole question, the enigma, resides within a Mallarméan ‘Abyss’ 
of dissolved meanings. 
 
 
…given that the essence of the event is to be 
undecidable with regard to its belonging to the 
situation, an event whose content is the eventness of 
the event (and this is clearly the cast of dice thrown 
‘in eternal circumstances’) cannot, in turn, have any 
other form than that of indecision.  
(Badiou [1988] 2005: 193) [emphasis in 
original] 
 
 
Badiou claims that there is always a hesitation at play, which continually 
precludes us from knowing the certainty of any event. In the poem the Master will 
never cast the dice and it is that hesitation that prevents us from ever really 
perceiving the actuality of the event. It is left to imagination. If he casts the dice 
the event is lost in our anticipation of it, and if he does not then, to reference the 
poem, “…nothing will have taken place but place…” (Mallarmé in Badiou [1988] 
2005: 193). By this logic then, the true answer to our own questionable ‘event’ 
has to be undecidable, it is lost between its belonging to the situation of 
photography, the visible, and the cancellation of the event by its total invisibility 
in the situation. 
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Figure 7: Pavel Büchler, 1987, detail from ‘Principles’  
[black and white photograph] Redesigned as book  
cover for Albert Camus The Fall ([1956] 1963). 
 
 
Above we have a Pavel Büchler (b. 1952) image that has been recontextualised 
into a book cover for Camus’ The Fall ([1956] 1963), an image, which in a way, 
is meant to signal the event of the book. The black markings in the bottom left-
hand corner in their indeterminacy can either be imagined as a black ink-spot or a 
man falling. It is the book as evental-site that in itself signals the possible event of 
the falling man. The book itself consisting of the drunken thoughts of a man 
regarding his own existence produce an uncertain testimony insofar as what is at 
stake is the producing of an event out of the thought of an event. Büchler himself 
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describes his own practice as ‘making nothing happen’, perfectly apt in this 
context.  
 
The six words of the question Can Photography Describe Its Own Event? stage 
their own undecidability; the anticipation of the situation of the event, named as 
the ‘place’ of photography, cancelled out by the inbuilt hesitancy of the question, 
which renders it suspended within its own irrationality. The result of such 
inevitable undecidability meaning that again ‘nothing will have taken place but 
place’ – nothing will have taken place but photography leaving us with “…the 
nothingness of the presentation in which the unpresentables of the site are 
dispersed.” (Badiou [1988] 2005: 194). Just as we have tried to prove so far, 
notably in Section II that with such a question composed of successive 
transformations, it is always enough that one supplementary image-interpretation 
is sufficient to disrupt the extensive whole. The wager of the cast of the dice is 
then “…the wager of being able to decide an absolute event” (Badiou [1988] 
2005: 195). The hesitancy of the clenched fist is that of deciding between a 
rational choice within the situation and the appeal to chance, and it is the 
indeterminacy of the gesture that allows for the annihilation of both positions 
(Schrödinger’s Cat once more), resulting in the neutral position of the zero degree 
of the event. If the dice were cast then the number would be known and the event 
would come to actuality and it would assume the form of an enclosed entity, or as 
Badiou states, “…having closed itself within its own appearance […] In short, the 
event would be within the situation, it would have been presented…” (Badiou 
[1988] 2005: 195). Badiou concludes that the poem is telling us that the true 
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nature of any event is that it is incalculable. It is not the ‘nothing’ or the absence 
of what happens, but how that absence comes to signify the event of language. All 
at the zero degree is inexpressible, or in Mallarmé’s words, “Every Thought Emits 
a Throw of Dice” (Mallarmé  in Meillassoux 2012: 273[XI]). Therefore if 
undecidability is a prerequisite of every thought/event we are left to bet on the 
existence of such an event, including of course the event of photography. For 
Badiou it seems that it is the concept of event that engenders the creation of new 
possibilities, new actualities of presentation. 
 
 
The fixity of the event as result […] is carefully 
detailed by Mallarmé: it would come to existence, 
[…] it would be enclosed within its limits, […] 
having emerged amidst its own disappearance, […] 
and having closed itself within its own appearance, 
[...] In short, the event would be within the situation, 
it would have been presented.  
(Badiou ([1988] 2005: 195) [emphasis in 
original] 
 
 
On this notion of the presentation of the event, Badiou’s former student Quentin 
Meillasoux (b. 1967) in The Number and the Siren: A Decipherment of 
Mallarmé’s ‘Coup de Dés’ (2012) proposes that the mode of presentation offered 
in Mallarmé’s poem owes more to the Eucharist of religion than to literary 
experimentation. The oscillation between the anticipation of the event and the 
hesitancy that denies its being is equivalent to the anticipated presence of the ‘Son 
of Man’ (Christ) in the Mass that Meillasoux identifies as “…a paradoxical mode 
of ‘presence in absence’” (Meillasoux 2012: 111) [emphasis in original]. A hoped 
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for event that in which as yet, ‘nothing will have taken place but place’. “It is a 
presence that is not in the present, but in the past and in the future.” (Meillasoux 
2012: 111-112).  
 
 
The ultimate singularity of Mallarmé’s poetics – the 
idea that oriented his last writings – thus consisted in 
the quest for a ‘diffusion of the absolute’ 
emancipated from representation (even if, evidently, 
the latter is not annulled in the labor of the work)… 
(Meillasoux 2012: 112) [emphasis in 
original] 
 
 
In Meillassoux’s argument then, the Eucharist is the ultimate model for the 
presentation and disappearance in oscillation of all events in Mallarmé. Yet this is 
only an aspect of Meillasoux’s book, as the central tenet is concerned with the 
‘decipherment’ of a secret code in Mallarmé’s classic poem. Meillassoux engages 
with the notion that Un Coup de Dés is encrypted and that through a process of 
deciphering, the unique number hidden within the lines of the poem will be 
revealed. Seeing as we have been deciphering the question of CPDIOE? 
throughout the thesis, let us look more closely into the term ‘decipherment’ that 
forms part of the subheading of the book. For this we must turn to the translator’s 
note, where Robin Mackay clarifies the play between the terms déchiffrement – 
deciphering and déchiffrage – which “…brings together a musical motif with that 
of coding and decoding” (Mackay 2012: 294) in that it specifically references a 
musician’s ‘deciphering’ of a written musical score. Moreover, although the 
French–English translation does convey the ‘etymological convergence’ between 
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“…that of musical keys and keys that unlock – there is no English equivalent for 
‘déchiffrage’, the equivalent term being ‘sight-reading’, which I have used once 
or twice to mark the double register.” (Mackay 2012: 294) [emphasis in original]. 
Certainly, we can appreciate this subtle difference in terms and recognise that the 
very layout of Mallarmé’s poem in some way resembles a musical score, as his 
prose dances disruptively across the page.  
 
 
Thus, the discovery of the code will not offer us a 
response that will unknot all the difficulties of the 
poem, but will instead present us with a new 
question: Why encrypt the Coup de Dés; or more 
exactly, why encrypt it in this way? The code will 
not give us the ultimate key to the poem, but rather 
the form of its unsuspected lock: not the revelation 
of its true meaning, but the making explicit of a 
heretofore invisible difficulty. The text will not be 
completely illuminated once its cipher is elucidated, 
but will obscure itself otherwise, cloaking itself in 
unsuspected shadows. The elucidation of the 
encryption, rather than being the end of the mystery, 
will be the unveiling of a new problem, which can 
be posed only by the reader aware of the encryption: 
How did a simple, elementary secret code acquire a 
fundamental poetical importance for Mallarmé? 
Only the resolution of this ‘enigma within the 
enigma’ will allow us to penetrate the meaning of 
this strange poem.  
(Meillasoux 2012: 112) [emphasis in 
original] 
 
 
Whilst this is not the place to elaborate in great detail, it seems pertinent to 
acknowledge this aspect of the speculative-realist philosophers’ book, given that 
we are carrying out an investigation of a similar nature concerning our enigmatic 
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code CPDIOE?. The quotation above perhaps comes the closest to our endeavour 
in the tone that it is written and accordingly we can draw parallels between our 
work and the sentiment of Meillasoux’s quest. If we now translate some of the 
above we can ask some speculative questions of the inquiry of Can Photography 
Describe Its Own Event?. As we have established at great length thus far, we must 
concur with the assertion that it will not be possible to reveal the ‘true meaning’ 
of CPDIOE?, yet, via the decryption of our code, we have taken away some of the 
shrouded ambiguity of the enigma. That is not to say though that this has been a 
fruitless undertaking, as we would be missing the point if we were to hope for a 
concrete resolution to emerge from something that resists definition, is fugitive, 
fleeting. Perhaps our ‘enigma within the enigma’ then could be the question: how 
does the code/question CPDIOE? acquire a fundamental importance for 
photography? Philippe Sollers in writing about Un Coup de Dés described the full 
sentence of Mallarmé’s title as being “[s]ubjected to an atomic disintegration and 
dissemination,” where what remains is “…no longer the transcription of a 
meaning, but the virtually spontaneous upheaval of the written surface.” (Sollers 
in Glazier 2015: u.p.). The very purpose of the thesis has been to achieve 
something similar in terms of photography with our own complex and encrypted 
question. Our central question Can Photography Describe Its Own Event? 
performs a call to contingency and arguably produces such an ‘atomic 
disintegration’, an infinitesimal dissolution of the classical perspective in the 
concept of photography, or indeed the ‘virtual spontaneous upheaval of the 
photographic surface’. 
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Nietzsche’s ‘Zerography’ 
 
Let us now dig a little deeper into the formulation of our concept of 
‘[zero]graphy’ by looking at the other very sparse uses of  the phrase 
‘zerography’, which can be found particularly within the field of Critical Literary 
Discourse. It is worth identifying here that we can uncover the term in two essays, 
the first being by Rudolf Kuenzli from 1981 titled ‘Nietzsche’s Zerography: Thus 
Spoke Zarathustra’, that formed part of a publication Boundary 2: Why Nietzsche 
Now? A Boundary 2 Symposium. The second usage, also in this field, appears in 
Garrett Stewart’s Reading Voices: Literature and the Phonotext (1990), where 
Stewart uses this term as a subheading (without elaboration) in an essay titled 
‘Catching the Drift: Woolf as Shakespeare’s Sister’. Kuenzli’s essay is primarily 
concerned with ‘reading’ Nietzsche, or more specifically, the problems in reading 
a philosopher who “…has cast the strongest doubt on language itself” (Kuenzli 
1981: 99). To try and understand Nietzsche’s multifarious writings and to 
establish a sense of continuity, to take his oeuvre from the realm of hazy 
ambiguity into that of transparent lucidity is certainly a problematic endeavour, 
yet a challenge that many philosophers are unable to resist. We can draw a 
parallel here with our work on Benjamin in Section II in that we uncovered 
inconsistencies over different times and in a variety of texts, which lends his work 
the appearance of a palimpsest, also a malleable entity that can be ‘read’ in many 
(different) ways. “More traditional philosophers may very well disagree with the 
misreading of Nietzsche as a zerographer. But they have to be aware of their own 
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methods and strategies by which they manufacture their Nietzsche.” (Kuenzli 
1981: 99). Kuenzli goes on to identify the variety of ways philosophers try to 
“…exercise their sense of charity, to save Nietzsche from himself, from his style 
[…] and to rewrite him in unambiguous statements that produce a philosophical 
system.” (Kuenzli 1981: 100), by way of focusing on specific texts, or finding 
stability in categorising his work into ‘phases’ and in consequence, eliminating 
problematic contradictions. On the other hand, as an alternate reading: 
 
 
Nietzsche’s deconstruction of his own text, his 
zerography, has become the model for critics who, 
having subdued their former rage for the organic 
whole, are now drawn to the holes, breaks, ruptures 
and discontinuities in the text. 
(Kuenzli 1981: 99) [my emphasis] 
 
 
Here we may draw an allusion to the task of this thesis in so much as it attempts 
to deconstruct photography as a form of communication, and by applying a close 
textual analysis as it were, we too are looking for discontinuities, breaks and 
ruptures from which to build new meanings. We can now begin to grapple with 
the use of the term zerography in the essay and see if it shares any consistencies 
with our ideas thus far. Once we have established the use of the phrase here, we 
shall read across, read though this to draw out aspects that might reverberate for 
our own concerns. In turn, it is hoped this will help to reinstate the term in a new 
context and the possibility that it can actually illuminate our aim for zero[graphy] 
to offer a new perspective for photography. Within the text, the formalised 
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method that we have briefly considered above is then set against an alternative 
way to ‘(mis)read’ Nietzsche – to instead take an approach that seeks to connect 
with the unstable and shifting meanings that exist at the heart of his writings. 
Referring to Blanchot’s distinction between Nietzsche’s variety of approaches, 
Kuenzli notes, “…the fragmentary, discontinuous nature of Nietzsche’s work, 
which does neither affirm nor deny, but which establishes a pluralism of meaning, 
a labyrinth.” (Kuenzli 1981: 102). Furthermore, Kuenzli points out the apparent 
importance we can place on Nietzsche in a philosopher such as Derrida’s writings, 
an influence the philosopher seems uncomfortable to disclose. 
 
 
He himself describes his zerography in the following 
way: “…a blaze of words: to consume the sign to 
ashes, but first and more violently dislocate the 
verbal unity, the integrity of the voice through the 
irritated verve, to wear down or frighten… the calm 
surface of ‘words’ by subjecting their body to a 
gymnastic ceremony.” 
(Derrida in Kuenzli 1981: 103) 
 
 
Indeed, we can see the similarity with Nietzsche’s concerns in Derrida’s writing 
in the quotation above, a preoccupation with pushing words to their limits, 
revelling in the joy of the displacement, disruption, destruction of language. The 
remaining fragments of language, of ideas, entice the reader into adopting the role 
of a detective, just as we saw in Mallarmé, as we seek to uncover the hidden 
depths of what is tantalisingly laid out for us. It is here that we arrive at the core 
of the essay, where we unearth the use of the term via Kuenzli’s examination of 
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Nietzsche’s zerography, that he succinctly defines as “…the textual machinery by 
which he is able to put everything he states into doubt.” (Kuenzli 1981:103-4). He 
goes on: 
 
 
‘Zerography’ seems to be at least in the English and 
French language a suitable term. The OED lists the 
Arabic word ‘çifr’ as the common root for ‘zero’ and 
‘cipher’. The relatedness and former 
interchangeability of ‘zero/cipher’ is given in the 
following quote from the OED: ‘They accounted 
their weeks by thirteen days, marking the days with 
a zero or a cipher.’ ‘Zero’ then is a ‘cipher’, a 
marking, a character. Zerography then is the turning 
of the wheel, the circle, the loosening of the fixed 
meaning, the production of the pluralistic text. 
  (Kuenzli 1981: 104) [emphasis in original] 
 
 
This explanation unquestionably falls into line with the ideas we have been 
addressing throughout the thesis, certainly with regards to the notion of codes and 
encryption – what Kuenzli describes as a literary apparatus or tactic of sorts. 
“Zerography then is the writing process, the strategy by which the whole is 
deconstructed and rendered as a cipher, the signifier is liberated from the ‘primary 
signified’.” (Kuenzli 1981: 104) [emphasis in original]. Here we can refer back to 
the very start of this Section and Barthes’ ‘third meaning’, where once again we 
find the signifier in an estranged relationship with the signified. Perhaps we can 
speculate here that although the term zerography as used by Kuenzli describes a 
very similar function in regard to language that Barthes’ concept of the zero 
degree does, he is trying to avoid confusing his ruminations on Nietzsche with the 
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contemporary writings of Barthes, hence the use of the term zerography. 
However, this Section aims to prove connections between various functions of the 
concept of zero and its associated terminology and we can see how Mallarmé’s 
experiments in writing degree zero (Barthes’ expression) and Kuenzli’s 
observations regarding Nietzsche’s philosophy describe the same functioning of 
language when subjected to the cipher of the obtuse. Both writers employ 
strategies and codes in order to bring the serious reader to thought and as we can 
see, Nietzsche, Mallarmé and later Benjamin were no strangers to utilising 
misdirection and promoting willful misunderstanding as literary devices. We 
might even say that they often encrypted their thought in a haze of ambiguity, as 
testament to their baroque sensibilities.  
 
Karl Jaspers in his seminal work Nietzsche: An Introduction to the Understanding 
of His Philosophical Activity ([1936] 1965) identifies the philosopher’s 
contradictions as one of the most important elements of his work; “[a]ll 
statements seem to be annulled by other statements. Self-contradiction is the 
fundamental ingredient of Nietzsche’s thought. For nearly every single one of 
Nietzsche’s judgments, one can also find an opposite.” (Jaspers [1936] 1965: 10) 
[emphasis in original]. In Kuenzli, the notion of self-contradiction must also be 
regarded as the key strategy of Nietzsche’s zerography (Kuenzli 1981: 104) and 
we can speculate that another reason he chose to use this term can be found here. 
The notion of one position annulling another to create a neutrality takes us back to 
the very start of this Section: Zero[graphy] where we considered the idea of the 
combination of the enlightened and the encrypted (Sections I and II) leading to a 
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third and neutralised state, zerography. Furthermore, we must also recall the 
contradiction and inconsistency of our enigmatic question at this point – can 
photography describe its own event? Here too, we see that Nietzsche’s self-
contradiction creates a similar situation in the tension between two opposing 
ideas, or antinomies, “[i]t is due to the presence of these two constantly recurring 
moments of creation and deconstruction, that diametrically opposed readings of 
Zarathustra are possible.” (Kuenzli 1981: 107). Perhaps it is here that we can see 
Nietzsche as a major influence on Nishitani in his play of self-contradiction, as 
Heisig notes – “[a]s a young man grappling with the problems of life and unsure 
where to turn […] he used to carry Thus Spoke Zarathustra around with him ‘like 
my bible.’” (Heisig 1990: 76) [emphasis in original]. 
 
 
This play of building and destroying, of asserting 
and doubting, of riding old myths and parodying 
them, of lyrical flights and self-parody seems to 
form Nietzsche’s zerography. This circular motion, 
which rhythmically passes through the moments of 
forgetting and remembering, puts everything into 
question […] 
  (Kuenzli 1981: 113) 
 
 
This image brings to mind the circular motion of Jarry’s revolving stick as 
discussed above in Caesar-Antichrist which turned across the stage, inscribing the 
figure of the circle, or zero, oscillating between the plus and the minus sign in the 
way perhaps Kuenzli speaks of the forgetting and the remembering. According to 
his theory of Nietzsche’s zerography “…the sequential rhythmical alternation 
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between segments of forgetting and remembering” (Kuenzli 1981: 113) is best 
summed up by the relationship of the troublesome fourth part of Thus Spoke 
Zarathustra to the preceding text. The comic tone of this final section works to 
undercut and nullify the seriousness of Zarathustra’s teachings in the book as a 
whole. It is worth noting that this ill-received section is titled ‘The Awakening’ 
and maybe this was Nietzsche’s very own way of rearranging the furniture of his 
thought. “Zarathustra’s repeated awareness of the necessary falsity of all signs 
leads him at times to claim that all his speeches are mere noise that hides his 
silence” (Kuenzli 1981: 112). Many critics have tried to dismiss this section as the 
beginnings of Nietzsche’s mental decay; Kuenzli disagrees and finds in it the vital 
clue to Nietzsche’s zerography, of the play of building and destroying that testify 
to his thought process. As Bök states insightfully: 
 
 
Jarry performs humorously on behalf of literature 
what Nietzsche performs seriously on behalf of 
philosophy. Both thinkers in effect dream up a ‘gay 
science,’ whose joie de vivre thrives wherever the 
tyranny of truth has increased our esteem for the lie 
and wherever the tyranny of reason has increased 
our esteem for the mad. 
(Bök 2002: 9) [emphasis in original] 
 
 
Nietzsche places all his writings ‘under erasure’ in the form of Gendankenstriche, 
which Kuenzli understands as a ‘crossing out of ideas, thoughts’ (Kuenzli 1981: 
117 n.47) and by the end of his essay he counsels us against even quoting from 
Nietzsche, as by doing so “…we ‘freeze’ the sense of passage, whose meaning is 
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undecidable, since it is a fluid state and caught within the movement of 
Nietzsche’s zerography.” (Kuenzli 1981: 113) [emphasis in original]. Arkady 
Plotnitsky has referred to something similar to Nietzsche’s zerography (as 
identified by Kuenzli as a purposeful nullification that signifies the inexpressible) 
as non-nonwriting in his essay ‘Un-Scriptible’ from the edited Writing the Image 
after Roland Barthes (1997). By this term he maintains that the double negative 
does not return us to the positive before the negative but “…moves toward a more 
radical difference from both the positive and the first negative.” (Plotnitsky 1997: 
254). This concept could provide a more accurate way of situating this present 
Section of the thesis in relation to the first two. That is to say that if Section I 
constitutes a writing of photography and the crypt of Section II a non-writing, 
then Section III suggests the potential for a paradigm shift in what we consider the 
very concept of photography to be. A non-nonwriting of photography that 
occupies a productive neutral space; a space in which photography may transform 
itself. 
 
The second instance of the use of the phrase ‘zerography’ is referenced as a 
subheading in a chapter in Stewart’s Reading Voices: Literature and the 
Phonotext (1990). Written nine years after Kuenzli’s essay was published and 
within the same field of study, we are left to assume a connection, as there is no 
citation to Kuenzli in Stewart’s use of this term. Aside from this, ‘zerography’ 
does not appear again but a brief discussion follows on aspects of zero, which we 
shall now summarise. Here Stewart’s thesis recalls for us Nishitani’s theory of 
self-identity via the number theory of Gottlob Frege (1848 – 1925) and the rupture 
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between one and zero. Frege names the number one as assigned to the concept of 
self-identity as “…logic demands that any object be identical to itself, each object 
is therefore identified singly by the number ‘one’, naming not wholeness but the 
concept of being one of itself, one with itself.” (Stewart 1990: 267-268). Frege 
then ponders which numerical concept would name an object that is not identical 
with itself. 
 
 
Since this concept is a logical contradiction, it 
subsumes among possible objects exactly ‘none’. 
Thus the zero is engendered. As the number that 
names the concept having no object, zero is 
paradoxically the first ‘one’ among the series of 
numbers but it is represented there not by the 
numerical ‘1’ but by the arithmetical ‘0’. 
(Stewart 1990: 268) [emphasis in original] 
 
 
A code or a cipher is appealed to here as  “[z]ero thus oscillates between an 
inauguration and a naught, a cipher in both senses, an integer and its own 
negation, logically engorged by the sequence it institutes.” (Stewart 1990: 268). 
Like the Derridian concept of writing under erasure (sous rature), (or as Kuenzli 
argues above, a crossing out of ideas) a designation under erasure leaves a trace, a 
remainder. It is this oscillation between an absence and a signifying presence that 
barely masks it that marks the self-identity of zero. Following Nishitani’s logic, 
just as with the self-identity of fire it cannot exist in its own self-enclosure and so 
zero (0) in order to exist as the selfness of zero for itself must extend beyond the 
enclosure of its own entity into the surrounding field. ‘Since this concept is a 
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logical contradiction’ (see quotation above) then just as fire must burn itself as 
well as the firewood to assume its true self identity, (and photography must 
describe its own event as well as external events in the world to assume its true 
self identity) then the true concept of zero must oscillate between an absence and 
a presence in order to be self identical as the one that displaces the zero. “Let us 
grant that zero marks the rupture…” (Stewart 1990: 268). The rupture then, in the 
question CPDIOE?, is marked by the shadow of zero and can be identified as the 
emergence of zero[graphy]. 
 
 
 
Becoming zero 
 
We are not in the world, we become with the world; 
we become by contemplating it. Everything is 
vision, becoming. We become universes. Becoming 
animal, plant, molecular, becoming zero.  
(Deleuze and Guattari [1991] 1994: 169) [my 
emphasis] 
 
 
And so what of a becoming photography? The very words with which we began 
this thesis. In order to map out22 the present task, we shall explore the topography 
of our current surroundings and negotiate the terrain of the grey, flat plane in 
which we metaphorically find ourselves situated, and that we might identify for 
our purpose now as a plane of immanence. Immanence can succinctly be defined 
as something that is inherent or innate in itself; remaining or existing within – and 
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as such, has no outside as a relation. There are no external forces working against 
a system of immanence as all change is emergent from within its own internal 
relations. We will first contextualise the Deleuzian plane of immanence (which is 
of primary importance to this Section) through the influences of Spinoza and 
Nietzsche and then address his concept of the virtual as adopted from Bergson. 
An appropriate starting point here is Baruch Spinoza’s (1632 – 1677) speculative 
and daring idea that God and nature amount to the same thing and are not in 
conflict with each other. In Spinoza, ‘Nature’ refers to the ‘Nature’ of everything; 
“Nature, in this sense, is the essence of the world, or that which makes the world 
what it is.”  (Stewart 2005: 158). It was Spinoza’s radical conviction that there 
was no mysterious force or essence external to the world; the world was 
ultimately knowable in itself. Even if there are things we may never know, 
potentially there is nothing that cannot be known. He makes the distinction 
between the immanent cause of things (God) and a transitive cause of things that 
lies outside its effect; the renowned example of a transitive cause being the 
watchmaker who is ultimately responsible for the existence of the watch. “An 
‘immanent’ cause is in some sense ‘inside’ or ‘together with’ that which it causes. 
The nature of a circle, for example, is the immanent cause of its roundness.” 
(Stewart 2005: 159) [emphasis in original]. In Spinoza’s philosophy, ‘God, or 
Nature’ is commensurate with his term ‘substance’ of which there is only one, and 
not many, and consists of infinite attributes (God once more). However it is 
important to note as Spinoza states in the Ethics ([1677] 1996) that “[t]hings could 
not have been produced by God in any manner or in any order different from that 
which in fact exists.” (Spinoza [1677] 1996: 22 – part 1, proposition 33). This 
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underlines the premise that there is no transcendent external will exercising choice 
or anything else, and that the ‘Nature’ of the world emerges or unfolds from its 
own constituent elements. We can see now that our question CPDIOE? is in fact a 
question of immanence, as in an immanent system there would be no event 
external to the event of photography. This is a radical shift in the classical 
perspective of photography, as the referent and its representation can no longer sit 
in transcendental relation to each other; estranged, but must be seen as immanent 
in process, emergent from within the internal conditions of the concept of 
photography. We will also speculate later whether a practice of zero[graphy] in 
relation to photography could also be considered an immanent practice. 
 
Deleuze aligns himself with philosophies of immanence over those of 
transcendence and for ease of explanation James Williams asks us to consider, 
“[a]re the privileged relations in a philosophy of the form of a relation ‘to’ 
something, or of a relation ‘in’ something? If it is ‘to’ then it is philosophy of 
transcendence. If it is ‘in’ then it is immanence.” (Williams in Parr 2010a: 128) 
[emphasis in original]. In his final essay ‘Immanence: A Life’ ([1995] 2001c), we 
can see how there is a consistency between Deleuze’s immanence and Spinoza’s 
ideas of a single substance, that is, that immanence is not immanent to substance, 
but instead, immanence is substance – namely, it is immanent to itself. As 
Deleuze notes, “…it is only when immanence is no longer immanence to anything 
other than itself that we can speak of a plane of immanence.” (Deleuze [1995] 
2001c: 27).    
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It is essential not to confuse the plane of immanence 
and the concepts that occupy it. Although the same 
elements may appear twice over, on the plane and in 
the concept, it will not be in the same guise, even 
when they are expressed in the same verb and 
words.  
(Deleuze and Guattari [1991] 1994: 39) 
 
 
Here we can recognise the Nietzschean influence on Deleuze and Guattari’s 
conception of immanence in the above quotation, as an evocation of his doctrine 
of eternal return – despite elements appearing the same at different instances, this 
semblance is illusory. Eternal return then, is an immanent process that reveals it is 
not the ‘same’ that is being returned, it is the transformative return of difference. 
Both immanence and difference as Deleuzian concepts, the latter of which we 
expounded in Sections I and II, can be seen to take inspiration from Nietzsche’s 
philosophy. It is principally from Nietzsche that a third related concept emerges 
for Deleuze, the univocal. This is where Deleuze deviates from the Platonic norm 
in philosophy, where for instance the referent in photography would hold 
precedence over the copy or representation in an equivocal system. With 
univocity, everything is ‘real’ to the same degree, there is no hierarchy between 
model and copy, the real or the potential. As in Spinoza there is only one 
substance and all difference comes from within. (We are reminded here of the 
pataphysical (non)system of equivalence where all concepts and objects have 
equality in the world.) The concept of univocity renders a conventional discussion 
of the marked and the unmarked term in linguistics null and void, save for Barthes 
intuition (as discussed above) that they are differentiated intensities of the same 
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concept. Within the univocal perspective no event or object is more real than any 
other which, we might speculate can lead to a certain indeterminacy between 
concepts and objects in the field of thought (as well as vision) – between fact and 
fiction for instance, which one could argue throws everything into Nishitani’s 
field of radical impermanence – śūnyatā. This describes a reality of continuous 
variation or process that distinguishes itself on a plane of immanence, rather than 
a more ‘bounded’ transcendent attitude. In Bergsonian terms, if we have a 
univocity, then difference can only exist as difference in kind, each 
difference/intensity as real as any other and therefore only differing from itself. It 
is from Spinoza’s univocity that Deleuze can form his own conception of 
immanence, that is, if there is only one substance this denies any perspective 
external to that substance and so everything that is possesses full and equal reality 
from within the plane of the substance. Therefore the Platonic/Cartesian division 
between mind and matter makes no sense when considered as distinct substances 
and so logically neither can be reliant or derived from one another, and in 
Spinoza’s terms, are merely attributes of a single substance. Nietzsche’s concept 
of the eternal return concurs with this singular sense of being but introduces the 
concept of becoming as that which ushers in the new and engenders the notion of 
radically different futures. Eternal return repeats and affirms what has gone before 
whilst slowly factoring out any negative attributes, and it is important to see this 
as an organic process constituting the passage between two boundless states, an 
increase or decrease in power and/or speed. This process affirms difference and 
negates identity as Deleuze insists it is only difference that returns and not the 
same. “Eternal return is an immanent process that brings differenciating and 
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identifying processes together. In eternal return, difference returns to transform 
identities (the same).” (Williams in Parr 2010a: 129). This throws some light on 
the differentiating properties of our question CPDIOE? as it negates the identity 
of photography, whilst affirming the self-identity of photography (see Nishitani 
above), as it further promotes the difference in kind in the concept of 
photography.  
 
Let us now turn to the concept of the virtual, a field of difference and creation that 
perhaps holds one of the keys to this Section insomuch as in order to dissolve the 
classical perspective in the concept of photography, we must differ in concept 
from the ‘real and the possible’ to the ‘virtual and the actual’. We shall take a 
moment to focus on some terms that pertain to the virtual, in order to aid our 
understanding of the concept and its relation to other ideas discussed in this 
section. When we consider similar terms that could arguably lead to some 
confusion, we must recognise that the ontological coupling of the ‘actual and the 
virtual’ are opposed to the ‘real and the possible’.  
 
 
The virtual then names a real place but one which 
has yet to be actualised. Whereas the real and the 
possible instigate a philosophy of transcendence, the 
virtual and the actual affirm immanence. We might 
rephrase this and say that whereas the possible 
names the logic of Being (ontology of stasis), the 
virtual affirms a logic of becoming (ontology of 
process). Indeed, it is only with, and within, the 
virtual that we have pure difference in and of itself 
[…] The virtual, or rather the actualisation of the 
virtual is then the creative act – precisely the 
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production, or actualisation, of difference and thus 
diversity from a pre-existing field of potentialities.  
(O’Sullivan 2006: 103) 
 
 
To return to the beginning of the thesis, and more specifically the opening pages 
of Section I, we established an attitude in approaching our question in that we 
would follow the model of the Bergsonian question. A question that is eloquently 
stated by Alliez in that “…to pose the problem is instead to invent and not only 
dis-cover; it is to create, in the same movement, both the problem and its 
solution.” (Alliez 2004: 113) [emphasis in original]. This takes us to the very 
heart of actualisation. In Difference and Repetition, Deleuze remarks that “[t]he 
virtual possesses the reality of a task to be performed or a problem to be 
solved…” (Deleuze [1968] 2004a: 264). In the context of the virtual/actual 
paradigm, one must note that the conditions of what might be termed ‘the 
problem’ do not resemble or represent its solution. “Most important for Deleuze is 
that the virtual is not to be understood as duplicating or resembling the actual, nor 
should it be taken to mean transcendence.” (Boundas in Parr 2010a: 302). 
Therefore without resembling that actual, the virtual is fundamental in bringing an 
object or thought to actualisation. The virtual, unlike the possible, is not opposed 
to the real, and in possessing a reality by itself it does not need realising, and so 
the process it participates in is that of actualisation. However, if the possible has 
to be realised, and the virtual partakes in actualisation, a crucial difference is that 
the processes are governed by different rules – in Deleuze’s own words:  
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…the process of realization is subject to two 
essential rules, one of resemblance and one of 
limitation. For the real is supposed to be in the 
image of the possible that it realizes. […] and the 
rules of actualization are not those of resemblance 
and limitation, but those of difference or divergence 
and creation.  
(Deleuze [1966] 1988a: 97) 
 
 
What this means is that where actualisation through difference always brings 
about the ‘new’ then the realisation of the possible merely offers more of the 
same. Here once again we are made aware of the different paradigms of difference 
and representation, indeed at this stage we can say immanence and transcendence. 
For Deleuze the plane of immanence is commensurate with the play of the virtual 
and as an empirical thinker the ultimate example is perhaps that of the ‘Idea’, 
which has as its essence the ability to actualise itself. Again we can claim this as 
the primary method of the thesis in the Bergsonian sense, that our enigmatic 
question and our workings upon it throughout the Sections are played out as if on 
a plane of immanence/consistency23 where we can map the movements of the 
virtual into actualisation – can photography describe its own event?. In each case, 
to appreciate the multiple actualisations of the question, we must be able to intuit 
their virtual conditions.  
 
 
Concepts are like multiple waves, rising and falling, 
but the plane of immanence is the single wave that 
rolls them up and unrolls them. The plane envelops 
infinite movements that pass back and forth through 
it, but concepts are the infinite speeds of finite 
movements that, in each case, pass only through 
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their own components. […] this speed requires a 
milieu that moves infinitely in itself – the plane, the 
void, the horizon. 
(Deleuze and Guattari [1991] 1994: 35-36) 
 
 
As the evocative quotation above puts forward, we should perceive the plane of 
immanence like a wave, and perhaps we might speculate that this is also akin to 
the waves of Mallarmé’s poem whereby they create the virtual event of the 
shipwreck from the immanent plane of the ocean, which may or may not have 
come to actualisation. The indeterminacy of such an event however has no 
perceivable impact on its status within the real, for Mallarmé situates the 
shipwreck-event on the cusp of the waves that delineate it and perhaps in the 
process of actualisation. The evental-site being “…the deserted Ocean–a phantom 
multiple, which metaphorizes the inexistence of which the site is the 
presentation.” (Badiou [1988] 2005: 192) [emphasis in original]. This imagined 
scene where the shipwreck-event emerges from the foaming waves of an 
indistinguishable sea and sky may enable us to comprehend as an image the 
relationship of event to plane of immanence. The shipwreck then is not an act that 
we are contemplating as past but as a becoming on the degree zero of the 
immanent space of sea and sky. The indeterminate event of the ship being 
subsumed by the waves: 
 
 
…is no longer an object as such, or not only an 
object, but also a space or a zone from which 
creativity emerges. An ‘event site’ as Alain Badiou 
might call it; ‘a point of exile where it is possible 
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that something, finally, might happen’ (Badiou 
1999, 84.5). 
(O’Sullivan 2006: 45) [emphasis in original] 
 
 
Perhaps this is our dream for a becoming-photography that under the supplement 
of difference and through the optic of a zerography, a new creativity might 
emerge. The shipwreck of Mallarmé’s poem situated in the plane of the 
indistinguishable sea and sky is no more than a becoming-shipwreck event, a 
boundless object in the ‘total field of the universal remainder’ and reminds us of 
Deleuze and Guattari’s interest in Herman Melville’s (1819 – 1891) seafaring 
novel Moby-Dick (1851). “Absolute immanence is in itself: it is not in something, 
to something; it does not depend on an object or belong to a subject.” (Deleuze 
[1995] 2001c: 26) [emphasis in original]. Captain Ahab’s obsession with the 
whale Moby-Dick is about a transversal becoming between Ahab and the whale in 
much the same way as the de-/re-territorialisation of the wasp and the orchid as 
discussed earlier in the thesis; “Captain Ahab is engaged in an irresistible 
becoming-whale with Moby Dick…” (Deleuze and Guattari [1987] 2004a: 335). 
What matters in this case is the dissolving borders between the entities, as in our 
discussion of awakenings earlier in this Section and Nishitani’s transparent or 
permeable borders between objects in the concept of radical impermanence.  
 
 
…I have no personal history with Moby-Dick, no 
revenge to take, anymore than I have a myth to play 
out; but I do have a becoming! Moby-Dick is neither 
an individual nor a genus; he is the borderline, and I 
have to strike him to get at the pack as a whole […] 
 326 
the characteristics of the pack are only symbolic 
entities; all that counts is the borderline–the 
anomalous. 
(Deleuze and Guattari [1987] 2004a: 270) 
 
 
Here we can see that the relationship between Ahab and the whale does not reside 
within the paradigm of the subject-object duality. Moby-Dick here is not an entity 
as such or part of an individuated species but both man and whale are caught up in 
a multiplicity of experiences that has absorbed them in virtuality and rolls them 
back out as event. “The principle of immanence demands that we do not see 
experience as the experience of some being or some ultimate subject. Rather, there 
is a flow or multiplicity of experiences from which any being or idea is effected.” 
(Colebrook 2002: 87) [emphasis in original]. 
 
 
Taking his lead from Frederich Nietzsche’s early 
notes, Deleuze uses the term ‘becoming’ (devenir) to 
describe the continual production (or ‘return’) of 
difference immanent within the constitution of 
events, whether physical or otherwise. Becoming is 
the pure movement evident in changes between 
particular events.  
(Stagoll in Parr 2010a: 26) [emphasis in 
original] 
 
 
As we already know from our work thus far, alongside difference, becoming is 
one of the central tenets of Deleuze’s philosophical project. It should also be 
reiterated that as a connecting mechanism, becoming does not seek out an end-
point or a conclusion, nor does it simply denote a phase between two points. 
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Instead, we must consider becoming as a dynamic process of change and 
transformation that produces the productive return of difference. Furthermore, 
becoming has no founding origin and in the ‘Translator’s Notes’ to Negotiations, 
Martin Joughin recognises that “[b]ecoming has ‘itself’ no fixed identity or being, 
is always becoming-other, alteration rather than alternation, pure difference rather 
than repetition, multiple becomings rather than unitary becoming.” (Joughin in 
Deleuze 1995: 186 n.8). Considering the difference between ‘alteration’ and 
‘alternation’ then, this reveals a subtle yet significant point in Deleuze’s ontology 
of becoming. It is true that alternation speaks of a process of change, yet this 
change is determined by a consecutive and regular repeated pattern. However, 
alteration can markedly be aligned with change via difference and process, a 
variation that has no predetermined ‘outline’ but instead manifests itself as an 
undefined boundless entity. Here we can refer back to Nietzsche’s eternal return 
as a productive cyclical arrangement that constitutes a process of becoming: 
“…becoming ‘moves through’ every event, such that each is simultaneously start-
point, end-point and mid-point of an ongoing cycle of production.” (Stagoll in 
Parr 2010a: 26) [emphasis in original].  
 
It is at this point in our perambulations through disparate yet related concepts 
relating to our formulation of zero[graphy] that we must return to our map to 
make those connections. In this sub-section becoming zero, we have turned our 
attention to Deleuze’s plane of immanence, the inter-related ideas of eternal 
return, the codependent terms of the virtual and actual in the process of 
actualisation and the foundational ideas that perhaps connect them all, that of 
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difference and becoming. Now we must turn our attention back to the concept of 
zero and how events emerge from a zero degree plane, the zero degree of 
language, of representation, of difference. “To make a clean slate of it, to start 
over and over again at zero, to look for a beginning or a foundation – all imply a 
false conception of voyage and movement […]” (Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 58) 
[my emphasis] but we must find “…another way to travel, as if moving or setting 
off in the middle, through the middle, entering and leaving, not beginning or 
ending.” (Deleuze and Guattari 1983: 58). To begin again in the middle, and 
acknowledge our founding question can photography describe its own event?, we 
must look to the immanent emergence of the event in what we might speculate to 
be a zero[graphy]. Thus far, we have considered a degree zero of form in terms of 
language via Barthes, Mallarmé and Nietzsche in their attempts at attaining a 
neutrality of form, a ‘colourless writing’ as Barthes calls it. Perhaps we can 
contemplate this zero degree of writing as an immanent practice of writing, and 
from this position it shall be useful to ascertain what relevance Deleuze’s plane of 
immanence (or consistency) has for us in our formulation of the concept of 
zero[graphy]. Is it possible for the photographic to emerge from a set of 
circumstances, as an unfolding event without beginning or end in a rhizomatic 
relation to its remainder? “As Deleuze will say, we always start from the middle 
of things; thought has no beginning, just an outside to which it is connected.” 
(Hurley in Deleuze [1970] 1988c: i). For as O’Sullivan notes when viewing 
Robert Smithson’s large earthwork the Spiral Jetty (1970) from a helicopter, there 
is an index where the natural and the artificial become to be seen as co-existent, 
where form and formlessness synthesise into a ‘degree 0’ that can only be intuited 
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and experienced from within an affective register. “Smithson is not nihilistic, he 
does not plunge into the abyss, but like Deleuze he favours that art which has 
something of the abyss, of chaos, about it.” (O’Sullivan 2006: 117). 
 
 
 
What constitutes an Event? 
 
To set photography in motion by describing it as a becoming-photography, is to 
produce it as an event in itself. Let us now address the concept of becoming in its 
relation to Deleuze’s event, which occurs across a number of texts, though most 
notably in The Logic of Sense ([1990] 2004c), The Fold: Leibniz and The Baroque 
([1993] 2003) and with Guattari in What is Philosophy? ([1991] 1994). At this 
stage, it is worth noting that the concept of  ‘event’ is one that permeates the 
thought of a number of scholars in a variety of philosophical contexts that extend 
far beyond the scope of the thesis. So in order to deftly negotiate this complicated 
area, we shall focus on interpretations that pertain to our investigation thus far, 
and to our enigmatic question; can photography describe its own event? This shall 
entail a consideration of Deleuze’s rendition followed by a brief reflection on the 
irksome philosophical relationship between Deleuze and Badiou. In The Logic of 
Sense, Deleuze introduces the notion of the ‘event’ as something that manifests 
itself out of the changes immanent to the convergence and interaction of forces. A 
useful explanation here is the changing colour of the tree in the spring. For 
Deleuze, the event must not be thought of as ‘the tree becomes green’ because this 
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is a passing “…surface effect or expression of an events actualisation…” (Stagoll 
in Parr 2010: 90). It also reveals the confluence of other events on the tree such as 
weather patterns, pigmentation effects, soil conditions and so on. “Therefore we 
ought not to say ‘the tree became green’ or ‘the tree is now green’ (both of which 
imply a change in the tree’s essence), but rather ‘the tree greens’.” (Stagoll in Parr 
2010: 90) [emphasis in original]. The becoming-green of the tree does not disrupt 
some continuous state in the tree, but rather, when actualised, marks the tree in a 
state of transformation. The ‘tree greens’ is a dynamic event that speaks of 
process and continuous variation, as well as becoming and as such, there is no 
end-point that marks the ‘ideal’ state of the tree. We might recall in Section II the 
notion of a red apple and Kant’s synthesis of intuition and understanding, 
whereby the representations of ‘apple’ and ‘redness’ are synthesised in a single 
act of knowledge. We may now understand this in Deleuzian terms as an event 
with no beginning, middle or end but instead a becoming-red of the apple as an 
instance of difference in itself, or more properly in Deleuze’s event theory, as an 
intrinsic property of an extensive series. The redness of the apple is now seen in 
terms of an intensity or gradation. “It is something rather than nothing, but also 
this rather than that: no longer the indefinite article, but the demonstrative 
pronoun.” (Deleuze [1993] 2003: 77). It is now a red apple, demonstratively ripe, 
rather than just an apple, thereby determining change or inherent difference.  
 
Before we move on, it is important to remind ourselves that over different 
timeframes and in different texts Deleuze uses particular words and phrases in 
diverse yet specific ways, so any conflicting terms or ideas must be read as the 
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current expression of Deleuze’s thought in the work being referred to at the time. 
We can read these as intensities of the same concept in Deleuze’s mind as they 
develop and change. As a philosopher that was interested in the folding, unfolding 
and refolding of ideas, it is not surprising that this process can present supposed 
‘inconsistencies’ over his body of work as a whole. As we know, Deleuze enjoyed 
the process of engaging in close studies of particular philosophers or aspects of 
their work he found provocative. In this case of The Fold then, he writes ‘What Is 
An Event?’ a short section heavily influenced by Whitehead in a book about 
Leibniz. Indeed, this is the very nature of constructing an argument, drawing 
together ideas from a number of inspirations, yet we must recognise that such an 
intellectual miscellany can result in a problematic use of terminology on some 
occasions. Our task here is to sustain an unprejudiced way of reading Deleuze that 
opens up the philosophers thought rather than getting caught up in assumed 
dichotomies. 
 
We shall begin by noticing a number of characteristics in the Deleuzian event that 
can offer an entry point onto quite a difficult aspect of the philosopher’s thought, 
in part due to his intentional folding of meanings and sense throughout his work. 
First of all, there is no predetermined path that paves the way for the happening of 
an event; instead, an event occurs primitively, that is, it arises from the forces of 
its production at the very moment of their interaction. The event is not external to 
this process but an inherent characteristic of it, intrinsically connected to it, 
immanent. Secondly, events are not based on representative models or copies via 
an overarching reality but are born out of immanence and creativity and always 
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produce what is new. Lastly, an event is not concerned with finding an end-point; 
its function is purely an instigator of change. To sum up, “[A]n event is unrelated 
to any material content, being without fixed structure, position, temporality or 
property, and without beginning or end.” (Stagoll in Parr 2010a: 90). Stagoll goes 
on: 
 
 
An event is neither a beginning nor an end point, but 
rather always ‘in the middle’. Events themselves 
have no beginning- or end-point, and their 
relationship with Deleuze’s notion of dynamic 
change – ‘becoming’ – is neither one of ‘joining 
moments together’ nor one in which an event is the 
‘end’ of one productive process, to be supplanted or 
supplemented by the next. Rather, becoming ‘moves 
through’ an event, with the event representing just a 
momentary productive intensity. 
(Stagoll in Parr 2010a: 91) [emphasis in 
original] 
 
 
So we understand from the characteristics of an event and through the quotation 
above that becoming does not operate as an intermediary, a liaison between 
events, but is actually a distinguishing feature of them. Moreover, becoming 
expresses the continuous immanent production of difference inside the creation of 
events.  
 
 
In Deleuze’s account of series and events, life is 
only constituted by series and events, that is by 
wave-like alterations running through series of 
relations. To occur at all any event highlights some 
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changing relations and makes others dimmer. This 
stress on distinctness and obscurity, against the 
Cartesian clarity and distinctness, is a recurrent 
theme in Deleuze’s work […] The inseparability of 
distinctness and obscurity in series leads to a focus 
on connections and shifts in emphasis, rather than to 
clear analytical distinctions. Selections and events 
are not cuts and abstraction. Instead, they must be 
cuts, connections, shadings and highlights, where 
none of these terms is separable from the others. 
(Williams 2008: 7-8) [emphasis in original] 
 
 
As we can see from the illuminating explanation above, perhaps the fundamental 
aspect of Deleuze’s conception of event is its interconnectedness and 
indistinguishable relationship with its surroundings and even when focusing on 
one event, it is imperative that we maintain an awareness of relations that have 
been ‘made dimmer’. This was precisely the pursuit of Section II: Crypto[graphy], 
where much of the undertaking concerned itself with the oscillations, vacillations 
and reverberations between distinctness and obscurity that dealt with the shifts in 
emphasis and points of connection within the crypt of our code CPDIOE?.  
 
In Chapter Six of The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque, ‘What Is an Event?’ 
Deleuze addresses this question via Whitehead’s Process-Relational Philosophy, 
which appeared in Section I of the thesis. Deleuze asks us in this Chapter to 
reconsider what we might comprehend as an event, and puts forward The Great 
Pyramid as an example of this: “[t]he Great Pyramid is an event, and its duration 
for a period of one hour, thirty minutes, five minutes . . . , a passage of Nature,” 
(Deleuze [1993] 2003: 76) [emphasis in original]. In the ‘Translator’s Foreword’ 
to The Fold, Tom Conley explains: 
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In the vision of Alfred North Whitehead, a 
philosopher inspired by Leibniz, an event can be 
seen in the duration that produces the site of a 
pyramid, an avalanche of snow, or the jagged edge 
of rifts in a block of ice, For Deleuze, an event 
unfolds from the union of our perception and the 
duration of a fan – of the kind Mallarmé describes in 
his occasional verse – that unites and disperses a 
word (an event) and an object (an éventail) when it 
swirls in the atmosphere. 
  (Conley [1993] 2003: xii) [emphasis in  
  original] 
 
 
It is our contention here that photography too is such an event. If we delve into the 
obtuse writings that constitute Deleuze’s book on The Fold, then we can see that 
he situates the concept of the event first and foremost in a field of chaos; “…when 
an event occurs it must do so in relation to something incalculable, a chaos that 
alters the effect.” (Williams 2008: 6). This chaos is an abstraction in that it is 
inseparable from what Deleuze terms a ‘screen’ that allows something to emerge 
from it. Here we can speculate that by the term ‘screen’, Deleuze is referring to 
the concept that elsewhere he calls the plane of immanence. The ‘something’ that 
emerges he distinguishes from the concept of chaos by formulating a Leibnizian 
relationship between the Many (chaos) and the One (something); “A great screen 
has to be placed between them. Like a formless elastic membrane, an 
electromagnetic field, […] the screen makes something issue from chaos, and, 
even if this something differs only slightly.” (Deleuze [1993] 2003: 76) [emphasis 
in original]. When Leibniz insists that the world is the ‘best of all possible 
worlds’, he means that those properties that emerge into the actual world are 
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merely those that can be extracted from the chaos and exist in actuality as 
compossibles – only those things that can exist together and only the best 
combination of compossibles. In Deleuze’s conception then, events emerge from 
the ‘screen’ or plane of immanence in a manner that means they can co-exist to 
form series. “The event is a vibration with an infinity of harmonics or 
submultiples.” (Deleuze [1993] 2003: 77). The plane of immanence extracts 
‘differentials’ that are possible to be integrated into ordered perceptions. As 
Deleuze suggests, chaos is an abstraction of the underside of the ‘great screen’ or 
plane.  
 
Developing his formation of event based on Whitehead and Leibniz’s thought, 
Deleuze specifies four conditions or components of the definition of an event: 
extension, intensities, the individual (and ‘prehensions’) and eternal objects (or 
‘ingressions’). We shall now briefly summarise these four conditions in order to 
better understand Deleuze’s conception of event (and despite the obtuse level of 
theory at play, it is hoped that some light might be shed on our notion of a 
photography of immanence that could be perceived of as event in itself). 
Extension concerns the transitive inter-relation between events and the variety of 
ways this plays out – from the extent that events can be completely included in 
other events, they can be entirely separate from one another, or they can overlap 
without complete inclusion.  
 
 
Extension exists when one element is stretched over 
the following ones, such that it is a whole and the 
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following elements are its parts. Such a connection 
of whole-parts forms an infinite series that contains 
neither a final term or limit (the limits of our senses 
being excepted).  
(Deleuze [1993] 2003: 77) [emphasis in 
original] 
 
 
Perhaps we can grasp this more clearly if we think of Benjamin’s mosaic analogy 
– the tesserae being analogous to Deleuze’s notion of intensities within an 
extensive whole, and this leads us onto Deleuze’s second condition; intensity. The 
intrinsic properties of extensive series enter into new multiple series, but this time 
convergent series working towards limits as the properties we may consider could 
include “…height, intensity, timbre of a sound, a tint, a value, a saturation of 
colour…” (Deleuze [1993] 2003: 77). The redness of the apple or the greenness of 
the tree for instance. These properties are no longer extensions but intentions, 
intensities or degrees. These intensive properties however, hold some material 
value and are intensities between, which have a relation to “…a function of 
different materials that are part of it.” (Deleuze [1993] 2003: 77). The third 
component is that of the individual, which is equivalent to creativity and the new 
and introduces Whitehead’s notion of ‘prehension’, which is a relationship 
between entities that encompasses both experience, and affect and that are 
embodied in individual unity. “Everything prehends its antecedents and its 
concomitants and, by degrees, prehends a world.” (Deleuze [1993] 2003: 78). 
Here we may look to Whitehead for a precursor to these ideas and for him, the 
smallest of all events “…are momentary drops of experience or feeling. These are 
the building blocks of reality. Your mind, your flow of awareness, for example, is 
 337 
a series of such events.” (Mesle 2008: 95) [emphasis in original]. For Whitehead, 
your mind is constituted from a series of what he termed actual entities 
(occasions), which comprise an event of space-time, or a drop of feeling. “That 
the actual world is a process, and that the process is the becoming of actual 
entities.” (Whitehead [1929] 1978: 22). Whitehead states that these actual entities 
or occasions are “…the final real things of which the world is made up. […] They 
differ among themselves …”(Whitehead [1929] 1978: 18). Here Deleuze in The 
Fold makes the leap to another precursor in that he links these ‘final real things’ 
in the world to Leibniz’s system of monads, thereby updating Leibniz’s ingenious 
notion of substances to the process reality of Whitehead. The latter believing that 
becoming is merely a series of events and that there is nothing between these 
events but difference that we may call change. “[h]ow an actual entity becomes 
constitutes what that actual entity is […] Its ‘being’ is constituted by its 
‘becoming’. This is the ‘principle of process.’” (Whitehead [1929] 1978: 23) 
[emphasis in original]. Here we have an emphasis central to this mode of thought 
in that being is always comprised of its becomings, thereby promoting the notion 
of seriality over that of essence, process over object. So for Whitehead, an actual 
entity (or occasion) has to create itself out of past actual entities, appropriating the 
term ‘apprehend’, Whitehead states that an actual entity prehends or detains 
previous actual entities in order to create itself in the now. “The individual 
emerges as a becoming, a prehension that relates past and present, subject and 
object, potentiality and reality. The prehension of the event renders the event as an 
event to another event.” (Crockett 2013: 90). It is here that difference emerges for 
Deleuze as the primary concept in event theory and as Clayton Crockett notes in 
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Deleuze Beyond Badiou: Ontology, Multiplicity and Event (2013), “[t]he 
individual prehension occurs in the contrast between extension and intensity, and 
the difference between them.” (Crockett 2013: 90). Thus we are dealing in 
Deleuzian terms with pure difference, the difference between the extensive and 
the intensive, between representation and difference. The forth condition of an 
event is concerned with eternal objects or ‘ingressions’, which is a term 
Whitehead uses in The Concept of Nature ([1920] 2004)24 to speak of the 
relationship of objects as part of events. This concerns how an object gains access 
to an event and vice versa in order to make events of the world and in the world. 
 
 
Eternal objects produce ingression in the event. 
Sometimes these can be Qualities, such as a color or 
a sound that qualifies a combination of prehensions; 
sometimes Figures, like the pyramid, that determine 
an extension; sometimes they are Things, like gold 
or marble, that cut through a matter. […] An eternal 
object can thus cease becoming incarnate, just as 
new things – a new shade of color, or a new figure – 
can finally find their conditions. 
(Deleuze [1993] 2003: 79-80) 
 
 
Is it too much to speculate here that the ‘object’ of photography even can have 
finally found its condition? In more literal terms can the camera as an object 
become to be seen as gaining access or ingress into the concept of event, and 
furthermore be perceived as part of the relations of the matrix of entities that make 
up events in all their virtuality? Referring to Whitehead’s use of the term 
ingression to denote a general relation of objects to events, “[t]he ingression of an 
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object into an event is the way the character of the event shapes itself in virtue of 
the being of the object.” (Whitehead [1920] 2004: 144). If we see the concept of 
photography as a mode of perception then we recognise that the event is defined 
by the object and even modified by the object, indeed “[i]t is equally true to say 
that objects are what they are because events are what they are.” (Whitehead 
[1920] 2004: 144). In terms of photography, we can perhaps speak of a form of 
observer interaction as in quantum physics maybe, where events are determined to 
a small degree by the process of observing and measuring. This speculation is of 
no real consequence in our argument, but might be an interesting perspective 
when designing event based photographic works.  
 
At this point perhaps we should address the reader who intrinsically links the 
notion of event with Alain Badiou in order to demonstrate the differences and 
tensions between Deleuze’s event and that of Badiou’s. In this process, it is 
possible that our own use of the term event (CPDIOE?) can be illuminated from 
more than one direction. As we learned above, whilst Deleuze’s event delves into 
the subatomic structure of processes that overlap and coexist, Badiou’s event is 
more constructed and rarefied, to the point that it can be considered elite. Rather 
than emerging from chaos through a screen or plane of immanence in a play of the 
virtual and actual, Badiou’s event is resolutely human in scale and is imagined (as 
its status is always to the fore), as we saw from his treatment of Mallarmé’s poem 
above. “An event is what will come to be. An event is a be-coming. The only 
temporality therefore is future anterior – purely formal and non-durational.” 
(Mullarkey 2006: 101) [emphasis in original]. Furthermore, Badiou’s privileged 
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events are restricted to the conventional grand narratives of science, art, love and 
politics, these being the foremost endeavors of humanity, and as such, the 
subjective and the event are intrinsically linked. An event in this context is based 
within the parameters of ‘universal truth’, a position antithetical to most post-
structuralist thought, including Deleuze. For Badiou, his commitment to universal 
truth is supported by his dependence on mathematics and set theory, which 
provide him with constants in the development of his philosophy. Truth here is 
placed in a reciprocal arrangement with the concepts of subject and event, an 
arrangement that is never less than innovative or revolutionary in its relation to 
the status quo of established knowledge. Here Badiou’s notion of event manifests 
its central radical aspect. Real truths or events always disrupt and renew hitherto 
accepted truths.  
 
 
A truth is always the product of an event, which is 
something that is necessarily unpredictable and 
inexplicable from the perspective of existing 
knowledge: ‘A truth is solely constituted by 
rupturing with the order that supports it, never as an 
effect of that order. I have named this type of rupture 
which opens up truths “the event”.’  
(West 2010: 260) 
 
 
Events emerge in Badiou, just as in Deleuze, although in the former it is more 
akin to an irruption or a rupture in an already existing situation, rather than an 
impersonal process. Both are connected integrally to the production of the new – 
one as a process, the other as ‘what will come to be’. “The event belongs to the 
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situation but also supplements it by transforming it. It is both in it and of it – and 
this duplicity is its power of transformation…” (Mullarkey 2006: 101) [emphasis 
in original]. 
 
 
Change arises from an anomalous position within 
any situation, what is called an ‘evental-site’. 
Evental-sites are always local, in situ, at ‘site-
points’. The existence of an eventual-site does not 
guarantee a change in the situation, however: it 
merely outlines the event to come.  
(Mullarkey 2006: 101) [emphasis in 
original] 
 
 
We have already seen this in Badiou’s explication of Mallarmé’s shipwreck-event 
in the poem Un Coup de Dés earlier in this Section insofar as the event was 
ultimately indiscernible. An event’s true function is to transform a situation in a 
way that cannot be foreseen. In terms of the intrinsic link between a subject and 
an event, “[t]ruths are made rather than discovered by subjects. What is more, 
both truths and events are subjective in the additional sense that they serve to 
constitute genuine subjects in the first place.”  (West 2010: 261) [emphasis in 
original]. The event being unpredictable and formulated through a rupture in the 
status quo (situation), is tied to a subject who recognises the event as new and 
names it. Therefore the subject of any event only comes into existence with the 
nomination of such an event. As all truths (synonymous here with events) come 
into being through a radical break from the existing state of affairs Badiou insists 
that ‘real’ subjects too can only be synonymous with ‘militants of truth’ (West 
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2010: 261). Here we see the centrality of the political in Badiou’s conception of 
the event; an event is always political for him as we can see by many of his 
examples, which often constitute revolutionary political moments such as the 
French revolution. Events always work toward the good of a situation, “[t]hey 
concern emancipation, and as such, equality.” (Mullarkey 2006: 104). In 
conclusion Badiou does not recognise Deleuze’s processural folding of the past 
into the future but conceptualises a rupture, an interruption, in situational time 
from where new beginnings emerge as if from nothing, from a void. If we 
consider again Mallarmé’s poem, then we can see how the shipwreck appears and 
disappears in the rupture of the evental-site or place (the indiscernible sea and 
sky) and produces a paradox from which the event is born. This paradox is 
however a productive paradox in that it produces the event. Or if alternately no 
event, then “…nothing will have taken place but the place…” (Mallarmé [1898] 
2015: 20-21).  
 
Between Deleuze and Badiou then, we have two perspectives on the zero degree 
of the event. One emerging from chaos, through a screen onto a plane of 
immanence as compossibles that are capable of existing together in the actual. 
The other ‘coming to be’ through a rupture in a situation, which can be seen as a 
paradoxical interruption in the status quo. Both of which though, crucially give 
birth to the new, creating something out of seemingly nothing, one from a co-
dependent realm of the virtual, the other literally from the void. Two aspects 
perhaps of what we might term a zero degree that at this point, we might 
speculatively posit as a zerography.  
 343 
 
Let us now take a moment to interpret these two formations of event through our 
enigmatic question CPDIOE?. First, we shall consider the perspective that a 
Deleuzian concept of event offers for CPDIOE?, which highlights its inherence to 
an immanent process of change and the creative production of the new. As a 
philosopher of becoming, of dynamic process and difference, Deleuze’s event is 
most certainly folded into these overarching ideas and presents a novel 
interpretation on such concepts. We can notice at this stage how the concept of 
event here corresponds to the Deleuzian perspective we have expounded thus far 
in the thesis, and in addition, how it reverberates for this Section as a whole. For 
our question then, can photography describe its own event?, Deleuze’s 
perspective allows us to contemplate a new interpretation of photography, a 
photography that differs in itself by invoking movement from within the concept. 
It allows us to creatively question how we can instigate change via the production 
of new elucidations of the concept of photography, the event of photography 
itself. Here we are more concerned with the concept of photography as a mode of 
perception and a perspective in itself for interpreting the world and its becomings. 
There may well be ways that this perspective can be applied to the practical notion 
of photography but that is not our first concern here.  
 
Furthermore, an event signifies a “…momentary productive intensity” (Stagoll in 
Parr 2010a: 91) of the process of becoming, and just as this fleeting expression 
manifests itself, it is connected inseparably to its surrounding field and as a result, 
becomes indistinct through a shift in emphasis, in focus. Here we must think 
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about the question can photography describe its own event?, and how each 
iteration incites transformation and difference in the production of new intensities 
of the crypt/question. We are brought back to Whitehead’s assertion in the 
Introduction of the thesis of the re-definition of words and phrases, which must be 
“ …stretched towards a generality foreign to their ordinary usage” (Whitehead 
[1929] 1978: 4). That is to say, how the word or phrase or concept of 
‘photography’ is “…mutely appealing for an imaginative leap” (Whitehead [1929] 
1978: 4). This imaginative leap then, calls forth a creative rendering, in order to 
attend to a more imaginative interpretation of the medium that perhaps lies 
outside a photography that is based on the model of representation. The instability 
of meaning that is reiterated throughout the thesis in differing manifestations 
provokes us to deliberate how we could utilise such an idea by applying it to our 
enigmatic question. As we have witnessed, many of the philosophers we have 
encountered through this process shared an interest in pushing or more fittingly, 
stretching, words, phrases and even ideas out of more established positions or 
modes and into new areas. This encounter with new modalities of thought has 
perhaps been our task; to stretch the concept of photography ‘towards a generality 
foreign to its ordinary usage’. Maybe the remit of the thesis is not in the end that 
of performed photography for instance, in that it is looking for new modes of 
practice, but rather, the imperative is to instigate a break in the concept of 
photography whereby photography becomes a way of thinking about the world. 
An eddy in the stream of becoming, a mode of thought, as well as a practice. 
There are precedents to this in the thought of figures discussed in the thesis, 
Benjamin, Barthes and Bergson, “…from the very moment that there is thought, 
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there is photography, even if it is a photography before photography as we know 
it…” (Cadava 1997: 90). As we learned in Section I, Deleuze has a far more 
indirect relationship with these ideas, but nevertheless, even though Deleuze 
rarely mentions the medium and even then, often as a negative, he says enough as 
to offer a challenge toward a more creative future for the medium: 
 
 
Photography is a kind of ‘molding’: the mould 
organizes the internal forces of the thing in such a 
way that they reach a state of equilibrium at a certain 
instant (immobile section). However, modulation 
does not stop when equilibrium is reached, and 
constantly modifies the mould, constitutes a 
variable, continuous, temporal mould. 
(Deleuze [1983] 1986: 24) [emphasis in 
original] 
 
 
One could read this in the context of Auslander (as discussed in Section I) that the 
photograph continues to perform meaning over time and through context, and so 
is not necessarily as enclosed as we might believe. It was pure creativity as 
potential that drew Deleuze to art in its generative capacity and for this reason, his 
interest was taken up with genres such as painting, music, cinema and literature, 
but not photography due to its supposed enclosure and its setting of a limit on the 
dynamism of life. This is why the thesis and our ‘case study’ in Section I on 
Performed Photography place an emphasis on event and not picture or 
representation, which reflect mainstream practices. It is the position of the thesis 
that only an event-based practice can provide a paradigm shift in photography that 
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moves the medium toward a vitalist position that Deleuze would have 
appreciated.  
 
To return to the concept of event as argued above, it is a question of scale, 
Deleuze’s infinitesimal process in coexistence with Badiou’s majestic creation 
that offers us two useful interpretations of event (however it is acknowledged that 
there are many theories of event in existence). In this way, we can regard these 
two theories as antinomies of the concept of event in that both are reasonable yet 
discordant expressions of the idea. Contradiction and incoherence present 
themselves to us as a productive paradox, in which we can acknowledge a 
generative function where new understandings and interpretations emerge. 
Throughout the thesis, it has been our intention to elucidate such a process, in 
order to better state our enigmatic question – can photography describe its own 
event?. A code/question that is intentionally obtuse in its construction in order to 
force the reader to thought, to produce an encounter, as Deleuze would say.25 
Perhaps we might suggest that Badiou was advocating his own encounter with 
Deleuze (and his audience) by ostensibly setting out his daring ideas against the 
philosopher in such a palpable way. Deleuze and Badiou both appeal for a return 
to a philosophy of immanence, and perhaps their approaches to the notion of event 
can be broadly read as differing dimensions, as intensities of the same concept. 
Also, as process philosophers (albeit in different ways), Deleuze’s view is 
concerned with a ‘process-vitalism’ and Badiou’s preoccupation lies with a 
‘process-truth’. As Mullarkey notes; “[i]n each case there is a focus on how 
immanence relates to change – the immanent change of truth procedures for 
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Badiou, in material flows on the plane of immanence for Deleuze…” (Mullarkey 
2006: 8).  
 
 
Deleuze’s philosophy was always already 
ontological, and it was not shaped by the linguistic 
turn. Badiou follows Deleuze in evading the 
consequences of the linguistic turn, although Badiou 
is more invested in formalizing this ontology in 
mathematical terms, whereas Deleuze is more 
interested in problematizing philosophy, that is, 
seeing how philosophy asks questions and poses 
problems. Badiou’s philosophy and his mathematics 
are axiomatic, whereas Deleuze’s philosophy is 
more unsettled, and in a continual state of becoming. 
(Crockett 2013: 4) 
 
 
The principal disparity and source of contention between these two thinkers is 
caught up in Badiou’s position as an Actualist and as such, he is resolutely 
opposed to Deleuze’s concept of the virtual, believing it to be a transcendent 
realm. However, Williams makes a valid point: “[b]ut this is to miss the necessary 
inter-relation of virtual and actual through a reciprocal determination. Neither is 
independent of the other and cannot therefore be said to enter into a relation of 
transcendence.” (Williams in Parr 2010a: 129-30). Acknowledging that the 
perspective of the thesis is largely Deleuzian it is interesting to consider Badiou’s 
work here as a foil and fuel for speculation. For instance Badiou’s notion of 
paradox as central to the productive force of an event can be used if we put 
Deleuze against Badiou here. The paradox between them producing a new event, 
a rupture, in political or human dimension that could produce a paradigm shift and 
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hence put the concept to work for the ends of the thesis in that a new line of 
thought (flight?) is produced. In this sense we can speculate on producing a 
Badiouian event from the paradox of the two thinkers conceptions of event. In 
fact the thesis could be perceived as an evental-site in the Badiouian sense in that 
it represents “…some unpredictable change within a situation that, with further 
investigation, may eventually come to be an event.” (Mullarkey 2006: 114). This 
is not too outlandish considering how Badiou purposely misreads Deleuze in 
order to promote his own philosophical endeavour. As stated earlier in this 
Section in our ruminations on Nietzsche’s zerography, it is not uncommon for 
thinkers to read (misread) the work of others in a way that conforms to their own 
concerns. It is my opinion here that Deleuze is often more generous with the work 
of others and not so led by his own ego.  
 
 
...in many ways Deleuze worked out his philosophy 
by means of a profound engagement with other 
thinkers as well as artists, but the danger of reading 
Deleuze on another figure is that the result is a 
composite. Nietzsche and Philosophy, for example, 
is the expression of a kind of Deleuze-Nietzsche. In 
this book, Deleuze helped create the so-called 
French Nietszche who became so prominent and 
influential in the 1960s and 1970s. 
(Crockett 2013: 9) [emphasis in original] 
 
 
Within Mullarkey’s critique of Badiou’s notion of event he makes an important 
distinction for our project here, in his invocation of Bergson’s notion of 
‘fabulation’, that is how we construct an event from more primary and multiple 
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processes – how we utilise fiction in making events real for ourselves. (On a basic 
level this explains how we purposely ignore the fictional status of a film for 
instance, and allow ourselves to suspend disbelief in entering into another reality 
(Mullarkey 2007)). As we have seen from Badiou’s treatment of Mallarmé’s 
poem, where there is a tension between the fiction and reality of the shipwreck-
event, we recognise that it is the description of the event that produces such 
indeterminacy. Here we have another resonance for our question can photography 
describe its own event? (CPDIOE?) in that the indeterminacy that marks the 
question can be said to reverberate between the event of photography and the very 
notion of its description. “The description of an event is another event, or rather, it 
is part of the event it describes, it fabulates it.” (Mullarkey 2006: 117). 
 
 
How can a philosophy of immanence critique its 
outside? Must it only describe everything it sees, or 
can it not also prescribe what is exemplary for it? If 
it is to be critical rather than just descriptive, then on 
what new set of values will its ‘judgments’ be based 
and how will these values be established?  
(Mullarkey 2010: 9) [emphasis in original] 
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Endnotes to Section III: Zero[graphy] 
 
 
1 The zone system was an analogue method for calibrating negative exposures, 
printing techniques and cameras. The system was scaled between zero and ten, 
zero being black. Zone five was commonly known as eighteen percent grey, or 
mid-tone. 
 
2 “The now of recognizability is the moment of awakening.” (Benjamin 1999a: 
486). 
 
3 This refers to the third opening quotation of this Section. 
 
4 See ‘The Third Meaning’ (Barthes [1977] 1984a: 61). 
 
5 ‘Writing Degree Zero’ was published alongside another famous text  ‘Elements 
of Semiology’ (1964) in Writing Degree Zero & Elements of Semiology (1984). 
 
6 As David Sterritt notes, Godard; 
…strips away superficially enticing moments in hopes of finding a ‘zero-degree’ 
of cinematic language – an objective dating back (with different sets of 
inflections) to the Dziga-Vertov Group films and even to The Little Soldier and 
portions of Breathless. The goal of this effort is made clear by an exchange I cited 
in the introduction to this book, between Émile Rousseau and Patricia Lumumba, 
the punningly named protagonists of Le Gai Savoir, near the beginning of that 
movie. ‘I want to learn,’ says Patricia, ‘to teach… that we must turn against our 
enemy the weapon with which he fundamentally attacks us: language.’ Émile 
agrees, adding, ‘Let’s start from zero.’ Patricia then refines their task by asserting 
that ‘first we have to go back there, return to zero,’ a process that will mean 
dissolving ‘images and sounds’ in order to grasp how these are constituted and 
capitalized on in the modern world. 
(Sterritt 1999: 260) [emphasis in original] 
 
7 Another element not to be overlooked is the considerable machinations that the 
Japanese had to go though to translate philosophical works into their own 
language. In absorbing new ideas, they often preferred not to draw on terms from 
their own intellectual history and thus force assimilation, but to learn a foreign 
vocabulary and let it seep into the culture naturally. As ponderous and unattractive 
as this new vocabulary was, the etymological transparency lent to it by the 
Chinese characters made it more immediately suggestive than the Greek and Latin 
terms which philosophy has tended to adopt for its technical terminology have 
been to the West. 
(Heisig 1990: 56) 
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8 This is a reference to the title of James Elkins’s book The Object Stares Back: 
On the Nature of Seeing (1997). 
 
9 This Section shows the etymology of zero moving from the Indian Sanskrit 
śūnya to the Arabic çifr which evolved into cipher. As John D. Barrow explains in 
The Book of Nothing: Vacuums, Voids, and the Latest Ideas about the Origins of 
the Universe (2002), the concept of śūnya was multifaceted, much more than 
merely a digit:  
Whereas the Babylonian tradition had a one-dimensional approach to the zero 
symbol, seeing it as simply as a sign for a vacant slot in an accountant’s register, 
the Indian mind saw it as part of a wider philosophical spectrum of meanings for 
nothingness and the void. 
(Barrow 2002: 36) 
 
10 The term ‘classical’, which holds a commonly held definition, can also be used 
within the thesis as analogous between classical physics and the revolution to 
come of quantum physics.  
 
11 Photography and perception are analogous to one another in Bersgon not so 
much because perception works like a camera to seize reality but rather because, 
working like a camera, it fails to seize reality. What photography and perception 
do not perceive they do not perceive for reasons of principle. That is, it is because 
they are photography and perception that they do not perceive. 
(Cadava 1997: 92-3)  
 
12 Here I would draw the readers attention in Section I regarding Nietzsche’s 
concept of the Appolonian and the Dionysian which coexist within the same 
concept.  
 
13 This essay is about the later period of Nishitani’s life, and is not specifically 
about śūnyatā but it evidently bears some relation.  
 
14 Observables come in pairs that epistemologically exclude each other. An 
everyday example of this behaviour can be given in musical terms. It is not 
possible to both assign a precise instant to when a note was sounded and to know 
precisely what its pitch was. This is because determining the pitch of a note 
requires analysing the frequency of the sound and this requires listening to a note 
for a period lasting several oscillations before an accurate estimate can be made. It 
is the wave nature of sound that imposes this restriction, and if the measurement 
questions of quantum theory are discussed from the point of view of wave 
mechanics, exactly similar considerations lead back to the uncertainty principle. 
(Polkinhorne 2002: 33) 
 
15 See Deleuze and Guattari What is Philosophy? ([1991] 1994): 
“The creation of concepts in itself calls for a future form, for a new earth and 
people that do not yet exist.” (Deleuze and Guattari [1991] 1994: 108). 
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Albert Einstein (1879 – 1955) was a staunch opponent and refused to accept it –
“The idea was anathema to Einstein, among others. ‘God does not play dice,’ he 
said referring to the theory that the world is governed by the accumulation of 
outcomes of essentially random ‘choices’ of possibilities at the quantum level.”  
(Gribbin 1991: 3) 
 
17 Concerning the use of the apostrophe: 
“[T]his book will follow the Collège conventions that `pataphysics given with the 
apostrophe is conscious or, better expressed, voluntary (and refers to Jarry’s 
science and the activities of the Collège), whereas pataphysics sans apostrophe is 
involuntary. The words pataphysician and pataphysical will always be given 
without the apostrophe.”  
(Hugill 2012: 8) [emphasis in original] 
 
18 `Pataphysics is part of the twentieth century avant-garde and related to 
movements such as dada, surrealism and the situationists, however it is a much 
more fluid ephemeral undercurrent than a movement.   
 
19 See between Section III and the Conclusion in ‘Photographic Experiments 
carried out as IPCRES’ for project, the ‘IPCRES Reading Ensemble’. 
 
20 In the ‘Translator’s Notes’ to Negotiations, Martin Joughin notes a composition 
by French classical composer Pierre Boulez (b. 1925) ‘Fold by Fold’, “Pli selon 
pli (1957–62) is the title of Boulez’s ‘musical portrait’ of Mallarmé (one of the 
composer’s chief inspirations).” (Joughin in Deleuze 1995: 202, n.7). 
 
21 See Deleuze, Difference and Repetition ([1968] 2004a) conclusion, pages 353-
355 on the divine game “…that which Mallarmé evokes with such religious fear 
and repentance…” (Deleuze [1968] 2004a: 353) 
 
…For us it is the most difficult game to understand, impossible to deal with in the 
world of representation. First there is no pre-existent rule, since the game includes 
its own rules. As a result, every time, the whole of chance is affirmed in the 
necessarily winning throw. Nothing is exempt from the game: consequences are 
not subtracted from chance by connecting them with a hypothetical necessity 
which would tie them to a determinate fragment; on the contrary, they are 
adequate to the whole of chance, which retains and sub-divides all possible 
consequences. 
(Deleuze [1968] 2004a: 353-354) 
 
22 See note 8 of Section II: Crypto[graphy]. O’Sullivan further elucidates: 
A rhizome, as a map is to do with experimentation. It does not trace something 
that came before (again no representation) rather it actively creates the terrain it 
maps – setting out the coordination points for the worlds-in-progress, for 
subjectivities-to-come. 
(O’Sullivan 2006: 35) [emphasis in original] 
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23 These terms are interchangeable in Deleuze’s writings. 
 
24 You may have noticed that I am using the term ‘ingression’ to denote the 
general relation of objects to events. The ingression of an object into an event is 
the way the character of the event shapes itself in virtue of the being of the object. 
Namely, the event is what it is, because the object is what it is; and when I am 
thinking of this modification of the event by the object, I call the relation between 
the two ‘the ingression of the object into the event.’ It is equally true to say that 
objects are what they are because events are what they are.  
(Whitehead [1920] 2004: 144) [emphasis in original] 
 
25 “Something in the world forces us to think. This something is an object not of 
recognition but of a fundamental encounter.” (Deleuze [1968] 1994: 139) 
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Photographic experiments carried out as: 
 
The International Project Centre for  
Research into Events and Situations 
(IPCRES) 
 
Before the Conclusion it will be useful to introduce some visual material that 
might illuminate some of the conceptual arguments put forward by the thesis. The 
work that appears over the following pages consists of photographic experiments 
that have been devised parallel to my research. They flow from the parameters 
laid down by ‘performed photography’ in so far as they formulate an event-based 
practice, but differ through the application of a differential seriality amidst a zero 
degree of communication. The general argument of the thesis is for a practice of 
co-existence between the representational paradigm and the paradigm of 
difference based largely on the work of Bergson and Deleuze. More than this, the 
thesis offers a theory of zerography (that emerges metaphorically from a synthesis 
of the two paradigms) as it might pertain to photographic practice and it is hoped 
that the nuances introduced through an interrogation of the three perspectives; 
photo[graphy], crypto[graphy] and zero[graphy] can be recognised in the 
following experiments. In terms of photography, the practice has the transparency 
of the representational mode, although it has been rendered serial. Images are still 
predicated on vision and optical perspective although they do not necessarily 
conform fully to pictorial conventions. The images are non-decisional in 
character, that is, they are un-composed, taken as part of a process and therefore 
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to some extent correspond to François Laruelle’s concept of non-photography, 
which is discussed further in the Conclusion of the thesis. Regarding 
cryptography, the serial nature of the photographs demonstrates the major themes 
of Section II concerning the discussions on the intensive and the extensive, the 
relation of the one to the multiple and difference and repetition. Here one can also 
perceive the dissolving of the concept of identity (as well as the classical 
perspective) that is reinforced by the creative stammering of seriality in relation to 
event, the and…and…and of the space between. The founding event that envelops 
the act of photography in these works is rendered as process through serialisation 
in order to align the photographic method with notions of temporality as espoused 
by featured philosophers Deleuze and Bergson. The concept of the instant is 
replaced by the instance of duration. Concerning the novel concept of zerography 
as proposed by the thesis there are several pertinent issues that the experimental 
works address. Firstly, the act of photography emerging as it does from within the 
event cannot therefore objectify the event as external to itself in the conventional 
representational manner. This renders the event enigmatic, placing it in a blind 
spot whilst the camera surveys the ‘remainder’ as in our discussion of Nishitani in 
Section III. What constitutes an event in western representation is thrown into 
uncertainty and photography at such a zero-degree no longer describes the world 
from the perspective of the subject-object axis. The zero-degree of representation 
is indeed a strange space as it describes significant absence rather than presence. 
As we look for meaning in these works we must rely on context, as a zerography 
can only present a neutrality of communication, and ultimately in Mallarmé’s 
words, nothing will have taken place but the place (Mallarmé in Badiou [1988] 
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2005: 191). In the final analysis perhaps the application of difference to the 
representational mode forming a co-existent state as a new way to describe the 
world is reminiscent of Proust’s notion of a new awakening, a paradigm shift. 
Insomuch as for a moment, we struggle to locate our position as all the furniture is 
shifting around us. It is for the reader to speculate on the evidence provided by the 
thesis to decide whether photography is in the end enhanced by looking at the 
world as if instead of as is. Further analysis and contextualisation of these visual 
experiments can be found in the Conclusion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8: (overleaf) (PORTFOLIO: 2 PROJECTS) 
Photographic experiments carried out as the International Project Centre for 
Research into Events and Situations (IPCRES) 2011/2012.  
[serial event based photography] 
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IPCRES 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CREATION 
CRISIS 
CRITIQUE 
? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                        AVOID CATASTROPHE 
  MARCH BACKWARDS 
 
    4th International Deleuze Studies Conference 
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IPCRES 
MIS  ION  BRIEFING 
       S 
 
# 0996. Protest Against Progres . 
                                                           s 
                  Qualitative Easing. 
 
This mission is concerned with an organised protest against the concept 
of progress. To be carried out at the 4th International Deleuze Studies 
Conference in Copenhagen, June 2011. An assembled group will 
convene at an agreed time and place in the city of Copenhagen. The 
assemblage will be holding  IPCRES placards sporting the words ‘Protest 
Against Progress’ and ‘Avoid Catastrophe March Backwards’. The 
concept of the march is to take one step forward and two steps back, 
done rhythmically, so that we progress slowly backwards through the 
urban space until we arrive at a predetermined destination. To 
document the event an IPCRES Officer will be at the 'head' of the march 
with a camera around her neck, pressing the shutter every third step 
thereby documenting a slowly receding city view, a la Vito Acconci. 
  
Both Leibniz and Nietzsche sensed and feared an over-rationalization of our 
daily experience. Benjamin spoke of the ‘decline of photography’ after the 
1850s in direct contrast to the rapid technological improvements that occurred 
(although by progress we don’t mean technology). Bergson asked us to think in 
terms of time rather than space, and valued a non-measurable duration 
(duree) over a spatialised and measured time. All of these in reaction to what 
‘opinion’ called progress. These intuitions are part of Deleuze’s inheritance. 
Our protest invokes Benjamin’s ‘Angel of History’ metaphor where the angel is 
being blown backwards into the future, whilst a storm, which blows in from 
paradise, piles up catastrophe at the angel’s feet. The storm is called progress. 
Like the angel we must distance ourselves from the thing that we are staring 
at. The catastrophe at out feet is rationalization. 
 
This project is part of IPCRES's programme of qualitative easing. In an increasingly 
information obsessed, homogenous and quantifiable society, where everything is 
described and measured and little experienced anymore beyond the audit, it is 
deemed desirable to inject enigmatic qualitative lived 'moments' into the urban 
space. This is an incursion into everyday life and an antidote to a spatialised and 
quantitatively bland world where lived experience is valued less and less. We are 
enduring a qualitative recession masked by a quantitative boom. Qualitative easing 
allows people to encounter strangeness on the streets for no cost and little reason. 
It increases our ability to encounter the world rather than merely recognise it. 
Meaning is as deep or as shallow as you wish and all that is wished for is the 
generation of stories, and an appreciation of the moment you find yourself in. 
 
The photographic documentation can be found at some future time in IPCRES file #0996, should we or 
the conference organisers desire to make public at a future date. This proclamation contains a call for 
delegates/volunteers to assemble at a given time in a given place. Individual instances of documentation 
are authorised. All enquiries to the IPCRES office or IPCRES @smu.ac.uk 
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IPCRES 
MIS  ION  BRIEFING 
       S 
 
 
 
# 0986. The IPCRES Reading Ensemble. 
 
Book Live! International Symposium. London South Bank Univ, 8.6.12. 
I will not make poems with reference to parts/ But I will make poems 
with reference to ensemble - Walt Whitman. 
 
The IPCRES Reading Ensemble is a performative encounter with the 
book and the act of reading, in order to create ‘new universes of 
reference’ (Guattari 1989) – an affective poem with reference to 
ensemble. 
 
A participatory ‘reading/walking’ event exploring the inter-connectedness 
of body and mind. The perception of moving through multiple universes at 
the same time, one a shared physical space, others more temporal and 
virtual perhaps, and accessed via an experience of parallel durations, 
reverie and affect. An evocation of the spirit of the flaneur, 
psychogeography and the situationist derive; the experience of reading 
conjures up worlds within worlds, it is amplified here through mobility and 
the shared experience. At a certain point some participants will be turned 
around converting the experiment into a ‘Large Hadron Collider’. Particles 
fired around both ways in order to promote collisions, each collision a 
quantum metaphor for a new universe. Senior IPCRES operatives will 
’record’ the ‘collisions’ via a photographic process. 
 
The experiment requires that operatives set off walking and reading 
at the same time, an interesting experience in its own right, thereby 
exploring the inter-connectedness of body and mind. The book and 
the experience of reading: walking and reading at the same time 
forms a complex threshold between worlds, making manifest the 
intrinsic links between body and soul, the thin membrane between 
universes. 
 
 
As Antonio Damasio remarks, the mind is embodied... not just embrained. 
 
As Walt Whitman promised his readers, Your very flesh shall be a great poem. 
 366 
 
IPCRES READING ENSEMBLE: THE BOOK IS ALIVE! (PUBLISHED 2013)  
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Conclusion: 
Can Photography Describe Its Own Event? 
 
 
       Figure 9: Bruno Jakob, 2003,   
        ‘Invisible Painting (Horse)’  
    
 
Perhaps the immobility of the things that surround 
us is forced upon them by our conviction that they 
are themselves and not anything else, by the 
immobility of our conception of them.  
(Proust 1996: 4) 
 
 
…without some common ground in the professional-
level literature, the conversation has to take place in 
a third discipline, which I would argue is always, in 
the end, philosophy. 
(Elkins 2008: 228) [emphasis in original] 
 
 
The result of a productive assemblage is a new 
means of expression, a new territorial/spatial 
organisation, a new institution, a new behaviour, or a 
new realisation. The assemblage is destined to 
produce a new reality, by making numerous, often 
unexpected connections.  
(Livesey in Parr 2010a: 19) 
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We end the thesis as we began, still pondering our enigmatic question, the 
crypt/code that has been the insistent force behind our investigations; can 
photography describe its own event? (CPDIOE?). We shall conclude in the 
manner that we embarked upon our quest, in the spirit of the Bergsonian problem 
(in which the resolution is inherent in its stating); explained initially as the method 
by which we would achieve some forms of resolution, not necessarily through 
logic or deduction, but through creation and invention. “Indeed, the aim of writing 
should not be representation but invention.” (Colebrook 2002: 4). It would be 
antithetical to our work to expect the customary answer at this point, one that 
merely maintains the classical binary polarity of question/answer. “Certainty and 
presence are displaced, and they are found in another context.” (Elkins 2008: 85). 
For that reason this conclusion shall be brief and instead we shall make some 
observations; both regarding the thesis and potential directions post-doctoral 
research might take, whilst making some connections to my continuing interest in 
the concept of zero and my ongoing practical experiments. These experiments 
although related to the conceptual work of the thesis are not an area of primary 
concern here, but are included to show possible manifestations of the ideas and 
future directions for photographies yet to come. Indeed, the works offer another 
way to perform my thoughts other than writing.  
 
To address the first quotation at the head of this Conclusion, Proust here 
delineates one of our central ideas, particularly attended to in Section I: 
Photo[graphy]. That is, that photography in the classical perspective was invented 
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for and adopts a position towards a world of facts and objects, ideally suited to a 
practice of representation, where the force of immobility is applied to the forces of 
the world. As O’Sullivan simply states, photography is “…the representational 
medium.” (O’Sullivan 2012: 3) [emphasis in original]. This articulation by Proust 
of his own conception of the ‘angel of certainty’ (Proust 1996a: 7-8) is suggestive 
of O’Sullivan’s remark in that it might be photography that largely forms this 
conviction in its imposition of stasis – ‘that they are themselves and not anything 
else’. A crucial point to make here is that Proust’s quotation suggests that this 
immobility, supported by the invention of photography, is essentially the 
immobility of our own thought. In terms of the thesis, this can be mediated by 
recognising the potential coexistence of representation alongside a system of 
difference and the dynamism that this brings to our sensibilities. Elkins in the 
following quotation illuminates a recurrent aspect of the thesis; that of the ‘third’. 
Our third Section provides the ground for a coexistence of the first two, that is, 
representation and difference in tandem produce what we refer to here as 
zero[graphy]. This is further illustrated by Barthes’ conception of the Third or 
obtuse meaning, which follows both the informational level of meaning, and the 
symbolic level of meaning. As Elkins argues, our own conversation often takes 
place in a ‘third discipline’, that of philosophy, even if only used as a poetic 
construct. The conversation then, takes place on foreign ground, sometimes that 
of critical literary theory, and of necessity draws in the concept of translation that 
I have highlighted wherever possible. Livesey in the third quotation highlights 
another method of the thesis, one that we can say is akin to the theory of Ars 
Combinatoria1 of G.W. Leibniz, that of making productive connections. This ‘art 
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of combinations’ re-termed assemblage by Deleuze and Guattari (the English 
translation of agencement – arrangement), concerns the linkage together of 
disparate elements in interesting ways to produce new ideas. Assemblages are 
“…complex constellations of objects, bodies, expressions, qualities, and 
territories that come together for varying periods of time to ideally create new 
ways of functioning.” (Livesey in Parr 2010a: 18). In the thesis we have drawn 
together perhaps eccentric ideas that pertain to the question CPDIOE?, in order to 
produce resonances and vibrations between concepts that constitute new lines of 
flight and innovative constellations of thought. New conditions, for concepts and 
practices of photographies yet to come. This speaks of what is succinctly summed 
up by O’Sullivan in Art Encounters Deleuze and Guattari: Thought Beyond 
Representation (2006): 
 
 
It is the power art has to break habit, and produce 
new and more spontaneous ways of being in the 
world that seems of particular importance. Here, 
creativity and recombination (difference and 
repetition) replace critique as art’s modus operandi. 
This might involve only a small deviation from the 
typical, but this clinamen can operate as the germ of 
something new. 
(O’Sullivan 2006: 154) [emphasis in 
original] 
 
 
-o- 
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It may be pertinent here to review both our hypothesis and some claims to 
originality that the thesis offers. Our intention from the outset was directly 
acknowledged in the (sub) title of the thesis – the dissolving of the classical 
perspective in the concept of photography. Dissolving in this context is a reference 
to Henri Bergson’s illustration of the concept of difference whereby he ‘dissolved’ 
a lump of sugar in a glass of warm water, proving difference through duration in 
that the constituent parts remained the same, but have differed in themselves in 
synthesising with the water (something akin to the process of osmosis). The 
hypothesis was that photography in its classical perspective could undergo similar 
differences in its constituent form through a synthesis with the philosophical 
paradigm of difference. This expansion in the conception of photography allows a 
shift from the spatial to the temporal, from picture to event and ushers in perhaps 
unlimited new creative potential. Finally our hypothesis in seeking a synthesis of 
representation and difference as an expanded form of photographic 
communication, also exposes a further theoretical paradigm that I have named 
zerography. It is this zerography, a zero degree of photographic expression that 
defines the likely outcome of the synthesis referred to above, forming evocative 
new expressions of meaning that define the potential inexpressibility of 
contemporary expositions of what constitutes an event in the world. The logical 
conclusion of such a hypothesis will produce the conditions for an immanent 
practice of photography; it is this theoretical research that is proffered in the thesis. 
 
As for the original contributions of the thesis, I can claim to have imagined a 
scenario for photography by which two major antagonistic paradigms of thought 
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(representation and difference) can be potentially reconciled together in the 
theoretical orbit of photography. A major motivation addressed in the earlier 
stages of the thesis was to consider  “[h]ow in fact to think beyond 
representation?” (O’Sullivan 2006: 29) as well as to address Batchen’s imperative 
of inventing new modes of critical practice, which as he states “…remains the 
most pressing task to face the present generation of photography’s interlocutors” 
(Batchen 2009: 21). I can realistically claim at this stage to have made a serious 
attempt at both. Furthermore, in the process I have participated in the play on 
invention and creation of concepts, not least in inventing an enigmatic question 
(CPDIOE?) that within six words encapsulates the intellectual trajectory of the 
thesis and in doing so, produces a paradoxical multiplicity that I have rendered 
productive. As a consequence of the above, I have also imagined a new 
hermeneutics that emerges from the swirling sea of antinomies produced by a co-
existence in the concept of representation and difference. The tensions generated 
promote a sense of the illogical, the paradoxical and the indeterminate that I have 
named zerography. These contributions are directed toward a new generation of 
researchers for whom interdisciplinarity and the synthesis of practice and theory 
form a contemporary syntax, also those scholars in the world of photography for 
whom Deleuze presents a vital opportunity. 
 
Some further thoughts regarding the photographic works that precede this 
Conclusion and are carried out under the auspices of IPCRES (International 
Project Centre for Research into Events and Situations). Works that are made 
manifest under a serialised form based on Deleuze’s theory of difference and 
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repetition and carried out at a zero degree of photography, devoid of metaphor and 
any pictorialised subject/object polarity. “There is almost nothing left to look at in 
these pictures. The object has departed: it has gone far away, beyond 
representation, leaving only its hollow and inadequate traces.” (Elkins 2008: 231). 
It must be recognised here that the works employ the seriality of a xerox machine 
by which a zerography, a phonetic play on xerography, produces serial copies 
fracturing in Benjamin’s terms, the aura of any supposed original2. In fact, in the 
case of the works it is quite evident that there is no original. This seriality of form 
fractures the essence of any supposed content too as it also motivates and 
mobilizes that essence, as Deleuze asserts in Proust and Signs ([1964] 2008): 
 
 
This is because essence is in itself difference. But it 
does not have the power to diversify, and to 
diversify itself, without also having the power to 
repeat itself, identical to itself. What can one do with 
essence, which is ultimate difference, except to 
repeat it, because it is irreplaceable and because 
nothing can be substituted for it?  
(Deleuze [1964] 2008: 32)  
 
 
It is the contention of the thesis that this can also be said of photography and our 
experiments in repeating photography, ‘identical to itself’ – can photography 
describe its own event?. All photographs within the serial for each work are taken 
from within a constructed event, therefore disrupting the central binary tenet of 
vision in representation (see Sartre and Lacan in Section III) by being immanent to 
the event and looking both through (evoking Nishitani) and out of the event as 
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part of the remainder of the field of vision. As in most cases, there appears to be 
no isolated and bounded object to the practice of zerography, the visual concept 
encompasses the uncertainty of Heisenburg and the indeterminacy of Mallarmé as 
well as the neutrality of Barthes’ zero degree.  
 
 
That zero degree, says Blanchot, is not just the 
neutral, fearless style that Barthes finds exemplified 
in Camus. It is a more dangerous, more destructible, 
more lethal neutrality. In that neutrality everything, 
including literature itself disappears…  
(Miller 2003: 80) 
 
 
Following literary critic Joseph Hillis Miller’s (b. 1928) linguistic observation that 
“…words must be differentiated from other words to make meaning.” (Miller 
2003: 52), the serialised photographs from my experiments with IPCRES fracture 
the notion of subject through repetition and are undifferentiated in relation to the 
event. Miller goes on, “[z]ero is undifferentiated, incapable of being 
differentiated, just one long undifferentiated tone […] ‘Zero’ is an assemblage of 
phonemes…” (Miller 2003: 52). Here we are reminded of Yves Klein’s 1949 
Monotone Symphony that comprised a twenty-minute single sustained chord, 
followed by a period of silence lasting a further twenty minutes. In a recent 
publication (October 22nd 2015 in hardback), Mehgan Vicks in Narratives of 
Nothing in Twentieth Century Literature (2015) explores how that in literature the 
concept of nothing is inextricably linked to the creation of meaning; she writes of 
Maurice Blanchot (1907 – 2003) and the ‘zero point’:  
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…he argues that the liberated, true writer will devote 
himself to the ‘zero point’–the point of literature 
where even writing is done away with, thus 
destroying the temple of writing that has made 
sacred and necessary this very action, writerly 
conventions, and the written word. That is, writing is 
literature’s final convention, which the writer must 
break free of if he is to truly write. The true writer, 
therefore, will ultimately turn to silence.  
(Vicks 2015: 17) [emphasis in original] 
 
 
As we did in Section III regarding a quotation by Nishitani, if we map across and 
substitute the words ‘photography’ for ‘writing’ whilst also translating the context 
of the quotation relevant to our own concerns, then it can reveal a central concern 
of the thesis with regards to the concept and practice of zero[graphy].  
 
 
…he argues that the liberated, true photographer will 
devote himself to the ‘zero point’–the point of 
photography where even photography is done away 
with, thus destroying the temple of photography that 
has made sacred and necessary this very action, 
photographic conventions, and the photographic 
image. That is, photography is representation’s final 
convention, which the photographer must break free 
of if he is to truly decipher the world. The true 
photographer, therefore, will ultimately turn to 
silence.  
 
 
It is interesting to point out here that Blanchot was an avid reader of Mallarmé and 
took many of his ideas from the experimental work of the poet. Returning to my 
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own practical experiments, it is worthy of note that just as in performed 
photography, the photographs relation to the event is one of immanence. An event 
is designed and the photography emerges from within the event and therefore does 
not take up the transcendent position of mainstream practice. Perhaps the most 
significant distinction between the two practices of performed photography and 
my zero[graphy] is that performed photography is attempting to bridge the 
dispassionate estrangement in representational photography by purposefully 
imbuing the situation with emotional intent. After all, this practice emerged from 
the performative paradigms of experimental theatre and live art. My experiments 
although sharing many aspects with performed photography, most notably as an 
event based practice, have evolved from it in that any subject matter has almost 
disappeared and there is an emphasis on a zero degree neutrality of expression. 
My work in relation to the IPCRES performative events highlights the process-led 
seriality of event theory. Each non-decisional photograph is an intensive stage of 
the larger event and when viewed in its seriality can be seen via the intensive 
relation to an extensive whole to be premised on a productive difference. A 
complex repetition that produces pure difference, hence a process. IPCRES events 
are intentionally designed around the notion of a progressive rhythm and my 
photographic experiments are attempts to coincide an internal record of the event 
with the natural rhythms of the event. Another important aspect that differentiates 
my experiments with IPCRES from performed photography is that each serial 
photograph is fundamentally non-decisional, as well as non-pictorial and un-
composed. In fact, there is a machinic non-human dimension to the images that 
removes them as far as possible from human agency and returns them to a purely 
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photographic ontology that François Laruelle (b. 1937) identifies as a ‘non-
photography’. 
 
 
There is no photographic decision; on the other hand 
there is a (non-)photographic vision that is, so to 
speak, parallel to the World; a photographic process 
which has the same contents of representation as 
those that are in the World, but which enjoys an 
absolutely different transcendental status since it is 
by definition immanent to vision-force.  
(Laruelle 2011: 19) 
 
 
The concept of non-philosophy (non-photography) as espoused by Laruelle is 
only of interest to the thesis insofar as it offers direction for post-doctoral work. In 
the present context, Laruelle’s radical immanence is too eccentric to be much use 
to our argument, although it is worthy of a small detour at this point. As Deleuze 
and Guattari remark in What is Philosophy? ([1991] 1994), “François Laruelle is 
engaged in one of the most interesting undertakings of contemporary philosophy.” 
(Deleuze and Guattari [1991] 1994: 220 n.5). John Mullarkey and Anthony Paul 
Smith in Laruelle and Non-Philosophy (2012) assert that Laruelle’s concept 
engages in “…the rigor of invention and not convention…” (Mullarkey and Smith 
(eds.) 2012: 160) and he extols us to invent philosophy, invent photography. 
Laruelle’s system is anti-representational where there are no representations of 
reality that are not a material part of the ‘Real’. Representation is immanent to and 
part of the Real, rather than any transcendental notion that can ‘capture’ the Real. 
Therefore it makes no sense for a part to be able to represent the whole (Real), as 
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the whole is indifferent to its parts. Transferred to photography, this means that 
the concept, being immanent to the Real, cannot represent it as such but must 
know itself as an inherent element of the Real. Hence, photography like thought 
must see “…itself as a performative thought and not a representational one […] as 
non-philosophy [photography] is an action, a doing and a showing, rather than a 
saying or a representing.” (Mullarkey and Smith (eds.) 2012: 9) [my brackets]. In 
Laruelle’s own words concerning photography, “[n]on-photography is thus 
neither an extension of photography with some variation, difference or decision; 
nor its negation. It is a use of photography…” (Laruelle [2011] 2012: 4-5). 
Laruelle regards photography as a theoretical practice that is no more or less 
relevant than any other knowledge production system such as science, 
mathematics and art. All knowledges are equal in his conception and have the 
condition of ‘flat’ thought. It is interesting in the context of the thesis that Laruelle 
describes photography as a mode of thinking, photography itself thinks. “But for 
non-photography the photo is no longer of an object, it is its own Reality, it 
photographs, or puts ‘in-photo’, the Real.” (Mullarkey and Smith (eds.) 2012: 
151) [emphasis in original]. Thought as photography is not about the world, but is 
coexistent with (alongside) a Real in which both are inherent. For the thesis then, 
if photography is an inherent part of the Real that it photographs, or renders ‘in-
photo’ for Laruelle, then every photograph of necessity partakes in performing a 
description of its own event. One might say it literally thinks its own event.  
 
 
…a good description of photography necessitates 
that one treat it as an essence unto itself; […] that 
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one recognise the existence, not just of a 
photographic art, but of an authentic photographic 
thought; the existence, beyond the components of 
technology and image-production, of a certain 
specific relation to the real, one which knows itself 
as such. 
(Laruelle [2011] 2012: 6) 
  
 
-o- 
  
 
As there are very few instances where the thesis concentrates on actual works of 
art, perhaps I should qualify here some of the reasons. The pivotal question of 
zero seems to be stimulating an increasingly popular area of study across a 
number of disciplines. At this stage, I would like to acknowledge some 
preliminary research material that, being more broadly historical, assisted in my 
initial formulating of ideas concerning zero and cryptography but did not feature 
in the arguments themselves. These were Robert Kaplan’s The Nothing That Is: A 
Natural History of Zero (1999), Charles Seife and Zero: The Biography of a 
Dangerous Idea (2000), Murphy and Piper’s Cryptography: A Very Short 
Introduction (2002) and Mario Perniola’s Enigmas: The Egyptian Moment in 
Society and Art ([1990] 1995). Although more general in purpose, these works 
have been informative, however my particular intention has been to test how the 
coincidence of photography and zero can instigate new modalities of thought in 
both areas of study. As the thesis has revealed, much of the work on zero has been 
carried out within critical literary discourse. Whilst many of these scholars have 
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addressed artworks pertinent to this shared concern, they often identify certain 
conventions within art that produce an effluence between zero and nothing. 
 
In an informal conversation with novelist Tom McCarthy in 2012 I offered the 
title of the thesis; can photography describe its own event? (CPDIOE?) and my 
term ‘zero[graphy]’, with a reference to the anti-representational, and so followed 
a speculation on the subject matter. His conjecture was Kazimir Malevich (1878 – 
1935), the Russian Suprematist painter renowned for his Black Square (1915) 
paintings, perhaps the apotheosis of non-representational art. We should refer here 
to one of Malevich’s famous quotations that corroborates this presumption; “[i]t is 
from zero, in zero, that the true movement of being begins.” (Drutt 2003: inside 
cover). From the research I have carried out, this reference is one that continually 
surfaces, along with Ad Reinhardt’s (1913 – 1967) monochrome paintings of the 
1950’s, followed by his all-black paintings of the 1960’s. In addition, the 
relationship between silence, nothing and zero converge in John Cage’s 4’33” 
(1952) which additionally seems a consistent point of reference for writers 
approaching this area of study. Austin Clarkson clarifies this connection in his 
essay ‘The Intent of the Musical Moment: Cage and the Transpersonal’ (2001): 
 
 
…when one adds up 4 minutes and 33 seconds, the 
sum is 273 seconds. Translated into negative degrees 
of temperature, this happens to be absolute zero on 
the Kelvin scale (actually -273.2ºC). As substances 
approach that temperature, molecular motion ceases 
and they begin to exhibit peculiar properties. 
Although Cage heard sounds in an anechoic 
chamber and concluded that silence does not exist, 
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his silent prayer of 273 seconds is a metaphor for a 
physical state in which matter is maximally ordered, 
vibratory activity is stilled, and silence is, in 
principle, absolute.  
(Clarkson 2001: 72) 
 
 
Malevich first exhibited his Black Square painting at the 0.10 exhibition in 
Petrograd in 1915. The enigmatic title of the exhibition referring to the figure of 
zero which denoted the possibility of beginning again, and ten signaling the 
number of artists taking part in the exhibition (eventually there were fourteen in 
total). 
 
To move on to a very contemporary exhibition I recently viewed at the 
Guggenheim, New York, a show titled, Zero: Countdown to Tomorrow: 1950s-
60s (October 2014 – January 2015). This was a historical survey dedicated to the 
German artists’ group, the Zero group (1957 – 66) founded by Heinz Mack (b. 
1931) and Otto Piene (1928 – 2014). They were joined by Günther Uecker (b. 
1930) and the artists collective ZERO in 1961, an international network of 
experimental artists from Europe, Japan and North and South America. Piene 
explained in 1964 that the name was to suggest “…a zone of silence and of pure 
possibilities for a new beginning as at the countdown when rockets take off” (in 
Hillings 2015: u.p.). The show contained work by such radical artists as Yves 
Klein and Jean Tinguely (1925 – 1991). Interestingly, the panel discussion on the 
subject of the exhibition was entitled ‘ZEROgraphy: Mapping the ZERO network 
1957-67’ in which Guggenheim describe the phrase ‘ZEROgraphy’ as a mapping 
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geography of the ZERO movement, which consisted of over forty artists across a 
number of countries. 
 
I mention these instances of zero in the arts to show that the term has a certain 
currency within the art establishment and that my researches have encompassed 
them. To conclude the thesis I make these closing remarks. In terms of the 
structure, the journey from Photo[graphy] to Zero[graphy] via Crypto[graphy] 
seems a long and arduous one. And it is easy to forget that the thesis speaks 
primarily about the coexistence of all of these concepts within possible 
photographies of the future. Practices that in Deleuze’s terms deal with matter and 
imagination in the same instance, that can describe a world in constant variation 
without resorting to rational notions of an ideal, fixed and static state. Perhaps we 
must emphasise here that the mainstream practice of photography is not to be 
eradicated by any possible paradigm shift, but merely enriched by other 
perspectives. “Then it would begin to seem unintelligible, as the thoughts of a 
previous existence must be after reincarnation;” (Proust 1996a: 1). A word of 
explanation regarding the two images included on tracing paper that act as porous 
membranes between Sections. The first is a photograph that Barthes identifies in 
the French Edition of Camera Lucida as ‘Polaroid, 1979’ by Daniel Boudinet 
from a series called ‘Fragments of a Labyrinth’. This relatively little discussed 
image remains somewhat of an enigma in relation to the book and for our 
purposes, the chink of light if offers us through the closed curtains shields the 
entrance to the crypt of Section II. We leave it to W.J.T. Mitchell to illuminate 
any perceived meaning: 
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The Boudinet polaroid stands independent of 
Barthes’s text: the best ‘reading’ we can give it is 
perhaps simply as an emblem of the unreadability of 
photography, its occupation of a site forever prior to 
and outside Barthes’s text. The photo presents an 
image of a veiled, intimate boudoir, simultaneously 
erotic and funereal, its tantalizingly partial revelation 
of light gleaming through the cleavage in the 
curtains like the secret at the center [sic] of a 
labyrinth.  
(Mitchell 1995: 302) [emphasis in original] 
 
 
The only colour image in Barthes’ book Camera Lucida (French edition only), 
Diana Knight makes the connection that as the dawn light gives the curtains a 
blue-green luminosity this is the same blue-green that Barthes’ in his book 
attributes to his mothers’ eyes. (Knight 1997: 138). In the thesis, it is enough to 
reproduce it in monochrome. The other image between Section II and III is a 
section from J.M.W. Turner’s ‘Snow Storm: Steam Boat off a Harbour’s Mouth’ 
(1842) and simply introduces the theme of undecidability which runs through the 
ensuing Section. On top of this, it goes some way to evoking Mallarmé’s poem 
Un Coup de Dés (1897) as well as encapsulating the concept of zero-zero, a 
weather term denoting zero visibility in both vertical and horizontal directions. It 
has also been reproduced here in monochrome.  
 
The thesis takes us from the light of photography through the depths of 
cryptography and onto the flat plane of an immanent zero[graphy]. The desire to 
move away from the metaphor-laden photographies of the past can be summed up 
best by referring to Maurice Blanchot. “Zero […] is not a unique generative 
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source within each author. It is an impersonal zero point on the horizon or in the 
depths, or somewhere out of this world, toward which the literary effort is 
oriented and which it attempts to reach…” (Miller 2003: 73). And so we leave the 
final word to the poetic vision of Blanchot via Joseph Hillis Miller: 
 
 
With zero we come to the end of the alphabetical 
line. We reach rock bottom. Or rather we plunge into 
the bottomless pit, or perhaps into an unfathomable 
ocean, such as that place, ‘l’espace littéraire’, the 
place where everything turns into image. Maurice 
Blanchot says the Song of the Sirens leads us to that 
place, a zero point where all song vanishes:  
(Miller 2003: 39) 
 
 
What was that place? It was a place where the only 
thing left was to disappear, because in this region of 
source and origin, music itself has disappeared more 
completely that in any other place in the world; it 
was like a sea into which the living would sink with 
their ears closed and where the Sirens, too, even 
they, as proof of their good will, would one day have 
to disappear.  
(Blanchot 1981: 105)  
 
 
 
-o- 
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Endnotes to Conclusion 
 
 
1 For an explanation of this concept see Antognazza Leibniz: An Intellectual 
Biography (2009), page 63. 
 
2 See Benjamin [1936] 2008a – The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical 
Reproduction for a general discussion on the concept of aura in an original Work 
of Art.  
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